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National  parliaments  have  always  been  involved  in  the  affairs  of  the  European  Union. 
They  have  debated  and  voted  on  joining  the  Community  and  have  ratified  the 
European  treaties  negotiated  by  their  governments.  On  a  more  regular  basis,  national 
parliaments  have  also,  to  varying  degrees,  scrutinised  European  legislation  and  the 
European-level  activities  of  their  executives.  Increasingly,  it  has  been  recognised  that 
national  parliaments  underpin  decisions  taken  at  the  European  level  by  legitimising 
the  actions  of  their  executives. 
As  Europeanisation  has  progressed  and  the  impact  of  European  legislation  has  become 
more  widely  felt  at  the  domestic  level,  national  parliaments  have  found  that  their  space 
to  manoeuvre  has  shrunk.  National  parliaments  have  become  part  of  a  multi-level 
system  of  governance  and  can  no  longer,  singularly,  determine  the  parameters  within 
which  they  operate. 
The  traditional  model  of  undertaking  scrutiny,  with  specialised  European  committees 
operating  in  isolation  from  the  rest  of  parliament,  is  therefore  no  longer  tenable.  EU 
specialists  are  unable  to  provide  the  expertise  on  all  areas  covered  by  European 
integration  and  increasingly  require  the  expertise  found  in  other  committees  within 
national  parliaments  to  perform  their  scrutiny  adequately.  Inter-parliamentary  contacts 
have  contributed  to  a  better  understanding  of  common  parliamentary  problems. 
Parliamentarians  have  become  more  aware  of  the  challenges  of  Europeanisation  and 
globalisation,  but  have  also  discovered  ways  to,  collectively  and  individually,  face 
these  challenges. 
National  parliaments  are  likely  to  remain  firmly  anchored  in  the  domestic  level, 
maintaining  their  roles  as  legitimisers  of  national  executives  as  well  as  expressions  of 
national  sovereignty.  They  can  therefore  also  be  expected  to  remain  independent  and 
autonomous  institutions,  determining  their  own  activities  and  procedures.  As  a 
consequence,  the  impetus  behind  any  move  by  national  parliaments  to  further  develop 
their  influence  over  European  (or  global)  decision-making  and  activities  must  come 
from  within  national  parliaments  themselves. 
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7 Chapter  1:  Introduction 
National  parliamentsl  have  always  been  involved  in  the  affairs  of  the  European  Union 
(EU).  z  They  have  debated  and  voted  on  whether  their  member  states  should  join  what 
is  now  the  EU  and  have  ratified  the  European  treaties  negotiated  by  their  governments. 
On  a  more  regular  basis,  national  parliaments  have  also,  albeit  to  varying  degrees, 
scrutinised  European  legislation  and  the  European-level  activities  of  their  executives. 
While  the  EU's  own  institutions-the  European  Commission,  Council  of  Ministers,  and 
European  Parliament  (EP)-are  the  EU's  primary  decision-takers,  it  has  become 
increasingly  recognised  that  national  parliaments  underpin  decisions  taken  at  the 
European  level  by  legitimising  the  actions  of  their  executives. 
The  central  hypothesis  of  this  thesis  is  that  the  role  of  national  parliaments  in  EU 
policy-making  has  changed  and  expanded,  but  only  to  a  limited  extent  and  as  part  of  a 
more  general  process  of  Europeanisation  (a  process  related  to  but  distinct  from 
European  integration),  in  which  other  national  institutions  (especially  administrations) 
have  become  considerably  more  intimately  involved  with  European  issues  compared 
to  national  parliaments.  The  research  has  attempted  to  identify  these  changes  and 
(some  of)  their  causes.  A  related  hypothesis  is  that  national  parliaments  have  expanded 
(or  have  the  potential  to  expand)  their  role  in  the  EU  legislative  process.  Such 
expansion  is  achieved  by  scrutinising  European  legislation  and  holding  national 
representatives  in  the  Council  accountable  to  the  national  electorates.  In  a  process  that 
has  been  initiated,  as  well  as  furthered,  by  Europeanisation  national  parliaments  thus, 
theoretically  at  least,  contribute  to  the  legitimisation  of  the  EU,  although  there  remain 
unfulfilled  demands-as  reflected  by  the  ungratified  Constitutional  Treaty-for  further 
legitimisation  by  national  parliaments. 
There  is,  however,  little  agreement  on  how  national  parliaments  ought  to  engage  in 
scrutiny  activities  or  with  the  European  level.  An  important  finding  of  this  thesis  is  that 
national  parliaments  have  struggled  to  adapt  to  their  new  roles.  While  Europeanisation 
has  contributed  to  changes  in  procedures,  it  has  also  emphasised  the  contradiction 
inherent  in  national  parliaments  engaging  with  activities  at  the  European  level. 
Differences  in  legislative  procedures  as  well  as  timetables  have  meant  that,  although 
national  parliamentarians  have  discussed  the  importance  of  developing  scrutiny 
'  Neil  MacCormick  has  proposed  that  parliaments  representing  an  entire  EU  member  state  be  called  a 
member  state  parliament,  while  the  term  'state  parliament'  has  also  been  suggested.  Although  these 
descriptions  may  be  more  accurate  than  the  term  'national  parliament',  they  have  not  (yet?  )  caught  on  in 
literature  on  the  subject,  and  the  term  'national  parliament'  will  therefore  be  adopted  here. 
2  Throughout  the  text  'EU'  will  be  used  to  describe  the  current  Union  as  well  as  its  historic  predecessors. 
8 procedures  at  the  national  level  extensively,  practical  moves  in  that  direction  have  been 
slow  and  (usually)  limited. 
All  EU  Member  State  parliaments  now  have  a  committee  dedicated  to  EU  affairs.  Yet 
this  may,  ironically,  limit  incentives  for  parliamentarians  not  involved  with  these 
committees  to  engage  with  EU  affairs.  Rather  than  undertaking  the  extra  work 
required  to  scrutinise  EU  legislation,  there  is  a  strong  temptation  to  refer  European 
matters  to  the  EU  committee  for  consideration.  National  parliaments  have  therefore 
had  to  decide  whether  EU  affairs  must  be  dealt  with  by  the  entire  parliament  or  a 
parliamentary  'sub-section'.  A  second  finding  of  this  thesis  is  thus  that  existing 
parliamentary  rules  for  the  treatment  of  domestic  legislation  have,  to  a  considerable 
degree,  determined  how  European  legislation  has  been  handled.  With  the  partial 
exception  of  the  UK,  changes  in  parliamentary  activities  and  procedures  have 
conformed  to  existing  rules  at  the  national  level.  Differences  between  national 
parliaments,  historic  as  well  as  procedural,  therefore  help  explain  how  and  why  EU 
affairs  are  handled  differently  by  individual  parliaments.  As  will  become  evident  in 
later  chapters,  certain  common  themes  and  challenges  have  emerged  in  national-level 
scrutiny  of  European  legislation  as  all  member  states  are  subject  to  the  effects  of 
Europeanisation. 
In  some  ways,  national  parliaments  have  been  somewhat  shielded  from  the  effects  of 
Europeanisation.  European  affairs  have  traditionally  been  defined  as  foreign 
policy-and  therefore  a  matter  for  the  national  executives  rather  than  parliaments.  The 
recent  crisis  over  the  EU's  failure  to  ratify  its  Constitutional  Treaty  was  a  consequence 
of  'no'  votes  in  the  2005  French  and  Dutch  referendums,  even  as  national  parliaments 
in  a  majority  of  EU  member  states  quietly  (usually)  voted  to  ratify  the  new  Treaty.  Still, 
as  European  integration  has  developed,  national  parliaments  have  found  it 
increasingly  difficult  to  maintain  a  distance  from  European  affairs  given  the  increasing 
impact  European  legislation  has  in  most  policy-areas  at  the  domestic  level.  In  turn,  this 
intertwining  of  the  domestic  and  the  EU  has  increased  the  need  for  parliaments  to 
scrutinise  the  activities  of  national  executives  at  the  European  level.  Indeed,  national 
parliaments  have  gradually  realised  that  they  must  alter  their  procedures  and  activities 
relating  to  European  legislation. 
The  fact  that  national  parliaments  focus  on  national-level  legislation,  together  with  the 
differences  between  national  parliaments,  means  that  inter-parliamentary  cooperation 
on  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  is  often  seen  to  be  neither  desirable  nor  particularly 
effective.  A  third  major  finding  of  this  thesis  is  thus  that  inter-parliamentary 
cooperation  has  been  useful  mainly  for  the  purposes  of  exchanging  information  and 
experiences.  Although  it  has  been  recognised  that  changes  affect  all  the  national 
9 parliaments  of  the  EU,  with  fora  for  the  exchange  of  information  and  common 
experiences  being  developed,  it  appears  that  these  meetings  have  had  little  direct  or 
traceable  effect  at  the  national  level.  However,  it  has  also  become  clear  that  the  drive 
for  improved  scrutiny-and  for  acceptable  changes  to  national-level  scrutiny 
procedures-must  originate  at  the  national  level. 
Despite  wide-spread  agreement  amongst  national  parliamentarians  that  their  focus 
should  remain  at  the  national  level,  the  introduction  of  appropriate  methods  for 
scrutiny  of  European  legislation  at  the  national  level  has  also  been  difficult.  Scrutiny  of 
European  affairs  has  thus  come  to  present  a  significant  challenge  for  national 
parliaments  in  two  important  ways.  The  first  challenge  is  the  increased  number  of 
decisions  taken  at  the  European  level.  Moving  decision-making  powers  to  the 
European  level-in  a  framework  that  binds  member  states  to  uphold  such 
decisions-limits  the  ability  of  parliaments  to  act  autonomously  within  their  own 
state.  '  Vertical  dispersion  of  decision-making  (both  upwards  to  the  European  level  and 
downwards  to  regions)  does  not  make  national  parliaments  redundant,  but  reduces  the 
areas  over  which  they  have  full  and  exclusive  influence,  thereby  limiting  their  ability  to 
act  independently  as  purveyors  and  guardians  of  national  sovereignty. 
A  second  challenge  has  been  responding  to  demands  that  national  parliaments  become 
more  involved  in  Community  affairs  at  both  the  national  and  European  levels.  Any 
such  involvement  poses  a  challenge  to  traditional  patterns  of  activity  as  well  as  notions 
of  what  a  parliament  is  and  does.  The  consequences  of  European  integration  thus  go 
beyond  mere  policy-impact  and  have  prompted  national  parliaments  to  introduce  new 
scrutiny  procedures  and  activities.  As  part  of  this  process,  national  parliamentarians 
have  had  to  consider  what  level  of  involvement  is  appropriate-as  well  as  possible-at 
both  the  national  and  European  levels.  Not  only  have  national  parliaments  responded 
differently  to  the  challenges  of  EU  membership,  they  have  done  so  at  different  times 
and  stages  of  their  state's  membership.  Individual  solutions  to  the  problem  of  Europe's 
`encroachment'  on  national  affairs  have  been  shaped  by  a  wide  variety  of  existing 
attitudes,  procedures  and  political  cultures,  thereby  creating  a  wide  range  of 
institutional  models  for  parliamentary  involvement.  However,  merely  considering  the 
formal  rules  and  procedures  that  govern  this  involvement  does  not  provide  the  entire 
picture.  Informal  arrangements  and  relations  between  parliaments  and  their  respective 
governments  and  administrations  must  also  be  examined. 
3  William  Wallace  (1986,  p.  367)  defines  national  sovereignty  as  'the  formal  ability  of  a  nation  to  act  on  its 
own  rather  than  under  the  instruction  of  another  nation',  whereas  national  autonomy  is  'the  ability  of  a 
nation  to  attain  its  objectives  through  unilateral  action'.  He  argues  that  the  former  is  undiminished  while 
the  latter  has  become  highly  constrained.  In  this  text  the  term  'national  sovereignty'  will  be  used  in  a 
manner  equating  to  Wallace's  concept  of  national  autonomy. 
10 Despite  the  increased  importance  placed  upon  national  parliaments  and  their 
contributions  to  the  European  integration  process,  their  scrutiny  activities  have 
attracted  relatively  little  scholarly  attention.  Moreover,  research  rarely  moves  beyond 
an  acknowledgement  of  the  formal  rules  and  procedures  in  place  for  parliamentary 
scrutiny.  '  Few  book-length  studies  focusing  solely  on  the  role  of  national  parliaments 
have  been  published  (important  contributions  have  been  Katz  and  Wessels,  1999; 
Maurer  and  Wessels,  2001b;  Norton,  1996c),  with  significant  amounts  of  material 
instead  found  in  individual  articles  or  conference  papers  (examples  include  Bindi, 
2002;  Fitzmaurice,  1996;  Holzhacker,  2002;  Judge,  1995;  Raunio,  1999,2001)  or 
documents  issued  by  national  parliaments  themselves  (for  instance  European 
Parliament,  2000c;  Folketinget,  1999,2001a;  House  of  Commons  European  Scrutiny 
Committee,  2002a). 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  is  to  achieve  a  deeper  understanding  of  national  parliamentary 
involvement  in  EU  affairs.  As  national  parliaments  have  increasingly  been  considered 
important  legitimisers  of  European  activities,  it  has  become  imperative  to  understand 
the  role  of  national  parliaments  within  the  European  context  better.  By  supporting 
their  governments  at  the  national  level,  national  parliaments  also-albeit 
indirectly-help  to  uphold  and  legitimise  government  policies  on  Europe. 
Increasingly,  parliaments  have  been  unwilling  to  do  so  without  question,  creating  a 
trend  towards  more  substantial  scrutiny  by  national  parliaments  of  governmental 
activities  at  the  European  level.  In  other  words,  national  parliaments  have  become 
important  actors  within  European  integration  in  a  way  that  was  never  foreseen  at  the 
origins  of  what  is  now  the  EU. 
National  procedures  for  scrutiny  will  likely  remain  a  matter  for  individual  parliaments 
to  determine.  European  institutions  do  not  have  it  within  their  powers  to  determine 
what  such  procedures  should  be  like.  Moreover,  in  all  the  three  case  studies  of 
Denmark,  Italy  and  the  UK,  the  pressure  to  adapt  has  originated  at  the  domestic  level 
although  European  variables  (specifically,  European  legislation  and  the  decision- 
making  procedures  surrounding  it)  have  influenced  how  national  parliaments  have 
adapted.  It  can  thus  be  argued  that  Europeanisation,  rather  than  European 
integration-two  very  distinct  processes  (see  below)-has  shaped  scrutiny  procedures 
within  national  parliaments. 
Section  one  of  this  introductory  chapter  will  therefore  introduce  the  concept  of 
Europeanisation.  It  will  explore  what  Europeanisation  can  contribute  to  the  discussion 
`A 
good  example  is  Hussein  Kassim's  (2005  (forthcoming))contnbution  to  Bulmer  and  Lesquesne's  text  on 
EU's  member  states.  Table  2  (overview  of  European  affairs  committees  in  national  legislatures  (EU-15)) 
relies  entirely  on  earlier,  secondary  sources  and  therefore  does  not  reflect,  for  instance,  developments  in 
the  Italian  Senate  (see  Chapter  five  for  details  on  these  developments). 
11 of  scrutiny  procedures  within  national  parliaments,  and  how  it  can  contribute  to  an 
understanding  of  how  and  why  national  parliamentary  scrutiny  procedures  have 
changed.  Section  two  examines  what  a  parliament  is  and  does,  defines  power  and 
influence,  and  looks  at  vertical  division  of  power  and  influence  within  the  EU.  The 
third  section  will,  briefly,  look  at  national  parliaments  in  the  European  context  while 
section  four  briefly  introduces  the  three  case  studies. 
L  'Me  impact  of  Europeanisation 
The  two  concepts  of  Europeanisation  and  European  integration  differ  in  many 
respects.  There  is  still  no  uncontested  definition  of  Europeanisation,  and  the  concept 
continues  to  be  applied  in  a  variety  of  ways.  In  an  authoritative  article  on  the  topic, 
Johan  P.  Olsen  (2002,  pp.  923-4)  thus  outlines  five  distinct  possible  uses: 
"  changes  in  external  boundaries; 
"  developing  institutions  at  the  European  level; 
"  central  penetration  of  national  systems  of  governance; 
"  exporting  forms  of  political  organisation  and 
"a  political  unification  project 
It  is  the  third  of  these  definitions  that  is  of  relevance  here.  Europeanisation  as  central 
penetration  of  national  systems  of  governance  is,  according  to  Olsen,  the  most  common 
way  in  which  the  term  is  used.  He  expands  on  this  particular  definition  by  stating  that 
it  'focuses  on  change  in  core  domestic  institutions  of  governance  and  politics, 
understood  as  a  consequence  of  the  development  of  European-level  institutions, 
identities  and  policies'  (2002,  p.  932).  This  obviously  includes  changes  that  have  taken 
place  within  national  parliaments  in  response  to  events  at  the  European  level  and 
indicates  a  tentative  agreement  that  the  concept  of  Europeanisation  can  be  used  to  link 
national  political  culture  with  the  European  level-and  therefore  with  European 
integration. 
Jos  de  Beus  and  Jeanette  Mak  consider  Europeanisation  and  European  integration  to  be 
sharply  distinguished  as  'European  integration  leaves  national  identity  and  political 
culture  by  and  large  untouched,  while  Europeanisation  involves  mutation  of  national 
identity  and  political  culture'  (2003,  p.  2).  In  a  more  integrative  approach,  Claudio  M. 
Radaelli  (2004,  p.  5)  links  the  two  concepts  by  stating  that  'the  theoretical  effort  in 
Europeanisation  as  a  research  agenda  is  all  about  bringing  domestic  politics  back  into 
our  understanding  of  European  integration,  without  assuming  that  the  balance  of 
power  between  the  state  and  European  institutions  is  being  tilted  in  one  direction  or 
another'  and  that  'Europeanisation  is  mostly  interested  in  adaptation  to  Europe'.  In  a 
12 definition  that  will  be  adopted  here,  Radaelli  subsequently  (2004,  p.  35)  describes 
Europeanisation  as 
processes  of  a)  construction,  b)  diffusion  and  c)  institutionalisation  of 
formal  and  informal  rules,  procedures,  policy  paradigms,  styles,  'ways  of 
doing  things'  and  shared  beliefs  and  norms  which  are  first  defined  and 
consolidated  in  the  EU  policy  process  and  then  incorporated  in  the  logic  of 
domestic  (national  and  subnational)  discourse,  political  structures  and 
public  policies. 
The  adaptation  that  has  taken  place  within  national  parliaments  has,  in  most  cases, 
been  quite  limited,  as  well  as  preceded  and  exceeded  by  adaptation  within  national 
administrations  and  executives.  Because  of  the  different  and  uneven  ways  in  which  EU 
institutions  impact  upon  the  national  level,  various  parts  of  national-level  political 
systems  have  responded  differently  to  Europeanisation.  Olsen  (2002,  p  933)  argues  that 
'because  European  institution-building  and  policy-making  are  unevenly  developed 
across  institutional  spheres  and  policy  areas,  the  adaptive  pressures  on  states  and 
institutions  vary'.  In  the  context  of  parliamentary  involvement  in  Community  affairs, 
this  uneven  development  is  evident  in  the  relatively  late  process  of  parliamentary 
adaptation  to  membership  of  the  European  Union.  Whereas  national  administrations 
and  governments  have  participated  in  policy-development  and  decision-making  at  the 
European  level  for  as  long  as  the  state  has  been  a  member  of  the  Community/Union 
(or  even  prior  to  this  when  negotiating  membership  terms),  it  is  only  very  recently  that 
most  national  parliaments  have  become  involved  in  any  significant  or  meaningful  way. 
Moreover,  public  debate  on  Europe  often  appears  limited  to  brief  periods  surrounding 
elections  to  the  European  Parliament  or  referenda  on  European  matters.  This  can  be 
seen  as  an  indication  that  Europeanisation  may  have  affected  national  subcultures  (at 
the  elite  level  of  political  classes)  rather  than  fundamental  aspects  of  national  political 
cultures. 
While  institutional  differences  exist,  different  member  states  (influenced  by  the 
adaptive  pressure  on  the  state)  have  also  had  fundamentally  different  approaches 
towards  membership.  It  can  thus  be  argued  that,  due  to  Euroscepticism  within  Britain 
and  Denmark  (expressed  to  some  extent  in  the  emphasis  on  economic  rather  than 
political  rationale  for  joining  the  Community),  the  goverranents  and  administrations  of 
both  these  countries  have  needed  to  be  very  pragmatic  and  'result-oriented'  in  their 
approach  to  Community  membership.  On  the  other  hand,  Italy's  membership  was 
motivated  mainly  by  ideological  support  for  European  integration,  with  the 
consequence  that  the  issue  of  how  much  Italy  has  benefited  (especially  economically) 
has  only  recently  become  more  prominent.  In  turn,  this  has  meant  that  the  Italian 
13 administration  and  executive  have  been  under  less  pressure  to  'perform',  specifically 
with  regard  to  obtaining  the  best  possible  result  for  the  Italian  state  and  people,  in  the 
manner  both  British  and  Danish  governments  have. 
In  all  three  case  studies,  and  by  its  very  definition,  Europeanisation  has  altered  the 
political  environments  within  which  national  political  institutions  have  operated.  With 
the  degree  of  misfit  varying  across  the  policy  areas,  processes  and  institutions,  it  is 
commonly  assumed  that  '[t]he  lower  the  compatibility  ...  the  higher  the  adaptational 
pressure'  (Börzel  and  Risse,  2000,  p.  6).  According  to  Tanja  Börzel  and  Thomas  Risse 
this  adaptational  pressure  can  cause  three  different  degrees  of  change  at  the  domestic 
level:  absorption,  accommodation  and  transformation,  5 
each  leading  to  low,  modest  or 
high  degrees  of  change  at  the  domestic  level  (2000,  p.  10)  6  This  contrasts  somewhat 
with  Olsens  view  (2002,  pp.  934-5)  that  'a  main  finding  (although  with  many  nuances) 
is  that  there  has  been  no  radical  change  in  any  of  the  national  systems  and  no 
significant  convergence  towards  a  common  institutional  model  homogenizing  the 
domestic  structures  of  the  European  states'.  In  other  words,  '[e]stablished  national 
patterns  are  resistant  to,  but  also  flexible  enough  to  cope  with,  changes  at  the  European 
level'. 
However,  adaptation  is  not  necessarily  undertaken  solely  due  to  pressure  from  the 
European  level.  Scrutiny  procedures  within  national  parliaments  have  altered  the  most 
at  times  when  European  integration  has  taken  significant  steps,  but  changes  have  also 
taken  place  at  other  points  in  time.  The  development  of  scrutiny  procedures  can 
therefore  be  seen  as  a  bottom-up  process,  a  story  which,  in  the  words  of  Radaelli, 
`starts  and  finishes  at  the  level  of  the  domestic  system  of  interaction'  (2004,  p.  9).  The 
bottom-up  process  has  thus  developed  beyond  the  initial  approach  which  `was  mainly 
concerned  with  how  to  conceptualize  and  explain  the  effect  of  member  states  on 
processes  and  outcomes  of  European  integration'  (Börzel,  2003,  p.  1).  The  development 
of  relations  between  national  parliaments  and  European  institutions  has  not  been  easy. 
'  'Absorption'  is  defined  as  an  ability  to  'incorporate  European  policies  or  ideas  and  readjust  their 
institutions,  respectively,  without  substantially  modifying  existing  processes,  policies  and  institutions'. 
Accommodation  is  when  pressure  for  Europeanisation  is  accommodated  'by  existing  processes,  policies 
and  institutions  without  changing  their  essential  features  and  the  underlying  collective  understanding 
attached  to  them',  while  transformation  requires  replacement  of  'existing  policies,  processes,  and 
institutions  by  new,  substantially  different  ones,  or  alter  existing  ones  to  the  extent  that  their  essential 
features  and/or  the  underlying  collective  understanding  are  fundamentally  changes'  (Börzel  and  Risse, 
2000,  p.  10). 
6A  wide  range  of  resources,  political  as  well  as  administrative,  contribute  to  the  success  or  otherwise  of 
any  such  change.  Bbrzel  thus  argues  that 
[tjhe  administrative  capacity  of  Member  States  to  shape  and  take  EU  policies  is  a  function  of 
particular  resources,  such  as  staff-power,  money,  expertise,  and  coalition-building  skill.... 
Member  States,  like  Denmark  or  Britain,  where  EU  related  policy-making  competencies  are 
concentrated,  are  able  to  formulate  and  represent  a  coherent  bargaining  position  and  stand  a 
better  chance  to  be  heard  than  counties  like  Greece  or  Italy,  where  competencies  are  highly 
fragmented  as  a  result  of  which  they  often  do  not  speak  with  one  voice  (2003,  p.  7,  emphasis 
in  original). 
14 Europeanisation  has  forced  national  parliaments  to  become  acquainted  with  and  take 
into  consideration  the  workings  of  institutions  at  the  European  level.  Thus,  when 
conceptualising  Europeanisation  as  a  process  and  contributing  factor  in  explaining 
domestic  change  (and  therefore  not  as  a  separate  theory),  national  parliaments,  as 
political  actors  in  their  own  right,  become  better  understood.  For  the  purposes  of  this 
thesis,  an  understanding  of  what  a  parliament  is  must  be  developed.  The  following 
section  therefore  looks  at  definitions  of  a  parliament  as  well  as  the  power.  and  influence 
exercised  by  parliaments. 
2.  Legislatures  and  parliaments 
Parliaments  are  rule-making  bodies  within  political  systems.  They  are  usually  elected, 
although  institutions  such  as  the  British  House  of  Lords  are  exceptions  to  this  rule. 
Institutions  whose  constituent  members  are  elected  will  here  be  referred  to  as 
parliaments.  Parliaments  are  often  seen  as  the  institutionalisation  of  representation: 
while  the  citizens  remain  sovereign,  the  power  to  decide  on  their  behalf  is  vested  in 
their  parliamentary  representatives. 
A  suitable  definition  of  a  parliament  would  thus  be  'a  group  of  individuals  operating 
on  the  behalf  of  others  in  a  binding  and  legitimate  manner  and  making  decisions 
collectively  but  with  formal  equality'  (Copeland  and  Patterson,  1994,  p.  153).  The 
emphasis  on  legitimacy  implies  that  those  represented  must  consent  to  the  'group  of 
individuals'  taking  decisions  on  their  behalf,  with  consent  provided  through 
participation  in  elections  (or,  at  the  very  least,  acknowledgement  that  elections  provide 
legitimate  parliamentary  bodies).  In  contrast  to  'parliaments',  a  definition  of 
legislatures  has  been  provided  by  Philip  Norton  (1990a,  p.  1)  as  'constitutionally 
designated  institutions  for  giving  assent  to  binding  measures  of  public  policy,  that 
assent  being  given  on  behalf  of  a  political  community  that  extends  beyond  the 
government  elite  responsible  for  formulating  those  measures'.  This  definition  is  more 
overarching  than  that  for  'parliaments'  and  in  fact  subsumes  the  latter  as  a  category  of 
'legislature',  but  does  not  include  the  specific  requirement  of  legitimacy.  In  this  study 
the  term  'parliament'  will  be  used,  with  the  British  House  of  Lords  considered  one 
chamber  of  the  parliament. 
Parliaments'  involvement  in  legislation  and  governance  is  discussed  with  frequent 
reference  to  the  concepts  of  'power'  and  'influence'.  Parliaments  gain  their  right  to 
exercise  power,  authority  and  influence  by  performing  their  three  main  tasks: 
legitimisation,  linkage  and  decision-making  (Copeland  and  Patterson,  1994,  p.  154).  In 
scrutinising,  holding  accountable,  and  providing  support  for  the  government  of  the 
day,  parliaments  legitimise  governments  as  well  as  their  policies.  As  representative 
15 bodies  parliaments  also  link  citizens  with  governing  bodies  and  structures,  making  it 
possible  to  govern  larger  territories.  Madison  believed  that  representative  bodies  also 
made  it  possible  to  address  social  conflict  better  by  bringing  it  into  a  forum  where  it 
could  be  controlled.  However,  such  control  is  only  possible  if  representatives  pursue 
the  interests  of  their  constituents  (Pitkin,  1989,  p.  146).  The  link  between  parliaments 
and  executives  also  enables  accountability  to  be  exercised,  as  regular  elections  provide 
citizens  the  opportunity  to  pass  judgement  on  both  parliament  and  government. 
Parliamentary  power  and  influence  over  legislation  varies  significantly  throughout  the 
democratic  world.  Norton  (1994,  p.  18)  identifies  three'levels'  of  parliaments: 
"  policy-making  (able  to  `modify  or  reject  measures  brought  forward  by  the 
executive  and  can  formulate  and  substitute  policies  of  their  own  l; 
9  policy  influencing  (can  'modify  or  reject  measures  brought  forward  by  the 
executive  but  cannot  formulate  and  substitute  policies  of  their  own'); 
9  legislatures  with  little  or  no  policy  affect. 
Following  this  classification,  Norton  (1994,  p.  19)  placed  EU  national  parliaments 
(those  for  which  he  has  sufficient  information)  in  the  policy  influencing  category.  More 
specifically,  he  argued  that  the  Italian  and  Danish  parliaments  bordered  on  the  policy- 
making  category,  while  the  British  Parliament  had  only  relatively  recently  begun  to 
move  away  from  the  third  category  of  legislatures  with  little  or  no  policy  affect. 
When  considering  European  legislation,  however,  it  can  be  argued  that  parliamentary 
power  has  been  reduced  to  parliamentary  influence.  The  two  concepts  are  strongly 
linked  and  interrelated,  with  one  often  used  to  describe  the  other.  Consider,  for 
example,  one  definition  of  influence  as  'power  or  sway  resulting  from  ability,  wealth, 
position,  etc.  ',  or  power  defined  as  `political,  financial,  social,  etc.,  force  or  influence' 
(Makins,  1991,  pp.  794  and  1220).  Moreover,  both  concepts  are  included  in  Robert 
Dahl's  list  of  'power  terms'  (1979,  p.  406).  In  general,  the  concept  of  power  is  used  to 
explain  how  one  actor  actively  alters  (or  maintains)  a  particular  environment  or 
situation.  Specific  definitions  include:  'the  abilities  of  social  agents  to  affect  the  world 
in  some  way  or  other'  (Isaac,  1992),  'the  ability  to  make  people  (or  things)  do  what  they 
would  not  otherwise  have  done'  (Allison,  1996,  p.  396),  and  Russell's  definition  of 
power  as  'the  production  of  intended  effect'  (cited  in  Allison,  1996).  Arguably,  Dahl's 
definition  of  power  terms  has  been  the  most  influential.  To  Dahl,  power  terms  'refer  to 
subsets  of  relations  among  social  units  such  that  the  behaviors  of  one  or  more  units 
(the  responsive  units,  R)  depend  in  some  circumstances  on  the  behavior  of  other  units 
(the  controlling  units,  C)'  (1979,  p.  407).  However,  as  indicated  earlier,  Dahl  includes 
both  'power'  and  'influence'  in  his  'power  terms',  and  argues  that  'the  names  for  the 
16 various  categories  are  so  completely  unstandardized  that  what  is  labeled  power  in  one 
scheme  maybe  called  coercion  or  influence  in  another'  (1979,  p.  412). 
A  significant  problem  in  Dahl's  conception  is  that  it  is  concerned  solely  with  what 
actually  occurs.  Other  theorists,  such  as  Steven  Lukes,  argue  that  power  may  be 
exercised  even  though  there  is  no  visible  evidence  of  it.  This  makes  it  even  more 
difficult  to  distinguish  between  power  and  influence,  as  it  is  often  impossible  to 
determine  whether  R's  altered  behavior  is  due  to  good  argumentation  (influence)  or 
the  threat  of  sanctions  (power)  on  behalf  of  C. 
A  further  complication  is  the  notion  of  legitimate  power,  what  Jens  Peter  Frelund 
Thomsen  calls  authority.  According  to  Thomsen,  'whether  exercise  of  power  is 
legitimate  or  illegitimate  depends  on  the  extent  to  which  it  is  the  result  of  a  preceding 
democratic  procedure'  (2000,  p.  58,  author's  translation).  Thomsen  !s  three  methods  for 
affecting  behaviour  are  summarized  as  follows: 
Figure  L1  Power,  authority  and  influence  as  methods  of  affecting  behaviour 
Power  Authority  Influence 
Criteria  Conflict  Agreement  Agreement 
Sanctions  Sanctions  Freedom 
Methods  of  Force  Legislation  Suggestions 
affecting  Control  Punishment  Encouragement 
behaviour  Manipulation  Rewards  Persuasion 
Disciplinary  action  Expertise  Open  dialogue 
Suppression  of  identity 
Source:  Thomsen,  2000,  p.  58,  authors  translation. 
As  will  become  evident,  the  ability  of  national  parliaments  to  influence  the  behaviour 
of  actual  decision-makers  in  the  European  legislative  process  is  very  limited.  This 
contrasts  with  procedures  at  the  national  level  where  parliamentarians  most  often  have 
the  ability  to  affect  changes  in  domestic  legislation.  At  the  European  level  it  is  only 
indirectly,  through  their  own  executives,  that  national  parliaments  can  wield  influence, 
with  power  over  final  decisions  being  beyond  their  grasp.  One  way  of  defining  the  two 
concepts  of  power  and  influence  independently  of  each  other  thus  lies  in  separating 
policy-shaping  decisions-which  alter  the  detailed  provisions  of  legislative 
options-from  decisions  that  actually  choose  (or  'set')  policies  (for  a  discussion  of  the 
concepts  of  policy-shaping  and  policy-setting  (as  well  as  history-making)  see  Peterson 
and  Bomberg,  1999,  Chapter  one).  It  is  thus  possible  to  have  influence  without  power, 
although  power  does  bring  its  own  amount  of  influence.  In  this  study,  influence  will 
17 thus  be  defined  as  a  (sometimes  indirect)  say  in  policy-making  and  power  as 
'possession'  of  legal  authority  to  make  decisions  that  definitively  set  policy. 
Within  most  liberal  democratic  states,  national  parliaments  are  considered  as 
sovereign,  with  governments  required  to  find  a  majority  in  support  of  its  legislation. 
However,  if  applying  the  above  definitions  of  power  and  influence  to  national 
parliaments  and  their  participation  in  European  affairs,  very  few  can  be  classified  as 
having  formal  power-or  even  authority-as  they  are  limited  to  attempts  at 
influencing  their  executives.  Moreover,  formal  power  and  influence  (as  well  as 
authority)  has  been  significantly  limited  by  (perceived)  political  realities,  making  it 
difficult  for  national  parliaments  to  regain  influence  in  this  area  (Siedentop,  2000,  p. 
119).  Few  authors  of  written  constitutions  were  able  to  foresee  that  foreign  policy 
would  be  conducted  at  several  different  levels.?  Constitutions,  therefore,  generally 
contain  few  or  no  provisions  for  parliamentary  involvement  in  foreign  policy,  a  policy 
sphere  that  is  traditionally  viewed  as  extending  to  issues  of  peace  and  war,  life  and 
death,  and  thus  touching  quite  directly  on  national  sovereignty. 
Vertical  division  of  power 
Over  time,  and  as  a  consequence  of  EU  membership,  the  issues  handled  by  national 
parliaments  have  changed.  In  turn,  so  have  notions  of  'proper'  democratic  procedures 
and  institutions.  All  of  the  EU  member  states'  parliaments  have  thus  established 
committees  dealing  with  EU-issues.  Such  committees  are  an  example  of  the  horizontal 
division  of  power  that  has  become  a  standard  feature  of  EU  membership-although  it 
also  introduces  certain  problems.  Where  specialised  EU  committees  handle 
Community  affairs  on  an  exclusive  basis,  Members  of  Parliament  (MPs)  who  are  not 
members  of  such  committees  may  become  complacent  about  EU  affairs,  choosing  to 
refer  these  to  the  EU  committee.  The  realisation  that  EU  policy  is  no  longer  foreign,  but 
also  domestic  policy,  has  only  taken  hold  gradually. 
Regional  devolution,  as  it  has  taken  place  in  Europe,  has  implications  for  how 
European  issues  are  handled,  as  regional  authorities  are  often  given  the  task  of 
implementing  European  measures.  The  decision-making  process  within  Europe  can 
thus  become  further  complicated,  as  the  regional  authorities  may  wish  to  influence 
negotiations  on  these  issues.  In  countries  with  strong  sub-national  entities,  Spain  and 
Germany  for  example,  there  are  important  issues.  However,  regionalism,  regional 
7  As  will  become  evident  in  Chapter  five.  Italy,  with  its  relatively  young  constitution,  is  an  exception  due 
to  the  option  of  limiting  Italian  sovereignty  through  international  cooperation. 
18 authorities  and  institutions  (including  regional  parliaments  where  these  exist)  and 
their  involvement  in  European  affairs  are  matters  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis  .3 
Within  the  EU,  power  has  also  flowed  upwards  with  the  emergence  of  an  increasingly 
powerful  European  Parliament.  The  legal  basis  for  this  institution  has  changed  several 
times  in  its  relatively  short  lifetime,  forcing  it  to  adapt  to  new  environments  and 
challenges.  The  similarities  between  national  parliaments  and  the  EP  lie  in  the 
provision  of  a  linkage  between  EU's  citizens  and  governing  structures,  as  well  as  the 
EP's  participation  in  decision-making.  The  greater  distance  (perceived  or  real)  between 
representatives  and  represented  has  meant  that  Members  of  the  European  Parliament 
(MEPs)  are  perceived  differently  to  national  parliamentarians.  According  to  Dahl  'it 
seems  fanciful  to  expect  that  the  European  Parliament 
...  would  ever  become  as 
responsive  to  the  citizens  of  the  European  Union 
...  as  the  existing  national 
parliaments  of  the  present  members  of  the  EU'  (1994,  p.  32).  Moreover,  Karlheinz 
Neunriether  (2000,  p.  147)  argues  that  'for  both  constitutional  and  attitudinal  reasons, 
the  representation  of  the  component  wholes  is  likely  to  remain  stronger  than  the 
majority  of  EP  members  are  prepared  to  admit'.  If  these  interpretations  are  correct, 
national  parliaments  will  remain  important  actors  in  the  European  system  of 
governance,  providing  a(nother)  link  between  European  citizens  and  the  bodies  where 
decisions  governing  their  lives  are  taken. 
While  the  EP  contributes  to  the  legitimacy  of  Community  legislation,  the  formal 
separation  of  powers  between  EU  institutions  means  it  does  not  provide  any 
legitimacy  for  its  legislative  partner,  the  Council.  Instead,  national  parliaments  act  as 
legitimisers  of  the  Council,  which  is  the  EU-institution  most  closely  resembling  an 
executive.  The  Commission,  however,  is  subject  to  a  vote  of  confidence  from  the  EP. 
Although  the  EP  votes  on  the  Commission  en  bloc,  concerns  about  individual 
Commissioners  have  caused  the  EP  to  withhold  (or  threaten  to  withdraw)  their 
support  for  the  Commission,  as  occurred  when  the  incoming  Commission  under  Jose 
Manuel  Barroso  was  forced  to  reconstitute  itself,  without  the  controversial  Italian 
nominee,  Rocco  Buttiliogne,  to  secure  a  vote  of  investiture  in  2004.  In  contrast  to  the 
EP's  power  over  the  Commission,  no  other  EU  institution  can  threaten  to  dissolve  the 
EP.  The  guarantee  of  an  un-interrupted  five-year  term  has  provided  the  EP  with  a 
certain  degree  of  stability  to  pursue  increased  institutional  power  and  influence  for 
itself.  While  MEPs  come  from  many  different  backgrounds  and  all  sections  of  the 
Greenland  and  the  Faeroe  Islands,  despite  being  part  of  the  Danish  kingdom,  are  not  part  of  the  EU.  The 
Faeroe  Islands  elected  to  not  join  with  Denmark  in  1973  while  Greenland,  after  a  referendum  in  1982, 
chose  to  leave  the  Community.  This  leaves  a  potentially  awkward  situation  due  to  the  development  of 
European  cooperation  on  issues  such  as  foreign  policy,  defence  and  justice  which,  despite  'home  rule', 
remain  the  prerogative  of  the  Danish  Folketing.  As  the  Greenlandic  and  Faroese  populations  do  not 
participate  in  Danish  referenda  on  European  matters,  they  essentially  have  no  say  in  where  decisions 
governing  critical  aspects  of  their  lives  are  taken. 
19 political  ideological  spectrum,  most  have  been  united  in  seeking  to  empower  the  EP 
further. 
3.  National  parliaments  and  the  EU 
The  historic  development  of  the  EP  is  an  important  component  in  most  theories  of 
European  integration.  However,  as  will  be  discussed  in  Chapter  two,  few  integration 
theorists  concern  themselves  with  national  parliaments.  In  most  cases,  including  in 
work  on  multi-level  governance,  the  national  actor  considered  is  the  'state',  which  most 
frequently  means  the  executive.  Multi-level  theorists  thus  describe  European 
integration  as  'a  polity-creating  process  in  which  authority  and  policy-making 
influence  are  shared  across  multiple  levels  of  government  -  subnational,  national,  and 
supranational',  with  multi-level  governance  being  the  'dispersion  of  authoritative 
decision  making  across  multiple  territorial  levels'  (Hooghe  and  Marks,  2001,  pp.  xi  and 
2).  Despite  the  focus  on  multiple  actors  and  levels  within  the  model  of  multi-level 
governance,  national  parliaments  rarely  get  a  specific  mention  here.  In  the  main, 
writers  on  multi-level  governance  consider  national  parliaments  to  be  legitimisers  of 
national  governments  rather  than  actors  in  their  own  right.  The  deepening  integration 
process  and  lack  of  direct  participation  in  the  European  decision-making  process  have 
weakened  national  parliaments  institutionally.  Membership  of  the  Union  has  therefore 
been  a  constraint  on  parliaments'  ability  to  legislate  freely  in  all  policy-areas. 
Decisions  influencing  the  lives  of  European  citizens  are  clearly  taken  at  both  the 
national  and  European  levels.  The  EU  therefore  conforms  well  to  Robert  D.  Putnam's 
model  of  two-level  games.  Putnam  (1988,  p.  434)  contends  that 
[a]t  the  national  level,  domestic  groups  pursue  their  interests  by  pressuring 
the  government  to  adopt  favorable  policies,  and  politicians  seek  power  by 
constructing  coalitions  among  those  groups.  At  the  international  level, 
national  governments  seek  to  maximize  their  own  ability  to  satisfy 
domestic  pressures,  while  minimizing  the  adverse  consequences  of  foreign 
developments.  Neither  of  the  two  games  can  be  ignored  by  central 
decision-makers,  so  long  as  their  countries  remain  interdependent,  yet 
sovereign. 
National  parliaments  fit  into  this  model  as  they  can  be  considered  one  of  the  domestic 
groups  pressuring  the  government  at  the  national  level.  Moreover,  if  dissatisfied  with 
the  outcome  of  European-level  decision-making,  national  parliaments  have  the 
potential  to  withdraw  support  for  their  executives-perhaps  the  ultimate  `adverse 
consequence'. 
20 However,  central  decision-makers,  in  the  EU  national  executives  through  the  Council, 
maintain  a  strong  position  when  it  comes  to  the  negotiation  of  European  legislation,  a 
powerful  contributing  factor  in  the  perceived  decline  of  national  parliaments  in 
Europe.  By  monopolising  (or  strictly  controlling)  information  relevant  to  EU 
negotiations,  in  conjunction  with  the  principle  of  supremacy, 
9 
national  executives  have 
been  in  a  position  to  control  their  own  parliaments,  rather  than  the  other  way  round 
(Majone,  1996,  p.  284).  Parliamentary  decline  was  first  described  in  the  1920s,  long 
before  European  integration  was  a  factor,  by  Lord  Bryce  who  saw  power  passing  from 
the  House  of  Commons  to  the  Cabinet-and  especially  to  the  party  leaders  from  the 
party  supporting  the  Government  of  the  day.  '  Despite  the  parliamentary  decline,  Lord 
Bryce  (1990,  p.  56)  still  saw  parliaments  as  important,  claiming  that  they 
must  remain  the  vital  centre  of  the  frame  of  government  in  every  country 
not  small  enough  to  permit  of  the  constant  action  of  direct  popular 
legislation;  and  even  in  such  countries  they  cannot  be  altogether  dispensed 
with....  The  people  as  a  whole  cannot  attend  to  details,  still  less  exercise 
over  the  executive  the  watchful  supervision  needed  to  ensure  honest  and 
efficient  administration. 
Lord  Bryce's  description  of  the  declining  parliament  has  remained  influential. 
According  to  Norton  (1990a,  pp.  4-5) 
[t]wentieth-century  study  of  legislatures  has 
...  taken  place  within  the 
inheritance  of  three  basic  and  related  axioms:  that  the  fundamental  task  of 
legislatures  is  the  making  of  laws;  that  legislatures  in  and  since  the 
nineteenth  century  have  'declined';  that  the  explanation  for  such  decline 
lies  in  the  growth  of  party,  a  growth  that  in  the  context  of  legislatures  has 
been  cancerous. 
EU  membership  could,  initially,  be  interpreted  as  further  contributing  to  the  decline  of 
parliaments.  National  executives  took  the  lead  in  decision-making  at  the  European 
level,  with  important  areas  of  legislation  transferred  away  from  national  parliaments  to 
the  Community  level  (obvious  examples  are  protection  of  the  environment  and 
agricultural  policy).  Until  the  1990s,  the  EP  had  very  little  legislative  power  or 
influence.  Consequently,  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  measures  decided  at  the  European 
The  principle  of  supremacy  holds  that  Community  law  has  supremacy  over  national  law  in  case  of  a 
conflict,  including  in  cases  where  national  law  has  been  enacted  after  the  Community  legislation. 
10  The  importance  of  political  parties  was  derived  from  the  fact  that  they  appointed  the  parliamentary 
candidates.  These  candidates  thus  no  longer  felt  their  allegiance  to  be  with  their  constituencies,  but  rather 
with  their  party,  on  which  they  depended  for  reappointment  as  a  candidate. 
21 level  was  very  limited,  leading  to  allegations  of  a  democratic  deficit  (see  Chapter  two 
for  a  definition  and  further  discussion). 
More  recently,  however,  there  have  been  indications  that  parliaments  have  regained 
ground.  This  is  especially  so  in  proportional  systems  where  the  number  of  political 
parties  has  been  on  the  increase,  fragmenting  parliaments  and  causing  government 
coalitions  to  contain  or  be  supported  by  a  larger  number  of  parties.  Writing  specifically 
on  the  Scandinavian  Parliaments,  Erik  Damgaard  outlines  several  changes  that  have 
occurred  since  the  1970s.  Damgaard  associates  a  higher  level  of  parliamentary  activity 
(examples  include  more  bills  and  resolutions  proposed,  more  activities  in  committees 
and  an  increased  number  of  questions  asked)  with  a  higher  level  of  conflict  among 
political  parties  represented  in  parliament.  Such  increased  activity  and  conflict  also 
leads  to  more  (public)  disagreement  and  competition  for  the  attention  and  votes  of 
citizens  (1994,  p.  92).  Consequently,  the  challenge  of  being  in  government  has 
increased,  as  it  has  become  more  acceptable  and  practiced  behaviour  for  opposition 
parties  to  voice  concern  regarding  government  policy  as  well  as  offering  alternative 
policies  to  the  public:  '[t]he  power  of  parliaments  has  increased  vis-ä-vis  the 
governments  in  the  sense  that  party  groups  not  participating  in  the  governments  have 
obtained  increased  policy  influence  and  sometimes  even  the  power  to  make  the  crucial 
decisions'  (Damgaard,  1994,  p.  93). 
As  national  parliaments  have  developed  an  understanding  of  how  European 
legislation  impacts  upon  domestic  legislation,  they  have  begun  to  scrutinise 
government  activities  at  the  European  level  more  closely.  In  the  scrutiny  process,  an 
important  source  of  parliamentary  power  (even  in  the  British  House  of  Commons)  is 
that  of  select  committees.  The  resources  available  to  them  include  finance,  access  to 
expert  opinions  and  the  power  to  call  witnesses  including  members  of  the  executive. 
The  importance  of  committees  has  been  recognised  by  parliaments  themselves  in 
recent  years,  with  all  EU  member  states'  parliaments  establishing  or  strengthening 
committees  dealing  specifically  with  EU  issues.  This  can  be  interpreted  as  a 
(re)discovery  by  national  parliaments  that,  ultimately,  they  control  their 
governments-and  thus,  indirectly,  the  Council.  EU  committees  have  thus  become 
potentially  important  sites  of  political  control  regarding  the  use  of  EU  power  (Lord, 
1998,  p.  55). 
Since  the  Single  European  Act  (SEA),  but  especially  the  Treaty  of  European  Union 
(TEU),  I'  national  parliamentarians  have  increasingly  recognised  their  interdependence 
with  the  EU  and  the  extent  to  which  EU  decisions  circumscribe  their  ability  to  act  at  the 
national  level.  Moreover,  MPs  have  also  realised  that  unless  they  wish  to  become 
"  These  treaties  came  into  force  on  1  July  1987  and  1  November  1993  respectively. 
22 bystanders  to  decisions  affecting  their  own  constituents,  they  have  to  develop  methods 
for  participating  in  European  decision-making-even  if  this  is  achieved  indirectly 
through  scrutiny  of  their  executives'  activities  at  the  European  level.  However,  national 
parliamentarians  have  also  realised  that  certain  issues  (especially  those  of  a  cross- 
border  nature  such  as  environmental  issues)  are  better  dealt  with  at  the  European  level. 
A  symbiotic  relationship  has  thus  developed  between  national  parliaments  and  the  EU, 
although  one  with  limited  direct  contact  between  the  national  and  European  levels.  It 
has  therefore  become  widely  recognised  that  democratic  and  legitimate  cooperation  at 
the  European  level  cannot  be  achieved  merely  through  parliamentarisation  of  the 
European  level:  Europeanisation  of  the  national  level  is  necessary  too. 
In  Norton's  terms,  the  debate  is  about  at  what  level  it  is  most  appropriate  for  national 
parliaments  to  operate.  Norton  distinguishes  between  the  individual  and  collective 
levels,  although  he  emphasises  that  they  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  At  the  individual 
level,  national  parliaments  have  become  more  active  in  scrutinising  their  executives 
while,  collectively,  they  can  potentially  act  as  a  political  constraint  on  governments  at 
the  supranational  level  (Norton,  1996a,  p.  183). 
4.  The  case  studies  of  Denmark,  Italy  and  the  UK 
These  member  state  parliaments  for  the  case  studies  were  chosen  as  they  form  a 
continuum  in  terms  of  their  ability  to  scrutinise  their  executives.  The  Italian  parliament 
has  no  scrutiny  reserve  power,  and  appears  preoccupied  with  legislation  on  the 
implementation  of  European  legislation  rather  than  involvement  in  the  pre-decision 
process.  Moreover,  it  has  only  very  recently  begun  to  realise  that  in  order  to  influence 
European  decisions,  an  effort  at  the  earlier  stage  where  problems  can  be  developed 
into  policy  initiatives  is  required  (see  Greenwood,  1997,  p.  27).  However,  both 
chambers  of  the  Italian  Parliament  also  include  other  select  committees  in  their  work 
and  see  this  as  essential  to  carry  out  proper  scrutiny  of  European  legislation. 
Cooperation  between  select  committees  is  taken  to  its  logical  conclusion  in  the  Senate 
where  it  is  a  requirement  that  members  of  the  European  committee  are  also  members 
of  another  select  committee.  While  this  institutional  arrangement  manages  to  combine 
an  interest  in  European  affairs  with  specialised  knowledge  from  the  select  committees, 
it  also  introduces  problems,  mainly  by  adding  to  the  already  onerous  workload  of 
parliamentarians. 
In  the  British  parliament,  ex  ante  participation  in  the  legislative  process  is  an  unusual 
occurrence,  and  although  the  European  Scrutiny  Committee  (ESC)  in  the  House  of 
Commons  can  impose  a  scrutiny  reserve  power  (thereby  requiring  ministers  not  to 
commit  to  measures  still  being  scrutinised),  the  ESC  is  only  now  beginning  to  realise  its 
23 potential.  Moreover,  due  to  the  committee's  remit  to  provide  an  opinion  on  the  legal 
and  political  importance  of  European  documents  (although  an  opinion  on  the  merit  of 
these  documents  is  beyond  the  ESC),  the  scrutiny  reserve  power  does  not  allow  the 
ESC  to  impose  its  opinions  on  British  Ministers.  The  House  of  Lords  has  traditionally 
been  the  Chamber  undertaking  investigations  with  the  purpose  of  examining  the 
merits  of  European  legislation.  However,  it  too  is  unable  to  bind  ministers  to  particular 
behaviour  and  is  therefore  limited  to  influencing  decisions  through  other  means  such 
as  debates,  writing  of  reports  and  other  interactions  with  actors  at  the  domestic  as  well 
as  European  levels. 
In  contrast,  the  Danish  European  Union  Committee  (EUC)  mandates  Danish  ministers, 
and  does  so  prior  to  all  Council  meetings.  It  can  be  argued  that  Council  meetings,  as 
the  very  last  stage  of  the  decision-making  process,  are  a  very  late  point  for  the  Folketing 
(Danish  Parliament)  to  become  involved.  Yet,  participants  in  the  Danish  decision- 
making  process  contend  that  civil  servants  and  the  government  factor  the  knowledge 
that  all  decisions  have  to  be  accepted  by  the  EUC  into  their  negotiations  on  European- 
level  decisions.  Although  the  EUC  delivers  the  final  negotiation  mandate  in  a  meeting 
with  the  minister  in  question,  its  influence  is  largely  indirect.  The  fact  that  most  Danish 
governments  are  coalition  (and  often  minority)  governments,  accounts  for  the  strong 
involvement  of  the  Folketing  (through  the  EUC).  The  involvement  of  the  Folketing 
ensures  that  a  parliamentarian  majority  supports  government  policies, 
u 
although  it 
still  remains  the  prerogative  of  the  Danish  executive  to  conduct  foreign  (and  therefore 
also  European)  policy. 
The  case  studies  were  also  chosen  with  their  contrasting  electoral  systems  in  mind 
(majoritarian  and  proportional),  although  this  factor  does  not  appear  to  have  an  impact 
on  the  parliamentary  willingness  to  scrutinise  European  legislation.  Both  the  Danish 
and  British  parliaments  (one  elected  by  a  proportional  and  the  other  by  a  majoritarian 
electoral  system)  consider  parliamentary  scrutiny  to  be  of  significant  importance.  The 
impact  of  scrutiny  is  potentially  higher  in  a  proportionally  elected  parliament, 
although  the  Italian  case  indicates  that  this  is  not  always  the  case,  and  that  other  factors 
for  effective  scrutiny  are  important  too.  The  size  of  the  member  state  does  not  appear 
to  be  of  significance  either.  Size  may  have  been  thought  to  matter  insofar  as  a  large 
member  state  would  be  expected  (despite  being  traditionally  underrepresented  in 
votes  using  qualified  majority  voting  (QMV))  to  have  more  influence  in  the  Council.  It 
may  therefore  be  assumed  that  the  national  parliament  would  be  less  concerned  with 
EU  policy-making  than  the  parliament  of  a  smaller  member  state.  However,  as 
12  Technically  the  requirement  is  that  no  majority  is  against  the  government. 
24 parliamentary  scrutiny  procedures  are  considered  to  be  of  great  importance  in  the  UK, 
this  is  obviously  not  the  case. 
National  parliamentary  scrutiny  procedures  are  best  understood  if  placed  within  the 
context  of  the  overall  national  political  culture.  Taken  in  isolation  a  scrutiny  procedure 
conveys  little.  However,  as  an  expression  of  political  beliefs  and  convictions,  or 
national  political  culture,  it  acquires  more  meaning.  Within  this  particular  context  it 
becomes  important  to  consider  expectations  placed  on  national  parliaments,  how 
parliament  as  an  institution  fits  within  the  political  system  and  how  it  contributes  to 
national  ideas  of  what  democracy  is  and  how  it  works.  Because  democracy  and  the  role 
of  parliaments  within  it  are  perceived  differently  in  different  countries,  the  concept  of 
political  culture  can  be  useful  in  explaining  the  different  approaches  to  parliamentary 
involvement  in  European  matters,  and  the  interaction  between  parliaments  and 
executives  in  this  area. 
A  significant  challenge  common  to  EU's  national  parliaments  remains,  however,  in  the 
collective  parliamentary  activities  at  the  European  level.  Their  inability  to  control, 
fully,  the  actions  of  their  executives  at  the  European  level  has  caused  national 
parliaments  to  explore  international  cooperation  closer.  Such  cooperation  is  not 
undertaken  with  the  aim  of  participating  directly  in  the  legislative  process  at  the 
European  level,  but  to  create  a  forum  where  ideas  and  opinions  can  be  exchanged,  and 
matters  of  importance  to  all  parliaments  can  be  discussed.  As  national  parliaments 
have  traditionally  been  very  autonomous  actors,  the  notion  of  having  to  cooperate  with 
other  parliaments  in  order  to  carry  out  their  work  effectively  has  posed  a  great 
challenge. 
Non-binding  decisions  and  small  steps  towards  deeper  cooperation,  all  driven  by 
national  parliaments  themselves,  have  characterized  such  cooperation.  The  extent  to 
which  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  will  succeed  may  largely  depend  on  how  far 
national  political  cultures  permit  parliaments  to  'stray'.  In  Italy,  the  willingness  to 
cooperate  at  the  international  level  is  substantial,  owing  mainly  to  past  political 
experiences  and  ideological  support  for  European  integration.  Meanwhile,  in 
Denmark,  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  is  considered  in  a  positive  light  if  it  can  aid 
the  process  of  democratising  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  further.  However, 
European-level  cooperation  is  considered  more  problematic  in  Britain,  mainly  due  to 
the  sharp  divisions  between  committees  within  the  UK  Parliament's  two  Chambers  as 
well  as  the  inability  of  any  one  member  or  committee  to  commit  the  House  they 
represent-let  alone  the  entire  Parliament. 
25 Conclusion 
National  parliaments  have  found  themselves  in  a  multi-leveled  system  of  governance. 
New  demands  have  been  placed  upon  them  as  important  contributors  to  democracy  at 
both  the  national  and  European  levels.  Being  national  parliaments,  the  adaptation  to 
involvement  with  European  affairs  has  not  always  been  easy.  As  one  link  between 
governors  and  the  governed,  it  is  the  duty  of  national  parliamentarians  to  represent  the 
wishes  of  their  constituents-but  also  their  task  to  explain  the  development  and  impact 
of,  for  instance,  European  integration  and  globalisation. 
Increasing  political  interest  in  involving  national  parliaments  in  the  work  of  the  EU  led 
to  the  inclusion  of  the  'Protocol  on  the  Role  of  National  Parliaments  in  the  European 
Union'  in  the  Treaty  of  Amsterdam.  Although  the  first  paragraph  of  the  protocol  states 
that  'scrutiny  by  individual  national  parliaments  of  their  own  government  in  relation 
to  the  activities  of  the  Union  is  a  matter  for  the  particular  constitutional  organization 
and  practice  of  each  Member  State'  (Duff,  1997,  p.  302),  it  goes  on  to  encourage  national 
parliaments'  involvement  in  EU  affairs.  The  provisions  laid  down  in  the  protocol  cover 
access  to  Commission  consultation  documents  and  proposals  for  legislation.  It  also 
provides  direction  for  the  work  of  the  Conference  of  European  Affairs  Committees 
(COSAC),  currently  the  most  important  forum  for  inter-parliamentary  cooperation. 
It  seems  evident  that  collective  activities  have  been  important  sources  of  inspiration  for 
the  development  of  scrutiny  procedures  in  some  national  parliaments.  Events  like 
COSAC  have  thus  also  been  'show  grounds'  for  parliaments  with  more  developed 
scrutiny  systems,  making  it  difficult  to  speak  of  totally  separate  fields  of  events  as  the 
individual  and  collective  arenas  have  clearly  influenced  each  other.  Although  difficult 
to  prove  with  certainty,  it  appears  that  collective  activities  have  focused  attention  on 
the  general  need  for  national  parliaments  to  become  involved  in  European  affairs. 
Despite  the  recognised  value  of  such  meetings,  exchange  of  information  has  not  been 
limited  to  formal  meetings,  with  private  conversations  between  participants  at,  for 
instance,  COSAC  meetings  considered  just  as  important. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  national  parliaments  have  the  potential  to  become  important 
players  in  European  decision-making.  It  is  also  certain  that  this  is  a  welcome  step  from 
the  point  of  view  of  EU  legitimacy.  However,  exactly  how  such  involvement  is  to  he 
carried  out  remains  uncertain.  Official  recognition  of  the  importance  of  national 
parliaments  to  the  European  integration  project  is  still  lacking  while  the  future  of  the 
Constitutional  Treaty  remains  unclear.  Currently,  avoidance  of  binding  collective 
decisions  remains  an  overriding  feature  of  inter-parliamentary  cooperation,  making  it 
26 unlikely  that  national  parliaments  will  work  in  anything  other  than  an  advisory 
capacity  at  the  European  level. 
For  national  parliaments  to  engage  with  the  European  level  is  still  a  significant 
departure  from  their  traditional  roles.  Chapter  two  will  therefore  examine  governance 
and  democracy  within  the  nation  state,  as  well  as  how  integration  theories  have 
approached  national  parliaments.  Chapter  three  will  look  specifically  at  the  European 
context  and  how  relations  between  national  parliaments  and  European  institutions 
have  developed.  Chapters  four,  five  and  six  will  present  the  three  case  studies,  while 
Chapter  seven  investigates  the  concept  of  political  culture  and  its  relevance  in 
explaining  the  different  approaches  to  parliamentary  involvement  in  European 
matters.  In  Chapter  eight  the  difficulties  of  developing  inter-parliamentary  cooperation 
are  explored,  while  Chapter  nine,  the  conclusion,  draws  together  common  themes  and 
sets  out  the  findings  of  this  thesis. 
As  will  become  evident,  membership  of  the  EU  has  redefined  the  role  of  national 
parliaments  and  has  challenged  traditional  conceptions  of  what  parliaments  do,  as  well 
as  concepts  such  as  democracy  and  sovereignty.  Notions  of  democracy  and  its 
requirements  in  an  increasingly  internationalised  world  have  obviously  changed  with 
the  development  of  the  EU.  The  implications  of  these  changes  will  be  the  starting  point 
for  Chapter  two. 
27 Chapter  2:  Democracy  and  integration  theory. 
[D]ifferent  schools  of  researchers  have  exalted  different  parts  of  the 
integration  'elephant'.  They  have  claimed  either  that  their  parts  were  in  fact 
whole  beasts,  or  that  their  parts  were  the  most  important  ones. 
(Puchala,  1972,  p.  268) 
For  as  long  as  societies  have  existed,  effective  governance  has  been  central  to  their 
stability  and  development.  Dahl  (1989)  has  divided  governance  into  stages  separated 
by  two  'transitions',  with  a  third  transition  currently  taking  place.  The  first  transition 
occurred  when  the  ancient  Greeks  took  upon  themselves  the  ruling  of  their  city-states. 
This  move  vested  sovereignty  with  the  demos  and  based  governance  on  the  rule  of  law 
and  formal  equality  (in  participation  as  well  as  before  the  law).  To  the  Greeks  (or  at 
least  to  the  exclusive  male  part  of  the  population  classified  as  citizens),  democracy, 
literally  translated  'government  by  the  people',  meant  just  that:  every  citizen  had  the 
duty  to  participate  in  the  political  life  of  their  city-state.  While  the  democratic 
experience  of  the  ancient  Greeks  was  relatively  short-lived,  the  ideas  of  political 
equality,  rule  of  law  and  sovereignty  being  vested  in  the  citizens,  lived  on.  Eventually 
these  ideas  were  expressed  in  the  governing  principles  of  the  European  (especially 
Italian)  city-states  of  the  Renaissance.  However,  as  territorial  boundaries  (and  the 
number  of  citizens  within  these)  grew,  direct  participation  became  more  an  ideal  and 
less  a  reality,  as  the  city-state  gave  way  to  the  nation-state  in  the  second  of  Dahl's 
transformations. 
The  second  transformation  occurred  through  the  practice  of  representation.  This  idea 
would  most  probably  have  seemed  very  undemocratic  to  a  Greek  from  400  BC,  but  it 
allowed  for  the  popular  government  of  a  territory  with  a  much  larger  citizenry  than 
that  of  the  Greek  city-state.  The  institutions  (a  representative  parliament  and  a 
government  derived  from  it)  and  procedures  (free,  fair  and  competitive  elections) 
associated  with  representative  democracy  now  appear  throughout  the  world  in  many 
variations,  but  their  types  are  familiar  to  any  modern  student  of  politics.  The  term 
'democracy'  is  often  taken  to  mean  this  set  of  institutions  and  procedures  without  any 
further  definitions  provided,  leaving  democracy  'one  of  the  most  generalised  words  of 
approval  in  the  political  lexicon'  (Beetham,  1993,  p.  6).  Because  of  its  legitimising 
associations,  most  states  aspire  to  a  `democratic'  form  of  governance. 
Even  as  increasing  numbers  of  states  proclaim  themselves  to  be  democratic,  they  exist 
in  a  world  that  has  become  increasingly  interconnected  and  in  which  states  and 
28 citizenries  have  become  interdependent.  While  states  remain  important  actors 
internationally,  their  roles  have  changed.  David  Held  (2005)  thus  argues  that 
[w]hile  many  states  retain  the  ultimate  legal  claim  to  effective  supremacy 
over  what  occurs  within  their  own  territories,  this  should  be  juxtaposed 
with,  and  understood  in  relation  to,  the  expanding  jurisdiction  of  global 
and  regional  governance  and  the  constraints  of,  as  well  as  the  obligations 
derived  from,  new  and  changing  forms  of  international  regulation. 
Although  globalisation  involves  and  affects  states,  it  is  also  characterised  by  its 
'transnational  form'.  In  other  words,  'it  is  based  on  exchange  processes  which,  more  or 
less,  bypass  both  the  state  and  the  traditional  international  character  of  the  world 
economy  in  the  past'  (Ladeur,  2004).  '  Individual  nation  states  find  it  ever  more  difficult 
to  fulfill  all  the  needs  of  their  citizens  (one  example  being  protection  from  border- 
crossing  pollution)  and  have  developed  methods  for  cooperation  at  the  international 
level  in  a  response  to  these  difficulties.  The  EU  can  thus  be  seen  as  an 
acknowledgement  of  this  process  of  globalisation  and  of  a  third  transition  to  something 
at  least  approximating  regional  or  global  democracy. 
Increasingly,  it  is  demanded  that  regional  and  international  governing  structures  be 
subject  to  democratic  scrutiny  in  a  manner  similar  to  what  takes  place  in  democratic 
nation-states.  This  has  been  especially  so  with  the  EU,  where  one  institutional  response 
to  this  demand  has  been  the  increased  powers  accorded  the  EP.  A  requirement  for 
membership  of  the  EU  is  that  the  applicant  state  is  democratic,  even  though  the  EU 
itself  is  frequently  accused  of  harbouring  a  'democratic  deficit'.  Indeed,  in  the  words  of 
MEP  David  Martin,  if  the  EU  was  to  apply  to  become  a  member  of  itself  'it  would  be 
turned  down  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  not  a  democracy'  (Martin,  1991,  p.  16).  Exactly 
how  to  assess  democracy  at  the  regional  or  international  level  remains  open  to  debate. 
Although  the  EU's  governance  structures  in  some  respects  resemble  those  of  a  nation 
state  (having  institutions  that  largely  conform  to  a  national-level  parliament, 
government  and  administration),  the  differences  are  still  sufficient  to  cast  the 
democratic  criteria  usually  applied  at  the  national  level  as  inapplicable  at  the  European 
level.  Views  on  how  best  to  democratise  the  EU  are  closely  aligned  with  opinions  on 
how  further  integration  should  be  undertaken.  Intergovernmentalists  emphasise  the 
role  of  national  actors  while  supranationalist  thinkers  support  the  development  of  the 
EP,  although  both  see  a  role  for  national  parliaments.  In  the  words  of  Beetham  (1993,  p. 
8) 
the  degree  of  democracy  in  a  society  is  not  to  be  judged  by  the  degree  of 
support  any  particular  governmental  decision  may  enjoy  -  after  all,  even 
dictators  may  enjoy  periods  of  great  popularity.  It  is  to  be  judged  by  the 
'  For  a  definition  of  globalisation  and  further  discussion  of  the  concept  see  below. 
29 effectiveness  of  the  arrangements  for  ensuring  popular  control  over 
decision  makers  on  a  regular  basis. 
This  chapter  will  not  attempt  to  develop  an  exacting  definition  of  democracy.  Rather,  it 
is  the  historic  development  of  democracy  and  the  importance  of  national  parliaments 
in  this  development  that  will  be  discussed.  Global  interdependence  has  caused 
alterations  in  the  nature  of  decision-making  with  an  increasing  number  of  decisions 
taken  above  the  national  level.  In  turn,  this  process  has  changed  the  demands  placed 
on  democracy  in  order  that  decisions  remain  legitimate.  Parliaments  remain  the  most 
important  legitimisers  of  international  cooperation,  especially  national  parliaments, 
although  at  the  international  level  their  role  is  often  indirect-and  rarely  explicitly 
recognised  by  integration  theorists. 
In  this  chapter  the  second  and  third  transitions  of  democracy  will  thus  be  explored  in 
an  attempt  to  better  understand  how  familiar  structures  of  governance  (and  national 
parliaments)  have  developed  and  are  now  being  challenged.  Following  this  discussion 
the  term  'globalisation'  will  be  examined  together  with  the  forces  that  gave  rise  to  it. 
The  final  section  will  offer  a  brief  overview  of  how  various  theories  of  European 
integration  view  democracy  within  the  EU,  attempting  to  identify  their  views  on  the 
role  of  national  parliaments  within  the  European  construct. 
1.  The  nation  state  and  its  governance 
Arguably,  the  system  of  nation  states  to  which  we  have  become  accustomed  was 
established  with  the  peace  of  Westphalia  in  1648.  At  this  time,  four  aspects  of  statehood 
(territoriality,  sovereignty,  autonomy  and  legality  (McGrew,  1997)),  became  firmly 
established  and  formed  the  basis  on  which  nation  states  could  build  their  existence' 
Increasingly,  territorial  boundaries  coincided  with  uniform  systems  of  rule,  a  situation 
that  was  aided  by  the  Protestant  reformation  as  well  as  the  emergence  of  absolute 
monarchs  that  encouraged  national  churches  and  national  rule.  As  the  peoples'  rights 
and  duties  were  no  longer  tied  to  the  church,  but  to  a  territorial  entity  based  on  secular 
political  powers,  these  people  could  claim  sovereignty.  In  other  words,  they  became 
'capable  of  being  active  citizens  of  a  new  political  order  -  citizens  of  their  state'  (Held, 
1995,  p.  37).  While  active  citizenship  was  initially  limited  to  a  very  small  number  of 
people,  the  development  of  both  a  capitalist  economy  and  new  ways  of  conducting 
war  helped  increase  the  scope  of  citizenship.  Economic  power  and  influence  eventually 
translated  into  political  power  and  influence  for  new  sectors  of  society,  while  the 
development  of  the  standing  army  made  it  necessary  to  extend  political  rights  to 
2  See  also  James  A.  Caporaso's  (1996,  p.  34)  discussion  of  the  Westphalian  state  system,  described  as  a 
world  organised  into  'territorially  exclusive,  sovereign  nation-states,  each  with  an  internal  monopoly  of 
legitimate  violence'. 
30 significant  parts  of  the  male  population.  Although  on  a  different  scale,  this,  in  effect, 
amounted  to  a  repeat  of  events  in  ancient  Greece  some  2000  years  earlier. 
As  the  nation  state  was  significantly  larger  than  the  Greek  city-states,  representative 
democracy  developed  to  ensure  a  link  between  citizens  and  the  system  of  government. 
In  other  words,  representative  democracy  ensures  accountability  as  it  `limits 
government  power  by  establishing  mechanisms  of  political  control  in  which  one 
institution  (or  a  range  of  institutions)  oversees  the  working  and  performance  of 
another,  scrutinising  policy  proposals  and  monitoring  political  performance'  (Thomas, 
2005). 
Within  representative  systems  of  governance,  executives  have  increasingly  taken  the 
lead  in  terms  of  initiation  of  legislation.  An  important  role  of  parliaments  has  therefore 
become  that  of  legislative  scrutiny.  Indeed,  the  British  Parliament  states  that  'the 
Government  is  primarily  responsible  for  arranging  the  business  of  both  Houses.  As  the 
initiator  of  policy,  it  indicates  which  actions  it  wishes  Parliament  to  take,  and  explains 
and  defends  its  position  in  statements  and  public  debate.  Parliament  is  responsible  for 
making  the  Government  accountable  for  its  actions'  (The  British  Parliament,  2004b).  3 
In  the  main,  the  UK  parliament  conducts  post-legislative  scrutiny,  whereas  both  the 
Danish  and  Italian  parliaments  are  more  heavily  involved  in  the  legislative  process 
leading  up  to  the  decision-making.  The  Danish  Folketing  thus  describes  its  roles  as 
being  those  of  legislation  and  control  of  the  government,  i.  e.  scrutiny.  Whether 
conducted  before  or  after  legislation  has  been  passed,  the  ability  to  ask  questions  of  the 
government  (in  either  the  chamber  or  committees)  has  become  an  important  means  by 
which  parliamentarians  hold  the  government  accountable.  '  Moreover,  the  feeling  that 
parliaments  should  be  able  to  scrutinise  their  governments  is  now  extending  to 
European  issues  too,  providing  these  with  a  democratic  foundation  which  the  EP  on  its 
own  (due  to  it  not  having  been  granted  co-legislative  power  in  all  areas  of  EU  decision- 
making)  is  unable  to  provide. 
The  protection  of  liberal  values,  expressed  through  civil  and  political  rights,  together 
with  systems  of  representation  (with  governments  derived  from  and  answerable  to  a 
representative  body),  has  resulted  in  most  current  democracies  describing  themselves 
as  liberal  democracies.  Varying  enormously  in  their  institutional  and  constitutional 
3A 
more  comprehensive  list  of  ways  in  which  the  British  Parliament  holds  its  government  accountable 
includes  parliamentary  questions,  adjournment  debates,  early  day  motions  (House  of  Commons), 
unstarred  questions  and  general  debates  (House  of  Lords)  (The  British  Parliament,  2004a)  (in  political 
systems  where  coalitions  and/or  minority  governments  are  common,  methods  for  holding  the  executive 
accountable  to  parliament  are  very  similar,  see  for  instance  Folketinget,  2005a;  Folketinget,  2005b). 
`  The  fact  that  British  procedures  for  post-legislative  scrutiny  can  be  described  as  reactive  and 
unsystematic  does  not  detract  from  the  fact  that  politicians-and  the  British  public-feel  that  scrutiny  is  an 
important  element  of  the  work  of  MPs. 
31 architecture,  liberal  democracies  are  still  generally  based  on  the  territory  of  nation 
states  whose  citizens  elect  representatives  to  make  decision  on  their  behalf,  including 
decisions  made  in  international  arenas. 
Consequently,  a  widely  accepted  definition  of  'democracy'  is  very  difficult  to  find.  A 
very  narrow,  and  purely  procedural,  definition  of  democracy  is  provided  by  Joseph  A. 
Schumpeter  (1943,  p.  269)  who  states  that  'the  democratic  method  is  that  institutional 
arrangement  for  arriving  at  political  decisions  in  which  individuals  acquire  the  power 
to  decide  by  means  of  a  competitive  struggle  for  the  people's  vote'.  Politics  is  thus 
reduced  to  an  economistic  transaction  with  governmental  performance,  in  effect, 
exchanged  for  electoral  support.  In  contrast,  Held  (1987,  p.  271)  provides  a 
considerably  wider  interpretation,  requiring  a  much  higher  level  of  both  knowledge 
and  participation  by  citizens.  His'principle  of  autonomy'  states  that 
individuals  should  be  free  and  equal  in  the  determination  of  the  conditions 
of  their  own  lives;  that  is,  they  should  enjoy  equal  rights  (and,  accordingly, 
equal  obligations)  in  the  specification  of  the  framework  which  generates 
and  limits  the  opportunities  available  to  them,  so  long  as  they  do  not 
deploy  this  framework  to  negate  the  rights  of  others. 
In  between  these  two  definitions  lies  that  of  Georg  Sorensen  (1998,  pp.  12-13),  for 
whom  political  democracy  is  a  system  of  government  which  a)  provides  meaningful 
and  extensive  competition  for  all  effective  positions  of  government  power,  b)  has  a 
highly  inclusive  level  of  political  participation  in  the  selection  of  leaders  and  policies 
and  c)  provides  and  protects  a  certain  level  of  civil  and  political  liberties.  While  this 
definition  may  not  live  up  to  Held's  ideal,  it  is  still  extensive  enough  for  most  countries 
in  today's  world  to  fall  short  of  all  its  requirements. 
The  advantage  of  Sorensen's  definition  lies  in  its  prescription  of  processes  rather  than 
particular  sets  of  institutions  and  positions,  thereby  making  it  possible  to  compare 
presidential  systems  to  that  of  constitutional  monarchies,  while  also  gauging 
democracy  at  the  regional  or  international  level.  All  of  these  definitions  aim  to  define 
democracy  within  a  liberal,  representative  system.  While  they  may  represent  a 
continuum  on  a  theoretical  'democracy-scale',  all  require  a  representative  parliament  as 
part  of  an  institutional  set-up. 
Any  representative  body  in  a  democratic  system  would  need  to  partake  in  decision- 
making-in  other  words,  legislation-to  fulfill  the  requirements  of  a  democracy.  It  is 
not  enough  that  representatives  merely  present  the  opinions  and  views  of  those 
represented,  as  without  influence  on  policy-making  the  representative  body,  as  well  as 
the  idea  of  democracy,  is  impotent.  When  decision-taking  shifts  upwards  to  the 
regional  or  international  level,  any  direct  participation  by  elected  representatives 
32 becomes  difficult.  With  the  third  transition,  towards  increasing  globalisation,  national 
parliaments  have  become  limited  and  indirect  participants  in  increasingly  important 
decision-taking  processes,  while  also  having  their  functions  challenged  by  the 
introduction  of  multi-national  parliaments  such  as  the  EP.  The  process  of  globalisation 
and  its  causes  are  therefore  the  subject  of  the  next  section. 
Globalisation 
Throughout  history,  no  state  has  ever  existed  in  total  isolation.  Moreover,  few  societies 
have  been  truly  self-sufficient,  always  relying  in  some  measure  on  trade  and  contacts 
with  other  societies.  As  economic  integration  has  progressed,  the  term  'globalisation' 
has  been  used  with  increasing  frequency  to  describe  this  trend.  However,  as  with 
democracy,  globalisation  can  be  interpreted  in  many  ways,  and  'is  sufficiently 
ubiquitous  to  make  it  relevant  to  discussion  of  issues  in  all  academic  disciplines  today' 
(Gavin,  2001,  p.  2).  Although  globalisation  is  most  commonly  associated  with  economic 
activity,  it  is  more  appropriately  described  as  a  multi-faceted  process.  Indeed,  Held 
(1995,  p.  21)  argues  that  globalisation  'implies  at  least  two  distinct  phenomena.  First,  it 
suggests  that  many  chains  of  political,  economic  and  social  activity  are  becoming 
world-wide  in  scope.  And,  secondly,  it  suggests  that  there  has  been  an  intensification 
of  levels  of  interaction  and  interconnectedness  within  and  between  states  and 
societies'.  Since  the  Second  World  War,  globalisation  has  advanced  with  increasing 
rapidity  as  the  ability  to  transfer  raw  materials,  finished  goods  and  (not  least)  know- 
how  and  economic  resources  has  developed. 
The  political  dimension  of  globalisation  has  had  several  implications.  According  to 
Held  (1995,  p.  16)  'regional  and  global  interconnectedness  contests  the  traditional 
national  resolutions  of  the  key  questions  of  democratic  theory  and  practice.  The  very 
process  of  governance  can  escape  the  reach  of  the  nation-state'.  Held  (Held,  2005) 
further  argues  that 
[t]he  intimate  connection  between  `physical  setting',  'social  situation'  and 
politics,  which  distinguished  most  political  associations  from  pre-modern 
to  modern  times,  has  been  ruptured,  new  modes  of  understanding  and 
new  frames  of  political  reference  independent  of  direct  contact  with 
particular  peoples,  issues  or  events. 
Obviously,  this  has  serious  implications  for  national  parliaments  whose  ability  to  hold 
their  executives  accountable  diminishes  as  the  number  of  decisions  taken  beyond  the 
nation  state  increases. 
Developing  globalisation  has  consequently  brought  with  it  a  need  for  regulation  at  the 
international  level,  to  which  the  EU  has  been  one  answer.  However,  the  European 
33 parliament  has  not  been  accorded  powers  similar  to  those  ceded  by  national 
parliaments  and,  accordingly,  it  can  be  argued  that  a  democratic  deficit  has  developed 
(see  below).  Moreover,  international  institutions  themselves  have  traditionally  been 
assumed  to  acquire  legitimacy  indirectly  'by  the  consent  of  the  participating 
governments  and  above  all  their  capacity  to  solve  the  problems  that  led  to  their 
creation'  (Held  and  Koenig-Archibugi,  2005,  p.  1).  While  Held  (1995,  p.  267)  contends 
that  globalisation  has  meant  that  'democracy  can  only  be  fully  sustained  by  ensuring 
the  accountability  of  all  related  and  interconnected  power  systems,  from  economics  to 
politics',  Rodger  A.  Payne  and  Nayef  H.  Samhat  (2004,  p.  132)  put  it  differently, 
arguing  that  '[t]he  challenge  of  democracy,  then,  is  to  open  channels  to 
"reinstrumentalize"  the  state  away  from  the  ideologies  and  influences  of  forces  of 
neoliberal  globalization-from-above-  toward  the  redefinition  of  its  role  as  a  mediator 
between  the  logic  of  capital  and  the  needs  of  its  people.  '  In  both  instances,  it  becomes 
obvious  that  national  parliaments,  if  they  wish  to  continue  their  activity  of  holding  the 
executive  accountable,  must  develop  an  understanding  of  international  affairs  and 
consider  this  dimension  in  their  daily  work.  ' 
While  globalisation  has  brought  benefits  (especially  economic)  to  states  in  the  EU,  it 
has  also  impacted  significantly  on  the  Westphalian  principles  of  sovereignty  and 
autonomy.  Within  the  EU,  trade  is  the  most  heavily  developed  area  of  integration,  with 
decisions  on  trade  and  how  to  regulate  it  moved  upwards  from  the  national  to  the 
European  level-and  in  some  cases  further  to  the  international  level  in  cases  where 
rules  formed  at  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  apply.  As  a  consequence  of 
deepening  globalisation,  states  have  thus  been  limited  in  both  their  political  and 
economic  options,  depriving  them  of  certain  instruments  of  self-government. 
In  the  European  integration  process,  member  states  have  willingly  relinquished  part  of 
their  ability  to  act  independently.  Consequently,  in  the  international  sphere,  nation 
states  have  become  but  one  type  of  actor,  thereby  limiting  their  significance.  One 
example  of  this  is  the  considerable  importance  lobby  and  interest  groups  play  within 
Europe,  especially  in  relation  to  the  Commission  during  the  formative  stages  of 
legislative  drafting.  ' 
'  It  is  recognised  that  globalisation  involves'  activities  carried  out  by  non-executive  actors  (examples 
include  trans-governmental  networks  and  business  and  civil  society  organisations  that  organise  at  the 
international  level).  However,  the  focus  here  will  be  on  activities  by  national  executives. 
6  Justin  Greenwood  (1997,  p.  2)  thus  argues  that,  as  a  whole, 
neither  the  outputs  (purposive  and  non-purposive  action  and  inaction),  nor  the  outcomes 
(end-results),  of  European  public  policies  can  be  understood  without  reference  to,  and 
analysis  of,  the  behaviour  and  perspectives  of  those  with  interests  in  them.  Similarly,  the 
development  of  the  EU  cannot  be  fully  understood  without  considering  the  role  which  key 
interests  have  played  in  encouraging  the  growth  of  European-level  competencies. 
34 States  voluntarily  sign  up  to  the  EU  (and  other  international  organizations-including 
the  WTO),  and  do  so  in  the  full  knowledge  that  membership  imposes  limits  on  both 
their  sovereignty  and  autonomy,  concepts  that  must  now  be  re-interpreted  in  a 
globalised  world.  In  the  words  of  Held  (1995,  p.  113):  'any  conception  of  sovereignty 
which  assumes  that  it  is  an  indivisible,  illimitable,  exclusive  and  perpetual  form  of 
public  power  -  embodied  within  an  individual  state  -  is  defunct':  Despite 
globalisation,  nation  states  have  by  no  means  lost  their  importance.  Nation  states  are 
still  the  building  blocks  of  international  organisations,  including  the  EU,  and  therefore 
important  seats  of  political  power.  National  parliaments  thus  remain  important  too,  as 
they  are  the  ultimate  legitimisers  of  national  governments  and  their  actions  at  the 
international  level.  The  EU  is  an  important  participant  in  the  globalisation  process,  but 
can  also  be  seen  as  a  response  to  globalisation  and  the  effects  it  has  on  nation  states. 
However,  democracy  has  been  very  difficult  to  achieve  at  the  international  level.  While 
shifting  decision-making  upwards  has  not  been  a  straightforward  process,  a  similar 
transfer  of  institutions  and  procedures  legitimising  these  decisions  has  proved  very 
difficult,  leaving  national  parliaments  with  important  legitimising  tasks. 
It  may,  however,  be  argued  that  democratic  requirements  applied  to  the  national  level 
are  inappropriate  for  cooperation  at  the  international  level.  Andrew  Moravcsik  (2002, 
p.  621)  thus  claims  that'[wihen  judged  by  the  practices  of  existing  nation-states  and  in 
the  context  of  a  multi-level  system,  there  is  little  evidence  that  the  EU  suffers  from  a 
fundamental  democratic  deficit'.  Moreover,  the  above  discussion  assumes  the 
legitimacy  of  the  EU  to  be  input-based,  and  does  not  consider  the  legitimacy  that  may 
be  derived  from  outputs  of  international  cooperation.  Fritz  W.  Scharpf  (1999,  pp.  10-11) 
argues  that  input-based  legitimacy  (government  by  the  people)  often  relies  on  the 
rhetoric  of  participation  and  consensus  and  is  derived  from  'a  pre-existing  collective 
identity'.  On  the  other  hand,  output-based  legitimacy  (government  for  the  people)  is 
based  on  the  'capacity  to  solve  problems  requiring  collective  solutions'  that  cannot  be 
solved  by  individual  action,  market  exchanges  or  voluntary  cooperation.  Due  to  the 
lack  of  a  pre-existing  collective  identity  at  the  European  level  and  thus  Europe-wide 
political  discourses,  combined  with  the  absence  of  a  Europe-wide  institutional 
infrastructure  ensuring  political  accountability  at  the  European  level,  Scharpf 
maintains  a  sceptical  view  of  input-based  legitimacy  (1999,  see  especially  the 
conclusion),  stating  that  'for  the  time  being  and  for  all  currently  practical  purposes,  the 
European  polity  will  lack  the  quality  of  government  by  the  people,  and  that  all 
See  also  Chapter  ten  for  a  discussion  of  how  the  Commission  has  encouraged  transnational  groups-and 
how  these  provides  it  with  'a  whole  range  of  advantages,  including  loyalty  transfer,  pressures  for  further 
integration,  a  simplified  consultation  and  participation  structure,  channels  of  communication,  and  sources 
such  as  information  exchange,  cooperation,  and  implementation  mechanisms'  (1997,  p.  265). 
Held's  use  of  the  word  'sovereignty'  in  this  particular  context  can  only  be  compared  with  Wallace's 
definition  of  'national  autonomy'  (see  Chapter  one,  fn  three). 
35 discourses  that  attempt  to  draw  on  input-oriented  legitimizing  arguments  can  only 
exacerbate  the  perception  of  an  irremediable  European  democratic  deficit'.  Moreover, 
in  principle,  'there  is  no  reason  why  governance  at  the  European  level  should  not  also 
be  supported  by  output-oriented  legitimacy  arguments'  (Scharpf,  1999,  p.  188).  The 
advance  of  globalisation  means  that  output-based  legitimacy  is  an  important  element 
when  justifying  membership  of  the  EU.  However,  while  many  problems  are  recognised 
as  better  dealt  with  at  the  European  level,  it  is  also  becoming  a  requirement  that  these 
decisions  are  taken  in  a  democratic  and  legitimate  manner.  In  other  words,  the 
legitimacy  of  EU  decisions  must  also,  to  a  certain  extent  at  least,  be  input-based. 
Decision-making  at  the  European  level  can  indeed  be  characterised  as  participatory 
and  consensus-based,  with  decision-making  processes  that  often  require  the  building 
of  compromises  in  order  to  succeed.  Furthermore,  while  a  collective  identity  may  not 
exist  among  citizens  of  EU  member  states,  actors  who  frequently  perform  in  the 
European  arena  are  more  likely  to  develop  such  an  identity.  At  the  very  least,  they  may 
develop  a  mutual  understanding  that  they  must  find  commonly  acceptable  solutions  to 
certain  policy  problems  presented  to  them! 
National  parliaments  do  not  participate  directly  in  European-level  decision-making, 
but  have  the  potential  to  hold  participants  acting  on  their  behalf  accountable  for  their 
actions.  As  a  direct  consequence  of  globalisation,  national  parliaments  have  become 
important  participants  in  a  multi-leveled  system  of  governance  where  they  have  had  to 
re-evaluate  their  activities  and  methods  of  government  scrutiny.  They  have  become 
essential  providers  of  input-based  legitimacy  for  European  cooperation.  The  EU,  with 
its  elaborate  institutional  set-up  and  decision-making  procedures,  is  the  most  advanced 
example  of  attempts  at  democracy  at  the  international  level-although  still  not  without 
its  problems,  as  will  be  discussed  in  the  next  section. 
2.  Democracy  in  the  EU 
EU  and  the  democratic  process 
Integration  can  be  seen  as  both  a  process  and  an  outcome.  It  is  thus  important  to  realise 
where  and  how  to  apply  democratic  criteria.  According  to  Moravcsik  the  EU  does  not 
fare  badly,  while  Alex  Warleigh  (2003,  p.  1)  claims  that  'European  integration  has 
never  been  democratic.  Instead  the  process  of  constructing  the  Euro-polity  has  been 
about  securing  conditions  in  which  democracy  is  a  viable  proposition'.  The  important 
I  Greenwood  (1997,  p.  252)  argues  that  'years  of  collaboration  within  the  structures  of  the  EU  has  had  an 
impact  on  the  ways  in  which  member  states  see  issues,  respond  to  them,  and  relate  to  one  another  and  to 
supranational  structures.  Actors  come  to  share  assumptions  and  belief  systems  as  a  product  of  the 
institutions  and  interests  in  which  they  participate  and  interact,  and  socialise  one  another  in  so  doing'. 
36 issue  then  becomes  the  extent  to  which  democracy  exists  within  the  developing 
European  system  of  governance. 
If  the  EU  is  judged  against  the  three  criteria  in  Sorensen's  definition  of  democracy  it 
fails  miserably.  The  only  criterion  that  is  fulfilled  is  the  protection  of  political  and  civil 
liberties.  Even  this  is  not  entirely  due  to  these  liberties  being  protected  at  EU  level,  but 
rather  because  they  are  protected  at  the  national  level,  and  through  EU's  member 
states  signing  up  to  the  United  Nation's  Charter  of  Human  Rights.  The  'Solemn 
Proclamation'  on  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union  agreed  in 
2000  can  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  to  provide  protection  of  citizens  at  the  European 
level.  However,  not  until  member  states  ratify  the  Constitutional  Treaty  (if  that  ever 
happens),  which  incorporates  the  charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  gives  it  legal 
force,  can  the  EU  itself  be  said  to  protect  the  political  and  civil  liberties  of  its  citizens. 
The  remaining  two  criteria-meaningful  and  extensive  competition  for  all  effective 
positions  of  government  power  and  a  high  level  of  inclusiveness  relating  to  the 
selection  of  leaders  and  policies-remain  unfulfilled.  If  'positions  of  government 
power'  is  taken  to  mean  positions  within  the  executive,  this  corresponds  to  both  the 
Council  and  the  Commission  at  EU  level.  '  While  EU  citizens  only  indirectly  choose 
who  should  represent  them  in  the  Council,  they  have  even  less  influence  over  the 
Commission.  Commissioners,  chosen  by  national  governments,  are  not  directly 
responsible  to  the  public.  The  EP's  powers  of  investiture  and  dismissal  are  of  the 
'nuclear  type':  the  EP  cannot  sanction  individual  Commissioners,  and  the  sacking  of 
(or  failure  to  confirm)  the  entire  Commission  is  a  serious  undertaking,  which  has  only 
been  threatened  on  very  few  occasions.  For  the  individual  voter,  influence  over  EU's 
governing  institutions  is  thus  very  limited,  as  there  is  no  way  in  which  EU  citizens  can 
'throw  the  rascals  out,  replacing  the  governing  body  of  the  EU  with  one  more  to  their 
liking.  At  best,  any  such  replacement  is  done  piecemeal,  and  thus  with  very  limited 
effect  (Lord,  1998,  p.  93). 
For  European  citizens,  participation  at  the  EU  level  is  limited  to  EP  elections  and  the 
occasional  referenda:  'there  is  no  civic  act  of  the  European  citizen  where  he  or  she  can 
influence  directly  the  outcome  of  any  policy  choice  facing  the  Community  and  Union' 
(Weiler  et  al.,  1996,  p.  2).  Elections  to  the  EP  do  not  result  in  a  European  government, 
and  national  elections  only  indirectly  influence  governance  (and  therefore  policy 
choices)  at  the  European  level.  Furthermore,  in  the  limited  number  of  member  states 
who  have  held  referenda  on  EU  issues,  the  citizens  have  been  presented  with  a  'take  it 
or  leave  it'  situation.  The  long  negotiations  preceding  referenda  on  either  membership 
of  the  EU  or  revisions  of  the  treaties  have  traditionally  been  conducted  by  governments 
9  For  a  discussion  of  individual  EU  institutions  as  well  as  inter-institutional  relations  see  Chapter  three. 
37 of  the  member  states,  often  with  no  or  very  limited  consultation  of  the  European 
peoples  or  their  representatives  in  parliaments.  Although  the  Convention  on  the 
Future  of  Europe  included  national  parliamentarians  in  work  determining  the  future  of 
European  integration,  this  work  was  limited  to  a  small  number  of  parliamentarians 
from  each  participating  country.  Moreover,  the  participants  have  been  described  as  'a 
self-selected  group  of  the  European  political  elite'  (Stuart,  2003),  and  although  the 
'pedagogic  impact'  of  parliamentarians'  participation  in  the  work  of  the  Convention 
should  not  be  underestimated,  it  is  still  that  case  that'[i]f  the  constitutional  treaty  is  to 
deliver  on  its  promise  of  securing  progress  for  Europe's  citizens  there  must  be  deeper 
understanding  and  more  discussion  of  the  Union  and  its  impact  in  national  and 
regional  legislatures'  (Norman,  2003,  p.  329).  Furthermore,  the  Constitution  and  its 
work  did  not  generate  as  much  attention  as  hoped  (Norman,  2003,  pp.  327-8).  It  can 
therefore  still  be  argued  that  'there  is  little  sense  in  which  this  pattern  of  deliberative 
politics  has  been  broadened  out  to  include  the  public'  (Lord,  1998,  p.  79). 
Citizens'  further  involvement  with  EU  affairs  can  be  achieved  through  petitions  to 
either  Members  of  the  European  Parliament  (MEPs),  the  ombudsman"  or  participation 
in  interest  groups.  Although  the  number  of  petitions  to  MEPs  has  increased  over  the 
years,  it  is  still  not  significant  (Corbett  et  al.,  2000,  pp.  275-278).  Whether  such  activity 
can  be  deemed  `participation'  should  also  be  questioned,  especially  in  the  case  of  mass- 
petitions,  where  most  people  do  little  more  than  sign  a  form.  Participation  in  interest 
groups  requires  more  from  the  individual  citizen  and  potentially  provides  the 
opportunity  to  interact  with  the  Commission  and  (increasingly)  the  EP,  influencing 
decisions  as  well  as  the  agenda.  However,  significant  resources  (time-wise  as  well  as 
financial)  are  required  to  be  effective  at  this  level,  restricting  such  activity  to  a  limited 
number  of  people.  Consequently,  the  number  of  citizens  able  to  influence  the  agenda  of 
the  EU  is  severely  circumscribed,  as  are  the  opportunities  for  influencing  policy 
outcomes. 
The  democratic  deficit 
Governing  structures  at  the  European  level  are  thus  different  to  those  of  a  nation  state. 
Political  power  and  influence  is  distributed  in  different  ways,  both  vertically  and 
horizontally,  making  it  difficult  for  EU  citizens  and  their  representatives  to  oversee  and 
control  executive  activities.  The  result  is  a  democratic  deficit  that  exists  at  both  the 
national  and  European  level. 
'°  It  is  stipulated  that 
The  European  Parliament  shall  appoint  an  Ombudsman  empowered  to  receive  complaints  from  any 
citizen  of  the  Union  or  any  natural  or  legal  person  residing  or  having  its  registered  office  in  a  Member 
State  concerning  instances  of  maladministration  in  the  activities  of  the  Community  institutions  or  bodies, 
with  the  exception  of  the  Court  of  Justice  and  the  Court  of  First  Instance'acting  in  their  judicial  role  (Treaty 
of  Nice,  20011,  Article  195,  para  1). 
38 The  source  of  the  deficit  is  commonly  attributed  to  the  transfer  of  responsibility  to  the 
EU-level  without  a  concomitant  transfer  of  (input-based)  democratic  procedures  and 
practices.  In  other  words,  decision-making  powers  are  transferred  from  national 
parliaments  to  institutions  at  the  European  level-but  without  awarding  the  EP 
powers  similar  to  those  of  national  parliaments.  This  situation  has  led  to  'deficiencies 
in  representation,  representativeness,  accountability,  transparency  and  legitimacy' 
(Eriksen  and  Fossum,  2000).  The  institution  most  commonly  providing  these  traits  in  a 
democratic  system  (at  the  national  level)  is  a  representative  parliament.  However, 
despite  becoming  an  equal  co-legislator  with  the  Council  in  a  majority  of  policy-areas 
the  EP  has  historically  had  limited  influence  (compared  to  national  parliaments)  on 
EU-legislation.  National  parliaments  have  been  considered  incapable  of  properly 
scrutinising  EU-matters,  mainly  due  to  time-constraints  and  lack  of  appropriate 
documentation  (Justice,  1996,  p.  5),  and  have  therefore  been  unable  to  complement  the 
work  of  the  EP.  The  democratic  deficit  within  the  EU  thus  has  two  dimensions  (as 
identified  by  Lord,  1998,  p.  14).  The  first  dimension  relates  to  a  difference  in  the  levels 
of  democracy  attained  at  national  and  EU-level  and  becomes  important  when 
competences  are  transferred  from  the  national  level  to  less  democratic  EU-institutions. 
In  theory  at  least,  this  dimension  of  the  deficit  is  rectifiable,  being  a  matter  of 
improving  democratic  practices  at  EU-level.  The  second  dimension  of  the  deficit  relates 
to  a  discrepancy  between  democratic  ideals  and  practices  which,  as  pointed  out  above, 
exists  in  any  political  system. 
EU  leaders  have  endeavoured  to  reduce  the  democratic  deficit,  including  the  attempt 
at  embracing  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  The  TEC  stipulates  that  'decisions  are  taken 
as  openly  as  possible  and  as  closely  as  possible  to  the  citizen'  (Treaty  on  European 
Union,  1997,  Article  1)  but  also  that  the  Community  is  to  act  'only  if  and  insofar  as  the 
objectives  of  the  proposed  action  cannot  be  sufficiently  achieved  by  the  Member  States 
and  can  therefore,  by  reason  of  the  scale  or  effects  of  the  proposed  action,  be  better 
achieved  by  the  Community'  (Treaty  Establishing  the  European  Community,  1997, 
Article  5).  As  these  two  'definitions'  do  not  sit  easily  together,  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity  may  better  be  defined  as  a  mechanism  that  'regulates  the  allocation  or  the 
use  of  authority  within  a  political  order  where  there  is  no  unitary  sovereign'  (Follesdal, 
1999).  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  subsidiarity  is  an  attempt  to  reconcile  the 
incompatible  objectives  of  sub-European  independence  and  popular  sovereignty  at  the 
European  level  (Katz,  2001,  p.  75).  Consequently,  a  decision  may  be  lifted  above  or 
pushed  below  the  national  level,  depending  on  which  is  more  appropriate.  However, 
the  principle  of  subsidiarity  cannot  by  itself  depoliticise  the  issues  it  helps  allocate.  In 
effect,  it  is  little  more  than  'a  tool  to  help  illuminate  the  costs  and  benefits  of  alternative 
choices'  (Peterson,  1994,  p.  130).  Moreover,  applying  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  does 
39 not  guarantee  that  decisions  are  subject  to  appropriate  democratic  measures,  most 
notably  parliamentary  scrutiny. 
Within  the  nation  state,  elections  to  a  representative  parliament  have  become  the  most 
important  method  for  citizens  to  express  their  choice  of  leaders  and  policies.  During 
election  campaigns,  political  parties  will  offer  their  candidates  for  election,  as  well  as  a 
policy  platform  based  on  a  certain  political  ideology,  with  citizens  being  free  to  choose 
between  them.  Although  only  a  limited  number  of  citizens  choose  to  do  so,  they  have 
the  opportunity  to  become  further  involved  at  the  party  level  where  they  can 
participate  in  the  formulation  of  policies  as  well  as  in  choosing  which  candidates  are  to 
stand  for  election.  Historically  the  end  destination  for  elected  representatives, 
parliaments  became  important  locations  for  the  aggregation  and  consideration  of 
citizens'  wishes  and  choices.  At  the  EU  level  this  function  is  increasingly  reflected  in 
the  gradual  extension  of  the  EP's  powers  (this  despite  a  continual  decline  in 
participation  at  EP-elections,  see  Chapter  three  for  further  details). 
Contacts  between  national  parliaments  and  the  EP  have  also  been  limited,  especially 
since  direct  elections  to  the  EP  began  in  1979.  Moreover,  EU  issues  have  been 
conspicuously  absent  from  most  national  election  campaigns-and  even  EP-elections 
have  mainly  featured  national  issues.  European  citizens  have  therefore  had  limited 
opportunities  to  become  informed  about  and  express  opinions  on  issues  dealt  with  at 
the  European  level.  However,  as  the  line  between  domestic  and  foreign  affairs 
continues  to  blur,  it  is  questionable  whether  such  a  distinction  remains  valid. 
Increasingly,  decisions  at  one  level  will  have  consequences  at  other  levels  of 
governance.  The  ability  of  national  parliaments  to  deal  exclusively  with  'national' 
issues,  and  the  EP  with  'EU-issues',  must  consequently  be  questioned.  Moreover,  the 
nation-state  (with  its  concomitant  administration)  has  acquired  the  additional  function 
of  being  a  'sorting  office';  deciding  at  what  level  a  decision  should  be  handled  as  well 
as  what  institutions  are  most  appropriate  for  solving  particular  issues.  In  the  words  of 
Held  'the  sovereign  state  now  lies  at  the  crossroads  of  a  vast  array  of  networks  and 
organizations  that  have  been  established  to  regulate  and  manage  diverse  areas  of 
international  and  transnational  activity  -  trade,  communications,  crime  and  so  on', 
while  globalisation  'is  associated  with  a  transformation  or  an  'unbundling'  of  the 
relationship  between  sovereignty,  territoriality  and  political  power'  (2005,  pp.  242  and 
243). 
One  implication  is  that  national  executives  or  citizen's  representatives  can  no  longer,  at 
any  one  level,  address  issues  on  their  own.  Instead,  it  has  become  necessary  to  debate 
and  inform  at  several  different  levels  and  in  several  different  forums  simultaneously. 
Legitimisation  of  multi-level  governance  is,  to  a  large  extent,  reliant  on  national 
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parliaments  have  been  unwilling  to  take  on  the  additional  work  required  to  scrutinise 
government  activities  above  the  national  level.  Because  of  the  ability  of  national 
executives  to  evade  the  most  direct  form  of  scrutiny  of  its  activities  at  the  European 
level,  it  can  be  argued  that  a  structural  (or  input-based)  democratic  deficit  exists  within 
the  EU.  Although  Moravcsik  argues  that  'indirect  democratic  control  via  national 
governments  (together  with  constitutional  checks  and  balances  and  the  increasingly 
powerful  European  Parliament)  provide  'in  nearly  all  cases,  clean,  transparent, 
effective,  and  politically  responsive'  decision  making  (2005,  p.  224,  emphasis  not 
reproduced),  he  does  not  consider  the  issue  of  accountability  of  national  governments 
to  national  parliaments. 
The  case  study  chapters  that  follow  in  this  thesis  will  seek  to  demonstrate  that  taking 
this  level  of  accountability  for  granted  is  an  error,  as  national  parliaments  generally  do 
not  have  the  ability  to  hold  their  executives  to  account  for  activities  at  the  European 
level.  As  the  following  section  will  show,  few  integration  theorists  have  considered 
national  parliaments  as  independent  actors  in  the  European  decision-making  process. 
It  has  been  done  only  infrequently-and  rarely  explicitly. 
3.  European  integration:  theories  and  the  parliaments 
According  to  the  Concise  Oxford  Dictionary,  'integrate'  originates  from  the  Latin 
'integrare',  meaning  to  make  whole.  Supporters  of  European  integration  can  thus  be 
said  to  favour  the  construction  of  a  'whole  Europe'.  However,  what  constitutes  a 
'whole  Europe'-and  how  to  achieve  this  construction-has  been  much  debated,  with 
means  often  being  dictated  by  visions  of  the  end  result.  Donald  J.  Puchala's  image 
(1972)  of  the  blind  men  fumbling  around  trying  to  identify  the  elephant  seems  apt  in 
this  context.  Attempts  at  defining  European  integration  and  governing  processes  are 
further  complicated  by  the  fact  that  events  can  often  be  interpreted  in  several  different 
ways.  One  example  is  the  Treaty  of  Maastricht  which,  on  the  basis  of  its  contents,  can 
be  interpreted  as  a  victory  for  integrationists,  but  also,  due  to  the  way  in  which  it  was 
negotiated,  as  vindication  of  the  (liberal)  intergovernmental  model  (see  Moravcsik 
(1998),  chapter  six).  It  has  become  increasingly  evident  that  one  theory  cannot  fulfill  all 
three  requirements  of  a  model  (description,  explanation  and  prediction)  for  all  aspects 
of  the  integration  process.  In  the  words  of  Ben  Rosamond  'theorists  have  to  decide 
what  they  plan  to  explain  from  the  array  of  multiple  games  embedded  in  any  single 
situation'  as  'different  theoretical  perspectives  produce  and  reproduce  different  types 
of  knowledge'  (2000,  pp.  6  and  7).  This  point  has  also  been  argued  by  John  Peterson, 
who  writes  that  the  choice  'is  about  what,  precisely,  is  being  explained,  and  at  what 
level  of  analysis  in  a  system  of  government  which  is  clearly  and  uniquely  multi-tiered' 
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theories  will  be  sketched,  with  special  emphasis  on  the  role  of  national  parliaments 
within  each  theory. 
Federalism,  transactionalism,  and  functionalism 
Of  the  three  theories  dealt  with  in  this  section,  federalism  is  the  oldest  and  may  be 
more  appropriately  described  as  a  movement  or  ideology.  The  carnage  left  by  the  First 
World  War  sparked  an  interest  in  a  federal  Europe  that  still  exists,  albeit  in  modified 
form.  The  Schuman  declaration,  which  speaks  of  pooling  of  coal  and  steel  production 
as  `a  first  step  in  the  federation  of  Europe'  (Fontaine,  2000,  p.  36),  can  be  seen  as  one  of 
the  first  expressions  of  a  desire  for  a  federal  Europe.  Common  institutions  and  systems 
of  governance  would  bind  the  nation  states  together,  making  it  less  likely  that  they 
would  fight  one  another.  A  federation  clearly  calls  for  representation  of  the  people(s)  at 
the  central  level  and  would  therefore  require  a  central  parliament,  in  effect  'bringing 
along'  its  own  democracy.  Such  a  parliament  would  most  likely  hold  powers  superior 
to  those  held  by  the  EP  today.  However,  in  all  existing  federations,  state-level 
parliaments  are  of  significant  importance  too.  This  is  especially  so  in  systems  like 
Germany's,  where  central  level  governance  is  partially  made  up  from  representatives 
from  the  constituent  parts.  If  the  EU  was  to  become  a  federation,  national  parliaments 
would  thus  continue  to  exist  and  be  an  important  part  of  the  institutional  construction 
of  this  federation.  In  existing  federations  the  central  government  commonly  deals  with 
'high  politics'  such  as  defence  and  foreign  policy,  issues  that  are  currently  only  weakly 
developed  at  the  European  level,  with  individual  states  maintaining  .  significant 
autonomy  in  these  areas.  Any  move  in  a  federal  direction  would  thus  change  the  role 
of  national  parliaments  as  well  as  the  topics  over  which  they  have  influence. 
National  parliaments  are  also  important  components  of  the  decision-making  process 
within  the  theory  of  transactionalism  (also  known  as  the  communications  or  pluralist 
theory),  as  is  a  central  parliament.  When  writing  about  the  'amalgated'  approach,  the 
best  known  writer  on  transactionalism,  Karl  W.  Deutch,  prescribes  a  common  set  of 
institutions,  requiring  'a  degree  of  compliance  and  popular  support  for  functioning'. 
Without  such  compliance,  authority  can  be  left  with  the  'components'  of  the  system, 
creating  a  'pluralistic'  decision  system  (Deutsch,  1964,  p.  60).  The  means  of  achieving  a 
'system'  is,  in  both  instances,  communication  or  transactions,  with  transactions 
understood  as  communication  between  societies  as  well  as  groups  and  individuals 
encompassed  therein. 
The  idea  of  contacts  and  cooperation  between  components  of  societies  is  also  the 
guiding  principle  in  David  Mitrany's  theory  of  functionalism.  To  Mitrany,  the  essential 
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(Rosamond,  2000,  p.  32).  He  dismissed  regional  cooperation  on  the  basis  that  these 
'represent  merely  a  rationalized  nationalism,  with  wider  limits  for  the  individual  units, 
but  otherwise  reproducing  the  working  characteristics  of  the  system  of  national  states'. 
In  other  words,  'peace  will  not  be  secured  if  we  organize  the  world  by  what  divides  it' 
(Mitrany,  1943,  pp.  19  and  54).  To  facilitate  international  cooperation  Mitrany 
suggested  instead  to  'proceed  by  means  of  a  natural  selection,  binding  together  those 
interests  which  are  common,  where  they  are  common,  and  to  the  extent  to  which  they 
are  common'  (Mitrany,  1943,  p.  32).  The  areas  to  cooperate  on  would  be  chosen 
according  to  need  and  requirements,  and  national  governments  would  not  be  involved 
in  the  setting  up  of  appropriate  bodies  through  which  to  conduct  the  cooperation. 
Equally,  no  international  organisations  would  be  set  up.  Although  Mitrany  briefly 
discussed  an  international  assembly  consisting  of  representatives  from  national 
assemblies,  such  a  body  was  only  intended  to  'discuss  and  ventilate  general  policies,  as 
an  expression  of  the  mind  and  will  of  the  public  opinion;  but  it  could  not  actually 
prescribe  policy,  or  this  might  turn  out  to  be  at  odds  with  the  policy  of  governments' 
(Mitrany,  1943,  p.  37).  As  national  governments  would  determine  what  areas  would  be 
subject  to  cooperation  at  the  supranational  level,  it  can  be  assumed  that  national 
parliaments  would  participate,  at  least  indirectly,  in  this  decision-making  process. 
However,  if  any  cooperation  beyond  the  nation  state  was  considered  a  matter  of 
foreign  affairs,  it  is  very  conceivable  that  national  parliamentarians  would  have  only  a 
cursory  input  into  decisions  on  how  to  engage  at  the  regional  or  international  level. 
The  functionalist  approach  is  prone  to  charges  of  being  'hopelessly  naive',  relying  too 
heavily  on  rational  behaviour  (Rosamond,  2000,  p.  40),  as  well  as  maintaining  a  distinct 
division  between  'technical  /functional'  and  'political/  constitutional'  issues  (Cram, 
1997,  pp.  11-12).  However,  functionalism,  together  with  both  federalism  and 
transactionalism,  raised  important  issues  about  both  agency  and  structure,  issues  on 
which  later  models  have  expanded. 
Neofunctionalism 
Neofunctionalism  has,  arguably,  taken  inspiration  from  all  of  the  above-mentioned 
theories  of  integration.  The  best  known  advocate  of  neofunctionalism  is  Ernst  Haas, 
who  defined  political  integration  as  `the  process  whereby  political  actors  in  several 
distinct  national  settings  are  persuaded  to  shift  their  loyalties,  expectations  and 
political  activities  toward  a  new  centre,  whose  institutions  possess  or  demand 
jurisdiction  over  the  pre-existing  national  states'  (Haas,  1968,  p.  16).  The  end  result  is 
thus  similar  to  what  federalists  advocated,  differing  from  functionalism  in  emphasising 
regional  government-within  which  a  regional  parliament  would  be  required. 
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on  the  cooperation  of  elites  within  societies.  A  certain  amount  of  political  will  is 
necessary  to  further  the  integration  process,  mainly  through  the  'spillover  effect'  as 
'[e]arlier  decisions 
...  spill  over  into  new  functional  contexts,  involve  more  and  more 
interbureaucratic  contact  and  consultation,  thereby  creating  their  own  logic  in  favor  of 
later  decisions,  meeting,  in  a  pro-community  direction,  the  new  problems  which  grow 
out  of  the  earlier  compromises'.  "  Haas  (1961,  p.  372)  therefore  argues  that  'policies 
made  pursuant  to  an  initial  task  and  grant  of  power  can  be  made  real  only  if  the  task 
itself  is  expanded,  as  reflected  in  the  compromises  among  the  states  interested  in  the 
task'.  The  emphasis  on  elites  and  'interbureaucratic  contact  and  consultation'  may, 
despite  the  mention  of  a  central  parliament  above,  indicate  a  limited  concern  for 
democracy,  with  the  upwards  transfer  of  cooperation  being  more  important  than  the 
simultaneous  transfer  of  democratic  practices. 
In  his  studies  of  early  attempts  at  European  institution-building,  Haas  emphasised  the 
importance  of  supranational  institutions.  As  facilitator  of  'the  transfer  of  elite  loyalties' 
as  well  as  being  a  'honest  broker'  (Cram,  1997,  p.  13),  the  High  Authority  of  the 
European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  played  an  important  role  in  the  development  of 
the  nascent  European  Community.  However,  the  Common  Assembly  was  also 
important  to  this  development  for  two  specific  reasons.  Firstly,  the  parliamentarians  in 
the  Common  Assembly  worked  'deliberately  and  self-consciously'  to  'create  a  federal 
Europe  by  prescribing  appropriate  policy  for  the  High  Authority'.  Secondly,  the 
parliamentarians  also  stressed  their  'latent  "legislative"  powers'  and  pushed  for 
further  integrative  treaties.  According  to  Haas,  the  early  parliamentarians  were 
'advocates  and  proponents  of  federation  in  their  parliamentary  activity'  (Haas,  1968,  p. 
390).  With  early  institutional  developments,  national  parliaments  also  maintained  a 
place  within  the  institutional  framework,  although  their  role  would  likely  change  as 
cooperation  at  the  European  level,  and  thereby  a  new  political  community,  developed. 
Realism/intergovernmentalism 
Haas'  most  influential  writings  were  published  in  the  late  1950s  and  early  1960s. 
However,  it  soon  became  evident  that  the  spillover  effect  and  the  theory  of 
neofunctionalism  had  its  limitations,  and  did  not  fully  explain  European  integration. 
The  slowdown  in  the  integration  process  after  the  early  1960s  was  not  accounted  for  in 
the  theory  of  neofunctionalism.  Although  nation  states  were  considered  important 
elements  of  the  theory,  the  continued  importance  they  obviously  enjoyed  was  not 
"  Haas  noted  the  interest  that  the  UK  expressed  in  becoming  a  member  of  the  European  Community 
(1968,  p.  317),  and  concluded  that  spill-over  could  be  geographical  as  well  as  functional. 
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despite  their  alleged  obsolescence;  indeed,  not  only  do  they  profit  from  man's 
incapacity  to  bring  about  a  better  order,  but  their  very  existence  is  a  formidable 
obstacle  to  their  replacement'  (1966,  p.  863).  Hoffmann  (1966,  p.  882)  goes  on  to 
describe  the  logic  of  integration  as  that  of  'a  blender  which  crunches  the  most  diverse 
products,  overcomes  their  different  tastes  and  perfumes,  and  replaces  them  with  one, 
presumably  delicious  juice'.  This  'presumably  delicious  juice'  may  be  acceptable  to 
national  governments  and  their  agents  if  the  ingredients  are  of  relatively  little 
importance  or  cost,  or  if  the  certainty  regarding  the  deliciousness  of  the  final  product  is 
relatively  high.  According  to  Hoffmann:  '[t]he  logic  of  diversity 
...  suggests  that,  in 
areas  of  key  importance  to  the  national  interest,  nations  prefer  the  certainty,  or  the  self- 
controlled  uncertainty,  of  national  self-reliance,  to  the  uncontrolled  uncertainty  of  the 
untested  blender'  (1966,  p.  882). 
For  national  parliaments  the  important  aspect  of  these  considerations  is  the  extent  to 
which  they  are  considered  foreign  policy.  With  foreign  policy  it  is  mainly  executives 
who  will  determine  what  is  contributed  to  the  blender.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  likely 
that  parliaments  have  to  judge  the  final  juice  without  knowing  exactly  what 
ingredients  went  into  it,  what  the  method  of  production  was  or  how  their  own 
government  contributed.  Any  influence  is  thus  indirect  and  difficult  to  assess. 
The  above  criticisms  of  the  functional  and  neofunctional  approaches  should  not  be 
taken  to  imply  that  Hoffmann  denies  the  influence  of  the  European  integration  process 
on  European  nation  states.  Hoffmann  writes  of  a  'transformation'  of  the  nations  in 
Europe  'promoted  by  the  Common  Market  itself',  but  still  maintains  that  the  most 
visible  aspect  of  the  European  balance  sheet  is  'the  survival  of  the  nation  states'  (1966, 
pp.  889).  The  survival,  and  continued  importance,  of  the  nation  states  is  fundamental 
to  intergovernmental  theories. 
Intergovernmentalism  in  the  context  of  European  integration  has  been  interpreted  by 
Moravcsik  as  the  process  whereby 
the  EC  has  been  based  on  interstate  bargains  between  its  leading  member 
states.  Heads  of  government,  backed  by  a  small  group  of  ministers  and 
advisers,  initiate  and  negotiate  major  initiatives  in  the  Council  of  Ministers 
or  the  European  Council.  Each  government  views  the  EC  through  the  lens 
of  its  own  policy  preferences;  EC  politics  is  the  continuation  of  domestic 
policies  by  other  means.  (Moravcsik,  1991,  p.  25) 
As  in  Hoffmann's  writings,  Moravcsik  considers  the  rational  nation  state  to  be  the 
basic  unit  of  European  cooperation.  International  regimes  exist  for  purely  functional 
reasons  as  long  as  they  serve  nation  states:  '[s]tates  are  the  principal  actors  in  the 
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International  regimes  shape  interstate  politics  by  providing  a 
common  framework  that  reduces  the  uncertainty  and  transaction  costs  of  interstate 
interactions'  (1991,  p.  27).  Moravcsik  (1998,  p.  472)  thus  views  integration  as  'a  series  of 
rational  adaptations  by  national  leaders  to  constraints  and  opportunities  stemming 
from  the  evolution  of  an  interdependent  world  economy,  the  relative  power  of  states  in 
the  international  system,  and  the  potential  for  international  institutions  to  bolster  the 
credibility  of  interstate  commitments'.  He  goes  on  to  argue  that  the  'EC  has  been,  for 
the  most  part,  the  deliberate  creation  of  statesmen  and  citizens  seeking  to  realize 
economic  interests  through  traditional  diplomatic  means'  (1998,  p.  501). 
Although  the  end  result  of  treaty  negotiations  are  presented  to  national  parliaments  for 
ratification,  parliamentarians  are,  in  effect,  faced  with  a  fait  accompli,  having  had  no 
voice  during  negotiations  and  very  limited  influence  over  the  final  outcome.  Only  with 
the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  did  parliamentarians  (European  and  national) 
gain  a  direct  voice  in  the  drafting  of  a  constitutional  text.  Final  negotiations  were  still, 
however,  kept  in  the  hands  of  national  governments  at  International  Government 
Conferences  (IGCs).  The  strong  focus  on  the  state  as  a  source  of  political  legitimacy 
means  that  within  intergovernmental  theories,  supranational  institutions  are  necessary 
only  to  uphold  the  terms  of  bargains  states  make  with  one  another.  Moravcsik  accords 
them  little  proactive  importance  in  the  process  of  European  integration,  and  considers 
the  driving  force  to  be  states  and  their  domestically  determined  requirements. 
Governance  is  thus  a  national  or  domestic  issue,  with  democratic  accountability  and 
legitimacy  derived  from  the  national  level,  a  process  that  necessarily  must  involve 
national  parliaments.  In  Moravcsik's  theory  of  liberal  intergovernmentalism  there  is  no 
need  for  accountability  and  legitimacy  to  be  derived  from  the  European  level,  as 
decision-making  is  carried  out  by  the  states  according  to  domestically  derived 
interests. 
Multi-level  governance 
The  focus  on  traditional  means  of  diplomacy,  economic  interests  and  the  state  does, 
however,  leave  certain  phenomena  unexplained.  For  instance,  European  governance 
has  become  too  complex,  as  well  as  independent  of  national  governments,  to  be 
explained  by  the  intergovernmental  model.  This  point  is  developed  by  Daniel  Wincott, 
who  also  points  to  'intergovernmentalism's  failure  to  theorize  the  significance  of  policy 
feedbacks  into  the  EU  system  that  are  the  consequence  of  previous  decisions'  (see 
Rosamond,  2000,  pp.  145-7). 
Even  if  one  accepts  that  national  governments  are  the  main  driving  forces  behind  EU 
policies,  the  preferences  of  these  national  governments  will  be  influenced  by 
46 membership  of  the  EU.  Wayne  Sandholtz  (1993,  p.  3)  writes  that  `national  interests  of 
EC  states  do  not  have  independent  existence;  they  are  not  formed  in  a  vacuum  and 
then  brought  to  Brussels'.  In  a  critique  of  the  dichotomous  view  of  European 
integration  which  the  'rivalry'  between  supranationalism  and  intergovernmentalism 
provides,  Sandholtz  concludes  that  '[p]erhaps  our  explanatory  goals  are  best  served  by 
specifying  the  analytic  strengths-and  limitations-of  approaches  that  work  better  in 
combination  than  alone'  (1993,  p.  39). 
The  concept  of  multi-level  governance  is  an  attempt  to  explain  how  multiple 
participants  with  affiliations  at  different  territorial  levels  take  part  in  the  European 
integration  process.  Not  only  are  national-level  actors  influenced  by  events,  procedures 
and  decisions  from  the  European  level,  they  have  also  been  forced  to  cede  influence  to 
actors  at  the  European  level  (and  in  some  cases  also  to  sub-national  level  actors).  What 
is  being  explained  is  thus  the  'dispersion  of  authoritative  decision  making  across 
multiple  territorial  levels',  with  European  integration  described  as  'a  polity-creating 
process  in  which  authority  and  policy-making  influence  are  shared  across  multiple 
levels  of  government  -  subnational,  national,  and  supranational'  (Hooghe  and  Marks, 
2001,  pp.  2  and  xi). 
As  decision-making  has  moved  both  horizontally  and  vertically,  more  actors  have 
become  involved  in  the  process.  National  governments  are  still  key  actors,  but  their 
role  has  altered  in  that  they  have  to  share  their  power  with  other  participants.  States 
'are  an  integral  and  powerful  part  of  the  EU,  but  they  no  longer  provide  the  sole 
interface  between  supranational  and  subnational  arenas,  and  they  share,  rather  than 
monopolize,  control  over  many  activities  that  take  place  in  their  respective  territories' 
(Marks  et  al.,  1996,  p.  347). 
The  focus  on  multiple  actors  and  levels  within  multi-level  governance  rarely  leads  to 
direct  discussion  or  even  mention  of  national  parliaments.  In  the  main,  writers  on 
multi-level  governance  consider  national  parliaments  to  be  legitimisers  of  national 
governments  rather  than  actors  in  their  own  right.  One  of  the  few  areas  where  this  is 
not  the  case  is  in  the  ratification  process  of  new  treaties.  Whereas  national  governments 
are  still  considered  key  actors  when  treaties  are  being  negotiated,  the  ratification 
process  of  the  TEU  has  meant  that  national  executives  now  'have  to  contend  with  the 
participation  of  many  kinds  of  domestic  actors'  (Hooghe  and  Marks,  2001,  p. 
6)-including  national  parliaments.  Parliamentarians  have  become  more  involved  in 
(especially)  oversight  procedures  due  to  a  perceived  need  for  greater  public  scrutiny, 
with  the  result  that  'action  has  shifted  from  national  governments  and  technocrats  in 
semi-isolation  to  domestic  politics  in  the  broad  and  usual  sense:  party  programs, 
47 electoral  competition,  parliamentary  debates  and  votes,  public  opinion  polls,  and 
public  referenda"  (Hooghe  and  Marks,  2001,  p.  10). 
Despite  different  visions  regarding  the  destination  of  European  integration,  integration 
theories  often  seem  united  in  the  view  that  national  parliaments  are  not  very  important 
in  this  process.  While  national  executives  are  most  frequently  considered  the  main 
actors  at  the  national  level,  national  parliaments  and  their  support  for  executive  policy 
are  often  taken  for  granted.  However,  the  nature  of  European  policy  at  the  domestic 
level  has  often  not  been  considered  by  integration  theorists,  and  potential  sources  of 
difficulty  for  the  conduct  of  coherent  EU  policy  therefore  not  investigated. 
Whether  or  not  European  integration  continues  to  deepen,  national  parliaments  are 
likely  to  develop  their  methods  of  scrutiny  further.  Such  a  development  may, 
potentially,  cause  existing  broad  interparliamentary  agreements  on  the  EU  to  dissolve, 
leaving  EU  policy  vulnerable  to  the  cleavages  traditionally  found  within  national 
parliaments.  As  a  consequence,  national  parliaments  may  come  to  be  thought  of  as 
important  national-level  actors  on  European  policy. 
Conclusion 
As  the  territory  in  which  'democracy'  has  been  the  chosen  form  of  governance  has 
expanded,  so  the  nature  of  that  democracy  has  altered.  Where  once  individual  citizens 
were  able  to  participate  directly  in  the  affairs  of  their  city-state,  individual  states  now 
represent  their  citizens  in  regional  or  international  forums  where  issues  that  directly 
affect  the  citizens  are  decided.  The  transformation  from  direct  to  representative 
democracy  is  well  documented,  with  theories  on  a  third  transition  towards  global  and 
multi-levelled  governance-and  how  it  might  be  democratised-currently  being 
developed. 
It  is  clear  that  governance  at  the  international  level  does  not  comply  with  the 
democratic  criteria  developed  above.  "  At  EU  level  the  selection  of  many  leaders  is 
indirect,  as  is  the  protection  of  many  civil  and  political  liberties.  However,  the  EU  does 
have  a  directly  elected  parliament  and  national  representatives  are  required  to  find 
support  for  most  policy  decisions  at  the  national  level.  Globalisation  may  thus  have 
necessitated  cooperation  at  the  international  level,  but  it  has  not  made  nation  states 
(including  national  parliaments)  redundant. 
U  This  point  is  little  disputed  if  democracy  is  defined  as  a  system  of  governance  providing  meaningful  and 
extensive  competition  for  all  effective  positions  of  government  power,  a  highly  inclusive  level  of  political 
participation  in  the  selection  of  leaders  and  policies  and  provision  and  protections  of  a  certain  level  of  civil 
and  political  liberties. 
48 Over  time,  demands  that  governance  at  the  European  level  be  developed  in  a 
democratic  manner  have  grown  stronger.  It  is  commonly  accepted  that  the  role  of 
national  parliaments  is  focused  at  the  national  level  and  that  their  involvement  in 
European  legislation  is  indirect  through  national  executives.  The  extent  to  which  EU 
decisions  reach  into  all  corners  of  the  lives  of  EU  citizens,  and  the  associated  reduction 
in  national  parliamentary  autonomy,  has  meant  that  the  role  of  national  parliaments 
has  changed.  While  EU  membership  was  initially  seen  as  a  limitation  of  their  roles,  the 
case  study  chapters  will  explore  how  national  parliaments  have  explored  potential 
sources  of  power  and  influence. 
The  limited  role  national  parliaments  play  at  the  European  level  is  reflected  in  how 
integration  theories  consider  the  role  of  national  parliaments.  While  all  integration 
theories  consider  parliaments  to  be  important  in  legitimising  the  activities  of  their 
executives,  most  theorists  do  not  recognise  parliaments  as  important  and  independent 
actors  within  the  explanatory  frameworks  they  deploy. 
One  partial  exception  to  this  limited  attention  to  national  parliaments  is  in  treaty- 
ratification  procedures.  Although  national  parliamentarians  do  not  partake  directly  in 
treaty  negotiations,  the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  saw  them  involved  in  the 
preparatory  work  for  the  IGC  that  followed  the  Convention.  Their  inclusion  in  this 
Convention  was  partially  a  result  of  the  difficulties  surrounding  the  ratification  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty,  which  served  to  emphasise  the  need  for  public  consultation  and 
involvement  during  negotiations  of  new  treaties. 
Having  national  parliamentarians  contribute  to  the  Convention  may  have  given  them  a 
sense  of  ownership  regarding  the  final  result,  thereby  easing  the  paths  of  ratification. 
However,  their  involvement  in  the  Convention  may  also  have  opened  their  eyes  to  the 
extent  to  which  European  matters  impact  on  legislative  activities  within  national 
parliaments,  underlining  the  need  for  scrutiny  of  European  affairs. 
The  ratification  process  of  the  Constitutional  Treaty  has,  if  anything,  underlined  this 
view.  The  French  and  Dutch  rejections  of  the  Treaty  in  referenda  were  a  clear 
indication  that  the  European  peoples  are  not  in  agreement  with  their  politicians  on  the 
issue  of  European  integration.  "  Clearly,  deeper  and  more  nuanced  debates  are 
necessary  if  politicians  and  citizens  are  to  understand  each  other  on  European  issues. 
13  ,  he  rpilfc  in  the  fwn  referomria  were  as  follows- 
No-vote  (percent)  Turnout  (r  cent) 
France  5468  69.34 
The  Netherlands  61.7  63 
49 Such  debates  may  also  influence  how  scrutiny  systems  within  national  parliaments 
develop. 
As  will  become  evident  through  the  case  studies,  how  national  parliaments  have 
reacted  to  the  European  integration  process  has  varied  considerably  between 
parliaments.  To  a  large  extent,  responses  have  depended  on  traditional  political 
cultures,  practices  and  procedures,  although  they  have  also  often  been  reactive  rather 
than  proactive.  However,  the  blindfolds  are  coming  off,  gradually  revealing  the 
integration  elephant  in  its  entirety. 
National  parliaments  therefore  remain  on  a  steep  learning  curve  as  their  contact  with 
and  understanding  of  the  European  level  is  becoming  more  important  but  has  often 
been  limited.  The  relationship  between  national  parliaments  and  European  institutions 
will  be  explored  in  the  next  chapter,  together  with  an  overview  of  how  national 
parliaments  have  been  considered  at  the  European  level  in  the  various  treaties  ratified 
so  far. 
50 Chapter  3:  The  European  Union  and  national  parliaments: 
Together  but  apart? 
[T]he  national  Parliament  shall  have  a  real  opportunity  to  use  the 
information  received  to  gain  an  influence  on  its  own  country's  European 
policy  and  thereby  the  common  decisions  made  in  the  Community. 
(COSAC,  2003b,  section  I). 
As  legitimisers  of  European  integration  national  parliaments  have  so  far  ratified  all  EU 
treaties  placed  in  front  of  them.  However,  their  ability  to  influence  the  treaty  texts  has 
traditionally  been  negligible,  only  existing  indirectly  through  their  national  executives. 
The  ratification  of  (especially)  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  (TEU)  made  it  clear  that 
the  EU  and  its  institutions  had  not  managed  to  develop  the  legitimacy  claimed  by 
national  institutions.  As  Europeanisation  has  developed,  it  has  become  increasingly 
obvious  that  national  level  institutions,  especially  national  parliaments,  are  integral  to 
the  legitimisation  of  the  Community  and  its  policies.  The  premises  for  the  involvement 
of  national  parliament  in  European  affairs  have  therefore  been  altered.  Despite  the 
importance  of  the  legitimising  function,  a  specific  role  for  national  parliaments  in  the 
European  construct  has  mot  been  included  in  any  of  the  treaties  ratified  to  date.  Indeed, 
until  very  recently  the  importance  of  this  function  has  not  been  widely  recognised 
amongst  national  parliaments  themselves.  The  two  Conventions  on  Human  Rights  and 
the  Future  of  Europe  (for  more  details  see  Chapter  eight)  have  changed  this  picture, 
with  national  parliamentarians  participating  directly  at  the  European  level,  and  it  is 
now  inconceivable  that  preparations  for  future  IGCs  will  exclude  national 
parliamentarians. 
In  contrast,  the  EP  has  been  included  in  the  treaties  as  a  fundamental  element  of  the 
European  institutional  order  from  the  onset  of  European  cooperation.  While  MEPs 
have  worked  to  increase  the  EP's  power  and  influence,  their  involvement  in  European 
decision-making  has  never  been  questioned.  The  idea  of  direct  involvement  by 
national  parliaments  at  the  European  level  has  been  raised  at  different  points  in  time, 
but  has  always  been  rejected  in  favour  of  national  parliaments  limiting  their  legislative 
activities  to  the  national  level.  Contacts  between  national  parliaments  and  European- 
level  institutions  have  been  limited  although  the  two  levels  have  increasingly  found 
themselves  needing  the  other:  European  cooperation  is,  to  a  large  extent,  legitimised  by 
national  parliaments,  but  it  has  also  been  recognised  that  certain  issues  of  relevance  to 
voters  at  the  national  level  are  better  dealt  with  at  the  European  level. 
51 In  this  chapter  the  relationship  between  national  parliaments  and  the  European  level 
will  therefore  be  examined.  Firstly,  the  EU's  development  will  be  investigated  through 
consecutive  treaties,  focusing  on  the  limited  extent  to  which  national  parliaments  are 
included  in  these  treaties.  In  the  second  section  the  Community's  main  institutions  are 
described,  with  a  focus  on  their  relations  with  national  parliaments.  The  final  section  is 
a  brief  overview  of  how  national  parliaments  have  attempted  to  scrutinise  their 
governments'  behaviour  and  actions  at  the  European  level.  National  parliaments  can 
be  classified  according  to  their  influence  on  either  national  or  European  legislation, 
with  no  certainty  that  the  two  categories  overlap.  Greater  influence  over  domestic 
legislation  does  not  automatically  translate  into  influence  over  European  legislation 
(even  indirectly  through  the  activities  of  executives  at  the  European  level).  Another 
important  factor  in  efficient  scrutiny  is  the  amount  and  type  of  information  available  to 
national  parliamentarians,  with  too  much  information  as  much  a  problem  as  too  little. 
Specific  national  circumstances  also  influence  parliamentary  levels  of  ambition,  with 
some  parliaments  perceiving  themselves  as  needing  to  be  supportive  rather  than 
critical  of  their  governments'  European  policies.  European  institutions  or  treaties  have 
not  dictated  scrutiny  activities  undertaken  at  the  national  level.  Indeed,  they  have 
barely  mentioned  national  parliaments.  The  gradual  recognition  of  their  role  within 
Europe  is  the  subject  of  the  first  sections  of  this  chapter. 
1.  The  EU's  founding  treaties 
The  origins  of  what  is  now  known  as  the  European  Union  lie  in  the  European  Coal  and 
Steel  Community  (ECSC),  whose  founding  treaty  was  the  first  of  those  upon  which  the 
EU  of  today  is  based.  The  ECSC  treaty  was  signed  in  April  1951  by  Belgium,  France, 
the  Republic  of  Germany  ('West  Germany'),  Italy,  Luxembourg,  and  the  Netherlands, 
also  known  as  'the  six'.  The  ECSC  was  to  'contribute,  in  harmony  with  the  general 
economy  of  the  Member  States  and  through  the  establishment  of  a  common  market  ... 
to  economic  expansion,  growth  of  employment  and  a  rising  standard  of  living  in  the 
Member  States'  (Treaty  Establishing  the  European  Coal  and  Steel  Community  (Paris,  18 
April  1951),  Article  2).  To  this  end  four  main  institutions  were  established:  a  High 
Authority,  a  Common  Assembly,  a  Special  Council  of  Ministers  (Council),  and  a  Court 
of  Justice.  The  Common  Assembly,  composed  of  members  appointed  from  member 
states'  national  parliaments,  was  intended  to  represent  the  peoples  of  the  member 
states  in  the  Community,  and  was  granted  supervisory  powers  accordingly.  However, 
its  influence  was  limited,  and  the  Assembly  remained  a  marginal  player  for  many 
years.  The  only  direct  way  for  national  parliaments  to  be  involved  in  the  emerging 
integration  process  was  thus  extremely  circumscribed,  with  the  only  other  method 
being  indirectly  through  national  executives  in  the  Council. 
52 The  institutional  design  altered  little  when  the  European  Economic  Community  (EEC) 
and  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  (EURATOM)  came  into  force  in  January 
1958.  The  aim  of  the  EEC  was  similar  to  that  of  the  ECSC,  namely  the  establishment  of 
a  common  market,  promotion  of  economic  activities,  increased  standard  of  living 
through  continuous  and  balanced  expansion,  an  increase  in  stability,  and  closer 
relations  between  the  Member  States  (Treaty  Establishing  the  European  Economic 
Community  (Rome,  25  March  1957),  Treaty  of  Rome,  Article  2). 
The  new  Communities  established  their  own  Councils  and  Commissions,  although  it 
was  decided  that  the  Assembly,  renamed  the  European  Parliamentary  Assembly, 
should  be  common  to  all  three  Communities  (Palmer,  1981,  p.  23).  The  Assembly 
remained  a  body  to  be  consulted,  but  whose  views  neither  the  Council  nor  the 
Commission  was  obligated  to  take  into  consideration.  Significantly,  though,  the 
Assembly  was  requested  to  draw  up  proposals  for  `elections  by  direct  universal 
suffrage  in  accordance  with  a  uniform  procedure  in  all  Member  States'  (Treaty 
Establishing  the  European  Economic  Community  (Rome,  25  March  1957),  Article  138, 
paragraph  3).  Although  never  implemented,  the  Assembly  worked  hard  to  develop 
such  procedures.  The  requirement  for  unanimity  within  the  Council  meant  that  no 
uniform  election  procedure  could  be  agreed  upon,  and  it  was  only  in  1976  that  the  Act 
on  direct  elections  of  members  to  the  Assembly  was  signed.  However,  direct  elections 
did  not  take  place  until  1979  and  are  still  conducted  according  to  electoral  procedures 
chosen  at  the  national  level. 
Direct  elections  brought  a  measure  of  legitimacy  to  the  Assembly,  which  its  members 
claimed  entitled  it  to  increased  influence.  Despite  the  claims  to  greater  legitimacy, 
further  influence  was  not  granted  until  the  introduction  of  the  Single  European  Act 
(SEA).  Moreover,  direct  elections  also  broke  the  direct  link  with  national  parliaments. 
At  this  point  the  involvement  of  national  parliaments  in  European  matters  thus 
diminished,  '  being  reduced  to  the  requirement  that  they  ratify  the  Treaties 
underpinning  European  integration.  As  they  were  intergovernmental  in  nature, 
negotiations  leading  to  these  treaties  remained  a  matter  purely  for  national  executives, 
effectively  leaving  national  parliaments  in  a  'take  it  or  leave  it'  situation,  with  no  scope 
for  directly  influencing  the  contents  of  the  treaties. 
The  next  significant  institutional  change  arrived  with  the  adoption  of  the  SEA,  which 
came  into  force  July  1987.  The  Act  reinforced  economic  cooperation  by  committing 
member  states  to  complete  the  internal  market  by  the  end  of  1992.  Furthermore, 
common  policies  were  extended,  and  new  objectives  pursued  in  the  fields  of  'economic 
'  Contacts  resulting  from  MEPs  holding  double  mandates  have  also  reduced,  as  the  practice  has  become 
less  frequent  with  many  political  parties  no  longer  permitting  this  practice. 
53 and  social  cohesion'  policy  (Article  23),  research  and  technological  development 
(Article  24)  and  the  environment. 
For  the  first  time  the  specific  aim  of  a  European  Union  was  mentioned  in  the  preamble, 
thereby  making  explicit  the  political  goals  of  European  integration.  The  need  to  'speak 
with  one  voice',  as  well  as  act  with  'consistency  and  solidarity'  to  protect  'common 
interests  and  independence',  while  also  contributing  to  the  'preservation  of 
international  peace  and  security'  was  thus  recognised,  and  the  political  nature  of 
Community  cooperation  provided  with  a  legal  basis.  Furthermore,  promotion  of 
democracy  was,  also  for  the  first  time,  mentioned  in  the  preamble.  To  this  end  the 
signatory  states  saw  the  EP  as  an  'indispensable  means  of  expression'  for  the  European 
peoples.  However,  national  parliaments  were  not  mentioned,  leaving  citizens  with  few 
opportunities  to  influence  the  decision-making  process,  and  the  EU  short  of  the 
democratic  requirements  discussed  in  Chapter  two. 
The  SEA  also  introduced  increased  powers  for  the  EP  that  somewhat  alleviated  the 
developing  democratic  deficit.  For  the  first  time  in  an  official  European  Treaty  the  EP 
was  referred  to  as  the  'European  Parliament',  a  name  it  had  adopted  for  itself  in  1962.  It 
was  also  invested  with  the  co-operation  (see  Figure  3.1)  and  assent2  procedures, 
significantly  increasing  the  influence  of  the  EP  in  the  areas  covered  by  these 
procedures.  National  parliaments,  however,  were  still  limited  to  expressing  their 
opinions  indirectly  through  the  Council. 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  (signed  February  1992,  and  coming  into  force  November  1993) 
has  to  date  been  the  most  controversial,  as  well  as  the  most  ambitious,  of  the 
Community's  Treaties.  Again,  the  preamble  is  a  helpful  indicator  of  how  far  the 
member  states  had  moved  since  the  last  treaty  amendment.  The  desire  to  promote 
economic  and  social  progress  was  reiterated,  as  was  the  aim  of  an  ever  closer  Union. 
Moreover,  the  Union  was  reinforced  through  the  provision  of  a  European  citizenship 
extended  to  all  nationals  of  the  member  states.  The  Union's  attachment  to  the  principle 
of  democracy  was  confirmed  and  enhanced  through  the  principle  of  subsidiarity, 
which  holds  that  decisions  should  be  taken  as  closely  to  the  citizen  as  possible. 
2  The  assent  procedure  requires  the  EP  to  approve  a  proposal  before  the  Council  can  adopt  it. 
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Figure  3.1  Co-decision  procedure  (Source:  Corbett  et  al.,  2000,  p.  190). 
As  with  previous  treaty  amendments,  the  institution  most  affected  by  the  Maastricht 
treaty  was  the  EP.  Its  powers  were  increased  with  the  introduction  of  the  co-decision 
55 procedure'  and  the  extended  use  of  the  co-operation  procedure  to  most  of  the  areas 
where  the  Council  uses  qualified  majority  voting  (for  an  overview  of  other  changes 
affecting  the  EP  see  Corbett  et  al.,  2000,  p.  300).  For  the  first  time  national  parliaments 
were  also,  in  protocols  thirteen  and  fourteen  annexed  to  the  Treaty  on  European  Union 
(TEU),  mentioned  in  the  Community  treaties.  Protocol  thirteen  on  the  role  of  national 
parliaments  in  the  European  Union  mentions  the  importance  of  encouraging  'greater 
involvement  of  national  parliaments  in  the  activities  of  the  European  Union', 
recommending  'exchange  of  information  between  the  national  Parliaments  and  the 
European  Parliament'  as  well  as  'granting  of  appropriate  reciprocal  facilities  and 
regular  meetings  between  members  of  Parliament  interested  in  the  same  issues'  (Treaty 
on  European  Union,  1992,  Protocol  13).  Protocol  fourteen  on  the  'Conference  of  the 
Parliaments'  encourages  the  formation  of  'Assizes',  meetings  between  the  EP  and 
national  parliaments.  `  The  protocols  do  not,  however,  indicate  a  more  specific  role  for 
national  parliaments,  nor  do  they  accord  these  institutions  any  specific  rights  at  the 
European  level.  Protocol  thirteen  does  say  that  'governments  of  the  Member  States  will 
ensure,  inter  alia,  that  national  parliaments  receive  Commission  proposals  for 
legislation  in  good  time  for  information  of  possible  examination',  although  this  can 
hardly  be  deemed  a  right.  Furthermore,  as  national  governments  provide  this 
information  for  scrutiny  at  the  national  level,  national  parliaments  were  still  not 
explicitly  recognised  in  the  European  decision-making  process  and  thus  still  did  not 
have  their  importance  to  the  European  construct  recognised  in  the  treaties.  This  very 
marginal  mention  of  national  parliaments  in  Community  treaties  contrasts  with  the 
treatment  of  the  EP,  which,  although  initially  only  a  consultative  body,  was  accorded 
treaty-based  rights  and  duties  from  the  very  outset  of  the  European  integrative 
process. 
With  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  it  can  be  argued  that  a  new  era  in  treaty  development 
began.  The  ratification  process  of  the  Maastricht  Treaty  had  clearly  indicated  that 
accept  of  deepening  cooperation  was  not  automatic.  The  Amsterdam  and  Nice  treaties, 
due  mainly  to  public  opinion  on  the  EU  but  also  because  of  the  upcoming  enlargement, 
shifted  the  negotiators'  focus  to  internal  structures  and  inter-institutional  relations.  As 
a  consequence,  the  agenda  for  the  1996  IGC  was  more  limited  than  that  for  the  TEU.  In 
the  words  of  Geoffrey  Edwards  and  Georg  Wiessala  (1998,  p.  4):  'what  the  relative  lack 
3  It  should  be  noted  that  the  only  point  at  which  national  parliaments  can  influence  decisions  is  when  the 
Council  announces  its  common  position,  a  very  indirect  method  of  participation.  For  the  most  part  the  co- 
decision  procedure  is  an  open  procedure,  permitting  national  parliaments  to  follow  the  legislative 
procedure.  If  a  conciliation  committee  is  convened,  following  the  legislative  process  becomes  more 
difficult,  causing  national  parliaments  to  rely  heavily  on  their  governments  for  information  about 
proceedings.  It  is  even  more  difficult,  however,  for  national  parliaments  to  follow  comitology  procedures. 
Comitology  has  been  summarised  as  'the  various  types  of  committees  (regulatory,  consultative,  and 
management)  created  to  oversee  the  implementation  of  Community  law,  a  power  delegated  to  the 
Commission  by  the  Council.  These  committees  are  composed  of  experts  from  the  member  states  and 
chaired  by  a  representative  of  the  Commission'  (Hayes-Renshaw,  2002,  p.  70  n.  5). 
4  The  Assizes  was  intended  as  a  body  to  be  consulted'on  the  main  features  of  the  European  Union'. 
56 of  ambition  in  the  IGC  also  revealed  was  an  increased  awareness  of  the  problems  of  the 
general  acceptability  and  legitimacy  of  the  European  venture'.  The  Treaty  of 
Amsterdam  can  thus  be  described  as  consolidating  rather  than  groundbreaking,  while 
the  Nice  Treaty  attempted  to  ready  the  EU's  institutions  for  the  upcoming 
enlargement. 
In  a  Protocol  (number  9)  to  the  Amsterdam  Treaty,  provision  of  information  from  the 
EU  to  national  parliaments  is  discussed,  and  the  Conference  of  Community  and 
European  Affairs  Committees  (COSAC)  is  mentioned  for  the  first  time.  This  can  be 
considered  as  evidence  that  the  topic  of  national  parliaments  and  their  relevance  to 
Europe  was  finding  its  way  on  to  the  European  agenda.  Confirmation  of  this  could  be 
found  in  the  Treaty  of  Nice,  where  national  parliaments  became  an  important  item  on 
the  European  agenda  as,  in  Declaration  23,  the  agenda  for  the  2004  IGC  is  outlined  and 
includes  'the  role  of  national  parliaments  in  the  European  architecture'  (Treaty  of  Nice, 
2001,  Declaration  23,5). 
National  parliaments  were  not  included  in  negotiations  leading  to  the  Amsterdam  and 
Nice  treaties.  They  were,  however,  involved  in  the  Convention  leading  to  the  Charter 
of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European  Union,  and  were  important  contributors  to  the 
Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  (for  further  discussion  see  Chapter  eight).  With 
the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  being  incorporated  into  the  Constitutional  Treaty 
and  the  second  Convention  delivering  recommendations  to  the  2004  IGC,  national 
parliaments  had  been  directly  involved  at  the  European  level  in  an  unprecedented 
manner  and  are  unlikely  to  be  excluded  from  any  Convention-like  undertakings  in  the 
future. 
These  two  events  aside,  contact  between  national  parliaments  and  European-level 
institutions  has  been  limited  and  mainly  indirect.  Direct  contacts  have  been  especially 
rare  after  direct  elections  to  the  EP  began  in  1979.  To  understand  the  relationship 
between  national  parliament  and  European-level  institutions  better,  the  next  section 
will  investigate  how  European  institutions  have  developed,  and  what  level  of  contact 
has  existed  between  them  and  national  parliaments. 
2.  The  EU  institutions 
The  Commission 
It  is  common  to  talk  of  'the  Commission  as  if  it  is  a  unitary  actor  although,  in  reality, 
there  are  two  'arms'  of  the  Commission.  One  of  these  is  the  administration  which 
consists  of  sectorally  based  Directorate  Generals  (DGs)  and  the  coordinating  services, 
57 while  the  political  arm  is  made  up  of  the  Commission  President,  the  Commissioners 
(individually  as  well  as  collectively  in  the  college)  and  the  cabinets  of  the  individual 
Commissioners  (Nugent,  1997,  pp.  2-7;  but  see  also  Nugent,  2002;  Peterson,  2002).  Far 
from  being  a  singular  entity,  the  Commission  can  thus  be  described  as  a  multifaceted 
institution,  and  its  officials  may  represent  either  national,  institutional,  political  or 
sectoral  interests  (Peterson,  1999,  p.  58).  The  Commission's  many  roles  and  functions 
remain  very  important  to  the  functioning  of  the  EU,  it  being  an  ally  to  and  blamed  by 
all  (Fitzmaurice,  1994,  p.  179),  as  well  as  central  to  the  EU's'self-definition'. 
The  tasks  of  the  Commission  have  vaguely  been  identified  in  the  treaties  as  ensuring 
'the  proper  functioning  and  development  of  the  common  market'  (Article  211). 
Complying  with  this  requirement,  the  Commission  has  developed  four  main  functions 
for  itself.  It  initiates  legislation;  it  administrates,  manages  and  guards  the  treaties;  it 
mediates  and  it  represents  the  Union  internationally  (outline  by  Edwards  and  Spence, 
1997,  p.  4).  In  fulfilling  all  of  these  tasks  the  Commission  relies  heavily  on  the  member 
states  and  their  agencies  for  implementation,  only  maintaining  a  relatively  small 
bureaucracy  itself.  The  effectiveness  of  the  Commission  thus  depends  heavily  on  both 
administrative  and  political  support  at  the  national  level,  and  the  Commission  must 
remain  sensitive  to  the  moods  in  national  capitals.  These  points  were  illustrated  by  the 
Prodi  Commission,  which  lacked  support  from  national  governments.  Often  showing 
insensitivity  to  national  agendas,  the  result  was  a  general  'lack  of  obvious  political 
capital  for  Prodi  to  fall  back  on  (Taylor,  2000b).  ' 
Direct  contact  between  the  Commission  and  national  parliaments  has  been  much  less 
frequent  than  contact  with  national  executives.  However,  as  the  role  of  national 
parliaments  at  the  European  level  is  being  reconsidered,  this  may  change  too.  Protocol 
9  in  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  thus  outlines  three  requirements  the  Commission  must 
fulfill  in  relation  to  national  parliaments,  although  these  mainly  serve  to  ease 
procedures  at  the  national  level.  Firstly,  all  consultation  documents  (Green  and  White 
Papers  included)  must  be  forwarded  to  member  state  parliaments  as  soon  as  possible; 
secondly,  legislative  proposals  must  be  forwarded  so  that  national  executives  can 
ensure  adequate  time  for  the  national  parliaments  to  receive  these  according  to 
national  rules;  thirdly,  at  least  six  weeks  must  pass  between  legislation  being  proposed 
and  it  being  placed  on  the  Council's  agenda  with  the  purpose  of  adopting  a  common 
position.  To  improve  relations  with  national  parliaments,  it  has  been  suggested  that 
with  the  increase  in  the  number  of  Commissioners  two  should  be  assigned  to  each 
'portfolio',  one  with  the  task  of  maintaining  contacts  with  national  parliament  on  issues 
s  See  also  Taylor  (2000a)  for  further  analysis  of  the  Prodi  Commission,  and  Peterson  (1999)  for  a  historical 
(as  well  as  normative  and  theoretical)  analysis  of  (especially)  the  Delors  and  Santer  Commissions. 
58 falling  within  their  remit.  6  A  further  suggestion  is  that  national  parliamentarians 
should  elect  the  Commission  President,  a  move  Simon  Hix  argues  would  give  national 
parliaments  'genuinely  significant  role  in  the  EU  system'  (Hix,  2002,  p.  22).  While  these 
changes  will  not  ensure  national  parliaments  any  further  influence  over  decision- 
making  at  the  European  level,  they  may  contribute  to  improved  scrutiny  at  the  national 
level. 
The  Council 
While  the  Commission  guards  the  treaties  and  initiates  and  implements  legislation,  the 
role  of  the  Council'  is  to  'ensure  coordination  of  the  general  economic  policies  of  the 
Member  States'  (Article  202).  It  also  defines  and  implements  work  in  the  second  and 
third  pillars  and,  together  with  the  EP,  is  the  Community's  budgetary  authority. 
According  to  the  treaties,  the  Council  is,  in  legal  terms,  one  entity.  In  reality,  however, 
it  meets  in  several  forms  based  on  sectoral  divisions,  with  ministers  from  the  member 
state  governments  representing  national  interests.  "  Although  ministers  meet  on  a 
regular  basis,  the  Council  is  heavily  dependent  on  other  Community  institutions  as 
well  as  on  close  cooperation  between  national  officials. 
When  votes  are  taken  in  the  Council  these  must  be  published.  However,  a  vote  is  very 
rarely  taken,  with  the  chairperson  merely  indicating  whether  a  majority  in  favour  has 
been  established  or  not.  In  such  cases  it  is  difficult  for  a  national  parliament  to  hold 
their  negotiators  accountable,  as  they  simply  do  not  have  the  information  to  achieve 
this.  Ministers  can  thus  blame  unappetising  decisions  on  'Brussels'  while  claiming 
victory  when  decisions  are  in  line  with  domestic  wishes.  Although  all  Council 
decisions  are  formally  taken  at  Council  meetings,  the  Committee  of  Permanent 
Representatives  (COREPER)  and  its  working  groups  (attended  by  member  state  civil 
servants)  in  effect  prepare  and  effectively  agree  most  decisions.  This  makes  it  even 
more  difficult  for  national  parliaments  to  follow  decisions  made  at  the  European  level. 
As  the  historically  most  important  institution  for  decision-making  within  the  European 
Community,  the  Council  has  been  heavily  criticised  for  the  secrecy  maintained  at  all 
levels  in  its  decision-making  process.  This  is  a  very  unsatisfactory  situation  for  the 
public,  parliaments  (at  both  national  and  European  levels),  lobbyists  and  the  press 
6  Interview  B-10. 
7  The  role  of  the  European  Council,  which  brings  together  Heads  of  State  or  government  of  the  member 
states,  assisted  by  their  Ministers  of  foreign  affairs,  is  to  provide  the  EU  with  the  necessary  impetus  for  its 
development  as  well  as  define  its  general  guidelines  (Article  4),  but  will  not  be  discussed  in  any  further 
detail  here. 
n  It  is  important  to  note  that  not  only  do  member  states  have  different  goals  regarding  what  they  wish  to 
achieve,  they  also  behave  in  different  ways,  and  are  by  no  means  unitary  actors.  See  for  instance  (Hayes- 
Renshaw  and  Wallace,  1997,  pp.  230-3). 
59 alike.  The  lack  of  transparency  at  all  levels  of  the  Council  restricts  parliamentary 
scrutiny-by  both  the  EP  and  national  parliaments.  While  the  EP  participates  in  the 
decision-making  process,  the  co-decision  procedure  still  does  not  cover  all  areas  of 
cooperation.  Furthermore,  the  Council  has  traditionally  been  accused  of  not  being 
transparent  enough.  The  forthcoming  constitutional  treaty  attempts  to  alleviate  this 
problem  with  the  Council  being  required  to  meet  in  public  when  deliberating  and 
voting  on  draft  legislative  acts. 
As  individual  institutions  operating  at  the  national  level,  national  parliaments  have 
obvious  difficulties  in  asserting  any  influence  over  the  Council  as  an  institution 
operating  at  the  European  level.  In  order  to  do  so,  collective  activities  would  have  to 
develop  significantly,  as  would  cooperation  with  the  EP.  It  therefore  seems  clear  that 
any  impact  must  be  developed  at  the  national  level,  with  national  parliaments 
attempting  to  scrutinise  their  own  executives'  activities  at  the  European  level. 
The  European  Court  of  Justice 
Although  the  Council  (including  the  European  Council)  has  provided  direction  and 
guidance  to  the  European  integration  project,  the  development  of  the  Community 
beyond  a  traditional  international  organisation  has  in  large  part  been  based  on  rulings 
and  opinions  by  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ).  '  The  duty  of  the  ECJ  is  to  ensure 
that  the  law  is  upheld  in  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the  treaties  (Article  220), 
a  task  the  ECJ  initially  fulfilled  during  a  long  period  of  'benign  neglect  by  the  powers 
that  be'  (as  first  identified  in  Eric  Stein's  article  on  the  ECJ  (1981)).  Fundamental  to 
developing  the  Community  beyond  a  'normal'  international  agreement  are  the 
principles  of  direct  effect  and  supremacy  which  establish  that  'EU  law  may  confer 
rights  or  impose  obligations  on  individuals  which  national  courts  are  bound  to 
recognise  and  enforce',  and  that  European  legislation  takes  precedence  over  national 
legislation  (see  also  Dehousse,  1998;  Hunnings,  1996;  Nugent,  1999,  p.  219).  Of 
importance  has  also  been  the  use  of  preliminary  reference,  which,  indirectly,  has 
allowed  individuals  access  to  the  ECJ.  '  The  requirement  that  the  ECJ  interprets  means 
that  its  opinions  are  always  abstracted,  only  providing  opinions  on  the  law,  not  on 
specific  cases.  In  the  words  of  Neill  Nugent,  the  ECJ  'fills  the  gaps  in  the  law  and,  in 
doing  so,  it  not  only  clarifies  the  law  but  it  also  extends  it'  (1999,  p.  258).  However,  the 
ECJ  has  often  gone  to  great  efforts  to  make  its  opinions  as  directly  implementable  as 
Although  the  EP's  right  to  take  proceedings  before  the  ECJ  developed  gradually,  'the  Court  has 
consistently  refused  to  exclude  the  Parliament  from  the  scope  of  provisions  which  refer  to  the  institutions 
of  the  Community  in  general  terms'  (Amull,  1990,  p.  691-2). 
"  Article  234  of  the  TEU  allows  lower  courts  (and  requires  Courts  of  last  instance)  to  request  a  ruling 
(preliminary  reference)  on  matters  of  the  interpretation  of  the  Treaty;  the  validity  and  interpretation  of  acts 
of  the  institutions  of  the  Community  and  of  the  ECB;  and  of  the  interpretation  of  the  statutes  of  bodies 
established  by  an  act  of  the  Council,  where  those  statutes  so  provide. 
60 possible.  According  to  G.  Federico  Mancini:  '[t]he  national  judge  is  thus  led  hand  in 
hand  as  far  as  the  door;  crossing  the  threshold  is  his  job,  but  now  a  job  no  harder  than 
child's  play'  (1989,  p.  606). 
From  the  point  of  view  of  national  parliaments  this  situation  is  very  unsatisfactory,  as 
their  role  as  legislators  becomes  circumscribed  by  a  body  over  which  they  have  no 
influence,  and  with  which  they  have  no  direct  contact.  Despite  the  right  to  submit 
reasoned  opinions  on  whether  a  piece  of  legislation  complies  with  the  principles  of 
subsidiarity  and  proportionality  embedded  in  the  Constitutional  Treaty,  national 
parliaments  can  still  not  go  directly  to  the  ECJ  to  seek  this  test  (for  further  details  see 
Chapter  eight).  Essentially,  national  rules  determine  whether  a  member  state,  in  effect 
the  executive,  is  to  take  a  case  to  the  ECJ,  and  parliaments  still  operate  individually  at 
the  national  level,  seeking  to  influence  their  executives.  While  national  parliaments  can 
coordinate  activities  in  an  effort  to  obtain  enough  votes  to  force  the  Commission  to 
review  its  position  (see  Article  6  of  the  protocol  for  the  exact  rules),  there  is  still  no 
direct  or  collective  way  for  MPs  to  express  their  concerns  at  the  European  level. 
In  contrast  to  national  parliaments,  the  EP  has  benefited  significantly  from  the  EQ's 
influence  on  the  integration  process.  Most  important  was  perhaps  the  Isoglucose  case 
in  1980  which  stated  that  the  Council  could  not  adopt  a  piece  of  legislation  unless  it 
had  received  the  EP's  opinion.  Further  cases  brought  before  the  ECJ  gradually 
recognised  the  EP  as  a  litigator,  allowing  it  to  bring  cases  of  annulment  before  the  ECJ 
in  order  to  protect  its  prerogatives  by  means  other  than  a  vote  of  no  confidence. 
The  European  Parliament 
Although  the  EP  is  no  longer  the  only  international  directly  elected  body,  "  it  remains 
the  'most  far-reaching  experiment  in  trans-national  democracy'  (Corbett  et  al.,  2000,  p. 
2).  One  reason  is  that  MEPs  have  organised  themselves  in  political  groups,  which  are 
fundamental  to  the  organisation  of  the  EP  and  its  work.  Historically,  positions  such  as 
President,  Vice-President  and  Quastors,  but  also  committee  chairs  and  rapporteurs, 
have  all  been  allocated  according  to  the  size  of  the  political  groups.  Moreover,  debates 
within  committees  are  conducted  on  the  basis  of  the  political  groups'  standpoints, 
while  the  allocation  of  speaking  time  in  plenary  sessions  is  also  determined  by 
membership  of  political  groups. 
MEPs  were  initially  chosen  by  and  from  members  of  the  national  parliaments,  thus 
only  indirectly  representing  the  European  peoples  at  the  European  level,  but  ensuring 
"  The  Central  American  parliament  is  the  only  other  multi-national  parliament  that  is  directly  elected 
(Corbett  et  al.,  2000,  p.  10). 
61 a  link  between  national  parliaments  and  the  EP.  Direct  elections  to  the  EP  began  in 
1979  and  have  occurred  at  five-year  intervals  since.  The  elections  marked  a  turning 
point  in  the  life  of  the  EP  as  it  began  to  accumulate  significant  powers  and  influence.  It 
was  hoped  that  direct  elections  would  provide  a  measure  of  legitimacy  for  the  EP  and 
the  Community  as  such.  However,  there  were  also  concerns  that  low  turnout  and 
general  lack  of  interest  in  the  elections  would  reduce  credibility  in  the  EP  and  the 
entire  process  of  European  cooperation.  '  Direct  elections  also  meant  that  links  to 
national  parliaments  were  severed,  the  only  link  being  parliamentarians  with  double 
mandates,  a  practice  which  is  increasingly  discouraged. 
Despite  an  emerging  political  system  at  the  European  level  (see  for  instance 
Thomassen  and  Schmitt,  1997),  interest  in  European  elections  has  generally  been 
limited.  To  date,  the  highest  level  of  participation  (65.9  per  cent)  was  measured  at  the 
first  elections  in  1979.  The  lowest  level  of  participation  was  recorded  in  the  2004 
election,  when  participation  was  45.7  per  cent.  "  Mark  Franklin  and  Cees  van  der  Eijk 
argue  that  EP  elections  are,  essentially,  'second-order  national  elections'  (1996).  For  his 
part,  Martin  Westlake  (1994,  Chapter  two)  argues  that  European  issues  are  emerging, 
that  'Europeanisation'  of  elections  to  the  EP  is  not  just  about  the  substance  of  the 
debate,  but  also  evident  in  the  fact  that  MEPs  are  elected  to  the  same  institution,  and 
that  these  elections  occur  simultaneously.  There  is  thus  little  agreement  on  how 
elections  to  the  EP  are  perceived  and  how  this  influences  the  voter  turnout. 
Table  3.1  Voter  turnout  in  elections  for  the  European  Parliament 
Member  State  1979  1984  1989  1994  1999  2004 
Denmark  47.8  52.4  46.2  52.9  50.5  47.9 
Italy  84.9  83.4  81.5  74.8  70.8  73.1 
United 
Kingdom 
32.2  32.6  36.2  36.4  24  38.83 
EU  Average  63  61  58.5  56.8  49.8  45.7 
Source:  1  ne  turopean  Yarltament,  www.  electionsZW4.  eu.  mt/  ep- 
elections  /  sites/  en/  results1306  /  turnout_html 
The  EP's  activities  resemble  those  of  a  national  parliament-although  it  remains  a  co- 
legislator.  Procedures  for  the  EP's  involvement  have  developed  gradually  over  the 
years,  with  the  'Isoglucose'  ruling  in  1980  representing  a  significant  turning  point.  In 
u  For  a  more  in  depth  discussion  of  these  problems,  see  for  instance  Lodge  (1986),  and,  for  a  later  analysis, 
Lodge  (1996b). 
13  The  figures  mask  significant  national  differences.  Some  countries  (Belgium,  Greece  and  until  recently 
Italy)  have  compulsory  voting,  thus  bringing  the  average  level  of  participation  up.  In  1999  the  highest  and 
lowest  levels  of  participation  were  thus  90.7  per  cent  (Belgium)  and  24  per  cent  (UK)  respectively  (see,  for 
instance,  Blondel  et  al.,  1997  for  possible  explanations  as  to  why  participation  is  so  low  in  comparison  with 
participation  in  national  elections). 
62 this  ruling,  the  ECJ  made  it  clear  to  the  Council  that  it  could  not  adopt  Community 
legislation  before  the  EP  had  given  its  opinion  if  the  treaties  required  it.  "  With  the 
Isoglucose  ruling  the  ECJ  gave  the  EP  a  significant  card  to  play,  in  effect  allowing  it  to 
delay  an  opinion  in  order  to  pressure  the  Commission  or  Council  into  adopting 
suggested  changes.  Although  the  EP  could  not  be  seen  to  delay  legislation  blatantly,  it 
became  possible  to  refer  legislation  back  to  committees  for  reconsideration,  potentially 
causing  considerable  delay. 
The  old  adage  that  'the  Commission  proposes  and  the  Council  disposes'  thus  clearly 
no  longer  holds  true  as  the  EU's  decision-making  process  has  developed  into  a 
triangular  institutional  setting  where  the  EP  plays  an  important  part  together  with  the 
Council  and  Commission  (and  occasionally  the  ECJ).  However,  the  EP  remains  heavily 
reliant  on  the  Commission  for  practical  purposes,  mainly  in  terms  of  the  Commission 
providing  the  EP  with  information  in  areas  where  the  EP's  level  of  influence  is  not  well 
developed.  The  reliance  of  the  EP  on  the  Commission  is  so  strong  that  it  has  been 
suggested  that  'Parliament's  theoretical  constitutional  independence  is  heavily 
compromised'  (Westlake,  1997,  p.  261). 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Council  has  traditionally  been  more  hesitant  in  cooperating 
with  the  EP,  guarding  its  own  status  as  the  main  decision-maker  within  the  EU.  As  the 
EP's  legislative  influence  has  grown,  contact  between  the  two  institutions  has  increased 
both  quantitatively  and  qualitatively.  As  a  result,  the  Council  has  come  a  long  way  in 
acknowledging  the  EP's  'significant  but  contingent'  contribution  to  Community 
legislation  (Earnshaw  and  Judge,  1996,  p.  124).  Still,  the  EP's  relationship  with  the 
Council  is  complicated  by  the  fact  that  the  Council  is  both  legislator  and  executive. 
While  the  EP  can  participate  constructively  in  the  legislative  process,  it  has  no 
influence  over  the  Council's  actions  as  executive,  having  to  rely  on  national 
parliaments  for  this  purpose.  Cooperation  with  national  parliaments  is  also  a  necessity 
if  the  Council  as  legislator  is  to  be  held  fully  accountable,  with  national  parliaments 
ensuring  domestic  points  of  view  are  being  taken  into  account,  as  well  as  scrutinising 
the  Council's  actions  in  areas  where  the  EP  has  no  or  little  influence  (including  at 
IGCs). 
National  parliaments  have  often  perceived  the  EP  as  a  competitor,  and  have  thus  been 
reluctant  to  increase  the  EP's  power  and  influence  within  the  EU.  MEPs,  on  the  other 
hand,  have  tended  to  resist  national  parliaments  becoming  directly  active  at  the 
European  level,  arguing  that  their  role  is  at  the  national  level  in  relation  to  their 
executives.  However,  it  is  increasingly  recognised  by  national  parliaments  that  the  EP 
has  an  important  role  to  fulfill,  especially  in  relation  to  the  Council,  which  national 
14  For  more  information  on  the  case  and  its  implications  see  Corbett  eLal.  (2000,  pp.  179-181). 
63 parliaments  cannot  undertake.  Suspicion  has  thus  slowly  given  way  to  tentative 
cooperation,  expressed  in  multilateral  parliamentary  meetings  (such  as  COSAC  and 
the  Speakers'  Conference,  discussed  in  greater  detail  in  Chapter  eight),  but  also  in 
meetings  between  members  from  select  committees  at  different  levels  of  governance. 
The  European  Parliament  is  thus  the  European-level  institutions  with  which  national 
parliaments  have  the  highest  level  of  contacts-and  the  ECJ  that  with  which  they  have 
the  least.  Relations  with  the  Council  exist  mainly  at  the  individual  level,  with  national 
parliaments  scrutinising  the  activities  of  their  participants  in  the  Council,  making  it 
difficult  for  national  parliaments  to  develop  a  joint  and  coherent  approach  towards  the 
Council  as  an  institution  has  been.  Such  a  relationship  is  easier  to  develop  with  the 
Commission,  as  this  institution  is  becoming  an  important  provider  of  information  for 
national  parliaments  which  all  have  similar  informational  needs.  By  receiving  further 
information,  directly  from  the  European  level,  national  parliaments  are,  theoretically, 
better  able  to  scrutinise  the  activities  of  their  executives  at  the  European  level.  An 
overview  of  scrutiny  procedures  will  be  developed  in  the  next  section,  where  it  will 
become  evident  that  national  parliaments  have  pursued  scrutiny  activities  with 
varying  levels  of  vigour  and  success. 
3.  National  parliaments  and  the  EU 
Parliaments  can  be  classified  according  to  several  criteria  such  as  methods  of  election, 
functions  or  influence  over  the  executive.  Michael  L.  Mezey  began  to  classify 
parliaments  according  to  their  influence  over  the  executive  based  on  two  criteria:  their 
mass  and  elite  support,  and  their  policy-making  power.  On  this  basis,  Mezey 
introduced  three  categories  of  parliament:  those  with  strong  policy-making  power 
(able  to  modify  and/or  reject  legislation  proposed  by  the  government);  those  with 
modest  policy-making  power  (able  to  modify  government  legislation);  and  those  with 
little  or  no  policy-making  power  (Mezey,  1990;  Norton,  1990b).  Philip  Norton  (1994,  p. 
17)  builds  on  this  'useful  but  not  problem-free'  classification,  arguing  that  Mezey  only 
includes  parliaments  able  to  respond  to  executive  activities,  and  thus  does  not  consider 
reactive  actions.  Incorporating  the  reactive  ways  in  which  parliaments  can  act,  Norton 
(1994;  but  see  also  Norton,  1996b;  Norton,  1998a)  thus  refines  Mezey's  parliamentary 
categories  to: 
"  Policy-making  legislatures  (able  to  modify  or  reject  measures  brought  forward 
by  the  executive,  can  formulate  and  substitute  policies  of  their  own). 
"  Policy-influencing  legislatures  (able  to  modify  or  reject  measures  brought 
forward  by  the  executive  but  cannot  formulate  and  substitute  policies  of  their 
own). 
64 "  Legislatures  with  little  or  no  policy  affect  (can  neither  modify  or  reject  policies 
brought  forward  by  the  executive  nor  formulate  and  substitute  policies  of  their 
own). 
All  of  the  seven  parliaments  investigated  in  Norton's  initial  outline  of  the  model  fall 
within  the  policy-influencing  category.  Italy  and  Denmark  lie  very  close  to  the  policy- 
making  category,  with  the  Netherlands  not  far  behind.  Germany  and  the  UK  sit  in  the 
middle  of  the  policy-influencing  category,  with  Ireland  and  France  towards  the  bottom 
(Norton,  1994,  p.  20).  The  legislation  over  which  parliaments  in  this  analysis  have 
power  is  domestic  legislation.  If  a  similar  categorisation  is  used  with  regard  to  the 
influence  national  parliaments15  have  over  European  legislation,  their  placements 
within  the  three  categories  alters  significantly  (European  Centre  for  Parliamentary 
Research  and  Documentation,  2003;  Maurer,  2001).  An  extract  from  Andreas  Maurer's 
table  shows  three  categories:  parliamentary  policy-making,  policy-influencing  and 
weak  impact.  While  each  category  contains  at  least  one  parliament,  some  parliaments 
straddle  two  of  the  categories.  The  Folketing  is  the  only  parliament  present  solely  in  the 
policy-making  category,  while  the  Austrian,  Finnish,  German  and  Swedish  parliaments 
cover  both  the  policy  making  and  influencing  categories.  Sitting  only  in  the  policy 
influencing  category  are  the  parliaments  of  France,  the  Netherlands  and  the  UK,  while 
weak  parliaments  are  considered  to  be  those  in  Belgium,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy, 
Luxembourg,  Portugal  and  Spain.  Seven  of  the  fifteen  member  state  parliaments 
included  in  this  study  are  thus  considered  to  have  a  weak  impact  on  European  matters. 
Table  3.2"  Impact  of  national  parliaments  in  EU  affairs 
Country  Weak  influence  Policy  influence  Policy  making 
Austria  X  X 
Belgium  X 
Denmark  X 
Finland  X  X 
France  X 
Germany  X  X 
Greece  X 
Ireland  X 
Italy  X 
Luxembourg  X 
Netherlands  X 
15  'National  parliaments'  still  refers  to  the  parliaments  of  the  15  nation  states  who  were  members  of  the 
Community  prior  to  I  May  2004.  For  brief  information  about  scrutiny  in  a  number  of  the  new  member 
states  (Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Latvia,  Poland  and  Slovakia),  see  the  Annex  to 
COSAC's  first  'Report  on  developments  in  European  Union  procedures  and  practices  relevant  to 
parliamentary  scrutiny'  (2004). 
65 Portugal  X 
Spain  X 
Sweden  x  x 
UK  x 
bource:  (Maurer,  ZUU1,  p.  24) 
A  table  like  this  raises  several  questions.  For  example,  what  determines  which  category 
a  parliament  is  placed  within?  Moreover,  does  this  placement  correspond  to  the 
parliament's  influence  in  domestic  matters?  The  remainder  of  this  chapter  will  look 
briefly  at  these  questions  in  a  historic  and  comparative  manner  (and  will  draw 
significantly  on  European  Centre  for  Parliamentary  Research  and  Documentation, 
2003;  Maurer,  2001;  Maurer  and  Wessels,  2001b;  Wessels  et  at.,  2003). 
Historic  developments 
Initial  involvement  by  national  parliaments  in  European  affairs  was  limited  in  the  early 
years  of  the  European  Economic  Community.  Not  until  the  Single  European  Act  and 
the  Maastricht  Treaty  did  many  national-level  parliamentarians  realise  that  for  their 
parliaments  to  maintain  influence  over  legislation  applied  within  their  country,  they 
had  to  take  an  interest  in  European  matters  too.  A  table  providing  an  overview  of 
developments  in  EU  committees  between  1957  and  1997  (Maurer,  2001,  pp.  6-7)  thus 
shows  a  total  of  37  entries  (as  some  committees  have  been  re-established  with  renewed 
or  altered  remits),  21  of  which  occur  post  -  SEA.  Despite  this  'awakening'  and  increased 
committee  activity,  only  three  parliaments  moved  one  step  to  the  right  in  table  3.2 
above.  In  France,  new  legislation  and  determined  action  on  behalf  of  the  Assemblee  and 
Senate  moved  these  institutions  from  the  category  of  'Weak  legislature'  to  that  of 
'Policy  influence'  (for  a  description  of  this  development  see  Szukala,  2003;  Szukala  and 
Rozenberg,  2001).  The  British  Parliament  made  a  similar  move  to  the  'Policy  influence' 
category  (especially  post-1997  as  Labour  implemented  its  manifesto  commitments  on 
domestic  reform),  although  it  was  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  rather  than  the  SEA,  which 
caused  parliamentarians  here  to  reflect  on  their  scrutiny  procedures.  While 
adjustments  also  took  place  during  the  1980s  and  early  1990s,  it  has  been  argued  that 
change  'was  by  far  outweighed  by  the  changes  in  the  decision-making  processes 
introduced  in  the  Single  European  Act'  (Hansen  and  Scholl,  2002,  p.  10).  Scrutiny 
procedures,  even  if  they  develop,  must  therefore  not  be  looked  at  in  isolation,  but  in 
relation  to  developments  at  the  European  level.  Perhaps  the  most  significant 
development  has  taken  place  in  Germany,  which,  according  to  Maurer's  table,  has 
moved  from  the  'Weak  legislature'  category  to  straddling  the  'Policy  influencing  and 
'Policy  making'  categories.  Significant  influence  is  limited  to  narrow  areas  of  policy 
making,  but  the  Bundestag's  EU  committee  has  developed  to  a  point  where  it  is  now 
66 considered  to  be  'a  useful  instrument  for  holding  the  government  to  account'  (see  also 
Hölscheidt,  2001;  Maurer,  2003,  p.  131). 
In  most  other  parliaments,  changes  have  mainly  been  related  to  rights  of  information 
and  improved  communication  between  parliament,  government  and  the 
administration.  As  several  parliaments  are  still  heavily  dependent  on  their  executives 
for  the  transfer  of  information,  improvements  in  transfer  procedures  contribute 
significantly  to  parliaments'  abilities  to  hold  the  executive  to  account  in  European 
matters.  The  importance  of  inter-institutional  relations  at  the  national  level  is  reflected 
in  the  fact  that  Working  Group  IV  in  the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  discussed 
the  subject  and  produced  several  recommendations  on  the  subject  (The  European 
Convention  Working  Group  IV,  2002a,  pp.  8-9).  However,  while  the  (timely)  transfer  of 
information  is  important,  explanatory  notes  are  perhaps  even  more  so.  Regular  reports 
from  executives  to  parliaments  on  European  affairs  and  on  the  executives'  activities  at 
the  European  level  are  thus  also  of  significant  importance  (for  more  information  on  the 
development  of  information  transfer,  see  Maurer,  2001). 
Information 
Appropriate  information  is  fundamental  to  parliaments  if  they  are  to  conduct  scrutiny 
in  an  adequate  manner.  However,  notions  about  what  constitutes  'appropriate'  levels 
of  information  vary  significantly  between  member  states.  On  matters  falling  under  the 
European  Community  Treaty,  Greek  parliamentarians  are  thus  entitled  to  receive  all 
draft  proposals  by  the  Commission,  with  the  Greek  Government  submitting  a  report 
on  developments  in  EC  affairs  at  the  end  of  each  parliamentary  session.  On  both  the 
common  foreign  and  security  policy  and  justice  and  home  affairs,  the  Government 
submits  progress  reports  (European  Centre  for  Parliamentary  Research  and 
Documentation,  2003,  pp.  22-3).  In  contrast,  the  Finnish  Parliament  receives,  in  all  three 
areas,  'comprehensive  information  on  the  drafting  of  EU  policy,  on  request  and  where 
needed',  and  the  Danish  Folketing  has  developed  a  system  whereby  documents  are 
automatically  transferred  from  the  Commission's  database  to  the  database  of  the 
Folketing's  EUC,  ensuring  that  all  documents  from  the  Commission  are  received  by  the 
EUC  on  their  day  of  publication  (COSAC,  2004;  European  Centre  for  Parliamentary 
Research  and  Documentation,  2003).  The  scope  of  information  received  thus  differs 
significantly-and,  consequently,  so  does  the  ability  of  national  parliaments  to 
scrutinise  their  governments.  In  the  Greek  case,  parliamentarians  can  do  little  but 
accept  the  outcome  of  events.  In  fact,  it  has  been  argued  that  effective  scrutiny  in  the 
Greek  parliament  is  absent,  and  that  'EU  affairs  are  usually  dealt  with  long  after  their 
news-worthiness  has  evaporated  and  debate  is  usually  derailed  by  general  party 
bickering'  (Frangakis  and  Papayannides,  2003,  p.  172).  On  the  other  hand,  the  Finnish 
67 Parliament  is  in  a  position  to  influence  its  government's  activities  at  the  European 
level.  As  it  is  kept  informed  of  how  European  legislation  is  developing,  the  Finnish 
Parliament  has  the  opportunity  to  contribute  to  the  government's  negotiating  stance 
during  both  the  initial  stages  of  decision-making,  as  well  as  at  the  final  decision  taking 
in  the  Council.  This  involvement  has  developed  to  a  point  where  the  Parliament  has 
been  described  as  'an  active  participant  in  the  formulation  of  Finnish  EU  policy' 
(Tiilikainen,  2003,  p.  156). 
The  timely  arrival  of  information  is  a  problem  most  parliaments  seem  to  encounter, 
especially  if  translation  into  a  less  used  language  is  required.  However,  even  British 
parliamentarians  often  consider  the  transfer  of  documents  to  be  too  slow.  Ministries  of 
foreign  affairs  still  hold  a  central  position  in  the  coordination  of  most  member  states' 
European  policy,  and  are  thus  frequently  also  in  charge  of  the  transfer  of  documents  to 
their  parliaments.  While  this  extra  stop  on  a  document's  route  to  a  national  parliament 
may  be  considered  necessary  within  a  national  political  context,  it  never  the  less  causes 
delays  which  may  hamper  the  parliament's  ability  to  scrutinise  the  government's 
actions  in  European  matters. 
Where  required,  explanatory  memoranda  are  often  transmitted  simultaneously  with 
European  documents  from  governments  and  administrations.  These  are  an  important 
component  of  parliaments'  basis  for  participation  in  the  pre-decision  stages  of 
European  legislation.  Such  notes  are  likely  to  spell  out  the  governments'  view  on  the 
matter  at  hand,  where  political  and  legal  problems  may  arise  and,  occasionally,  also  the 
anticipated  negotiating  stances  of  other  member  states. 
To  counter  the  problem  of  missing  or  delayed  information,  as  well  as  a  reliance  on  the 
executive  and  administration,  some  parliaments  have  set  up  their  own  offices  in  the 
European  Parliament.  "  These  offices  are  staffed  with  'spies'  (a  term  used  by  national 
parliamentarians  themselves),  who  may  be  able  to  obtain  information  about  upcoming 
legislation,  possibly  before  official  channels  communicate  this  to  their  parliaments, 
while  documents  may  also  be  obtained  directly.  Furthermore,  staff  in  these  offices 
often  develop  a  thorough  understanding  of  how  decision-making  at  the  European  level 
takes  place,  and  may  thus  be  able  to  explain  procedures  and  processes  to 
parliamentarians  if  required,  as  well  as  set  up  meetings  with  people  at  the  European 
level. 
'b  By  late  2004  the  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Hungary,  Ireland,  Italy,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
the  Netherlands,  Poland,  Sweden,  Slovenia  and  the  UK  either  had  (or  were  expected  to  have  very  shortly) 
representatives  in  the  EP. 
68 Unfortunately  few  MPs  seem  aware  of  the  existence  of  these  offices  or  the  potential  use 
they  could  make  of  the  staff  employed  there.  British  politicians  (unless  involved  with 
one  of  the  European  scrutiny  committees  within  Parliament)  thus  seemed  generally 
unaware  of  the  existence  of  the  British  parliamentary  office  in  Brussels.  For  instance, 
David  Curry,  MP  and  chair  of  Environment,  Food  and  Rural  Affairs  Committee  2001  - 
2003,  declared  that  he  "did  not  have  the  faintest  idea  they  existed'.  "  When  told  about 
the  office  and  its  functions  several  politicians,  including  Curry,  questioned  the  use  they 
could  make  of  a  parliamentary  office  in  Brussels.  Indeed,  Curry  claimed  that  staff  in 
Brussels  'wouldn't  tell  me  anything  that's  not  in  the  FT',  '°  while  Michael  Ancram 
(shadow  Foreign  Secretary  2001  -  2005)  and  Lord  Oxburgh  (chair  of  the  Science  and 
Technology  Select  Committee  in  the  House  of  Lords)  also  questioned  how  they  could 
use  the  office.  19  Members  of  the  Danish  parliament  seem  more  aware  of  the  existence  of 
the  parliamentary  office  in  Brussels  although  several  admit  to  not  utilising  the  resource 
to  its  fullest.  " 
A  further  source  of  information  for  parliamentarians  is  personal  contact  with 
parliamentarians  in  other  countries  or  in  the  EP.  Interparliamentary  meetings  are 
conducted  on  an  infrequent  basis,  and  usually  at  the  invitation  of  the  EP,  providing 
parliamentarians  with  a  forum  where  specific  issues  can  be  discussed  and  personal 
contacts  be  established.  Specifically  aimed  at  discussing  the  role  of  national 
parliaments  is  COSAC,  which  will  be  discussed  further  in  Chapter  eight.  Although 
dismissed,  until  very  recently,  as  a  'talking  club',  COSAC  is  increasingly  seen  as  a  place 
where  ideas  can  be  exchanged  on  how  national  parliaments  are  to  engage  themselves 
in  the  European  debate.  Concluding  'contributions'  are  still  not  binding  on  COSAC 
participants,  but  working  groups  and  the  recent  establishment  of  a  permanent 
secretariat  are  indications  that  COSAC  has  the  potential  to  develop  into  a  useful  and 
constructive  forum.  In  contrast  to  these  formal  channels,  direct  contact  with  MEPs  is 
often  through  party  contacts  at  the  national  level.  Only  the  Belgian  parliament 
explicitly  involves  MEPs  in  its  joint  committee  on  European  affairs,  while  MEPs  may 
attend  meetings  of  the  Community  committees  in  the  German  and  Greek  parliaments, 
although  they  have  no  voting  rights  in  either.  On  the  other  hand,  four  parliaments  (the 
Danish  Folketing,  Austrian  Bundesrat,  Swedish  Riksdag  and  UK  House  of  Commons) 
explicitly  exclude  MEPs  from  European  Committee  meetings. 
"  Interview  UK-7. 
is  Interview  UK-7. 
19  Michael  Ancram  asked  '[w]hat  do  you  use  it  for?  What  contacts  do  you  want  to  make?  The  easiest  thing 
for  me  as  an  MP  is  to  ring  up  one  of  my  MEPs  from  my  party  and  say  I'm  coming  over  to  Brussels,  can  you 
arrange  for  me  to  see  A,  B  and  C?  '  (Interview  UK-1)  while  Lord  Oxburgh  stated  that  he  did  not'know  how 
we  could  use  them'  (Interview  UK-13). 
9  E.  g.  interviews  DK-11  and  15. 
69 Levels  of  power 
Even  the  most  extensive  rights  to  information  are  worth  naught  if  parliamentarians  can 
do  little  with  the  information  obtained.  When  it  comes  to  actual  scrutiny  of  national 
governments,  several  factors  influence  how  parliaments  choose  to  monitor  their 
governments'  actions  at  the  European  level.  Formal  powers  and  responsibilities  are 
important,  but  political  restrictions  at  the  national  level  may  prevent  parliaments  from 
using  their  full  powers  of  scrutiny.  On  the  other  hand,  formal  and  legal  powers  may 
not  be  necessary  for  a  parliament  to  influence  its  government. 
The  Danish  Folketing  is  still  unique  within  the  Community,  having  established  its 
mandating  powers  for  itself  shortly  after  Denmark  entered  the  Community  in  1973. 
With  frequent  minority  governments  the  Folketing  plays  an  important  role  at  the 
domestic  level,  a  role  it  has  simply  extended  to  European  issues.  However,  the  EUC's 
ability  to  mandate  Danish  ministers  rests  on  a  political  agreement  with  no  formal  legal 
basis.  It  is  inconceivable  that  the  political  agreement  should  be  broken,  and  the  spirit  of 
the  agreement  remains  more  important  than  its  actual  legal  standing.  This  can  be 
contrasted  with  the  Austrian  Bundesrat,  whose  power  to  mandate  the  executive  has 
been  so  rarely  used  that  it  has  been  classified  as  a  weak  participant  at  the  European 
level  (Maurer  and  Wessels,  2001a,  p.  510).  In  an  investigation  of  scrutiny  procedures  in 
Austria,  Finland  and  Sweden,  Hans  Hegeland  and  Christine  Neuhold  (2002,  p.  13) 
state  that  'it  is  not  enough  to  have  formal  rules;  the  rules  must  also  be  implemented'  (as 
will  become  evident  in  Chapter  five,  the  Italian  parliament  has  also  found  this  to  be 
true). 
At  the  domestic  level  there  may  be  reasons  for  parliaments  to  curtail  the  use  of  formal 
powers.  The  German  Bundestag  thus  for  a  long  time  resisted  pressuring  the 
government  over  European  issues,  mainly  due  to  the  'permissive  consensus'  existing 
on  European  integration  (Hansen  and  Scholl,  2002,  p.  14).  A  similar  consensus-seeking 
style  can  be  found  in  the  Netherlands,  which  is  considered  a  strong  player  at  the 
national  level,  but  having  latent  or  potential  policy  influence  at  the  European  level. 
Both  the  French  and  British  parliaments  are  better  able  than  the  Dutch  parliament  to 
confront  their  governments  over  European  policy.  However,  having  'only'  a  scrutiny 
reserve  power  does  not  enable  them  to  force  their  governments  to  alter  policies  and 
directions  pursued  at  the  European  level.  These  two  parliaments  can  thus  be  labelled 
as  'modest  policy-making  legislatures'  with  weak  influence  at  the  national  level  too.  In 
most  other  member  states  (Belgium,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  Portugal  and 
Spain),  deliberation  of  European  affairs  takes  place  on  an  infrequent  basis,  and 
parliamentarians  often  consider  their  role  to  be  supportive  rather  than  critical  of  the 
70 government.  The  classifications  of  the  different  parliaments  can  be  summarised  in  the 
following  table: 
Table  3.3:  Types  of  actors  in  a  two-level  game 
Strong  national  player  Weak  national  player 
Strong  European  player  DK,  SF  EP 
Modestly  strong  European 
player 
D,  S  F,  UK 
Weak  European  player  A,  I,  NL  B,  E,  GR,  IR,  LUX,  P 
i  aoce  aaaptea  rrom:  (Maurer  and  Wessels,  ZUUla,  p.  5Uu). 
The  level  of  influence  wielded  by  national  parliaments  can  therefore  not  be  argued  to 
rest  solely  on  legal  provisions  for  scrutiny.  Nor  is  there  necessarily  a  connection 
between  institutional  impact  on  domestic  matters  and  ability  to  influence  European- 
level  activities.  Considerations  specific  to  individual  member  states  therefore 
contribute  significantly  to  explanations  of  how  national  parliaments  have  involved 
themselves  with  European  affairs.  One  example  are  the  concerns  of  the  German 
Bundesrat  mentioned  above,  another  is  the  Italian  parliament,  where  specific  reasons 
for  joining  the  Community  have  historically  made  EU  matters  a  'non-issue'  with  which 
parliament  had  no  interest  in  engaging  (see  Chapter  five  for  further  details). 
Conclusion 
Since  the  SEA,  but  especially  the  TEU,  national  parliaments  have  woken  up  to  the  fact 
that  they  are  'married'  to  the  EU,  and  that,  unless  they  wish  to  become  bystanders  to 
decision-making  within  their  own  country,  they  have  to  develop  methods  for 
participating  in  European  decision-making,  even  if  this  is  done  indirectly  through 
scrutiny  of  their  executives'  activities  at  the  European  level.  Europeanisation  has 
caused  national  parliaments  to  become  indirect  legitimisers  of  Council  decisions, 
providing  them  with  the  potential  to  play  an  important  role  in  the  European  construct, 
although  this  role  has  not  been  recognised  in  the  EU  treaties.  The  EP,  on  the  other 
hand,  has  always  been  provided  with  a  role  through  the  treaties-which  have  also 
increased  its  powers  to  the  extent  that  the  EP  can  now  be  described  as,  politically  and 
legally,  an  equal  co-legislator  with  the  Council  in  a  majority  of  policy  areas.  National 
parliaments  have  thus  had  the  disadvantage  (compared  to  the  EP)  of  having  an  ill- 
defined  role  to  fulfill,  although  this  has  also  permitted  the  better  development  of 
individual  responses  to  particular,  national  political  requirements  for  scrutiny 
procedures. 
71 The  appropriateness  of  national  parliaments  only  participating  indirectly  at  the 
European  level  has  been  questioned  on  several  occasions  and  in  several  forums  over 
the  years.  The  idea  of  direct  participation  has  most  commonly  been  dismissed  as 
undesirable,  unworkable  or  not  suitable  for  the  continued  development  of  European 
integration.  However,  as  national  parliaments  have  gradually  become  more  involved 
with  European  affairs,  it  has  been  accepted  that  certain  issues  are  better  dealt  with  at 
the  European  level.  A  symbiotic  relationship  is  thus  developing,  although  this  is  one 
without  much  direct  contact  between  the  national  and  European  levels.  Each  level, 
however,  needs  the  other:  Europe  cannot  become  democratic  merely  through 
parliamentarisation  at  the  European  level;  Europeanisation  of  the  national  level  is 
necessary  too. 
National  parliaments  have  experienced  limited  contact  with  (especially)  the  Eq  and 
the  Commission.  However,  contacts  with  the  Commission  seem  destined  to  develop  as 
it  becomes  increasingly  acceptable  for  national  parliaments  to  receive  documents 
directly  from  the  Commission  without  first  going  through  coordinating  bodies  (most 
often  ministries  of  foreign  affairs).  To  develop  relations  with  the  Council  as  an 
institution  has  been  difficult  for  national  parliaments,  with  national  interests  most 
often  outweighing  any  concerns  national  parliaments,  as  institutions,  may  have. 
Influence  over  Council-decisions  is  therefore  focused  on  the  national  level. 
Consequently,  the  only  European-level  institution  with  which  national  parliaments 
have  regular  (and  anything  approaching  frequent)  contact  is  the  EP.  Recognition  that  a 
European-level  parliament  is  indispensable  to  a  democratic  EU  has  gradually  led 
national  parliaments  to  develop  cooperation  with  this  institution,  although  at  times 
still  hesitant  and  guarded. 
Although  all  national  parliaments  accept  that  their  role  in  European  affairs  has  altered, 
scrutiny  efforts  undertaken  at  the  national  level  vary  significantly  in  extent  and  have 
differing  degrees  of  impact.  Differences  are  only  to  a  limited  extent  dependent  on  the 
availability  of  information,  as  national  parliaments  are  all  entitled  to  European 
documentation  as  well  as  time  to  examine  it.  Moreover,  documents  are  often  available 
on  the  internet,  and  parliamentary  'spies'  at  the  European  level  are  able  to  provide 
further  information  and  contacts  where  required.  To  some  extent  parliaments  can  be 
provided  with  too  much  information,  with  the  task  of  sifting  it  and  determining  what 
is  important  requiring  significant  resources.  It  thus  becomes  important  for  national 
parliaments  to  develop  quality  over  quantity  when  it  comes  to  provision  of 
information,  as  they  otherwise  stand  no  chance  of  making  any  perceptible  impact  on 
the  activities  of  their  executives. 
72 In  the  three  case  studies  chosen  for  this  research  (the  parliaments  of  Denmark,  Italy 
and  the  United  Kingdom),  developmental  continua  exist  on  several  dimensions,  while 
they  are  also  all  strong  parliaments  or  resting  on  a  strong  parliamentary  tradition.  In  all 
three  countries  the  parliaments  are  very  important  institutions  in  the  national  political 
process,  although  their  ability  to  influence  domestic  legislation  differs,  with  the  UK 
being  the  weakest.  In  terms  of  influence  over  European  legislation,  the  influence 
exercised  by  the  Danish  Folketing  reflects  the  influence  it  has  over  domestic  legislation, 
whereas  the  British  House  of  Commons  arguably  has  more  influence  over  European 
than  national  matters  and  the  Italian  Parliament  less.  In  the  following  three  chapters 
the  case  studies  will  be  further  examined,  and  reasons  for  the  differences  outlined 
above  investigated. 
73 Chapter  4:  Denmark 
I  always  experienced  it  as  a  constructive  and  positive  challenge  [to  meet 
with  Folketing  committees  prior  to  meeting  in  the  Council].  I  felt  a  deep 
responsibility  to  answer  as  satisfactorily  as  possible,  to  have  prepared 
properly  and  thereby  provide  the  EU  Committee  and  select  committees 
with  a  concrete  and  secure  basis  [for  the  provision  of  mandates].  This  is 
traditional  in  the  relationship  between  the  Folketing's  committees  and  the 
government. 
(Rasmussen,  2002,  Danish  Prime  Minister  1993  -  2001) 
The  political  institutions  in  Denmark  are  very  similar  to  those  of  most  other  democratic 
countries.  Voters  elect  parliamentarians  to  the  Danish  Folketing  (Parliament)  from 
which  a  government  is  formed.  Non-political  civil  servants  staff  the  administration, 
laws  are  upheld  by  (independent)  courts,  `  and  the  principle  of  universal  suffrage  is 
adhered  to.  Although  the  Monarch  has  formal  duties  to  carry  out  in  relation  to  the 
governance  of  Denmark  (such  as  appointing  or  dismissing  ministers),  absolute 
monarchy  was  abolished  with  the  signing  of  the  Constitution  in  1849. 
However,  the  Danish  system  of  governance  is  distinguished  by  how  democracy  is 
translated  into  a  'people's  democracy'  (folkestyre)  where  openness  and  transparency  are 
fundamental  to  political  institutions  and  processes-including  the  public 
administration.  Folkestyre  has  emerged  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  one  being  a  relatively 
flat  societal  structure.  The  limited  social  hierarchy  helped  establish  demands  for  direct 
influence  on  governance  structures  and  activities  during  the  19'x'  Century,  although  it 
was  not  until  the  early  20`x'  Century  that  the  right  to  vote  was  awarded  women  and 
servants. 
The  relatively  long  struggle  for  general  suffrage  has  contributed  to  the  feeling  that 
democracy  is  'valuable'  to  the  individual  citizen,  still  reflected  in  relatively  high  rates 
of  participation  in  elections  and  referenda.  Danish  folkestyre  has  developed  in 
conjunction  with  representative  democracy  with  the  consequence  that  close  scrutiny  of 
government  activities  has  become  fundamental  to  Danish  political  culture-greatly 
assisted  by  the  fact  that  Danish  governments  are  often  (minority)  coalition 
governments.  Close  scrutiny  is  also  evident  in  EU  affairs  where  the  EUC  mandates  all 
ministers  negotiating  for  Denmark  in  the  Council  and  all  select  committees  are 
increasingly  involved  in  scrutiny  of  European  affairs. 
'  The  oldest  Danish  law  from  1241  begins  with  the  statement  'Med  by  skal  land  bygges',  which  means 
'with  law  shall  a  country  be  built'. 
74 Historically,  the  Folketing's  scrutiny  of  EU  affairs  has  been  carried  out  by  the 
'Europaudvalget'  (European  Affairs  Committee  (EUC)),  the  second  oldest 
parliamentary  committee  on  Community  Affairs  within  the  EU.  The  committee  was 
established  in  1961,  twelve  years  prior  to  Danish  membership  of  the  Community, 
although  only  formalised  and  institutionalised  by  law  in  1972,  the  year  before 
Denmark  took  up  membership  of  the  Communities.  The  initial  purpose  of  the 
committee  was  to  be  a  forum  of  debate  where  Denmark's  options  regarding 
membership  of  the  Community  could  be  discussed-a  function  reflected  in  the 
committee's  first  name:  The  Market  Negotiation  Committee.  Later  on,  Danish  terms  of 
accession  were  discussed  within  the  committee,  and,  after  1  January  1973,  it  became  the 
main  parliamentary  forum  for  the  debate  of  Community  affairs.  The  changes  in  the 
committee's  functions,  as  well  as  developments  at  the  European  level,  have  been 
reflected  in  the  committee's  name,  which  was  altered,  initially,  to  'The  Market 
Committee'  in  1972,  and  again  in  1993  to  the  European  Affairs  Committee. 
As  will  become  evident,  the  handling  of  European  affairs  has  been  based  on  the 
systems  developed  for  national  legislation-but  European  legislation  (and 
Europeanisation)  has  also  altered  the  work  of  the  Folketing  in  general.  Whether 
parliamentarians  approve  of  EU  membership  or  not,  it  increasingly  influences  the 
work  of  all  Danish  MPs.  In  turn,  membership  is  also  beginning  to  impact  on  Danish 
political  culture,  as  membership  affects  Danish  governance,  institutionalisation  and 
discourse  (see  Radaelli,  2004,  pp.  10-14).  While  EU  issues  have  traditionally  been 
treated  separately  from  domestic  issues  by  the  EUC,  select  committees  are  beginning  to 
think  of  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  as  being  (almost)  as  important  as  their  work 
on  domestic  legislation.  Potentially,  this  development  may  bring  an  end  to  the  broad 
parliamentary  agreement  that  has  so  far  existed  on  EU  affairs,  instead  subjecting 
European  legislation  to  more  traditional  political  cleavages.  If  these  broad  agreements 
cease  to  exist,  it  is  likely  that  the  Folketing  and  its  select  committees  will  become 
increasingly  important  in  the  formulation  of  Danish  EU  policy,  making  it  imperative  to 
fully  understand  how  the  Folketing  engages  in  this  process  and  what  level  of  influence 
the  select  committees  can  develop. 
Changes  at  the  European  level,  through  successive  treaties  and  other  arrangements 
have  also  been  reflected  in  the  work  of  the  EUC  although  its  basic  function  has 
remained  the  same  throughout  its  institutionalised  history.  The  EUC's  primary  task  is 
to  coordinate  the  Folketing's  EU  policy  and  to  provide  Danish  ministers  negotiating  in 
the  Council  with  mandates  to  carry  out  this  policy.  It  is  still  the  Danish  government's 
prerogative  to  develop  Denmark's  EU  policy,  and  it  is  not  for  the  Folketing  to  take  over 
this  role.  Still,  parliamentary  influence  on  EU  policy  can  be  described  as  substantial 
75 because  of  the  considerable  involvement  of  the  EUC.  This  involvement  can,  on  one 
hand,  be  argued  to  only  occur  at  a  very  late  stage  and  therefore  leaving 
parliamentarians  with  no  real  opportunity  to  influence  European  legislation.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  Danish  government  as  well  as  civil  servants  are  aware  of  the  need  to 
obtain  agreement  on  European  issues  from  the  EUC,  and  they  keep  this  in  mind  during 
preparatory  stages  of  the  decision-making  process,  thereby  providing  the  EUC  with 
indirect  influence. 
As  early  as  1923  the  Folketing  set  up  an  advisory  foreign  Affairs  Committee  the 
government  was  to  consult  on  all  major  issues  (Fitzmaurice,  1981,  p.  136). 
Parliamentary  involvement  in  foreign  policy  thus  has  a  long  history  in  Denmark,  as 
does  the  institutionalisation  of  committees  within  the  Folkeling,  although  their  role  and 
importance  has  varied  over  the  years.  The  last  significant  reform  of  the  committee 
system  was  undertaken  in  the  1970s,  when  the  Folketing's  activities  were  made 
considerably  more  dependent  on  work  carried  out  within  committees.  To  fully 
understand  the  changes  that  have  taken  place  within  the  Folketing  and  the  inter- 
relationship  between  procedures  for  national  and  European  legislation  the  first  section 
of  this  chapter  will  focus  on  the  Folketing's  committees,  how  they  are  appointed,  the 
basis  of  their  membership  and  how  voting  is  carried  out.  This  will  be  followed  by  a 
closer  examination  of  the  EUC  whose  modus  operandi  is  contrasted  to  that  of  'normal' 
select  committees! 
An  increasingly  important  aspect  of  the  scrutiny  procedure  is  cooperation  between  the 
EUC  and  other  select  committees  within  the  Folketing.  It  has  been  recognised  that  the 
specialised  knowledge  available  in  the  select  committees  is  required  in  order  to  fully 
assess  the  impact  of  European  proposals  at  the  national  level.  The  role  of  select 
committees  in  the  scrutiny  process,  and  their  relationship  with  the  EUC,  will  thus  also 
be  investigated.  Members  of  select  committees  have  become  aware  that  scrutiny  of 
European  legislation  can  be  a  significant  task  that,  with  mandating  still  undertaken  by 
the  EUC  (to  preserve  the  overview  and  coordination)  does  not  appear  especially 
rewarding.  Consequently,  select  committees  have  been  reluctant  to  undertake  such 
work  and  the  involvement  of  select  committees  in  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  has 
therefore  developed  gradually  over  a  significant  period  of  time. 
The  last  section  of  this  chapter  will  explore  the  crucial  relationship  between  the 
administration  and  the  Folketing.  These  relations  have  developed  significantly  as  select 
committees  have  become  involved  in  scrutiny  procedures,  while  the  EUC's 
2  Committees  within  the  Folketing  are  called  'Wende  udvalg',  which,  literally  translated,  means  'standing 
committees',  a  term  the  Italian  Parliament  also  employs.  However,  for  the  sake  of  consistency,  they  will  all 
be  called  select  committees. 
76 relationship  with  the  administration  has  also  been  affected  by  changes  in  European- 
level  cooperation.  New  demands  for  the  provision  of  information  have  continuously 
been  placed  on  the  administration  as  Parliament  relies  heavily  on  such  information 
when  carrying  out  its  scrutiny.  Parliamentary  treatment  of  individual  ministers 
depends  on  the  individual  relationship,  specifically  the  amount  of  trust  that  has 
developed  between  a  select  committee  and  'its'  minister.  If  ministers  are  trusted  to 
uphold  the  spirit  of  a  negotiating  mandate,  they,  and  their  civil  servants,  will  likely 
find  it  easier  to  negotiate  the  terms  of  mandates  than  will  ministers  who  have  not 
developed  such  trust.  However,  before  reaching  the  stage  of  mandating,  Danish 
ministers  are  first  questioned  in  select  committees.  Because  of  the  fundamental  role 
select  committees  play  within  the  Folketing,  this  is  where  this  chapter  will  start. 
1.  Select  committees  within  the  Folketing 
According  to  the  Folketing  itself,  committees  are  its  'workshops'  (Folketinget,  2000), 
whereas  plenary  sessions  are  reserved  for  major  debates  and  voting.  Decisions  are 
prepared  in  select  committees,  of  which  24  currently  exist  with  remits  corresponding 
roughly  to  those  of  each  Danish  Ministry.  Two  are  considered  as  being  particularly 
powerful:  the  Finance  Committee  and  the  EUC  (Folketinget,  2000).  '  MPs  are  often, 
simultaneously,  members  of  several  committees,  a  practice  that  can  test  members  of 
small  parties  severely,  as  each  MP  has  to  cover  a  large  number  of  topics  within  both 
the  Folketing's  committees  and  in  the  party's  relations  with  the  press.  In  the  larger 
parties  MPs  can  share  the  workload  and  three  people  may,  for  example,  be  appointed 
to  the  Food,  Agriculture  and  Fisheries  Committee,  with  one  person  specializing  in  each 
of  the  topics  this  committee  covers. 
The  importance  accorded  EU  affairs  by  the  Folketing  is  evident  in  party  nominations  to 
the  EUC,  most  of  which  are  party  'heavyweights',  thereby  contributing  to  the 
committee's  significant  authority:  Just  as  parties  are  allocated  seats  in  the  EUC  on  the 
basis  of  their  representation  in  the  chamber,  voting  within  the  EUC  is  carried  out  on 
this  basis  as  well.  In  an  unusual  deviation  from  common  practice,  the  chair  of  the  EUC 
does  not  count  'heads'  (or  hands)  when  a  vote  is  taken,  but  the  number  of  seats  each 
3  The  importance  of  these  two  committees  is  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  in  material  generated  for  the  public 
about  the  Folketing,  one  information  sheet  covers  committees  in  general,  while  the  EUC  and  the  finance 
committee-but  only  those  two-are  described  in  individual  information  sheets. 
4  Examples  from  the  2003-20)4  memberships  include  Pia  Gjellerup  and  Kristian  Thulesen  Dahl  (group 
chairs  from  the  Social  Democrats  and  the  Danish  Progress  Party  respectively),  Jacob  Buksti  (former 
minister  of  transport)  and  Ritt  Bjerregaard  (former  agricultural  minister  and  European  Commissioner). 
77 member  of  the  committee  represents  in  the  Folketing.  '  As  the  EUC  takes  decisions  on 
behalf  of  the  Folketing  that,  at  a  later  date,  may  have  to  be  implemented  by  the 
Folketing,  the  counting  of  parliamentary  rather  than  committee  seats  minimises  the  risk 
of  a  minister  being  provided  with  a  mandate  that  may  not  be  carried  in  a  plenary  vote 
(Jensen,  2003).  In  a  further  deviation  from  common  practice,  the  EUC  generally 
operates  in  secrecy,  based  on  the  fact  that  Denmark's  negotiating  position  would 
otherwise  be  compromised. 
When  assessing  the  relationship  between  committees  of  the  Folketing  and  the 
government,  the  fact  that,  since  the  Second  World  War,  six  governments  (from  a  total 
of  29)  have  been  majority  governments  (none  of  them  single-party)  becomes 
important'  With  minority  governments  being  the  norm  rather  than  the  exception,  the 
importance  of  committees  within  the  Folketing  takes  on  a  new  dimension.  Being  a 
parliament  of  committees,  both  backbench  and  opposition  MPs  have  been  provided 
with  an  important  means  of  influencing,  in  some  instances  even  controlling,  the 
government.  The  influence  of  the  opposition  can  be  gleaned  from  the  number  of  votes 
on  which  governments  have  been  defeated  in  plenary  sessions.  Between  1982  and  1988 
governments  (all  Conservative)  lost  108  of  1356  final  votes  on  EU-related  issues.  These 
defeats  did  not  cause  108  elections,  indeed,  'in  all  but  three  cases  -  recourse  to  a 
popular  referendum  on  the  issue  of  the  Single  European  Act  in  February  1986  was  one 
-  the  Government  accepted  defeat  with  a  view  to  staying  in  office'  (Arter,  1996,  p.  119). 
The  notion  that  a  government  can  lose  approximately  8  per  cent  of  votes  on  a 
particular  topic  is  inconceivable  in,  for  instance,  the  United  Kingdom,  where  such 
events  would  have  brought  about  the  Government's  downfall.  Frequent  minority 
governments  and  the  salience  of  EU  issues  have  thus  allowed  the  EUC  and  other 
committees  to  wield  significant  influence.  The  EUC  does  not,  however,  replace  the 
government  and  still  'cannot  develop  a  positive,  alternative  strategy  in  Market  policy' 
(Fitzmaurice,  1979,  p.  215). 
The  ability  to  maintain  democratic  control  over  the  decision-making  processes, 
including  decisions  taken  at  the  European  level,  has  always  been  important  for  the 
Folketing.  National  democracy  is  the  most  frequently  cited  reason  for  the  thoroughness 
of  the  Danish  scrutiny  system  and  is  often  used  as  justification  for  the  involved  process 
by  politicians  from  the  entire  political  spectrum.  When  asked  whether  ministers  found 
having  to  obtain  mandates  from  the  EUC  inconvenient,  a  Conservative  Party  politician 
answered  that  that  was  a  given,  'but  this  is  the  democratic  process  that  has  to  be 
5  Political  parties  are  considered  to  be  unitary  actors  'in  the  politically  most  important  sense,  that  their 
members  in  the  parliamentary  chamber  on  the  whole  exhibits  a  uniform  decision-taking  pattern'  (Jensen, 
2002,  p.  216).  However,  the  EU  is  a  contentious  issue,  and  Danish  political  parties  are  not  always  united  on 
EU  policy.  How  disagreements  are  managed  when  it  comes  to  defining  and  agreeing  a  common  line 
within  the  EUC  is,  however,  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study. 
Indeed,  the  government  formed  immediately  after  the  Second  World  War  was  an  all-party  government. 
78 adhered  to'.  Another  member  of  the  Conservative  Party  believed  the  scrutiny  process 
to  be  worth  the  trouble  'because  we  know  the  decision  has  a  democratic  legitimacy  and 
that  parliaments  have  not  been  pushed  aside'.  At  the  opposite  end  of  the  political 
spectrum  a  member  of  the  Socialist  People's  Party  stated  (even  if  reluctantly):  'I  don't 
think,  in  the  world  of  realities,  that  it  is  possible  to  do  things  much  better'! 
When  Denmark  joined  the  Communities,  the  Luxembourg  Compromise  was  still  in 
effect,  ensuring  that  the  EUC,  through  the  Danish  representative  in  the  Council, 
wielded  significant  influence  over  EU  decisions,  even  if  indirect.  John  Fitzmaurice 
claims  that  'the  Luxembourg  agreement  was  part  of  the  legal  and  political  basis  for 
Danish  membership',  and  that  the  EUC  'discussed  possible  ways  of  exercising 
democratic  control  of  decision-making,  and  concluded  that  control  over  the  Council  of 
Ministers,  which  would  be  essential,  would  have  to  be  performed  by  national 
parliaments'  (Fitzmaurice,  1976,  p.  285).  Accepting  that  the  Luxembourg  compromise 
was  valid  when  Denmark  became  a  member  of  the  EU,  post-initiative  involvement 
would  be  sufficient  for  the  Folkeling  to  wield  considerable  influence,  as  all  initiatives 
could  be  vetoed  at  the  Council  stage.  With  Danish  representatives  in  the  Council  being 
mandated  by  the  EUC,  the  committee  was  able  to  influence  EU  decisions  effectively. 
However,  the  EU  no  longer  functions  on  the  basis  of  the  Luxembourg  compromise. 
When,  as  is  increasingly  the  case,  QMV  is  used  in  the  Council  even  a  mandated 
negotiator  can  be  voted  down.  Moreover,  only  a  small  percentage  of  cases  are  actually 
discussed  by  participants  at  Council  meetings,  with  the  vast  majority  of  issues  having 
been  solved  at  working  group  or  COREPER  level  (Hayes-Renshaw  and  Wallace,  1997). 
For  national  parliamentarians  to  be  effective  in  such  an  environment  they  not  only 
must  become  involved  at  a  much  earlier  stage,  they  also  have  to  become  familiar  with 
European  institutions  and  procedures. 
In  a  1995  study,  Torbert  K.  Jensen  investigated  how  Danish  MPs  differed  in  terms  of 
contacts  abroad.  Although  EUC  members  were  found  to  have  significantly  more 
contacts  abroad,  both  with  other  parliamentarians  and  other  'political  actors'  than  other 
MPs,  they  were  by  no  means  part  of  a  'trans-national  parliamentary  network  of 
contacts'.  EUC  members  were  not  considered  a  separate  group  with  regard  to  basic 
attitudes  to  and  opinions  on  'decision-making  competencies,  EU-institutions  and  the 
Danish  decision-making  processes'.  The  study  concludes  that  'Danish  politicians  ... 
seem  to  operate  within  a  traditional  confederalist  universe,  and,  perhaps  precisely 
because  of  this,  do  not  seem  to  be  especially  well  suited  to  the  challenges  presented  by 
Europeanisation  '  (Jensen,  1995,  p.  478,  author's  translation).  It  may  thus  appear  that,  at 
the  time  this  research  was  carried  out,  Danish  MPs  did  not  participate  in  European 
'  Interviews  DK-8,3  and  11. 
79 decision-making  to  their  maximum  ability,  in  part  because  they  did  not  understand  the 
nature  of  the  environment  they  operated  in.  The  latest  report  from  the  EUC  (available 
in  draft  form  only  (Europaudvalget,  2004))  indicates  that  changes  are  taking  place  to 
improve  the  impact  of  the  EUC,  with  one  of  the  most  important  elements  in  this  report 
being  the  more  efficient  organisation  of  select  committee  involvement  in  scrutiny  of 
European  affairs.  Incorporating  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  into  the  tasks  of  select 
committees  (listed  in  the  Folkefing's  standing  orders)  would  serve  to  make  such  activity 
more  of  a  normal  occurrence,  while  also  developing  a  better  understanding  amongst 
Ml's  of  how  Danish  and  European  decision-making  procedures  are  interconnected  and 
interdependent.  Such  an  improved  understanding  would  likely  lead  to  a  clearer 
perception  of  the  overall  legislative  environment  within  Europe-and  therefore  enable 
Danish  MPs  to  maximise  their  influence  within  it. 
Select  committees  have  come  to  be  fundamental  to  the  workings  of  a  political  system 
that  is  characterised  by  a  fragmented  parliament  and  coalition  governments.  The 
Folketing  has  therefore  been  able  to  develop  significant  influence,  including  in  the  areas 
of  foreign  and  EU  policy.  Danish  political  culture  is  also,  however,  influenced  by  a 
strong  scepticism  regarding  further  integration  with  Europe.  This  scepticism  has 
contributed  to  demands  for  strong  scrutiny  that  itself  has  grown  out  of  existing 
procedures  for  legislative  involvement. 
2.  The  European  Union  Committee 
The  competencies  of  the  EUC  are  listed  in  the  Folketing's  rules  of  procedure  and 
include  the  scrutiny  and  coordination  of  EU  issues  on  behalf  of  the  Folketing.  The  legal 
basis  for  the  work  of  the  EUC  rests  on  the  law  of  accession  from  1972  which  states  that 
'the  Government  informs  a  Committee,  established  by  the  Folketing,  about 
Commission  initiatives  which  will  be  immediately  applicable  in  Denmark,  or  for  which 
the  implementation  necessitates  the  cooperation  of  the  Folketing'  (Folketinget,  1995, 
author's  translation).  However,  of  more  significance  for  determining  the  powers  of  the 
EUC  was  the  first  report  issued  on  March  291973,  by  the  then  Market  Committee.  The 
report  was  concerned  with  the  Committee's  work  and  competencies,  and  stated  that: 
'the  Government  consults  [the  Folketing]  on  Community  issues  of  some  significance,  in 
a  way  which  respects  both  the  influence  of  the  Folkeling  as  well  as  the  freedom  of 
negotiation  of  the  Government'  (Folketinget,  1995,  author's  translation).  This  has 
resulted  in  a  situation  where  the  EUC,  on  behalf  of  the  Folkefing,  provides  ministers 
with  a  negotiating  mandate  prior  to  meetings  in  the  Council. 
The  accusation  that  the  Danish  system  of  mandating  ministers  delays  decision-making 
at  the  European  level  tends  to  be  denied  by  both  parliamentary  staff  and  politicians 
80 (including  ex-ministers).  Indeed,  having  experienced  the  process  of  obtaining  a 
negotiating  mandate  from  the  EUC,  ex-ministers  spoke  mainly  of  the  advantages  of 
this  process:  a  better  understanding  of  the  topic  and  certainty  that  the  issue  would  go 
through  the  Danish  parliament  and  implementation  without  being  challenged.  "  In  fact, 
Poul  Nyrup  Rasmussen  (Prime  Minister  1993  -  2001)  (2002)  states  that  he  'under  no 
circumstances'  found  the  Danish  mandating  process  slow  or  leading  to  delays  in 
activities  at  the  European  level.  On  the  contrary,  he  found  the  Danish  system 
democratic,  transparent  and  a  good  method  for  preventing  mistakes. 
To  carry  out  its  work,  the  EUC  is  provided  with  'all  the  information  it  could  possibly 
want'  according  to  Claus  Larsen-Jensen  (EUC-chair  2000  -  2005).  '  Despite  this 
seemingly  idyllic  situation,  Larsen-Jensen  (in  the  same  interview)  requested  better  and 
improved  information.  Specifically,  he  would  like  to  see  more  concrete  information, 
with  the  accompanying  governmental  notes  outlining  exactly  what  the  issue  is,  where 
any  problems  may  be,  and  what  Denmark's  negotiating  partners  are  expected  to  bring 
to  the  table.  Although  the  Folketing  now  receives  all  legislative  proposals  directly  from 
the  Commission  (COSAC,  2004),  important  information  is  still  received  from  the 
government  with  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  as  the  coordinating  body.  For 
instance,  to  accompany  Commission  initiatives  the  government  forwards  factual  notes. 
Further  information  is  provided  to  the  EUC  by  interest  organisations  and  the 
Folketing's  representative  in  Brussels.  Moreover,  members  of  the  EUC  travel  to  Brussels 
and  also  visit  the  parliament  in  the  member  state  holding  the  Presidency  of  the  EU.  On 
the  other  hand,  even  for  the  purposes  of  information  gathering,  cooperation  with  MEPs 
has,  historically,  not  featured  as  a  significant  part  of  the  EUC's  work.  To  the  extent  that 
MEPs  are  involved  in  national  affairs,  contacts  have  primarily  existed  within  the 
political  party  or  group-organisation  from  which  the  MEP  is  elected,  while  systematic 
contact  with  the  EUC  has  been  non-existent.  The  latest  report  from  the  EUC  seeks  to 
address  this  situation  by  establishing  regular,  monthly  meetings  between  the  EUC  and 
Danish  MEPs  (Europaudvalget,  2004).  Such  meetings  potentially  benefit  both  sides  by 
establishing  new,  direct  channels  of  communication  that  are  easily  tailored  to  the  needs 
of  the  participants. 
The  Folketing  encounters  several  problems  in  its  attempts  to  scrutinise  the  Danish 
Government  on  EU  policy.  One  issue  is  that  of  translations  which  may  not  be  available 
until  several  days  after  the  original  documents  have  been  released.  In  such  instances 
MPs  have  two  options:  they  can  either  wait  for  the  translations,  and  thereby  risk  not 
understanding  or  following  a  topic  properly,  or  learn  one  of  the  major  languages  of  the 
tl  For  instance  interviews  DK  2,10  and  31. 
9  Interview  DK-16. 
81 Community  and  attempt  to  work  with  documents  available  in  that  language.  "  While 
the  lack  of  translations  is  often  considered  an  inevitable  part  of  closer  integration,  it 
remains  a  nuisance  and  causes  delays,  potentially  limiting  the  ability  of  MPs  to 
undertake  national-level  scrutiny  in  as  comprehensive  a  manner  as  they  wish. 
Paradoxically,  an  equally  serious  problem  is  that  of  too  much  information.  "  Both 
politicians  and  civil  servants  agree  that  the  amount  of  information  is  substantial,  and 
that  it  is  often  difficult  (or  impossible)  to  examine  it  all,  even  with  the  simple  aim  of 
distinguishing  the  important  from  the  not-so-important.  The  sense  of  being 
overwhelmed  exists  even  in  select  committees-despite  these  'only'  dealing  with  what 
falls  within  their  remit.  Although  in  many  committees  staff  could  easily  spend  their 
entire  time  simply  following  Community  cases  within  their  remit,  their  main  focus  is 
still  on  national  legislation.  " 
While  politicians  insist  it  is  their  job  to  follow  'important'  cases,  in  reality  the 
importance  of  an  issue  is  often  determined  by  recommendations  of  committee  or 
personal  staff,  citizens  or  the  media.  It  thus  becomes  essential  to  determine  how  an 
'important'  issue  is  defined.  While,  historically,  broad  agreement  on  EU  policy  has 
existed  within  the  Folketing,  this  may  well  change  as  European  issues  increasingly 
become  part  of  everyday  parliamentary  activities.  The  distinction  between  domestic 
and  European  affairs  will  thus  continue  to  blur,  with  traditional  political  cleavages 
possibly  establishing  themselves  more  firmly  on  European  issues,  bringing  criteria 
relating  to  the  importance  of  domestic  legislation  to  bear  on  European  legislation  too. 
Such  a  development  is  likely  to  increase  the  importance  of  select  committees  further,  as 
this  is  where  most  parliamentary  work  is  carried  out. 
Interview  DK-11. 
"  Erling  Olsen,  7e'  ious  speaker  of  the  Folketing,  thus  related  how  he,  in  a  newspaper,  once  saw  a  picture 
of  the  chair  of  EUC  carrying  a  pile  of  papers.  The  papers,  approximately  1000  pages,  were  to  be 
discussed  at  the  EUC  meeting  the  following  Friday  and  had  been  made  available  to  MPs  on  the 
Wednesday  before  the  meeting.  In  other  words,  members  of  the  EUC  had  two  days  to  sift  through  the 
1000  pages.  Olsen  claimed  this  was  done  so  the  administration  could  claim  that  they  had  not  hidden 
anything.  His  response  to  this  was  that  'if  you  put  forward  1000  pages  you  have  not  put  everything  on  the 
table,  you  have  hidden  everything'.  His  plan  therefore  was  to  develop  a  system  where  each  important  case 
was  to  be  covered  in  a  document  of  no  longer  than  ten  pages,  preferably  no  more  than  five,  and  the  focus 
should  be  on  political  issues,  not  technical  or  legal  aspects  (interview  DK-22).  As  Larsen-Jensen  was  still 
able  to  find  shortcomings  in  the  information  provided,  systems  for  drawing  up  appropriate  information 
for  MPs  are  obviously  undergoing  continuous  development. 
"  This  state  of  affairs  became  evident  through  interviews  with  Danish  politicians  and  parliamentary  civil 
servants,  but  see  also  Bostrup  (2002). 
82 Two  further  (and  related)  problems  for  the  EUC  are  those  of  the  overall  time  frame  and 
the  final  decision  making  process  for  Community  proposals.  Margrethe  Vestager" 
expressed  it  as  follows: 
The  process  of  a  directive  can  be  very  fast  right  at  the  beginning,  by  taking 
a  decision  to  set  this  thing  going,  and  then  it  moves  so  slowly  that  one  cries 
for  mercy  until  suddenly,  right  towards  the  end  of  the  process,  everything 
has  to  move  very  quickly  again.  This  makes  it  very  difficult  for  people 
involved  to  maintain  a  momentum.  You  may  become  engaged  at  the 
beginning,  a  few  headlines  will  probably  appear,  somebody  has  heard  that 
now  they're  going  to  ban  -  whatever,  but  then  nothing  happens  for  a  long 
time  until  years  later  things  pick  up  speed  again.  I  think  this  is  difficult  for 
politicians,  not  just  for  politicians  as  participants  in  a  system,  but  for 
politicians  as  human  beings,  to  maintain  the  focus  during  such  a  long 
process,  and  I  think  this  creates  problems'.  " 
Examining  the  co-decision  procedure,  it  soon  becomes  obvious  that  national 
parliaments  have  very  few  'points  of  entry'  (even  indirect)  where  they  can  voice  their 
opinion.  This  is  only  possible  at  the  beginning  of  the  actual  decision-taking  process 
when  the  Council,  essentially  the  mouthpiece  of  national  parliaments  at  the  European 
level,  establishes  its  common  position.  The  Council  establishing  its  common  position  is 
the  beginning  of  the  final  'sprint'  towards  a  piece  of  European  legislation  being 
adopted,  and  the  final  stage  where  things  speed  up  significantly  after  the  long  period 
of  inactivity  described  by  Vestager.  This  is  also,  however,  the  stage  where  actors 
influence  Community  legislation  the  least,  with  the  most  effective  lobbying  having 
been  carried  out  prior  to  legislation  being  formally  proposed  by  the  Commission. 
Because  of  the  long  legislative  process  at  the  European  level  it  is  not  enough  for  a 
parliament  to  focus  on  this  last  'sprint'  towards  adoption  of  a  piece  of  legislation.  To  be 
effective,  parliaments  must  retain  an  overview  of  a  proposal  right  from  the  initial  idea, 
through  possible  Green  and  White  Papers,  to  the  final  proposal,  adoption  and 
implementation.  A  legislative  procedure  taking  seven  years  or  more  is,  in  all  countries 
within  the  EU,  likely  to  cover  at  least  two  election  periods,  making  a  changed 
membership  of  parliamentary  committees  almost  a  certainty,  with  continuous 
monitoring  of  legislative  proposals  correspondingly  difficult.  Executives  and  their 
administrations  are  at  a  natural  advantage  in  this  situation,  as  one  of  their  important 
tasks  is  to  maintain  an  overview  and  be  a  permanent  and  stable  force.  For  members  of 
the  EUC  it  is  not  possible  to  counter  the  administration,  nor  is  it  necessary,  as  it  is  not 
the  task  of  the  EUC  to  create  policy,  merely  to  scrutinise  it. 
"  Ex-minister  of  ecclesiastical  affairs  and  education.  While  these  topics  are  not  areas  of  dose  European 
cooperation,  Vestager  has  also  been  a  stagiere  with  the  European  Parliament,  and  is  therefore  aware  of  how 
the  two  levels  of  governance  impact  upon  each  other,  as  well  as  of  processes  and  procedures  of  European 
legislation. 
14  Interview  DK-29. 
83 3.  The  involvement  of  select  committees  in  European  affairs 
As  the  EUC  works  on  behalf  of  the  Folketing,  the  Danish  Parliament  as  a  whole  has 
rarely  been  involved  directly  in  Community  affairs.  This  situation  is  changing, 
however,  as  the  EUC  has  progressively  involved  other  select  committees  in  its  work. 
Although  a  relatively  new  development,  'farming  out'  of  work  from  the  EUC  has  been 
an  option  since  1973  when  the  Market  Committee,  in  its  first  report,  claimed  the  right 
to  'request  an  opinion  from  other  select  committees  in  cases  which  are  of  relevance  to 
these'  (Folketinget,  1999,  p.  1,  author's  translation).  Despite  having  the  option  to 
involve  other  select  committees,  the  EUC  very  rarely  did  so  for  several  reasons.  One 
important  reason  was  the  persistent  belief  amongst  members  of  select  committees  that 
EU  affairs  were  a  topic  separate  from  domestic  policy,  and  therefore  not  their  domain  15 
A  second  reason,  perhaps  equally  significant,  was  the  similar  attitude  of  various  chairs 
of  the  EUC  and  its  predecessors:  EU  affairs  were  a  matter  for  specialists,  and  therefore 
to  be  kept  within  the  confines  of  the  EUC. 
A  significant,  albeit  procedural,  step  towards  greater  involvement  of  other  select 
committees  was  taken  in  May  1994  with  the  publication  of  a  report  on  the 
Government's  duty  to  inform  the  Folketing  on  Community  issues  (Folketinget,  1999).  In 
this  report  it  was  decided  that  select  committees  were  to  receive  all  relevant 
information  from  the  ministries.  Information  from  the  government  was  forwarded 
from  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  (the  coordinating  body  for  the  government  on  EU 
affairs,  see  below)  through  the  EUC  to  the  select  committees.  Information  not 
originating  from  the  government  was  provided  to  the  EUC  and  relevant  select 
committee(s)  simultaneously.  The  report  also  emphasised  that  the  rules  should  not 
hinder  further  requests  for  information  from  the  select  committees,  thus  allowing  them 
to  scrutinise  'their'  minister  and  ministry  further.  It  was  also,  however,  left  to 
individual  committees  to  decide  how  to  use  the  information  with  which  they  were 
being  provided,  making  it  possible  to  claim  involvement  without  committing  to  full 
scrutiny  of  matters  within  the  committee's  remit.  While  all  committees  now  require  the 
minister  to  appear  before  them  prior  to  meetings  in  the  Council,  some  committees  go 
further  than  that,  agreeing  with  'their'  ministry  that  a  resume  of  activities  is  to  be 
forwarded  to  the  committee  every  six  months,  typically  in  connection  with  the  change 
of  Presidency  of  the  Union. 
The  Folketing  is  thus  attempting  to  combine  the  expertise  from  the  select  committees 
with  the  specialised  knowledge  and  coordination  ability  of  the  EUC.  This  has  also  been 
15  The  number  of  agenda  items  (relating  to  EU  issues)  found  on  the  ordinary  agendas  of  select  committees 
has  increased  from  ten  in  the  1979-80  parliamentary  year  to  205  in  2001-2.  The  Environmental  and 
Planning  Committee  is  responsible  for  a  significant  number  of  these,  namely  7  in  1979-80,  and  41  in  2001-2 
(Jensen,  2003,  p.  114). 
84 attempted  in  the  Italian  Senate  through  members  of  the  European  committee  also 
being  members  of  other  select  committees.  Within  the  Folketing  such  structural  means 
for  achieving  the  combination  of  knowledge  have  not  been  employed.  Instead,  the 
EUC  has  relied  on  select  committees  to  understand  the  importance  of  their 
involvement  in  scrutiny  procedures  and  their  willingness  to  undertake  the  work 
required. 
While  the  EUC  would  like  other  select  committees  to  forward  written 
recommendations  to  it,  only  the  committee  on  the  environment  has  done  so  for  a 
substantial  period  of  time.  It  is  thus  possible  to  detect  a  significant  divide  in 
behavioural  patterns  between  committees  dealing  with  issues  over  which  the 
Community  has  well  developed  competencies  (agriculture,  fishing  and  the 
environment  are  obvious  examples)  and  areas  where  the  Community  has  little 
competence  (health  and  social  issues  for  instance),  with  the  latter  according  EU  issues 
much  less  importance  than  the  former.  Committee  personnel  has  been  an  important 
factor  both  in  developing  interest  in  European  affairs  and  the  building  of  scrutiny 
procedures  within  committees.  It  is  evident  that  committees  with  chairs  and/or 
members  who  have  participated  in  the  work  of  the  EUC  often  have  a  better 
understanding  of  how  EU  legislation  affects  their  work  at  the  national  level.  As  a 
consequence,  these  committees  tend  to  be  much  more  interested  in  participating  in  the 
framing  of  European  legislation.  " 
The  debate  on  how  to  involve  select  committees  further  has  continued  within 
parliamentary  groups  and  the  parliamentary  Prxsidium  (governing  body).  A  report 
from  the  EUC  (published  February  1999)  thus  once  more  included  discussion  on  the 
role  of  select  committees  (Folketinget,  1999,  pp.  96-105).  It  was  argued  that  because  the 
EU  affects  the  Folketing's  committees  differently,  no  single  model  for  how  select 
committees  should  deal  with  EU  affairs  could  be  developed  and  implemented.  The 
EUC  did,  however,  encourage  select  committees  to  become  involved  at  an  early  stage 
where  the  ability  to  influence  the  stance  of  the  government  is  the  greatest.  The  EUC 
also  (again)  made  it  very  clear  that  the  final  mandating  of  ministers  takes  place  within 
the  EUC.  This  point  was  reiterated  in  a  report  from  2001  (Folketinget,  2001a)  which 
also  contained  a  catalogue  of  ideas  for  how  select  committees  could  potentially 
develop  their  work  on  Community  affairs.  " 
76  An  example  of  this  is  the  select  committee  on  Fiscal  affairs.  Jens  Peter  Vemersen  (chair  2001  -  2005)  was  a 
member  of  the  EUC  prior  to  the  2001  election  and  has  instigated  several  new  initiatives  within  the 
committee  he  now  chairs.  Although  the  EU  is  not-currently-harmonising  tax  legislation,  it  is  an  area  of 
much  contention,  and  the  committee  has  developed  a  system  for  keeping  track  of  current  legislation,  while 
also  asking  the  ministry  to  indicate  which  areas,  in  the  short,  medium  and  long  term,  they  expect  to  be  the 
subject  of  negotiation  at  the  European  level  (interview  DK-27). 
17  In  the  2001  report  it  was  also  decided  that  an  EU  consultant,  whose  specific  job  it  would  be  to  inform 
and  assist  the  select  committees,  should  be  employed  by  the  Folketing. 
85 In  the  latest  (draft)  report  from  2004,  a  more  systematic  and  independent  involvement 
of  select  committees  is  envisaged.  It  is  thus  suggested  that  the  first  review  of  EU 
legislation  should  take  place  in  select  committees  that  then  report  to  the  EUC.  The  EUC 
itself  would  still  provide  the  final  negotiating  mandate  in  order  to  'ensure  unity  and 
continuity  in  the  Folketing's  treatment  of  EU-cases'  (Europaudvalget,  2004,  p.  4, 
author's  translation).  For  select  committees  to  fulfill  this  role  they  need  to 
'systematically  undertake  an  independent  investigation  of  new  proposals  from  the 
Commission'  (Europaudvalget,  2004,  p.  6,  author's  translation).  Such  independent 
activities  require  their  involvement  to  begin  at  a  very  early  stage,  while  cooperation 
with  the  EUC  must  also  be  very  close. 
The  potential  reward  for  the  significant  amount  of  work  such  scrutiny  requires  is 
indirect  through  submissions  to  the  EUC,  although  an  improved  understanding  of 
Community  affairs  and  their  impact  at  the  national  level  can  also  be  achieved.  Despite 
the  wishes  of  the  EUC  and  the  obvious  impact  of  European  legislation  on  domestic 
legislative  activities,  the  incentives  for  select  committees  to  become  involved  with 
Community  issues  remain  limited.  Any  involvement  means  adding  to  the  workload  of 
committee  members  and  staff  as  well  as  a  steep  learning  curve  as  the  processes, 
vocabulary  and  style  of  Community  legislation  are  different  to  those  that  apply  to 
national  legislation.  Although  politicians  are  aware  that  they  need  to  include  a 
European  dimension  in  their  work,  they  are  also  aware  of  the  difficulties.  One  Danish 
MP  thus  stated  that  'it  demands  significant  engagement,  it  is  all  or  nothing',  '"  while 
another  MP  commented  that  'one  can  always  philosophise  about  whether  everybody 
can  work  it  out,  at  times  one  doubts  that  somewhat.  Partly  because  sometimes  material 
arrives  in  a  foreign  language,  while  at  the  same  time  it  is  somewhat  complicated'.  "  To 
alleviate  the  effect  of  the  different  legislative  procedures  Olsen  pushed  for  hearings  on 
Green  and  White  papers  from  the  Commission.  These  hearings  were  supposed  to  help 
MPs  become  aware  of  forthcoming  issues  at  the  European  level.  However,  'the 
problem  is  that  they  can  not  be  bothered  to  turn  up  because  it  may  take  several  years 
from  the  introduction  of  a  Green  paper  to  the  implementation  of  it,  and  before  [the 
implementation]  a  national  election  is  to  be  held,  there  is  a  party  at  home  in  the 
electorate  with  a  picnic  and  the  whole  lot,  and  that  is  what  matters  in  terms  of  being 
reelected':  '  An  ex-ministern  echoed  this  sentiment,  arguing  that: 
The  minister  turns  up  [in  a  select  committee]  to  inform  about  a  topic 
because  the  Commission  has  decided  to  make  a  directive  or  policy  on  that 
topic.  Then  we  inform,  the  committee  can  have  an  opinion,  take  a 
is  Interview  DK-5. 
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86 standpoint,  read  some  things  about  it  and  then,  in  principle,  three  years  go 
by  before  the  topic  returns.  And  then  it  has  become  a  directive  that  is  to  be 
implemented  where  you  can't  move  a  comma  and  where  the  ownership  of 
the  case  is  close  to  non-existent.  Then  it  easily  becomes  a  matter  of  leaning 
back  and  saying  'ah  well,  it  is  EU  legislation,  I  can't  do  anything  about  it', 
and  that  means  that  the  engagement  with  European  issues  is  very  limited 
However,  the  perhaps  biggest  disincentive  for  members  of  select  committees  to  engage 
with  European  affairs  remains  the  lack  of  mandating  powers  for  select  committees. 
While  the  EUC  and  the  Pr&sidium  have  pushed  for  select  committees  to  involve 
themselves  more  in  EU  affairs  and  contribute  to  debate  in  the  EUC  and  in  the 
formulation  of  and  commenting  on  mandates,  the  EUC  has  repeatedly  underlined  that 
mandates  are-and  will  continue  to  be-delivered  by  the  EUC.  This  has  often  resulted 
in  Community  issues  finding  their  way  to  the  bottom  of  the  pile  of  papers  to  be 
considered  at  select  committees  meetings.  A  Folketing  staff  member  suggested  that 
select  committees  had  the  'safety  network'  of  the  EUC  to  address  Community  issues 
and  therefore  did  not  need  to  develop  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  them.  '  If 
they  have  no  involvement  in  the  final  stage,  that  is,  the  granting  of  the  negotiating 
mandate,  members  of  select  committees  may  question  the  usefulness  of  undertaking  all 
the  preparatory  work. 
Other  scrutiny-related  problems  mentioned  by  Danish  MPs  on  select  committees  are 
similar  to  those  of  the  EUC,  namely  those  of  timely  arrival  of  papers,  mainly 
translations  of  papers  from  the  European  institutions,  as  well  as  the  quantity  of  papers. 
The  Government  has  not  been  directly  accused  of  drowning  the  parliament  in  papers, 
but  several  MPs  indicated  that  a  summary,  setting  out  the  issues  and  likely  problems 
together  with  the  government's  position,  would  be  helpful  to  busy  parliamentarians. 
As  the  administration  has  learnt  about  how  to  inform  parliament,  MPs  are  being 
provided  with  better  tools  for  carrying  out  their  scrutiny.  Procedural  improvements  do 
not,  however,  solve  the  issue  of  lack  of  participation  by  non-EUC  members  in  the  final 
provision  of  mandates.  However,  shifting  the  mandating  of  ministers  to  select 
committees  would  only  create  other  problems,  the  main  one  being  a  loss  of 
coordination  on  EU  issues  within  the  Folketing. 
With  the  increased  engagement  of  select  committees  in  Community  affairs,  a  greater 
number  of  MPs  are  involved  with  these  issues  on  several  levels.  Not  only  is 
coordination  between  the  EUC  and  select  committees  necessary,  it  has  also  become 
increasingly  necessary  to  coordinate  party  positions  across  policy  areas.  For  instance, 
the  spokesperson  on  agriculture  must  coordinate  with  the  party's  representative  in  the 
EUC  when  issues  falling  under  the  remit  of  the  agriculture  committee  are  discussed. 
Many  politicians  interviewed  mentioned  this  increased  coordination  as  being 
22  Interview  DK-25. 
87 imperative  to  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  work  within  parliamentary  party  groups. 
Party  spokespeople  have  historically  been  responsible  for  the  coordination  of  policy. 
However,  it  becomes  increasingly  difficult  for  one  person,  or  even  a  small  committee, 
to  formulate  a  party's  EU  policy  if  they  have  to  defer  to  the  entire  spectrum  of  select 
committees.  The  increased  requirements  for  coordination  of  EU  legislation,  both  at  the 
intra-party  and  inter-committee  levels,  may  thus  contribute  to  Community  matters 
increasingly  becoming  'everyday'  politics  to  be  considered  in  the  formulation  of 
domestic  policy  preferences. 
Currently,  the  roles  of  select  committees  remain  limited  by  the  EUC's  monopoly  on 
coordination  of  the  Folketing's  EU  policy.  Although  most  politicians  accept  this  state  of 
affairs  at  the  moment,  some  feel  the  opposite  approach  should  be  taken  and  that  EU 
policy  could  well  be  coordinated  in  the  select  committees.  Tove  Videbxk,  chair  of  the 
Social  Committee  in  the  Folketing,  thus  argues  that  the  coordination  process  could 
simply  be  reversed.  In  other  words,  the  spokesperson  from  the  select  committee  could 
ensure  that  a  proposal  conforms  to  their  party's  EU  policy,  rather  than  the 
spokesperson  on  EU  policy  checking  whether  a  proposal  falls  within  party  policy  on 
the  given  topic. 
While  it  is  very  likely  that  placing  the  mandating  procedure  with  select  committees 
would  result  in  increased  interest  in  Community  affairs,  maintaining  the  EUC  as  a 
coordinating  body  makes  sense  institutionally.  It  is  still  the  prerogative  of  the 
government  to  conduct  Danish  foreign  policy  and  Community  affairs  are  still 
organised  by  the  government  administration  in  a  manner  very  similar  to  foreign  affairs 
with  strong  central  coordination.  Compared  to  the  government  administration,  the 
Folketing  has  limited  resources  and  must  thus  maintain  tight  coordination  if  it  is  to  be 
effective  in  its  control  of  the  government. 
4.  The  Administration 
The  government's  right  to  conduct  foreign  policy  is  constitutionally  based  (Folketinget, 
2001b,  Chapter  III,  Article  19,  para.  1).  While  the  government  is  obliged  to  inform 
parliament  and  obtain  its  approval  on  matters  pertaining  to  inter-state  agreements  and 
any  alteration  of  the  Danish  Kingdom's  territory,  the  Constitution  does  not  mention  the 
parliament  as  a  participant  in  foreign  affairs.  Although  civil  servants  within  the 
Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  maintain  that  Community  matters  have  never  been 
considered  foreign  affairs  by  the  ministry,  "  the  coordination  of  EU  affairs  remains 
subject  to  strong  centralisation.  The  administration's  coordination  of  relations  with  the 
23  Interview  DK-30. 
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88 Folkefing  as  well  as  the  Government's  negotiations  at  the  European  level  thus  takes 
place  within  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Speaking  specifically  about  relations  with 
the  Folkefing,  a  centrally  placed  civil  servant  maintained  that  'no  paper  goes  to  the 
Folketing  without  it  first  passing  over  my  desk'.  ' 
While  the  procedure  of  channeling  all  information  through  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs  ensures  continuity  in  style  and  form,  as  well  as  guaranteeing  coordination  for 
the  government,  it  also  introduces  an  extra  bureaucratic  layer,  potentially  causing 
delays  that  may  prevent  a  thorough  examination  of  a  topic  by  the  Folketing.  It  is  not 
disputed  that  it  is  the  Government's  duty  to  inform  the  Folketing,  but  how  this  is 
achieved  has  been  the  subject  of  many  debates,  with  the  administration  repeatedly 
adjusting  to  new  demands  made  by  Danish  MPs.  Provision  of  information  to  the 
Folketing  can  therefore  be  described  as  a  learning  process  for  politicians  as  well  as  the 
administration.  While  politicians  on  select  committees  have  had  to  discover  what 
questions  to  ask  and  what  information  to  request,  staff  within  the  administration  have 
had  to  learn  how  to  accommodate  the  MPs'  demands. 
Although  structures  and  procedures  for  formulating  negotiating  briefs  and  directions 
are  centralised  within  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  several  non-governmental 
organisations  (NGOs)  and  other  interested  parties  are  also  involved  through  an  EU 
Committee  established  within  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs.  This  coordinating 
committee  has  several  sub-committees,  each  dedicated  to  an  area  roughly 
corresponding  to  a  ministry  within  the  Danish  administration.  '  The  sub-committees 
prepare  the  basis  for  Danish  negotiators,  with  final  decision  taken  in  the  EU  committee 
within  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  or  the  Danish  Government's  committee  on 
foreign  policy  (with  no  participants  from  outside  the  government  or  administration). 
Parliamentarians  do  not  participate  in  any  of  these  committees.  While  they  receive 
papers  from  committee  meetings,  the  section  outlining  the  Danish  government's 
negotiation  stance  and  goals  has  always  been  withheld.  The  government  has 
maintained  that  this  is  done  for  reasons  of  confidentiality,  arguing  that  if 
parliamentarians  leaked  the  government's  goals  and  aims  to  the  press  the  Danish 
negotiation  position  would  immediately  be  compromised.  While  this  argument  has  a 
strong  element  of  plausibility  to  it,  the  section  removed  from  the  documents  forwarded 
to  the  Parliament  is  also,  ironically,  the  one  which  parliamentarians  would  find  most 
useful  in  their  scrutiny  of  the  Government's  actions  at  the  European  level.  However, 
the  government  has  recognised  that  parliamentarians  may  find  the  sections  so  far 
25  Interview  DK-9. 
2  Participants,  on  an  ad  hoc  basis,  are  mainly  industry  and  labour  organisations.  Less  frequently 
organisations  protecting,  for  instance,  the  rights  of  consumers  will  also  be  involved.  At  the  latest  count  35 
committees,  each  with  between  4  and  67  participants,  were  established  under  the  EU  committee  within  the 
ministry  of  foreign  affairs  (Folketingets  EU-Oplysning,  2003)). 
89 removed  useful,  and  a  compromise  appears  to  have  emerged  in  the  latest  (draft)  report 
from  the  EUC.  The  government  has  agreed  to  include  its  overall  opinion  on  an  EU 
proposal  in  the  notes  forwarded  to  the  Folketing.  In  return,  the  Folketing  accepts  that  the 
wording  of  the  opinion  may  not  be  identical  to  the  negotiation  mandate  later  presented 
to  the  EUC  (Europaudvalget,  2004,  pp.  12-3).  It  is  not  in  the  interest  of  the  EUC  to 
undermine  the  government's  negotiating  position,  this  would  only  serve  to  diminish 
its  own  influence,  but  the  new  demands  on  information  provided  by  the 
administration  do,  overall,  enhance  the  basis  on  which  the  Folketing  operates. 
Civil  servants  from  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  all  officially  support  the 
development  of  scrutiny  in  the  Folketing's  select  committees.  However,  off  the  record, 
they  often  speak  with  some  disdain  of  the  parliamentary  claims  of  'significant 
improvements'  in  parliamentary  scrutiny  through  involvement  of  select  committees.  It 
is  pointed  out  that  such  involvement  has  been  a  possibility  for  many  years  and  is 
happening  only  very  slowly-often  with  great  reluctance  on  behalf  of  the  members  of 
the  select  committees.  "  However,  the  administration  has  its  own  difficulties  to  deal 
with.  In  particular,  the  insistence  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  that  all  papers  pass 
through  its  offices  has  been  a  source  of  resentment  within  other  ministries. 
For  individual  ministries,  the  involvement  of  select  committees  in  scrutiny  of  the 
government  on  EU  affairs  has  offered  a  chance  to  gain  a  level  of  independence  hitherto 
unattainable  owing  to  the  central  coordinating  function  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
Affairs.  As  select  committees  involve  themselves  more  in  Community  matters,  they 
place  greater  demands  on  their  respective  ministries  through  requests  for  information 
and  direct  communication.  The  relationship  between  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
and  the  other  specialised  ministries  has  become  an  inter-administration 
issue-although  more  often  hinted  at  than  directly  discussed. 
As  they  are  only  alluded  to,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  with  any  certainty  how  fierce 
inter-ministerial  'battles'  have  been.  However,  one  example  that  is  relatively  well 
known  is  that  of  Svend  Auken  (ex-minister  of  environmental  affairs)  and  his  fight 
against  beverages  being  sold  in  cans  within  Denmark.  Auken  was  mentioned  as  one 
minister  who  acted  very  independently  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  while  he 
himself  has  spoken  of  Foreign  Service  civil  servants'  dislike  of  the  Folketing's 
involvement.  '  The  Danish  ban  on  beverages  sold  in  cans  (because  these  did  not  fit  into 
the  already  existing  recycling  scheme  for  bottles'  is  one  example  of  Auken's 
ministerial  independence  that  was  mentioned  during  interviews.  For  Auken  it  became 
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29  In  Denmark  a  deposit  is  paid  for  the  bottle  itself  (on  top  of  the  price  for  the  drink)  when  buying  bottled 
beverages.  This  deposit  is  then  refunded  when  the  bottle  is  returned  to  an  authorised  collection  point. 
90 a  personal  battle  when  the  European  Commission  considered  the  ban  on  cans  a 
hindrance  to  entering  the  Danish  beverage  market.  Due  to  his  influence  within  the 
cabinet,  Auken  resisted  significant  pressure  from  other  cabinet  members  to  comply 
with  Commission  requests.  His  stubbornness  on  the  issue  was  an  embarrassment  to 
some  who  saw  it  as  an  unnecessary  distraction,  as  well  as  a  battle  he  was  destined  to 
lose.  It  caused  friction  within  the  Cabinet  as  well  as  between  ministries,  taking  up  time 
and  resources  many  thought  could  be  better  employed  on  other  issues.  Consequently, 
other  ministers  felt  that  the  strong  independence  exercised  by  the  Ministry  of 
Environmental  Affairs  was  detrimental  to  the  government's  overall  EU  strategy. 
Although  suppliers  have  had  to  set  up  a  recycling  scheme  similar  to  that  for  bottles 
after  a  long,  drawn-out  battle,  beverages  are  now  available  in  cans  in  Danish  shops. 
For  a  small  state  such  as  Denmark,  the  overall  coordination  of  the  Government's 
strategy  is  of  great  importance  in  ensuring  that  it  can  bring  influence  to  bear  on  EU 
negotiations.  Many  ministers  felt  that  the  close  links  between  their  ministry  and  the 
Folketing  benefited  their  work-both  when  it  came  to  individual  cases  and  the 
development  of  an  overall  strategy  for  Denmark's  EU  policy.  3'  The  greatest  benefit  of 
strong  parliamentary  involvement,  mentioned  by  all  those  interviewed,  was  the  added 
knowledge  it  naturally  provided  to  ministers.  As  a  consequence  of  the  scrutiny 
procedure  in  the  Folketing,  they  were  made  aware  of  where  political  problems  in  a 
proposal  were,  developed  a  good  knowledge  of  the  issue,  and  were  thus  better  able  to 
defend  Denmark's  position  in  Council  negotiations.  With  the  heavy  involvement  of 
both  select  committees  and  the  EUC,  they  could  not  get  away  with  just  reading  the 
briefing  papers  on  the  plane  to  Brussels-something  other  Council  participants  were 
sometimes  accused  of.  Niels  Helveg  Peterson  (minister  of  foreign  affairs  1993  -  2000) 
thus  argues  that: 
the  government,  at  a  very  early  point,  has  to  identify  where  the  problems 
are,  both  the  factual  and  the  political  problems.  But  because  of  the  often 
very  long  period  between  the  time  a  case  appears  on  the  agenda  of  the 
Council  to  the  point  where  a  decision  has  to  be  taken,  in  most  cases  there  is 
plenty  of  time  to  prepare  decision.  So  if  one  acts  wisely,  one  has  informed 
the  EUC  thoroughly  before  the  final  decision-making  phase  is  reached  so 
they  are  familiar  with  the  case  3' 
Moreover,  Marianne  Delved  (minister  of  finance  1994  -  2001)  stated  that  'I  believe  the 
preparatory  work  [in  the  EUC  and  select  committees]  qualifies.  That  you,  as  a  minister, 
must  also  be  able  to  convince  opposition  parties  of  the  rightness  of  the  government's 
30  The  ministers  interviewed  for  this  project  were  all  ex-ministers  at  the  time  of  the  interviews  (June  2002), 
following  the  change  in  government  taking  place  November  2001. 
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91 proposal  gives  your  arguments  totally  different  weight  in  the  Council, 
. 
32  While  Jacob 
Buksti  (minister  of  traffic  2000  -  2001)  declared  that: 
the  strength  in  the  Danish  system  is  not  that  the  mandate  limits  the 
minister,  it  is  that  the  mandate  strengthens  the  minister,  understood  in  the 
way  that  it  is  the  minister,  the  ministry,  who  formulates  the  mandate-and 
that  is  of  course  related  to  the  negotiation  situation.  It  can  be  very  limiting, 
or  it  can  be  very  wide,  but  the  important  thing  is  that  you  are  not  bound, 
the  important  thing  is  that  you  have  a  very  clear  feeling  for  the  limits 
within  which  you  can  move.  ' 
Despite  the  proclaimed  benefits  that  the  Danish  scrutiny  system  has  brought  its 
participants  it  is  not  without  problems.  Time  and  resources  must  be  allocated  to  it, 
occasionally  to  such  an  extent  that  some  ministers  felt  procedures  became  more 
important  than  issues.  At  least  some  participants  in  the  Danish  scrutiny  procedures 
thus  felt  that  better  results  could  have  been  achieved  if  resources  had  been  focused 
more  on  the  negotiations  taking  place  at  the  European  level  rather  than  on  national 
level  parliamentarians  bleating  about  democracy.  To  some  extent,  this  situation  can  be 
alleviated  by  trust  developing  between  ministers  and  parliament. 
A  trend  towards  governments  being  re-elected  and  parliaments  sitting  their  full  term 
(beginning  in  the  early  and  late  1980s  respectively)  has  contributed  towards  the 
development  of  such  trust  between  the  Folketing  on  the  one  side  and  the  administration 
on  the  other.  This  has  allowed  MPs  to  concentrate  on  work  within  the  committees, 
getting  to  grips  with  the  subject  and  thus  being  able  to  present  a  more  credible 
challenge  to  the  well-established  expertise  of  the  administration.  The  importance  of  the 
stability  this  creates  in  the  minister-Folketing  relationship  should  not  be  underestimated 
as  trust  has  a  significant  impact  on  the  granting  of  mandates.  If  the  level  of  trust  is 
high,  the  minister  is  likely  to  receive  more  flexible  mandates,  as  the  EUC  is  confident 
the  spirit  of  the  agreement  will  not  be  broken.  However,  if  ministers  show  signs  of  not 
cooperating  with  the  EUC,  they  and  their  civil  servants  are  likely  to  be  kept  on  a  much 
shorter  leash.  ' 
Although  at  times  difficult,  it  is  possible  for  Danish  parliamentarians  to  remain 
informed  about  European-level  legislation  going  through  the  Council.  Difficulties  arise 
if  they  wish  to  follow  and  scrutinise  legislation  carried  out  by  the  Commission  through 
comitology  procedures.  To  alleviate  this  situation  the  Folketing  has  agreed  with  the 
Danish  government  that  the  government  must  inform  Parliament  about  important 
cases  decided  using  the  comitology  procedure  (Folketinget,  2001c,  pp.  75-8).  This  duty 
'V  Interview  DK-10. 
"  Interview  DK-31. 
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92 to  inform  covers  important  cases  in  the  regulatory  committees,  and  follows  the  same 
guidelines  as  for  cases  dealt  with  by  the  Council  in  its  meetings.  In  other  words,  in 
important  cases  the  government,  or  rather  its  civil  servants,  must  obtain  a  negotiating 
mandate  from  the  Folketing.  Furthermore,  in  special  cases,  the  Government  must  also 
inform  about  cases  decided  in  management  committees  if  these  are  of  a  more  general 
nature.  Cases  of  this  kind  have  increased  significantly  in  recent  years  (Folketinget, 
2001c,  p.  76). 
Having  to  inform  the  Folketing  in  cases  of  this  type  obviously  places  the  administration 
under  increased  pressure.  It  could  be  argued  that  if  politicians  left  civil  servants  to  get 
on  with  negotiations  at  the  European  level  without  interference,  better  results  could  be 
achieved.  However,  much  depends  on  the  definition  of  'better'.  The  requirements 
stemming  from  deep-rooted  notions  of  a  public  democracy  (now  carried  out  through 
parliamentary  representatives)  have  to  be  fulfilled.  A-technically-good  result  may 
be  achieved  without  the  involvement  of  elected  politicians,  but  lacking  democratic 
scrutiny  it  has  no  legitimacy  and  may  thus  be  considered  a  worse  result  than  none  at 
all.  Civil  servants  too  are  aware  of  these  democratic  limitations  on  their  ability  to  act 
and  operate.  Members  of  the  Danish  permanent  representation  in  Brussels  thus 
sometimes  provide  information  to  the  Folketing  if  they  believe  the  topic  is  something 
the  Folketing  would  be  interested  in-even  though  established  procedures  do  not 
necessarily  require  it.  35 
Danish  membership  of  the  EU,  and  the  resulting  adaptation  of  scrutiny  procedures  in 
the  Folketing,  has  forced  significant  changes  within  the  administration.  It  has  set  new 
tasks  and  duties,  but  also  provided  new  channels  of  communication  and  influence. 
Ove  K.  Pedersen  asserts  that  such  developments  have  benefited  the  administration  and 
that  'European  integration  has  strengthened  the  position  of  the  administration  in 
relation  to  the  government  and  Folketing'.  However,  he  adds  that  'it  is  still  striking 
how  the  Danish  system  of  coordination  and  the  many  years'  experience  of  European 
integration  has  subjected  the  every-day  integration  to  democratic  control  and 
guidance'  (Pedersen,  2002,  p.  208,  author's  translation).  Although  the  relationship 
between  the  civil  service  and  the  Folketing  is  generally  not  as  well  understood  as  other 
inter-institutional  relationships  (for  instance  parliament  -  government),  it  remains 
crucial  to  the  smooth  functioning  of  the  Danish  scrutiny  procedure. 
Conclusion 
The  Danish  scrutiny  system  is  comprehensive  in  its  involvement  of  the  Folketing.  It 
offers  parliamentarians  significant  influence  through  the  ability  to  mandate  ministers 
35  Interview  DK-19. 
93 before  they  go  to  meetings  in  the  Council.  Although  this  active  involvement  comes  at  a 
very  late  stage  in  the  decision-making  process,  the  views  and  opinions  of 
parliamentarians  are  taken  into  account  in  the  preparation  of  the  negotiating  mandate 
by  civil  servants  and  the  government.  The  Folketing  (through  the  EUC)  is  thereby 
provided  with  an  early,  albeit  indirect,  voice  in  the  domestic-level  preparatory  work  on 
European  legislation.  This  strong  parliamentary  involvement  reflects  the  perceived 
need  to  comply  with  democratic  demands.  The  requirement  of  strong  public 
involvement  in  decision-making  has  manifested  itself  through  the  people's 
representatives  in  parliament  exerting  significant  influence,  even  power,  over  areas  of 
policy  traditionally  considered  the  domain  of  the  government.  It  is  also,  however,  a 
result  of  institutional  circumstances,  as  the  proportional  electoral  system  returns  a 
fragmented  parliament,  making  coalitions  a  necessity  and  minority  governments  a 
frequent  occurrence.  A  third  factor  contributing  to  the  strong  scrutiny  of  European 
policy  is  the  controversy  surrounding  Denmark's  membership  of  the  EU. 
Virtually  all  Danish  politicians  and  civil  servants  are  (officially  at  least)  in  favour  of  the 
strong  scrutiny  system.  Yet,  many  also  express  specific  concerns  about  it.  Most  focus 
on  procedures  that  could  be  improved,  resources  that  could  be  utilised  to  better  effect 
and  the  question  of  mandating  ministers  and  whether  this  power  should  be  granted  to 
select  committees.  No  one  consulted  for  the  purposes  of  this  study,  however, 
suggested  a  reduction  in  the  involvement  of  the  Folketing  in  European  affairs. 
That  said,  the  extent  of  desired  changes  differed  significantly.  Those  who  simply 
wanted  to  improve  current  procedures  and  'tinker'  rather  than  reform  root  and  branch 
tended  to  be  stronger  supporters  of  European  integration  than  were  those  advocating 
more  radical  changes.  The  latter  were  more  often  critical  of  the  integration  process  and 
the  consequences  it  has  had  for  Denmark.  Jens  Peter  Vernersen  has  thus  described  the 
current  system  as  one  in  which  politicians  have  the  possibility  to  follow  cases  right  to 
the  end,  to  'the  last  drop  of  blood'"  He  has  further  argued  that  if  the  democratic  aspect 
of  the  process  is  not  good  enough,  the  blame  can  only  be  placed  with  the  politicians 
themselves,  as  so  many  possibilities  for  following  cases  are  available  to  Danish 
politicians.  On  the  other  hand,  Jern  Jespersen  (from  the  Socialist  People's  Party)  found 
it  impossible  to  imagine  'what  reforms  it  would  require  before  I  seriously  felt  I  was  a 
real  participant  in  a  democratic  decision-making  process''  The  sheer  enormity  of  the 
workload,  the  slow  processing  of  documents  and  the  late  stage  at  which  MPs  in  reality 
become  involved  in  the  process  were  cited  as  major  reasons  for  holding  this  belief. 
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94 The  EUC  itself  has  also  been  criticised,  with  Professor  Seren  Dosenrode  describing  it  as 
a  'pussycat'  (Dosenrode,  2002).  According  to  Dosenrode  the  EUC  is  handicapped  by  a 
severe  case  of  paralysis:  as  a  political  institution  it  has  significant  powers,  but  dare  not 
use  them  for  fear  of  exposing  internal  party-divisions  on  EU  matters-or  indeed 
antagonising  potential  voters.  While  it  is  still  the  prerogative  of  the  government  to 
formulate  foreign  policy  (including  EU  affairs),  Dosenrode  further  argues  that 
parliament  is  not  the  main  alternative  influence  on  these  policies,  and  that  this  role  is 
instead  played  by  the  civil  service  and  a  wide  range  of  interest  groups. 
Many  politicians  also  speak  of  a  general  agreement  on  EU  matters  across  the  middle  of 
Danish  politics.  The  extent  to  which  this  agreement  extends  from  the  parliamentary 
party  groups  to  the  entire  party  is  a  topic  that  warrants  further  research,  as  does  the 
wider  question  of  differences  in  opinion  on  the  EU  in  general.  Although  beyond  the 
parameters  of  this  study,  questions  arise  as  to  whether  political  elites  are  'conditioned' 
on  European  issues  in  a  way  that  does  not  'spill  over'  to  their  party  members.  If  this 
turns  out  to  be  the  case,  it  must  be  asked  what  the  consequences  are-apart  from 
turning  the  EUC  into  a  'pussycat'.  A  further  question  is  whether  agreement  is  limited 
to  the  big  overarching  topics  and  whether  divisions  occur  with  regard  to  day-to-day 
politics.  In  other  words,  does  the  agreement  on  EU  policy  disappear  when  it  begins  to 
resemble  domestic  legislation  where  cleavages  such  as  the  traditional  left-right  come 
into  play? 
Although  the  Danish  procedure  ensures  that  parliamentarians  have  a  voice  in  the 
process  of  European  legislation,  the  lateness  of  this  involvement  remains  a  problem.  If 
MPs  are  serious  about  bringing  Europe  to  the  Danes''",  then  they  will  have  to  become 
active  participants  in  the  decision-making  process  at  a  much  earlier  stage.  Currently, 
sustained  involvement  by  MPs  at  the  national  level  is  difficult  due  to  the  long 
legislative  processes  at  the  European  level  as  well  as  the  fact  that  relatively  few 
changes  are  made  to  legislative  proposals  after  if  has  been  officially  proposed  by  the 
Commission  (which,  realistically,  is  the  earliest  point  at  which  national  parliaments  can 
become  formally  involved).  For  a  variety  of  reasons  MPs  therefore  have  considerable 
difficulties  maintaining  an  overview  of  and  influencing  (in  a  meaningful  way)  the 
European  legislative  process.  As  a  consequence,  parliamentarians  may  concentrate 
their  efforts  where  they  are  most  visible  rather  than  where  they  are  most  effective. 
Overall  the  Danish  scrutiny  system  can  be  described  as  very  extensive.  The  democratic 
strength  of  the  Danish  system  is  reflected  in  the  fact  that  ministers  must  obtain  a 
mandate  in  the  EUC  prior  to  negotiations  in  the  Council.  The  entire  process  is  centred 
on  the  weekly  EUC  meetings,  ensuring  the  involvement  of  parliamentarians. 
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95 Moreover,  the  involvement  in  earlier  stages  of  the  process  by  NGOs  and  interest 
groups  is  further  evidence  of  the  Danish  political  culture  of  openness  and 
inclusiveness.  It  is  still  debatable,  however,  whether  a  `democratic  surplus'  actually 
exists,  and  whether  it  is  possible  to  use  such  an  expression  when  it  comes  to  the  Danish 
aspect  of  the  European  legislative  process.  Pedersen  thus  argues  that  the  Folketing,  but 
also  the  administration  and  in  some  ways  even  the  government,  have  increased  their 
influence  over  European  matters.  '  The  question  then  becomes  whether  one  believes  in 
a  finite  amount  of  influence  and  whether  one  institution  increasing  the  influence  it  has 
over  a  process  necessarily  means  that  another  institution  must  have  its  influence 
reduced.  If  this  argument  is  refuted  (which  it  is  by  Pedersen),  it  becomes  meaningless 
to  speak  of  a  democratic  deficit  or  surplus. 
However,  the  institution'  whose  influence  is  being  reduced  may,  in  this  case,  be  that  of 
an  autonomous  decision-making  process  at  the  European  level.  If  all  member  states 
were  to  employ  similarly  extensive  and  involved  scrutiny  procedures,  it  may  well  be 
that  only  very  few  decisions  would  be  taken  at  Council  meetings.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Danish  parliamentary  scrutiny  system  may  also  be  viewed  as  one  step  in  the 
government's  preparatory  work  for  Council  meetings,  with  other  governments 
undertaking  similar  preparations,  albeit  with  other  (or  less  obvious)  national-level 
actors  providing  guidelines  as  to  how  far  the  government  can  move  during 
negotiations.  The  secrecy  that  has  traditionally  surrounded  Council  meetings  makes  it 
very  difficult  to  ascertain  the  extent  to  which  the  Danish  scrutiny  system  can  be 
blamed  for  delaying  negotiations  in  this  forum-something  Danish  politicians  and 
civil  servants  deny  takes  place.  Outside  observers  of  the  scrutiny  system  that  has 
developed  within  the  Folketing  may  see  it  as  causing  delays.  It  does,  however,  fulfill  the 
demands  of  Danish  political  culture  (and  the  current  domestic  political  climate)  for 
scrutiny  through  strong  parliamentary  involvement  and  accountability  of  government 
actions. 
There  can  be  no  doubt  that  Europeanisation  has  had  an  effect  within  the  Danish 
Folketing-or  that  the  changes  in  procedures  and  activities  have  been  very  closely 
tailored  to  conform  with  existing  practices  and  requirements.  However,  it  is  also 
becoming  apparent  that  the  influence  of  Europeanisation  goes  beyond  parliamentary 
structures  to  also  affect  discourse.  Increasing  numbers  of  parliamentarians  find 
themselves  involved  in  debates  on  EU  affairs,  with  the  distinction  between  European 
and  domestic  legislation  becoming  increasingly  blurred.  Although  legislation  may 
originate  at  different  levels,  it  is  becoming  increasingly  obvious  that  parliamentarians 
3'  Interview  DK-23. 
43  An  institution  can  be  an  organisation,  but  also  a  social  practice  'consisting  of  easily  recognised  roles 
coupled  with  clusters  of  rules  or  conventions  governing  relations  among  the  occupants  of  these  roles' 
(Jönsson  et  al.,  2000,  p.  6). 
96 must  be  capable  of  handling  both  types  and  develop  appropriate  procedures  for  doing 
so. 
97 Chapter  5:  Italy 
[Fortune]  shows  her  potency  where  there  is  no  well  regulated  power  to 
resist  her,  and  her  impetus  is  felt  where  she  knows  there  are  no 
embankments  and  dykes  built  to  restrain  her.  If  you  consider  Italy,  the 
theatre  of  those  changes  and  variations  I  mentioned,  which  first  appeared 
here,  you  will  see  that  she  is  a  country  without  embankments  and  without 
dykes:  for  if  Italy  had  been  adequately  reinforced,  like  Germany,  Spain, 
and  France,  either  this  flood  would  not  have  caused  the  great  changes  it 
has,  or  it  would  not  have  swept  in  at  all. 
(Machiavelli,  1981) 
The  Italian  parliament  is  significantly  younger  than  either  the  British  or  Danish 
parliaments  and  has  had  a  much  more  tumultuous  existence.  Italy  was  unified  only  in 
1861,  with  regionalism  still  playing  an  important  role  in  Italian  politics.  The  oft-cited 
statement  by  former  Prime  Minister  of  Piedmont,  Massimo  d'Azeglio,  that  'we  have 
made  Italy;  now  we  must  make  Italians',  is,  in  some  regards,  still  true.  Due  to  its 
relatively  late  unification,  Italy  has  had  a  much  shorter  time  than  both  Denmark  and 
the  UK  to  develop  a  uniform  political  culture.  Moreover,  Italians  have  developed  their 
democracy  in  the  face  of  significant  challenges.  According  to  Vittorio  Bufacchi  and 
Simon  Burgess  (2001)  'it  was  always  going  to  be  difficult  for  a  liberal  political  culture  to 
flourish  in  a  country  held  hostage  by  three  great  illiberal  forces:  Fascism,  Catholicism 
and  Communism'.  These  three  forces  have  each  placed  their  distinct  marks  on  the 
Italian  political  environment.  The  fascist  dictatorship-and  the  subsequent  political 
reaction  to  it-is  perhaps  most  evident  in  the  Italian  constitution.  Having  experienced 
fascist  rule,  those  involved  in  drawing  up  the  new  Italian  constitution  made  sure  that 
the  political  elite  was  subjected  to  regular  elections  for  a  central  parliament  from  which 
a  government  would  be  formed.  Despite  the  electoral  system  initially  being 
proportional,  generally  thought  to  favour  parties  with  a  geographically  broad  political 
base,  Italian  politicians  maintained  strong  links  with  their  local  area.  Regionalism 
remained  important  with  the  transformation  to  the  Second  Republic  which  was  firmly 
established  by  the  1996  election.  The  collapse  of  the  First  Republic  (which  lasted, 
roughly,  from  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  to  the  late  1980s)  also  caused  a 
restructuring  of  the  political  map  with  old  political  parties  disappearing  and  new  ones 
98 mainly  having  a  regional  basis.  '  Historically,  close  links  with  the  local  area  were  vitally 
important  for  re-election  and  secured  through  preferential  treatment  and  benefits  to 
local  interests  (Hine,  1993,  pp.  173-4).  Politicians  were  able  to  obtain  such  benefits 
through  legislation,  making  sure  that  programmes  and  projects  benefited  interests  in 
their  area.  This  process  was  aided  by  parliament  predominantly  legislating  through  its 
select  committees,  a  situation  which  provided  poor  oversight  and  budget  control,  but 
permitting  the  fulfilling  of  multiple  interests. 
The  Italian  Parliament  has  thus  been  an  important  element  in  the  development  of 
Italy's  own  brand  of  democracy.  It  has  survived  the  transformation  from  the  First  to 
the  Second  Republic  relatively  unscathed,  while  the  executive  and  political  parties 
have  undergone  significant  transformations.  Historically,  the  Italian  parliament  has 
been  a  strong  legislature,  although  this  status  has,  partly,  been  achieved  due  to  a 
comparatively  weak  executive.  However,  the  shift  to  the  Second  Republic  may  have 
altered  this  situation.  As  the  executive  is  becoming  more  cohesive  and  political  parties 
more  unified,  parliament  as  an  institution  may  be  losing  in  the  inter-institutional 
relationship.  One  area  in  which  this  trend  could  be  countered  is  European  affairs, 
where  the  Italian  parliament  has  gradually  begun  to  realise  the  importance  of  oversight 
and  scrutiny  of  the  executive,  activities  which  Parliament  has  begun  to  develop  in 
recent  years. 
These  developments  make  the  Italian  Parliament  an  interesting  case  study  because  of 
the  way  in  which  it  has  attempted  to  participate  in  European  affairs.  Legislation  has 
been  the  primary  focus-but  legislation  on  implementation.  Only  very  recently  has  it 
become  apparent  to  Italian  politicians  that  the  pre-decision  stage  is  of  considerable 
significance  and  that  scrutiny  procedures  addressing  this  stage  of  the  decision-making 
process  must  be  developed.  When  discussing  parliamentary  involvement  with 
European  affairs,  Parliamentarians  strongly  emphasise  the  legge  comunitaria 
(Community  law),  despite  this  annual  piece  of  legislation  only  dealing  with  the 
implementation  of  European  measures.  MPs  thus  do  not  exercise  any  direct  control 
over  the  content  of  the  legislation,  a  fact  that  is  slowly  being  understood  and  acted 
upon. 
To  fully  understand  existing  scrutiny  procedures  in  the  Italian  parliament,  this  chapter 
begins  with  a  historical  overview,  examining  Italy's  development  of  the  First  Republic 
'  The  transition  from  the  First  to  the  Second  Republic  was  gradual,  taking  place  over  a  period  from  the  late 
1980s  to  the  mid-1990s.  It  did  not  involve  a  new  constitution  (as  has  been  the  case,  for  instance,  in  France), 
but  has  consisted  more  of  a  series  of  events  (like  the  fall  of  the  Berlin  wall  and  the  corruption  scandals  of 
the  early  1990s)  that  contributed  to  the  demise  of  the  old  political  parties-and  the  emergence  of  new  ones. 
With  the  new  political  parties  (and  the  reformed  electoral  system)  a  political  environment  where  one  party 
did  not  monopolise  being  in  power  and  real  alteration  between  the  political  left  and  right  wings  have 
taken  place,  has  emerged.  This  contrasts  strongly  with  the  First  Republic  which  was  heavily  dominated  by 
the  Christian  Democrats. 
99 as  well  as  the  transformation  from  the  First  to  the  Second  Republic.  The  Italian 
Parliament  and  its  committee-based  legislative  procedures  are  investigated  in  order  to 
assess  whether  its  reputation  as  a  strong  parliament  is  justified,  followed  by 
examination  of  parliamentary  methods  of  scrutiny.  While  the  Italian  parliament  has  the 
potential  to  influence  its  executive  in  this  area  it  has  largely  opted  not  to  do  so.  The 
historic  legacy  of  a  legislating  parliament  has  been  difficult  to  overcome,  and  has 
meant  that  scrutiny  and  oversight  activities  are  poorly  developed  within  the  Italian 
Parliament.  Moreover,  the  historic  lack  of  controversy  surrounding  Italy's  membership 
of  the  EU  and  the  strong  support  for  membership,  from  the  political  elite  as  well  as  the 
public,  has  also  contributed  to  making  EU  a  'non-issue',  making  it  difficult  to  develop 
interest  in  often  very  technical  matters. 
In  the  last  section  the  relationship  with  the  Italian  administration  will  be  analysed. 
Sufficient,  timely  and  accurate  information  is  of  paramount  importance  if 
parliamentarians  are  to  contribute  productively  in  the  European  legislative  process. 
However,  the  delivery  of  such  information  has  proved  difficult,  due  to  both  the 
government  and  administration  being  not  just  unwilling  but  also  unable  to  provide  it. 
One  consequence  is  that  the  European  committees  in  both  chambers  have  become 
adept  at  obtaining  information  through  other  means,  while  also  being  strongly 
supportive  of  further  cooperation  between  national  parliaments.  In  order  to  fully 
understand  these  developments  it  is  necessary  to  understand  the  constitutional 
foundation  of  the  parliament  and  how  the  Italian  political  system  has  developed  since 
the  Second  World  War.  These  topics  are  therefore  examined  in  the  first  section. 
1.  The  First  republic  and  its  transformation 
During  the  Second  World  War,  most  fighting  undertaken  to  free  Italy  from  fascist  rule 
took  place  in  Northern  Italy  where  Italian  resistance  groups  aided  allied  troops  in  the 
fighting.  Some  resistance  groups  developed  in  workplaces 
but  were  mainly  organised  through  the  five  parties  of  the  Actionists,  Socialists, 
Christian  Democrats,  Liberals  and  Communists,  whose  main  unifying  factor  was  their 
anti-fascism.  While  the  military  efforts  of  the  resistance  groups  should  not  be 
underestimated,  their  main  impact  was,  arguably,  political.  Most  important  was 
perhaps  the  development  of  a  `national  unity',  defined  mainly  as  anti-fascism  and  the 
establishment  of  an  idealised  notion  of  Italy  (largely)  freeing  itself  from  German 
occupation  (Clark,  1996,  pp.  315-6).  According  to  Martin  Clark,  the  Communists 
benefited  the  most  from  this  development.  The  Communists  had  also  contributed  the 
most  to  the  actual  fighting  and  managed,  during  the  course  of  the  Resistance,  to 
legitimise  the  Parlito  Comunista  Italiano  (Italian  Communist  Party,  PCI)  to  a  point  where 
it  became  unthinkable  for  the  PCI  to  be  excluded  from  government  talks  after  the  war. 
100 The  Resistance,  however,  was  exclusively  a  northern  experience,  and  contributed 
significantly  to  post-War  antagonism  between  Northern  and  Southern  Italians,  a 
schism  that  still  exists  today  and  which  has  had  implications  even  within  the  political 
institutions-especially  the  executive  administration. 
Shortly  after  the  war,  on  2  June  1946,  a  referendum  was  held  on  whether  Italy  should 
remain  a  monarchy  or  become  a  republic.  The  Resistance  was  consistent  in  its  support 
for  the  Republican  cause,  while  the  more  conservative  South  voted  mainly  in  favour  of 
a  Monarchy,  again  exhibiting  the  North-South  divide  within  Italy.  Overall,  however, 
the  outcome  of  the  referendum  was  a  rejection  of  the  Monarchy.  On  the  same  day  as 
the  referendum,  elections  were  held  to  the  Constituent  Assembly  which  was  to  settle 
the  constitutional  future  of  Italy.  Of  the  556  seats  the  Christian  Democrats  won  204,  the 
Socialists  115  and  the  Communists  104.  These  three  parties  were  to  dominate  Italian 
politics  for  the  remainder  of  the  'First  Republic',  but  their  first  task  was  to  draft  a  new 
constitution  for  their  country. 
Having  just  fought  to  rid  Italy  of  a  fascist  regime,  a  democratic  foundation  for  the  new 
republic  was  important  to  the  drafters  of  the  new  constitution.  Democracy  is  thus 
explicitly  mentioned  in  Article  1  where  sovereignty  is  also  vested  with  the  people. 
Furthermore,  Article  11  rejects  war  as  a  means  of  settling  international  disputes,  whilst 
also  permitting  the  limitation  of  Italian  sovereignty  if  this  is  necessary  to  ensure  'peace 
and  justice  among  the  Nations'  (Republic  of  Italy,  2002,  Article  11).  Thus,  Italy's  was 
the  first  constitution  in  the  world  to  permit  the  relinquishing  of  sovereignty.  Article  11 
has,  furthermore,  been  used  as  a  base  for  continued  participation  in  the  European 
integration  process.  While  parliament  has  been  consulted  by  the  government  and  has 
debated  the  various  European  treaties,  on  the  basis  of  Article  11,  it  has  not  been 
considered  necessary  to  consult  the  Italian  public  on  the  acceptability,  or  otherwise,  of 
the  deepening  integration  process.  However,  direct  involvement  by  Parliament  in  the 
integration  process  has  also  been  limited.  Antonio  Cassese  writes  that  'the  President  of 
the  [Italian]  republic-with  a  few  exceptions-and  Parliament  have  played  the  role  of 
secondary  dramatis  personae  in  foreign  policy'  (1980,  p.  104).  As  in  most  other  member 
states,  the  Italian  Parliament  has  tended  to  treat  European  affairs  as  foreign  policy, 
accepting  executive  dominance  in  this  area,  with  little  parliamentary  oversight  or 
involvement. 
Italian  governments  have  historically  been  notorious  for  their  inability  to  last,  and  are, 
Constitutionally  at  least,  relatively  weak.  This  is  a  factor  some  argue  has  contributed  to 
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101 Parliament's  relative  strength.  '  One  reason  for  the  executive  weakness  is  the 
Constitutional  focus  on  the  dispersion  of  power  rather  than  an  emphasis  on  policy- 
making,  direction  and  guidance  (Della  Sala,  1998,  p.  76).  This  focus  is  another  outcome 
of  deliberate  constitutional  engineering.  On  the  whole,  the  Italian  Constitution  has 
very  little  to  say  about  the  Executive.  The  most  important  Article  is  number  94,  which 
states  that  the  Government  must  have  the  explicit  confidence  of  both  Houses  and  that  a 
vote  of  no  confidence  is  voted  on  by  roll  call.  The  last  point  is  pivotal  as,  until  1988, 
most  legislation  was  voted  on  by  secret  ballot  that  permitted  factions  within  political 
parties  to  upset  carefully  negotiated  compromises  and  indirectly  causing  government 
coalitions  to  fail.  However,  in  a  roll  call  vote  such  behaviour  is  not  possible-a 
contributing  factor  explaining  why  votes  of  no  confidence  have  played  a  minor  part  in 
bringing  down  governments. 
With  the  onset  of  the  Cold  War,  it  became  impossible  for  the  PCI  (the  largest 
Communist  party  in  the  Western  world  and  recipient  of  aid  from  the  Soviet  Union)  to 
participate  in  governments,  and  from  1948  it  became  the  permanent  opposition  party. 
The  Christian  Democrat  Party  ended  up,  uniquely  in  a  Western  democracy,  as  the 
permanent  party  in  government  (although  almost  always  in  coalition  with  other 
parties).  The  lack  of  party  rotation  at  government  level  meant  that,  despite  frequent 
government  changes,  a  certain  level  of  stability  still  existed  within  the  executive.  Party 
factions  merely  played  a  game  of  'musical  chairs',  with  candidates  for  ministerial  posts 
being  limited  to  a  relatively  small  number  of  senior  politicians.  `. 
The  relatively  weak  executive  had  a  strong  'sparring  partner'  in  the  Italian  Parliament 
whose  constitutional  basis  is  found  in  Part  II,  Title  I  of  the  Constitution  which  declares 
that  it  is  to  consist  of  two  chambers,  the  Camera  dei  Deputati  (Chamber  of  Deputies)  and 
the  Senato  (Senate).  According  to  Article  70  of  the  Constitution,  the  two  chambers 
collectively  exercise  the  legislative  function.  This  means  that  legislative  proposals  have 
to  be  passed  in  both  chambers-in  identical  wording.  Until  the  early  1990s,  the  Italian 
parliament  was  elected  using  a  proportional  system  that  repeatedly  resulted  in  high 
levels  of  fragmentation  within  both  Chambers.  A  new  electoral  system,  under  which  75 
per  cent  of  parliamentarians  are  elected  in  single-member  constituencies  (in  effect  a 
First  Past  the  Post  system),  was  intended  to  reduce  the  number  of  parties,  but  has 
actually  achieved  the  opposite  due  to  electoral  alliances  being  formed  by  very  small 
3  Interview  UK-12 
It  was  not  uncommon  for  politicians  to  be  returned  to  a  particular  office  after  having  previously  lost  it. 
Giulio  Andreotti,  for  example,  was  thus  Prime  Minister  of  seven  governments  over  a  20-year  period 
between  1972  and  1992  (February  -  June  1972,  June  1972  -  July  1973,  July  1976  -  March  1978,  March  1978  - 
January  1979,  January  -  August  1979,  August  1989  -  April  1991  and  April  1991  -  June  1992)  (Hine,  1993,  pp. 
345-6). 
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introduction  of  the  new  electoral  system  has  therefore  soon  become  associated  'more 
with  confusion  than  with  greater  democracy'  (Griffin,  1997,  p.  150). 
Due  to  this  high  level  of  fragmentation,  Parliament  became,  and  remains,  an  important 
actor  in  the  formation  of  governments.  Despite  the  high  number  of  governments 
formed  during  Italy's  'First  Republic',  parliament  in  fact  exhibited  a  significant  degree 
of  stability,  with  most  executive  crises  being  extra-parliamentary:  on  only  two 
occasions  did  a  government  resign  because  it  lost  a  vote  of  confidence  in  parliament. 
As  an  institution,  Parliament  has  thus  been  important  in  developing  Italy's  particular 
brand  of  democracy  and  has  survived  the  political  crises  of  the  1990s  relatively 
unscathed-unlike  both  the  executive  and  the  political  parties  (Della  Sala,  1998,  p.  73). 
Indeed,  several  authors  have  commented  on  the  level  of  continuity  within  the  Italian 
parliament.  Luca  Verzichelli  and  Maurizio  Cotta  thus  argue  that  'there  is  a  lot  of 
continuity  in  the  experience  of  parliamentarism  in  Italy,  before,  during  and  after  the 
first  republic'  and  that  'most  of  the  new  political  actors  are  somehow  linked  to  the  same 
"path  dependency"  characterising  Italian  politics  during  the  first  republic'  (2002,  pp.  24- 
5,  emphasis  in  original).  Mark  Donovan  (2003,  p.  20)  reports  unexpected  'continuity  in 
parliament's  consensual  legislative  style'  while  Paul  Furlong  (2000,  p.  11)  writes  that 
'what  many  observers  find  surprising  is  how  little  change  in  parliamentary  behaviour 
the  new  elites  have  brought  about'. 
Parliament  has  been  dismissed  as  a  relatively  weak  player  on  its  own  (Pasquino,  1996, 
p.  152),  but  is  nonetheless  a  strong  legislator,  a  role  it  predominately  carries  out 
through  parliamentary  committees.  The  role  of  committees  is  outlined  in  Article  72, 
which  states  that  all  bills  must  be  submitted  to  and  considered  by  a  committee,  while 
also  permitting  Committees  to  approve  certain  legislation  on  behalf  of  the  Houses.  ' 
This  procedure  suited  the  First  Republic  very  well,  as  it  provided  politicians  with 
excellent  opportunities  to  broker  deals  of  particular  advantage  to  their  electorates. 
With  close  to  70  per  cent  of  legislation  passed  by  parliamentary  committees  (Koff  and 
Koff,  2000,  p.  120),  spending  money  became  significantly  easier  than  restricting  the 
government's  budget.  On  the  other  hand,  European  legislation,  over  which  parliament 
had  no  direct  influence,  was  given  little  consideration  as  it  provided  few  immediate 
benefits  to  local  constituencies. 
5  For  an  analysis  of  the  transformation  of  Italian  political  parties  see  James  L.  Newell  (2000),  especially 
Chapter  six. 
6  Referral  back  to  the  Houses  can  take  place  if  ten  per  cent  of  the  members  of  the  House  or  20  per  cent  of  a 
committee's  membership  request  it.  In  the  cases  of  constitutional  and  electoral  matters,  the  enabling  of 
legislation,  ratification  of  international  treaties  and  the  approval  of  budgets  and  accounts  legislation  is,  as 
a  matter  of  procedure,  referred  back  to  the  Houses. 
103 While  the  Italian  Parliament  of  the  First  Republic  can  be  described  as  a  strong 
institution  in  relation  to  the  executive,  it  can  also  be  argued  that  it  was  more  an  arena 
for  the  political  parties  than  an  independent  actor.  Nonetheless,  the  emergence  of  the 
Second  Republic  (which  began  to  emerge  in  the  late  1980s,  and  was  fairly  securely 
established  by  the  election  in  1996)  saw  the  disappearance  of  the  old  political  parties 
and  the  emergence  of  new,  mainly  regional,  parties.  While  alternation  in  government 
has  taken  place  in  recent  years,  parliament  looks  and  acts  very  much  like  it  did  during 
the  First  Republic.  For  instance,  legislation  is  still  primarily  passed  in  committees, 
where  negotiations  tend  to  be  much  less  confrontational  than  plenary  meetings  in 
either  house.  This  pattern  has  survived  from  the  First  Republic,  when  legislating 
through  committees  permitted  deals  to  be  made  between  different  parliamentary 
parties,  even  facilitating  the  co-opting  of  the  Communist  Party  into  clientilistic 
methods  of  governance.  ' 
In  the  Second  Republic,  it  may  also  appear  that  the  political  parties  have  become  more 
disciplined,  acting  more  like  the  unitary  actors  taken  for  granted  in  the  Danish 
Folketing  and  the  UK  House  of  Commons.  If  parties  act  in  a  more  unified  fashion  this 
strengthens  the  (majority-based)  executive's  position  as  it  makes  it  more  likely  that 
their  programme  and  legislation  will  be  passed,  thereby  weakening  Parliament  in  the 
inter-institutional  relationship.  While  this  process  arguably  began  as  early  as  the  late 
1980s  with  the  reduced  use  of  the  secret  ballot,  the  effect  on  the  executive-legislative 
relationship  would  have  been  somewhat  reduced  due  to  other  crises. 
One  area  in  which  the  parliament  has  begun  to  reassert  itself  is  European  affairs.  In 
recent  years  parliament  has  begun  to  show  an  interest  in  how  the  Italian  government 
conducts  itself  at  the  European  level  and  what  the  implications  of  membership  of  the 
EU  are.  Parliament's  influence  over  European  legislation  has  been  minimal  (even 
indirect  through  the  executive),  while  MPs'  interest  in  European  issues  has  also  been 
negligible.  However,  the  Italian  parliament  is  gradually  developing  new  powers  and 
methods  of  influence  as  it  increasingly  scrutinises  European-level  activities  of  the 
executive  (and  the  administration). 
As  legislation  has  historically  played  such  a  significant  role  within  the  Parliament,  it  is 
no  surprise  that  most  parliamentarians  place  significant  importance  on  the  legge 
comunitaria,  the  annual  law  that  implements  European  legislation  into  Italian  law  (see 
7  The  'clientilistic'  or'spoils'  system  emerged  when,  to  fund  their  party  (and  re-election),  Italian  politicians 
had  to  provide  services  to  companies  or  interests,  but  these  companies  and  interests  had  to'bribe'  the 
politicians  to  get  the  contracts  or  jobs  they  needed  for  their  continued  existence.  The  entire  procedure, 
while  being  conducted  outside  parliament,  was  still  aided  by  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  legislation 
occurred  through  parliamentary  committees.  Moreover,  it  has  been  claimed  that  because  companies  were 
permitted  to  increase  their  price  on  government  contracts  which,  together  with  additional  benefits,  was 
enough  to  cover  the  cost  of  bribes  necessary  to  obtain  the  contracts,  the  entire  economic  burden  of  the 
corruption  system  was  carried  by  the  state  budget  (Pasquino,  2000,  p.  83). 
104 below).  Thus,  despite  being  generally  responsible  for  'the  legal  aspects  of  the  European 
Union's  activities  and  the  implementation  of  EU  legislation  and  decision',  the  Italian 
Parliament  has  no  scrutiny  reserve  power,  with  a  request  to  postpone  a  decision  in  the 
Council  carrying  only  'political,  but  no  legal  force'  (European  Parliament,  2000b). 
Parliament  therefore  possesses  the  potential  to  exert  significant  influence  over 
European  matters  but  has  historically  opted  not  to  do  so.  This  conundrum  will  now  be 
explored. 
2.  Parliamentary  scrutiny  of  European  affairs 
The  Chamber  of  Deputies 
While  equal  in  their  legislative  powers,  the  two  Italian  chambers  have,  until  very 
recently,  opted  to  treat  European  affairs  very  differently.  In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  a 
committee  on  European  affairs  was  established  in  1971,  a  few  years  later  than  the 
Senatorial  Giunta  (standing  committee).  Reforms  of  the  Committee  were  undertaken  in 
1990,1996  and  1999.  °  In  1996  it  was  decided  that  the  Committee  should  become  the 
Chamber's  14th  select  committee.  Whereas  the  Giunta  was  only  advisory,  the 
committee  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  can  conduct  investigations  and  has  the 
potential  to  interfere  at  the  pre-decision  stage,  although  here  too  this  has  to  be  done  in 
conjunction  with  the  specialised  committees.  In  the  year  2000  the  committee  also 
started  examining  the  European  Commission's  work  programme.  However,  as  in  the 
Senate,  the  European  Committee  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  cooperates  closely  with 
other  specialised  committees,  and  although  the  European  Committee  examines  the 
Commissions  programme  in  its  entirety,  the  other  select  committees  examine  the 
relevant  parts  falling  within  their  remit'  Furthermore,  the  remit  of  the  European 
Committee  only  extends  to  the  EU's  first  pillar,  with  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee 
being  responsible  for  items  falling  under  the  second  and  third  pillars.  It  can  thus  still 
be  argued  that  the  EU  committee  has  very  limited  influence  over  the  executive,  relying 
on  political  pressure  rather  than  institutional  rules  and  regulations  for  influence. 
In  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  it  appears  that  conversion  to  a  select  committee  has  not 
influenced  the  work  of  the  14th  committee  significantly,  and  it  seems  that  not  until  the 
14th  legislature  has  the  committee  undertaken  a  more  substantial  level  of  work.  A 
member  of  staff  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  thus  related  how  the  14th  Committee 
during  the  13th  Parliament  (1996  -  2001)  examined  seven  proposals.  During  the  first  15 
months  of  the  current  14th  legislature,  however,  nine  proposals  were  examined,  which, 
For  the  exact  text  of  the  Chamber's  regulations  on  which  the  Committee  is  based,  and  how  it  has  changed 
over  the  years,  see  the  Chamber  of  Deputies'  website: 
http:  //www.  camera.  it/deputati/funzionamento/regolamento  capoXXVIII  artl26  testoafronte.  asp 
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105 as  proudly  pointed  out  by  both  the  civil  servant  and  the  President  of  the  14th 
Committee,  is  more  than  in  the  previous  five  years  put  together.  " 
The  obvious  question  is  why  these  changes  are  taking  place  now.  It  is  difficult  to  give 
definitive  answers,  but  an  increased  awareness  of  European  matters  as  well  as  a 
politically  ambitious  committee  President  (Giacomo  Stucchi  from  Lega  Nord)  have  been 
key  ingredients.  The  European  office  within  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  has  been 
separated  from  a  larger  office  dealing  with  international  affairs  in  genera],  thereby 
making  European  affairs  more  'visible'.  A  division  in  opinion  between  civil  servants 
and  politicians  seems  to  exist,  however,  in  that  civil  servants  appear  more  aware  of  the 
impact  that  European  matters  have  on  the  ability  of  Italian  MPs  to  act  at  the  national 
level,  and  of  the  importance  of  including  a  European  dimension  in  all  domestic 
legislation.  However,  as  all  the  civil  servants  interviewed  for  this  project  were 
employed  within  units  dealing  specifically  with  European  affairs,  this  point  of  view 
may  be  somewhat  biased,  as  civil  servants  in  other  departments  may  not  feel  the  same 
need  to  include  the  European  dimension  in  their  work.  "  Because  both  the  Giunta  and 
the  14th  Committee  have  been  forced  to  cooperate  with  the  select  committees  in  their 
respective  chambers,  MPs  of  the  select  committees  do  not  have  the  excuse  of  MPs  in 
both  the  British  and  Danish  Parliaments:  that  is,  that  the  European  committee  will  deal 
with  European  matters.  In  the  Italian  Parliament,  formally  at  least,  responsibility  for 
European  affairs  has  always  been  shared  between  the  European  and  the  other 
committees.  Nonetheless,  civil  servants  were  more  alert  to  the  need  for  developing 
scrutiny  procedures  than  were  politicians,  who  all  looked  to  the  legge  comunitaria  as  the 
'proper'  way  of  involving  Parliament  in  European  legislation. 
An  interest  in  European  affairs  thus  seems  to  be  gradually  developing  (within  both 
chambers  of  the  Italian  Parliament),  especially  amongst  the  younger  parliamentarians. 
The  perception  of  Europe,  especially  the  European  Parliament,  as  'a  graveyard  for 
elephants"'  is  slowly  disappearing.  The  elephants  may  not  necessarily  be  old  in  years, 
merely  old  in  mind;  that  is,  stuck  in  old  ways  of  thinking  and  conducting  policy.  In 
Italy  this  means  focusing  solely  on  the  local  level  and  protecting  local  interests  at  the 
national  level,  without  being  able  to  see  the  importance  of  how  the  European  and, 
indeed,  global  levels  impact  on  what  is  achievable  and  obtainable  locally.  Traditional 
Italian  politics  as  conducted  during  the  first  republic  are  thus  slowly  being 
transformed,  with  membership  of  the  EU  arguably  a  significant  factor  in  this  change. 
Interviews  1-5  and  13. 
The  difficulty  in  obtaining  interviews  with  staff  from  committees  not  directly  involved  with  European 
affairs  illustrates  this  point.  Despite  numerous  approaches  no  such  interviews  were  conducted.  The 
reaction  is  thus  very  similar  to  that  of  politicians  described  below  where  prospective  interviewees  referred 
to  the'experts'  in  the  European  committees. 
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106 While  membership  of  the  EU  has  provided  Italian  governments  with  ready-made 
excuses  for  implementing  unwelcome  measures  (tough  fiscal  decisions  necessary  to 
become  a  founding  member  of  the  euro  area  being  just  one  example),  it  may  now  also 
force  parliamentarians  to  look  farther  afield  than  the  path  from  their  home  town  to 
Rome,  and  further  into  the  future  than  the  next  election. 
The  Senate 
The  Senate  has  set  up  a  Giunta  (a  standing,  as  opposed  to  a  select,  committee)  on 
Europe  during  each  parliament  since  1968.  However,  close  scrutiny  of  the  Senate's 
'Regolamento'  (Rules  of  Procedure)  reveals  that  on  February  6  2003  the  Giunta  was 
changed  into  a  select  committee.  It  was  not  until  October  of  that  year  that  the  change 
actually  took  place,  and  it  is  therefore  difficult  to  evaluate  the  implications.  An 
immediately  obvious  change  is  the  make-up  of  the  new,  14th  committee's  membership. 
It  is  customary  that  Italian  MPs  are  members  of  only  one  select  committee  within 
parliament.  However,  members  of  standing  committees  are  usually  also  members  of  a 
select  committee  as  such  membership  carries  more  prestige,  hence  the  norm  of  dual 
committee  membership  for  members  of  the  Giunta.  Unprecedented,  the  new  European 
committee  reflects  the  realisation  that  European  and  domestic  legislation  can  no  longer 
be  separated  and  that  a  new  European  committee  would  require  the  expertise  of  the 
select  committees.  In  an  interview,  Senator  Andrea  Manzella  expressed  a  wish  that  two 
members  from  each  of  the  other  select  committees  would  be  co-opted  to  the  new 
European  committee,  thus  providing  the  expertise  which  each  of  the  specialised 
committees  possess,  while  also  bringing  knowledge  of  European  affairs  to  the 
specialised  committees.  On  the  current  committee,  in  the  14th  legislature,  this  wish  has 
been  fulfilled.  The  European  committee  has  30  members,  two  from  each  of  the  other  13 
select  committees,  with  the  exceptions  of  Committees  1,2,3  and  5  (constitutional 
affairs,  justice,  foreign  affairs  and  budget),  all  of  which  have  contributed  three 
members  to  the  14th  committee.  According  to  the  committee  itself,  this  ensures  that 
MPs  'combine  deep  knowledge  of  European  issues  with  good  knowledge  of  matters 
within  the  terms  of  reference  of  the  other  committee  they  sit  on'  (Senato  della 
Repubblica,  2004).  The  Italian  Senate  has  thus  institutionalised  the  integration  of 
European  and  domestic  affairs  to  an  extent  not  seen  in  either  the  Danish  or  UK 
parliaments.  When  compared  to  most  of  its  counterparts  in  Europe,  the  Italian 
parliament  has  a  weak  basis  for  scrutiny  of  its  government  on  European  affairs,  yet  it  is 
perhaps  also  the  parliament  exhibiting  the  best  understanding  of  the  interrelationship 
between  the  two  levels. 
Within  Italy,  multitudes  of  rules  and  regulations  regarding  the  treatment  of  European 
affairs  have  been  developed  and  adopted  without  much  success.  However,  as  the  rules 
107 for  the  new  14th  committee  within  the  Senate  are  purely  intra-institutional  and  have 
been  under  development  for  a  considerable  period  of  time,  they  may  well  stand  a 
better  chance  of  being  successfully  applied  than  most  other  inter-institutional  rules. 
The  success  of  the  new  rules  depends,  to  a  large  extent,  on  whether  European  matters 
continue  to  be  accorded  a  low  level  of  importance.  This  attitude  has  been  especially 
evident  in  the  Senate,  a  situation  reflected  in  and  emphasised  by  the  limited  prestige 
associated  with  membership  of  the  Giunta.  As  a  standing  committee  the  Giunta  was 
unable  to  pass  legislation  on  its  own,  operated  in  a  mainly  consultative  role,  and  has 
been  described  as  having  'minimal  impact  on  parliamentary  activities'  (Bindi  Callusi 
and  Grasse,  2001,  p.  302).  Primary  responsibility  for  European  matters  rested  with  the 
select,  specialised,  committees.  In  the  cases  where  European  legislation  was  transferred 
by  the  government  to  parliament,  the  specialised  select  committees  were  the  main 
recipients,  and  the  'First  Committee'  (on  Constitutional  affairs)  was  generally 
considered  to  be  the  committee  with  primary  responsibility  for  European  affairs.  In  the 
words  of  a  Senatorial  employee  'The  Giunta  doesn't  have  legislative  competences,  it 
advices  and  can  approve  resolutions  and  can  make  reports,  call  people  to  give 
evidence  etc..  They  can  do  that,  but  they  don't  have  competence  in  the  legislative 
area.  "'  Select  committees  could  then  write  opinions  on  European  initiatives,  and  only  if 
they  had  not  acted  within  a  certain  period  could  the  Giunta  adopt  a  resolution  to 
submit  its  own  report  directly  to  the  government. 
With  the  establishment  of  the  new  14th  committee,  all  domestic  legislation  is 
scrutinised  for  compliance  with  Community  legislation,  and  reports  thereon  sent  to  the 
relevant  committee  within  the  Senate.  "  European  legislation  is  also  debated,  and 
guidelines  can  be  issued  which  the  government  'may'  follow  (Senato  della  Repubblica, 
2004).  The  emphasis,  therefore,  is  opposite  to  that  in  most  other  national  parliaments. 
In  both  Denmark  and  the  UK,  resources  are  spent  mostly  on  ensuring  that  European 
legislation  is  acceptable  to  national  politicians.  In  Italy,  more  resources  appear 
dedicated  to  ensuring  that  national  legislation  complies  with  European  legislation  than 
to  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  and  ascertaining  whether  it  complies  with  domestic 
Italian  wishes  and  needs.  While  it  can  be  argued  that  the  parliament  is  focusing  its 
(finite)  resources  on  the  area  in  which  it  can  assert  the  most  influence,  it  is  perhaps 
more  accurate  to  conclude  that  the  Senate  is  responsive  to  a  political  culture  in  which 
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"  As  explained  by  its  staff,  the  European  office  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  also  undertakes  this  task 
(especially  interviewees  I-11  and  12).  It  prepares  a  dossier  on  each  and  every  piece  of  domestic  legislation, 
setting  out  the  European  dimension  on  this  (information  includes  issues  such  as  European  activities  in  the 
area  and  whether  the  domestic  legislative  proposal  contradicts  European  legislation).  Dossiers  are 
provided  to  all  the  select  committees  as  well  as  the  14th  Committee,  as  are  regular  summaries  of  legislative 
proposals  as  well  as  other  activities  such  as  the  Convention.  It  is  this  activity  the  new  14th  committee  in 
the  Senate  is  attempting  to  emulate  and  which  may  contribute  to  improving  information  about  and 
interest  in  European  affairs.  Parliamentary  staff  thus  spends  time  and  resources  gathering  information 
their  colleagues  in  Denmark  and  the  UK  expect  their  governments  and  administrations  to  provide. 
108 legislation  is  considered  far  more  important  than  oversight,  as  well  as  asking  few 
difficult  questions  of  Italy's  membership  of  the  EU,  which  remain  much  less 
controversial  than  in  either  Denmark  or  the  UK.  " 
In  the  face  of  a  historically  low  level  of  interest  in  European  affairs,  the  Senate  has 
increased  its  activities  in  this  area  in  recent  years.  In  a  contribution  to  the  Convention's 
Working  Group  on  national  parliaments  (2002),  Senator  Filadelfio  Basile  (one  of  two 
secretaries  of  the  European  Committee  in  the  Senate)  mentions  'improvements'  in 
procedures  (transfer  of  documents  from  the  government  to  parliament)  in  the 
immediate  post-Amsterdam  period.  Between  September  2000  and  March  2001,  Basile 
thus  claims  that  the  Giunta,  in  'an  unprecedented  effort',  considered  approximately  70 
documents  and  sent  reports  to  the  Government  on  these-independently  of  the  select 
committees.  It  seems  that  at  this  point  in  time  at  least  two  factors  converged  to  make 
the  Giunta  more  active:  information  appeared  to  be  making  its  way  from  the 
Government  to  the  Parliament  while  the  Giunta's  President,  Senator  Tino  Bedin,  also 
recognised  the  importance  of  following  activities  on  European  matters,  and, 
importantly,  seemed  able  to  motivate  his  committee  to  submit  reports  to  the 
government  independently  of  the  select  committees.  However,  removing  any  one-let 
alone  both-of  these  factors  always  threatened  to  cause  the  work  of  the  Giunta  to 
collapse,  and  indeed  it  did.  Basile's  above-mentioned  contribution  thus  reveals  that 
with  the  new  legislature  (and  government)  in  the  spring  of  2001,  'the  flow  of  EU 
documents  from  the  Government  can  be  considered  as  substantially  reduced'  (Basile, 
2002).  While  Basile  mentions  no  further  explanations  for  the  more  'sporadic'  nature  of 
parliamentary  examination  of  European  legislation,  it  bears  mentioning  that  in  the  new 
legislature  Senator  Mario  Greco,  with  little  experience  in  European  affairs,  was  elected 
as  new  President  of  the  Giunta.  Although  President  Greco  has  worked  hard  to  improve 
''  While  it  is  the  case  that  Italy  has  historically  been  in  favour  of  European  integration,  it  is  also  evident 
that  a  more  EU-cautious  line  has  emerged  with  the  regionally  based  political  parties  (especially  those 
based  in  Northern  Italy)  and  Silvio  Berlusconi's  government.  A  Senatorial  employee  (interview  I-1) 
explained  the  situation  by  stating  that 
the  government  is  less  European  and  less  European  friendly  than  the  opposition,  even  if, 
generally  speaking,  they  are  not  against  the  Union,  except  a  few  particular  cases  like  La 
Lega.  The  previous  government  was  absolutely  in  favour  of  Europe,  the  present 
government  is  not  so.  Still,  when  we  had  our  last  important  debate  about  Europe  in  the 
General  Assembly,  before  Laeken,  there  was  wide  discussion,  and  the  resolution  approved 
was  in  favour  of  more  integration  anyway,  and  it  was  approved  by  the  entire  parliament, 
the  government  and  the  opposition.  So,  generally  speaking,  you  could  say  that  the 
parliament  is  more  in  favour  of  Europe  than  the  government  in  some  way,  because  of  some 
ministers  like  Tremonti  and  Bossi-and  the  Lega  of  course. 
Umberto  Bossi  is  leader  of  Lege  Nord  and  was  Minister  (without  portfolio)  for  Reform  and  Devolution  June 
2001  -  July  2004.  Giulio  Tremonti  is  a  member  of  Prime  Minister  Berlusconis  party  Forza  Italia  and  was 
Finance  Minister  June  2001  -  July  2004.  Although  rhetoric,  especially  government  rhetoric,  has  altered 
with  the  Berlusconi  government,  indicating  an  end  to  Italy's  'permissive  consensus'  on  the  EU,  it  is  more 
difficult  to  find  firm  instances  of  a  more  critical  approach  to  European  cooperation. 
109 his  knowledge  on  European  issues,  "  the  committee's  scrutiny  activities  inevitably 
slowed  down  considerably  as  a  result  of  the  change  in  Presidency. 
The  committee's  other  main  task,  provision  of  information  about  the  European 
dimension  of  domestic  legislation,  is  arguably  made  difficult  by  the  'ghettoisation'  of 
European  affairs.  Members  from  select  committees  (other  than  Community 
committees)  thus  often  referred  to  the  European  committees  when  asked  for  an 
interview  about  how  the  Italian  Parliament  handles  European  legislation.  These  MPs 
did  not  feel  able  to  contribute  to  this  research,  stating  that  European  affairs  were  not 
within  the  remit  of  their  committee.  " 
While  interest  in  EU  affairs  thus  appear  to  be  on  the  increase,  this  development  seems 
limited  to  a  relatively  small  number  of  parliamentarians  with  special  interest  or 
experience  in  the  area-despite  the  above-mentioned  formal  sharing  of  responsibilities. 
The  fact  that  Giorgio  La  Malfa  (President  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies'  Finance 
Committee  in  the  14th  parliament  and  one  of  only  two  interviewees  not  directly 
involved  with  European  affairs  committees)  had  previously  been  an  MEP  is 
noteworthy.  His  understanding  of  the  interplay  between  the  national  and  European 
levels,  and  the  impact  of  European  integration  on  the  work  of  his  committee,  was  thus 
more  informed  (although  also  coloured  by  strong  federalist  views)  than  that  of  several 
of  his  colleagues. 
Although  it  can  no  longer  be  doubted  that  contact  between  European  and  specialised 
committees  is  important,  the  new  structure  for  the  Senatorial  European  Committee  still 
faces  the  significant  problem  of  double  committee  membership.  Due  to  the  nature  of 
Italian  legislation,  with  a  great  deal  of  it  being  passed  in  the  select  committees, 
members  generally  carry  a  heavy  workload.  It  is  therefore  very  likely  that  a  dual 
membership  will  be  seen  as  a  significant  burden  which  only  few  Senators  with  a  strong 
interest  in  European  affairs  are  willing  to  take  on.  This  is  perhaps  the  greatest 
challenge  for  those  dealing  with  European  affairs  within  both  parliamentary  chambers: 
to  make  those  MPs  mainly  involved  with  national  legislation  aware  of  the  restrictions 
European  legislation  places  on  their  ability  to  manoeuvre  at  the  national  level-and  of 
the  importance  of  close  contact  between  the  European  committee  and  other  select 
committees. 
A  further  problem  in  this  area  is  the  limited  number  of  staff  available  to  the  Giunta  and 
Community  activities  in  the  Senate.  In  September  2002,  two  academic  staff  (analysts) 
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"  This  was  despite  several  approaches  that  included  explanations  of  why  their  contributions  would  be  of 
importance. 
110 were  available  to  the  Senators  with  a  further  two  medium-level  staff.  A  number  of 
secretaries  also  assisted  with  the  collation  and  distribution  of  documents.  The  limited 
amount  of  support  staff  means  that  with  the  occurrence  of  'extra'  events  like  the 
Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe,  other  work  is  necessarily  placed  on  the 
backburner.  Indeed,  as  staff-members  attempted  to  follow  events  at  the  Convention, 
scrutiny  of  European  legislation  was  neglected.  One  employee  in  the  Senate  thus  stated 
that  'we  do  what  we  can,  because  we  are  often  in  Brussels,  and  I  was  in  Copenhagen 
for  a  preliminary  meeting  for  the  next  COSAC.  So  w  are  really  not  here  enough  to 
regularly  follow  the  Giunta,  we  can't  make  an  impact'.  "  Although  the  European  office 
within  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  in  September  2002  undertook  more  work  than  the 
Giunfa,  it  was  in  a  better  position  staff-wise  with  three  academics,  8  researchers  and  a 
number  of  secretaries.  Still,  a  staff  member  here  expressed  the  feeling  that  'it  is  difficult 
to  be  everywhere  at  once,  we  have  to  choose  which  meeting  to  attend.  "' 
While  scrutiny  procedures  are  limited,  a  growing  understanding  that  Parliament  must 
direct  efforts  at  the  pre-decision  stage  is  developing.  However,  despite  this 
development  the  main  emphasis  is  still  on  legislating  on  European  affairs.  Federiga 
Bindi  Calussi  and  Stefano  B.  Grassi  (2001,  p.  299)  thus  write  that  'Parliament  acts  as  a 
legislator  and  neglects  control  and  scrutiny  functions',  while  Furlong  (1996,  p.  44) 
states  that  'legislation  is  Parliament's  privileged  point  of  access  to  the  political  system, 
one  to  which  it  has  always  given  priority,  over  other  functions  such  as  scrutiny  and 
redress'.  Parliamentary  legislative  activity  on  European  matters  centres  on  the  !  egge 
comunitaria,  part  of  the  'Legge  La  Pergola'  (after  the  politician  who  initiated  it),  which 
will  now  be  examined. 
3.  The  legge  comunitaria 
The  legge  comunitaria  is  based  on  Legge  La  Pergola,  Law  9  March  1989,  n.  86.  This  law  has 
as  its  purpose  to  facilitate  the  implementation  of  European  legislation  and  to  eradicate 
conflicts  between  European  and  Italian  law,  as  well  as  to  inform  Parliament  of 
European  developments  (Article  1).  The  way  in  which  Pärliament  is  involved  in  the 
process  of  implementation  is  detailed  in  Article  3(c),  which  lists  the  contents  of  the  law, 
and  dictates  that  Parliament  authorises  the  government  'to  implement,  in  a  prescribed 
way,  the  directives  or  recommendations  permitted  by  Article  4'  (Legge  La  Pergola, 
Article  3,  author's  translation).  It  can  thus  be  argued  that  one  aim  of  the  Legge 
comunifaria  is  to  provide  Parliament  with  a  means  of  institutional  check  on  the 
executive.  In  fulfilling  this  aim,  the  Parliament  has  been  'significantly  unsuccessful' 
(Fabbrini  and  Dona,  2002,  p.  2),  due  largely  to  lack  of  interest  on  behalf  of 
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111 parliamentarians.  Article  4  outlines  that  directives  to  be  implemented  under  Article 
3(c)  must  be  presented  in  a  list  contained  within  the  annual  legge  comunifaria.  The 
relevant  select  committees  within  both  Chambers  must  then  provide  an  opinion  on 
these  directives,  with  the  European  Committees  drawing  up  final  statements  to  be 
presented  in  the  Chambers  of  Parliament  m  As  the  legge  comunitaria  gathers  together 
legislation  in  need  of  implementation,  with  parliamentarians  limited  to  pronouncing 
on  the  way  in  which  the  implementation  is  carried  out,  the  legge  comunitaria  is  only 
partially  an  instrument  for  immediate  implementation,  but  rather  a  device  to 
programme  and  rationalise  the  various  sets  of  implementing  measures'  (Bindi  Callusi 
and  Grasse,  2001,  p.  306). 
An  explicit  purpose  behind,  although  not  mentioned  in,  the  Legge  La  Pergola,  was  the 
need  for  Italy  to  reduce  its  implementation  deficit.  While  Italy's  record  on 
implementation  has  improved,  the  process  of  gathering  together,  on  an  annual  basis, 
legislation  in  need  of  transposition  has  also  had  consequences  at  the  domestic 
level-especially  in  the  administration.  Flaminia  Gallo  and  Birgit  Hanny  (2003,  p.  276) 
thus  describe  the  legge  comunitaria  as  'a  vehicle  for  further  improvements  to  the 
structures  and  procedures  of  Italian  administration  and  political  units  dealing  with 
European  affairs'.  They  continue: 
[B]etween  1987  and  1997  there  was  no  coherent  adjustment  of  structures 
and  procedures  within  the  different  administrative  units  involved  in  the 
national  preparation  and  implementation  of  EC/EU  policies.  Rather,  a 
complex  patchwork  of  functions  and  competencies,  of  co-ordinating 
mechanisms  and  formalised  information  channels  was  put  into  practice... 
In  the  immediate  post-Maastricht  period,  almost  all  Italian  ministries  had 
introduced  special  units  dealing  in  some  way  with  policies  that  were 
negotiated  or  regulated  in  EC  policy  cycles. 
However,  even  with  this  increased  attention  to  European  affairs  within  the 
administration,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  success  of  the  Community  law  has  simply 
relocated  the  problem.  According  to  Furlong  (1996,  p.  43),  the  first  five  annual 
Community  laws  ensured  that  600  directives  were  dealt  with,  which  is  'nearly  as  many 
as  in  the  previous  30  years'.  This  increased  rate  in  parliamentary  work  has  thus  merely 
shifted  the  burden-and  the  backlog-to  the  ministries  responsible  for  the  actual 
implementation. 
Being  presented  with  one  annual  law  permits  the  committees  within  Parliament  to 
focus  their  attention  on  implementation  of  European  affairs  to  a  limited  time  of  one  - 
two  months  during  the  year,  instead  of  having  to  address  them  on  a  continuous  basis. 
M  During  the  existence  of  the  Giuuta  in  the  Senate,  it  was  only  the  First  Committee  (on  constitutional 
affairs)  and  the  European  affairs  committee  who  dealt  with  the  legge  commizitaria,  whereas  all  relevant 
standing  committees  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  are  involved. 
112 Politicians  and  civil  servants  interviewed  for  this  project  all  spoke  of  this  process  as 
being  advantageous.  Furthermore,  when  asked  about  Italian  parliamentary 
involvement  in  European  affairs  both  politicians  and  civil  servants  often  mentioned  the 
legge  comunitaria  immediately.  A  difference  between  civil  servants  and 
parliamentarians  could  be  detected,  however,  insofar  as  politicians  often  thought  the 
annual  law  to  be  sufficient  parliamentary  involvement,  whereas  civil  servants  were 
more  aware  of  how  the  limited  involvement  in  the  pre-decision  stage  restricted 
Parliament's  influence  over  the  decisions  they  later  helped  implement.  To  illustrate  the 
point,  Senator  Manzella,  a  senior  member  of  the  Giunta,  described  the  Legge  comunitaria 
as  'a  very  efficient  instrument  of  control  because  we  have  the  power  to  make 
amendments  to  the  European  laws'.  `  This  statement  is  obviously  not  true,  as  it  is  only 
the  implementation  process  the  Giunta  can  influence.  Parliamentary  staff  are  aware  of 
this  difficulty,  one  Senatorial  employee  thus  stated  that: 
the  real  role  should  be  in  the  creation  of  European  law,  not  in  the 
implementation  of  European  law.  Yes,  the  implementation  is  important, 
but  not  so  important.  On  the  contrary,  the  90  per  cent  of  our  activities  are 
on  implementation,  not  on  the  creation  [of  law].  Because  the  creation  is  all 
in  the  government  ß 
Another  member  of  staff  in  the  Senate  similarly  argued  that: 
the  Italian  parliament  is  essentially  a  legislative  body,  and  the  so-called 
control  function  is  not  in  the  DNA  of  the  Italian  parliament...  so  if  the  most 
important  function  of  the  Giunfa  should  be  that  of  controlling  the 
government  I  think  this  tradition  will  be  a  strong  obstacle.  It  will  take  a  lot 
of  time  before  a  control  system  will  start  to  happen  and  work.  That  is  our 
problem  and  I  don't  know  what  we  can  do? 
It  thus  seems  that,  since  the  legge  comunitaria  conforms  to  the  Italian  political  culture  in 
which  the  Parliament  legislates,  it  gives  parliamentarians  a  feeling  of  participating  in 
the  European  legislative  process,  albeit  at  the  national  level.  The  opportunity  to 
legislate  explicitly  on  European  issues,  coupled  with  a  lack  of  scrutiny  provisions  and 
traditions,  has  created  an  environment  where  a  further,  and  necessarily  more  technical, 
involvement  in  the  pre-legislative  stage  has  been  difficult  to  develop.  It  can  therefore 
be  argued  that  the  legge  comunitaria  has  'pacified'  the  Parliament,  and  thus,  to  a  large 
extent,  made  it  possible  for  the  executive  to  develop  and  pursue  its  own  strategies  at 
the  European  level. 
The  'pacification'  of  Parliament  is  not  necessarily  the  result  of  planned  action  on  behalf 
of  the  executive.  Parliamentarians  on  European  committees  in  both  chambers 
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113 repeatedly  complained  of  a  lack  of  interest  in  European  affairs,  whether  through 
scrutiny  or  legislative  measures.  "  One  of  the  few  opportunities  for  Italian 
parliamentarians  to  obtain  information  about  European  affairs  and  their  impact  on 
Italy  is  therefore  lost  and  the  legge  comunitaria  sometimes  treated  in  a  perfunctory 
manner.  Sondra  Z.  Koff  and  Stephen  P.  Koff  (2000,  p.  199)  actually  maim  that  'if  there  is 
other  pressing  business,  [the  Community  law]  receives  cursory  treatment  to  get  it  out 
of  the  way'.  One  explanation  for  this  unwillingness  to  engage,  even  in  a  mode  familiar 
to  the  MPs  (legislation),  is  that  European  legislation  can  often  seem  very  technical. 
Italian  Parliamentarians  appear  to  spend  little  energy  investigating  the  effects 
European  legislation  and  its  implementation  within  Italy,  may  have  on  Italians.  The 
availability  of  resources  is  obviously  an  issue,  but  a  lack  of  interest  seems  to  be  a 
significant  and  fundamental  factor. 
Although  the  'Legge  La  Pergola'  requires  the  government  to  present  Parliament  with 
the  legge  comunitaria  before  January  31  in  the  year  following  the  year  for  which  the 
implementation  procedures  apply,  this  has  rarely  happened.  For  instance,  in  2002,  the 
legge  comunitaria  for  2001  was  being  examined  by  Parliament  as  it  reconvened  after  the 
summer  recess-in  September  and  October  2002?  This  further  limits  the  ability  of 
parliamentarians  to  keep  up  to  date  with  events  at  the  European  level,  while  also 
placing  them  under  pressure  to  implement  directives  before  they  will  be  brought 
before  the  ECJ. 
A  fundamental  requirement  for  meaningful  parliamentary  engagement  in  the 
implementation  process  is  adequate  information  from  the  government.  However,  this 
has  consistently  been  lacking,  a  fact  both  politicians  and  parliamentary  employees 
lament.  The  way  in  which  information  is  gathered  and  presented  to  parliament  will 
therefore  be  considered  in  the  next  section. 
4.  Parliamentary  relations  with  government  and  the  administration 
The  Italian  executive  is  legally  obliged  to  consult  and  inform  parliament  about 
European  affairs.  However,  parliamentarians  and  parliamentary  civil  servants  are 
often  far  from  satisfied  with  the  information  provided  by  the  government.  requests  for 
information  from  (especially)  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  will  often  result  in  information 
being  provided,  but  it  is  not  forwarded  on  a  regular,  automatic  basis.  "'  In  fact,  several 
24  Parliamentary  staff  (for  instance  interviewees  1-3  and  5)  commented  on  this  too,  although  they  also 
reported  increasing  interest  by  specialist  committees. 
25  A  staff-member  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  showed  awareness  of  this  problem  when  commenting  that 
'now  we're  examining  it,  and  now  we  have  September,  so  this  is  about  last  year....  It  should  be  examined 
in  February,  that  would  be  good,  September  is  too  late,  it  should  be  much  earlier'  (Interview  I-3). 
25  As  stated  by,  for  instance,  interviewees  1-3,5  and  10. 
114 interviewees  commented  that  the  Italian  parliament  does  not  lack  rules  and  regulations 
granting  it  access  and  rights  to  information,  it  is  the  implementation  of  these  rules  and 
regulation  that  has  been  problematic.  In  other  words,  the  government  has  been  unable 
and/or  unwilling  to  enforce  its  own  rules.  Two  problems  thus  arise:  first,  the 
executive's  willingness  to  provide  information;  and,  second,  the  executive's  ability  to 
provide  parliament  with  information.  A  centrally  placed  parliamentary  employee,  who 
until  recently  worked  on  European  affairs,  described  it  succinctly  as'a  matter  of  choice, 
they  don't  like  to  keep  the  parliament  informed,  and  from  another  point  of  view  I  think 
it's  a  matter  of  [a  lack  of]  organisation'.  ' 
A  variety  of  views  exist  on  the  willingness  of  the  executive  to  inform  Parliament.  To 
some  extent,  the  executive  does  not  see  a  need  to  inform  parliament,  with  one  official 
arguing  that  the  current  level  of  information  is  'good  enough'.  The  official  went  on  to 
say  that  'the  Italian  Parliament  has  all  the  tools  it  needs  to  control  the  Italian 
government-and  does  quite  a  good  job  at  the  moment'.  '  On  the  other  hand,  this 
official  also  maintained  that  if  a  government  wishes,  it  can  relatively  easily  avoid 
parliamentary  scrutiny  and  that  parliaments  will  never  really  know  the  extent  to  which 
compromises  at  the  European  level  are  necessary,  or  whether  they  are  simply  'smoke 
screens'  erected  to  avoid  the  involvement  of  national  parliaments.  The  official's 
preparedness  to  discuss  such  a  scenario  suggests  that  this  is  not  an  unusual  occurrence, 
thereby  seriously  questioning  the  Italian  Government's  willingness  to  keep  Parliament 
informed  about  its  activities  at  the  European  level. 
MPs  as  well  as  parliamentary  employees  concur  that  the  government  lacks  both  the 
will  and  the  ability  to  inform  parliament,  stating  that  government  information  was 
often  non-existent  or  at  best  inadequate  and  seriously  delayed.  "  According  to  a  staff- 
member  from  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  two  reasons  account  for  this.  Firstly, 
information  can  be  seen  as  power,  which  the  government  is  reluctant  to  relinquish. 
Secondly,  the  poor  co-ordination  within  and  between  ministries  exists  because  'to  give 
elaborate  information  means  to  study,  to  suffer,  and  to  work  a  lot'.  " 
The  specific  nature  of  the  Italian  administration  is  thus  also  important.  Having  largely 
resisted  attempts  at  reforms  it  remains  beset  with  problems,  all  of  which  are 
emphasised  by  its  lack  of  integration  `into  the  social,  economic  and  political  fabric  of 
the  country'  (Koff  and  Koff,  2000,  p.  162).  Such  integration  has  been  difficult,  partly 
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115 because  the  administration  is  mainly  staffed  by  southerners.  "  According  to  Sabino 
Cassese  (1999,  p.  63)  this  has  had  the  implication  that  the  (senior)  civil  service 
mirrors  the  characteristics  of  Southern  Italy  which  can  be  summed  up  as 
follows:  (i)  coming  from  regions  characterized  by  unemployment,  job 
security  takes  precedence  over  efficiency  and  service;  (ii)  coming  from 
relatively  non-industrialized  areas  (or  where  industry  has  not  managed  to 
establish  firm  roots  in  society  and  the  economy),  legalistic  and  formalistic 
attitudes  tend  to  dominate,  without  reference  to  the  objectives  of  public 
administration;  the  mentality  is  far  from  managerialist;  there  is  a  rejection 
of  competition. 
Cassese  further  argues  that  the  civil  service  has  preferred  'the  bureaucratic  supervision 
of  secondary  administrative  management'  to  an  autonomous  policy-making  role  (1999, 
p.  63).  With  such  entrenched  opposition  to  changes  in  the  administration,  the 
implications  for  parliament's  ability  to  obtain  information  are  very  serious.  In  addition, 
the  implications  for  Italy's  ability  to  negotiate  well  at  the  European  level  may  also  be 
affected.  To  scrutinise  and  assess  European  legislation  effectively,  cooperation  will  be 
required  across  traditional  lines  of  division.  For  such  cooperation  to  be  successful,  it  is 
of  paramount  importance  that  new  methods  of  optimising  the  processing  and  dispersal 
of  information  are  found.  Membership  of  the  EU  may  thus  also  contribute,  indirectly  at 
least;  towards  reform  of  the  Italian  civil  service. 
A  small  measure  of  reform  has,  however,  been  undertaken  as  the  administration  too 
has  separated  out  European  affairs  from  international  affairs,  with  a  Department  of 
European  Affairs  having  been  established.  How  much  has  changed  as  a  result  is 
questionable,  as  the  ministry  of  foreign  affairs  still  maintains  a  European  section, 
which,  according  to  a  member  of  staff  in  the  European  Department,  actually  employs 
more  staff  than  the  Department  of  European  Affairs.  "  The  same  employee  described 
the  relationship  between  the  two  units  as  'co-operative--but  with  some  competitive 
elements'.  It  is  clear  that  a  certain  rivalry  exists,  a  situation  that  does  not  make  it  easier 
for  Parliament  to  obtain  information  from  the  government.  With  the  European 
Department  relying  on  other  ministries  to  prepare  reports  and  memoranda  on 
particular  issues  and  the  minister  in  charge  of  the  European  Department  being  a 
minister  without  portfolio,  the  Department  is  facing  a  serious  struggle  to  gain 
recognition  and  respect. 
For  Parliament,  the  Department  of  European  affairs  presents  a  problem  of  who  to  ask 
for  information.  Parliamentarians  must  decide  whether  to  go  directly  to  the  individual 
ministries  or  through  the  European  Department-or  indeed  to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign 
m  According  to  Koff  and  Koff  (2000,  p.  160)  '70  per  cent  of  public  servants  are  southern  in  origin  and  of  the 
highest  ranking,  the  percentage  rises  to  90'. 
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116 Affairs.  While  the  Minister  of  European  affairs  was  commended  for  attending 
Parliament  when  requested  to  appear,  he  was  also  still  regarded  as  'weak'.  "  On  the 
other  hand,  the  division  of  labour  between  the  European  and  Foreign  Affairs 
committees  within  Parliament,  resulting  in  the  need  for  the  Department  of  European 
Affairs  to  deal  with  four  different  committees  on  each  issue,  was  described  as  'leading 
to  a  lot  of  wasted  time'. 
While  parliamentarians  complained  of  how  the  European  Department  was  competing 
with  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  for  competency,  one  civil  servant  described  a 
similar  competitive  struggle  between  parliamentary  committees:  '  This  may  be  the 
symptom  of  an  emerging  process  of  scrutiny,  where  systems  and  competences  are  still 
being  developed  and  divided.  As  long  as  the  participants  are  still  feeling  their  way 
through  the  process  this  is  to  be  expected,  and,  if  administrative  issues  can  be 
overcome,  may  actually  contribute  to  the  Parliament's  European  committees'  joint  task 
of  scrutinising  the  Government. 
The  lack  of  co-ordination  within  the  administration  is  also  evident  in  the  way  the 
government  conducts  its  affairs  at  the  European  level.  '°  According  to  a  parliamentary 
employee,  the  lack  of  co-ordination  and  preparation  represents  a  serious  weakness  for 
Italy,  and  has  meant  that  Italy  has  not  always  achieved  its  potential  in  EU  negotiations. 
This  employee  also  argues  that: 
they  go  there,  from  the  administration,  not  very  prepared.  Dossiers  are  not  really 
prepared  by  the  Italians.  There  is  a  general  weakness  in  European  affairs,  not  only  in 
parliament,  but  also  in  government.  We  have  a  great  interest  in  the  main  issues,  the 
great  issues,  the  Treaty  of  Nice,  agricultural  reform,  but  the  day  to  day  to  work  we  are 
not  used  to  follow,  that  is  the  reality.  3' 
Serious  systemic  problems  within  the  executive  and  administration  may  therefore  be 
hampering  the  government's  work  as  well  as  parliament's  scrutiny  of  it.  Put 
differently,  it  can  be  said  that  Parliament  has  not  been  able  to  rely  on  the 
administration  for  information  and  support.  Indeed,  Calussi  and  Grassi  (2001,  p.  302) 
write  that  'there  is  yet  no  formal,  hierarchical  inter-ministerial  co-ordination  on  EU 
topics'  and  that  Italy  cannot  'count  on  an  efficient  bureaucracy'.  Several  civil  servants 
"  Interview  1-5. 
"Interview  I-20. 
'5  Interview  1-10. 
3'  Federiga  Bindi  also  writes  of  problems  with  coordination  and  transfer  of  information  within  and 
between  administrative  units-  Indeed,  she  claims  that  the  Italian  Permanent  Representatives  'has  often 
become  the  center  not  only  for  negotiations,  but  even  for  the  definition  of  national  positions'  (Bindi,  2002, 
16). 
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117 and  parliamentary  staff  (always  off  the  record),  as  well  as  politicians  (frequently  off  the 
record  too),  spoke  of  a  'lack  of  coordination  [on  European  affairs]  in  government'.  They 
implied  that  this  restricted  the  ability  of  government  to  prepare  appropriate 
information  and  thus  implicitly  hampering  Parliament's  ability  to  properly  conduct  its 
work  on  European  affairs.  One  politician  prepared  to  speak  out  openly  was  La  Malfa, 
who  claimed  that  information  from  the  government  was  always  too  little  and  the 
quality  of  it  'debatable  .3 
Strongly  related  to  the  lack  of  quality  information  is  the  lack  of  explanatory 
memoranda  from  the  executive.  Such  memoranda  are  contentious  within  most 
member  states.  In  Denmark  the  Folketing  continuously  attempts  to  pressure  the 
government  to  improve  these,  and  in  the  UK  the  House  of  Commons  has  worked  hard 
to  make  the  Government  deliver  its  memoranda  on  time.  In  Italy,  however, 
explanatory  memoranda,  even  by  the  admission  of  the  administration  itself,  are 
nonexistent.  This  point  was  brought  up  by  several  parliamentary  employees,  39  and 
used  as  an  argument  to  justify  direct  contact  between  the  Italian  Parliament  and 
European  institutions.  It  thus  seems  that  the  hope  amongst  members  of  Parliament  and 
those  working  for  the  parliament  was  that  if  the  European  Commission  was  in  charge 
of  delivering  new  proposals  directly  to  the  national  parliaments,  national  governments 
would  'only'  be  responsible  for  explaining  the  impact  this  legislation  would  have  on 
the  domestic  situation,  hopefully  reducing  the  national  administration's  task  to 
something  manageable. 
The  view  that  Parliament  is  short  of  information  is  somewhat  contradicted  by  officials 
in  the  Italian  civil  service  who  argued-independently  of  one  another-that  parliament 
has  enough  information.  "  Furthermore,  they  stated  that  MPs  and  their  staff  have  the 
possibility  to  obtain  further  assistance  from  the  special  departments  within  both 
Chambers  that  deal  with  European  affairs,  the  European  institutions  and  official  EU 
web  sites. 
Of  the  three  case  studies,  the  Italian  parliament  has  shown  the  strongest  support  for 
direct  contacts  between  national  parliaments  and  European  institutions.  This  may  in 
large  part  be  due  to  the  inability  of  Parliament  to  obtain  information  from  its  own 
government.  It  is  therefore  interesting  to  note  that  when  listing  the  main  tasks  of  the 
European  office  within  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  a  high-level  member  of  staff  ranked 
relations  with  similar  offices  in  other  countries  as  number  one,  with  provision  of 
36 
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118 information  to  MPs  about  EU  activities  as  number  two.  "  It  is  also  interesting  to  note 
that  Italian  MPs  are  keen  participants  at  (and  contributors  to)  COSAC,  that  the  Italian 
parliament  hosted  the  Assizes  when  this  was  held  in  Rome  in  1990  (see  Chapter  eight 
for  further  details  on  both  the  Assizes  and  COSAC)  and  are  generally  strong 
supporters  of  parliamentary  cooperation  at  the  European  level. 
Conclusion 
Compared  to  its  British  and  Danish  counterparts,  the  Italian  parliament  is  the  one  most 
obviously  guided  by  its  political  history  in  how  it  treats  European  affairs.  The  Italian 
Parliament  has  developed  legislative  procedures  capable  of  accommodating  all  the 
political  parties  and  their  wishes,  while  also  satisfying  the  need  of  parliamentarians  to 
reward  local  interests  for  their  'sponsorship'  of  their  (re)election.  Based  on 
constitutional  rules,  the  parliament  became  a  strong  legislative  force,  although  this  has 
arguably  been  due  mostly  to  a  relatively  weak  executive.  Because  of  the  direct  (and 
effective)  involvement  in  legislation,  the  tasks  of  executive  scrutiny  and  oversight  were 
never  well  developed  within  parliament-a  fact  that  is  especially  evident  in  European 
matters. 
Several  factors  have  contributed  to  the  limited  emphasis  on  European  scrutiny.  One  is 
the  recognition  of  Italy's  new  and  developing  democracy  that  membership  of  the  EU 
provided  (Pasquino,  1996,  p.  160).  Although  the  Communists  were  initially  opposed  to 
membership,  it  gradually  became  a  'non-issue'  (Bindi  Callusi  and  Grasse,  2001,  p.  297), 
with  the  vast  majority  of  Italian  politicians  being  in  favour  of  membership.  Italian 
politicians  and  citizens  were  thus,  in  contrast  to  both  the  UK  and  Denmark,  in 
agreement  over  membership  of  the  EU.  Although  the  number  of  Italians  who  see  EU 
membership  as  a  good  thing  has  fallen  over  the  years,  as  has  the  number  of  people 
who  believe  Italy  has  benefited  from  membership,  Italians  have  still  recorded  some  of 
the  most  positive  feelings  towards  the  EU,  traditionally  well  above  the  EU  average.  42 
Secondly,  while  both  parliamentarians  and  parliamentary  staff  involved  in  European 
affairs  are  aware  that  the  Parliament's  influence  is  limited  at  the  post-decision  stages, 
Italy's  political  culture  has  made  it  difficult  to  change  legislation-focused  practices  that 
have  been  in  existence  for  a  long  time.  This  is  consistent  with  the  third  explanation, 
which  is  the  lack  of  direct  benefits  to  be  obtained  from  the  European  level.  As  local 
C  Interview  I-11. 
42  Support  for  EU  membership  peaked  at  just  above  80  per  cent  in  1988,  and  has  since  dropped  to  54  per 
cent  in  2004,  while  the  percentage  believing  that  Italy  has  benefited  from  membership  has  dropped  from 
just  over  70  per  cent  to  49  per  cent  (also  in  1988  and  2004).  The  EU  average  for  membership  support  and 
belief  in  membership  as  beneficial  was  approximately  65  and  55  per  cent  respectively  in  1988,  and  48  and 
47  per  cent  in  2004.  Italian  figures  have  thus  come  much  loser  to  the  European  average,  although 
especially  so  for  the  support  measure  (European  Commission,  2004). 
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where  their  efforts  are  concentrated.  As  a  consequence,  the  EU  is  often  perceived  as 
being'a  long  way  away'  with  little  relevance  to  everyday  life. 
The  general  treatment  of  Community  matters  within  Italy  can  thus  be  described  as 
very  relaxed,  even  governed  by  a  certain  laissez  faire  attitude  in  Parliament,  executive 
and  administration.  There  are  signs--including  the  establishment  of  a  Department  of 
European  Affairs,  an  upgrading  of  the  Giunta  to  a  select  committee  and  increased 
numbers  of  hearings  on  European  matters  in  both  Chambers-that  this  is  slowly 
changing.  Europeanisation  is  being  felt  in  the  Italian  political  system  too. 
Despite  having  been  a  member  of  the  Community  right  from  the  outset,  Italy  is  also 
the  country  whose  parliament  has  the  weakest  influence  on  Community  legislation  of 
the  three  examined.  The  procedures  currently  emerging  are  sending  mixed  signals.  On 
the  one  hand,  both  European  committees  seem  to  be  developing  a  more  specialist 
attitude  towards  the  handling  of  European  affairs,  becoming  more  independent  and 
undertaking  more  scrutiny.  Against  this,  the  institutionally  secured  cooperation  with 
other  select  committees,  and  the  double  committee  membership  in  the  Senate,  ensures 
that  specialists  in  other  fields  examine  European  issues  as  well.  The  move  towards 
specialisation  is  a  development  witnessed  by  both  the  British  and  Danish  parliaments, 
while  only  the  Danish  EUC  has  also  begun  sharing  the  responsibility  of  scrutiny  of 
European  legislation  with  other  specialist  committees. 
As  in  other  parliaments,  Italian  MPs  have  to  persuade  their  colleagues  that  European 
affairs  are  relevant  to  national-level  politics,  and  this  in  the  face  of  difficult  working 
conditions.  In  the  Senate  problems  include  the  double  committee  membership,  while 
both  Houses  (but  again  especially  the  Senate)  suffer  from  the  difficulty  in  obtaining 
information  on  European  matters  from  the  Italian  executive  and  administration.  These 
are  deep  structural  difficulties  from  which  the  Government  also  suffers,  and  which 
heave  proven  difficult  to  tackle. 
The  continuing  processes  of  integration  and  Europeanisation  will,  however,  force 
changes  on  Italy-including  the  administration,  as  has  already  been  seen  with  the  shift 
of  the  implementation  burden.  These  changes  have  the  potential  to  bring  more 
extensive  change  to  the  Italian  parliament,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  the  political  system, 
than  have  the  last  20  years  of  electoral  reforms  and  party  restructuring.  Finished  dykes 
and  embankments  may  yet  be  some  way  off,  but  tentative  foundations  have  been  laid 
for  fuller  parliamentary  involvement  in  European  affairs. 
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Sovereignty  can  be  impotent.  A  man  in  the  desert  is  free  and  sovereign.  He 
is  beyond  the  reach  of  any  alien  authority,  but  he  is  powerless.  To  have 
value,  sovereignty  must  be  capable  of  being  used. 
(Heseltine,  1989,  p.  211) 
Perhaps  the  greatest  political  challenge  facing  Britain  in  recent  history  has  been  its 
membership  of  the  EU.  British  participation  in  a  political  environment  where 
compromises  are  the  norm  and  national  sovereignty  may  seem  to  diminish  has  not 
been  easy,  owing  mainly  to  its  long  history  of  political  and  territorial  independence 
and  unity,  together  with  an  electoral  system  in  which  the  'winner  takes  all'.  With  its 
unique  geo-political,  constitutional  and  historical  position,  this  'awkward  partner' 
(George,  1994)  has  been  severely  tested  by  the  integration  process  during  its 
membership. 
Because  of  how  Britain's  constitution  is  constructed,  membership  of  the  EU  has 
impacted  not  just  on  policies  and  institutions,  but  also  upon  the  British  constitution 
itself.  In  contrast  to  both  Italy  and  Denmark,  Britain  does  not  have  a  written,  codified 
constitution.  Various  texts,  conventions  and  institutions  together  provide  the  UK  with 
a  'constitution',  creating  a  very  unique  political  environment  for  political  actors  to 
operate  within.  The  core  components  and  characteristics  of  Britain's  political  make-up 
are  the  Monarchy;  parliamentary  sovereignty'  and  cabinet  rule;  the  rule  of  law;  the  use 
of  First  Past  the  Post  (FPP)  for  general  elections;  a  parliamentary  institutional  system 
that  encourages  a  very  adversarial  political  style  and,  increasingly,  membership  of  the 
EU. 
The  Monarch  is  officially  head  of  State,  with  Her  Majesty's  Government  and  Her 
Majesty's  Opposition  facing  each  other  in  parliament.  Despite  being  head  of  State,  any 
remaining  governing-related  official  functions  for  the  Monarch,  such  as  presenting  the 
annual  legislative  programme  in  the  Queen's  speech  and  signing  all  laws  before  they 
enter  into  force,  are  largely  symbolic.  However,  drawing  up,  debating  and  scrutinising 
legislation  are  tasks  carried  out  by  the  Cabinet  and  both  chambers  of  Parliament. 
Parliament  itself  dates  back  to  1707  and  the  Union  of  the  Crowns  (between  England 
and  Scotland)  although  it  has  roots  in  the  English  Parliament  whose  origins  can  be 
traced  to  the  mid-13th  Century.  This  long  history  makes  it  one  of  the  oldest 
I  It  should  be  remembered,  however,  that  'parliamentary  sovereignty  developed  out  of  the  struggle  over 
internal  sovereignty  between  King  and  Parliament',  although  it  has  been  an  issue  in  debates  on  UK 
membership  of  the  EU  (Wallace,  1986,  emphasis  in  original). 
121 representative  assemblies  in  the  world,  with  the  bi-cameral  system  developing  during 
the  14th  Century  (The  United  Kingdom  Parliament,  2003).  Jointly,  the  two  chambers 
(the  House  of  Commons  and  the  House  of  Lords)  fulfill  several  functions:  they  make 
all  British  law,  exact  taxes,  scrutinise  the  administration  and  government  policy, 
examine  European  legislation,  hear  appeals  (in  the  House  of  Lords)  and  debate  the 
major  issues  of  the  day. 
Actual  legislation  forms  an  important  element  of  the  British  constitution,  thereby 
marking  a  significant  difference  with  most  other  constitutions  found  in  the  Western 
world.  Whereas  most  constitutions  are  protected  from  any  'rash'  alterations  by,  for 
instance,  a  Supreme  Court  or  the  requirement  that  any  changes  be  passed  by  a 
significant  proportion  of  MPs  in  two  successive  parliaments,  no  such  mechanisms  exist 
in  Britain.  Indeed,  'constitutional  laws  may  be  changed  or  abolished  as  easily  as  any 
other  laws'  (Weir,  1994). 
Parliamentary  debates  constitute  a  very  important  feature  of  the  UK  political 
environment,  and  are  often  described  as  adversarial-especially  those  in  the  House  of 
Commons.  The  FPP  system,  which  ensures  that  a  single-member  constituency  can  be 
won  with  a  plurality  of  the  votes  cast  within  that  constituency,  encourages  a  two-party 
system  and  thereby  also  a  parliament  in  which  one  party  is  very  likely  to  have  a 
majority  (see  table  below  for  relative  party  strengths).  Due  to  strong  whipping  systems 
within  the  political  parties,  the  passing  of  a  government's  legislative  programme  is 
virtually  guaranteed.  As  a  consequence,  opposition  parties  have  limited  direct  impact 
on  legislation. 
Table  6.1--  Relative  strengths  of  party  representation  (after  2005  election) 
Number  of  Number  of 
representatives  at  Percentage  representatives  Percentage 
Party  Westminster  in  the  EP 
Labour  354  54.8  19  24.4 
Conservative  196  30.3  27  34.6 
Liberal  Democrat  62  9.6  12  15.4 
UK  Independence  Party  0.0  11  14.1 
Green  Party  0.0  2  2.6 
Scottish  National  Party  6  0.9  2  2.6 
Democratic  Unionist  Party  9  1.4  1  1.3 
Sinn  Fein  5  0.8  1  1.3 
Plaid  Cymru  3  0.5  1  1.3 
Ulster  Unionist  1  0.2  1  1.3 
122 Independents  2  0.3  1  1.3 
0.0 
Others  8  1.2 
Total  646  100.0  78  100.2 
The  category  'Others'  in  the  House  of  Commons  consists  of  the  following  parties  and 
individuals:  Social  Democratic  and  Labour  (3),  Respect  (1)  and  the  Speaker  and  three 
deputies. 
One  issue  the  traditionally  very  coherent  parliamentary  political  parties  have  been 
unable  to  agree  on  is  membership  of  the  EU.  Membership  has  been  controversial  since 
it  was  originally  proposed  and  continues  to  cause  rifts  within  the  two  main  UK  parties, 
with  neither  Labour  nor  the  Conservatives  being  able  to  boast  a  unified  front  on 
European  integration'  In  contrast,  the  Liberal  Democrats  have  consistently  promoted 
pro-European  policies,  while  the  U.  K.  Independence  Party  (UKIP)  is  committed  to 
withdrawing  Britain  from  the  EU.  The  scepticism  voiced  by  some  politicians'  is  also 
evident  in  the  British  population.  Eurobarometer  figures  (2003)  show  that  31  per  cent 
of  those  asked  see  British  membership  of  the  EU  as  a  good  thing,  while  30  per  cent 
believe  the  UK  has  benefited  from  membership.  These  figures  are  significantly  below 
the  EU  averages  of  55  and  50  per  cent  respectively  (European  Commission,  2003).  ' 
The  widespread  scepticism  regarding  Community  membership  has  in  many  ways 
contributed  to  the  development  of  current  scrutiny  systems  for  legislation  originating 
at  the  European  level,  although  elements  of  the  British  constitution  have  also  limited 
the  effectiveness  of  these  systems.  This  chapter  will  therefore  examine  how  the  British 
parliament,  especially  the  parliamentary  committee  system,  has  developed  over  the 
years.  It  will  also  look  specifically  at  the  European  Scrutiny  Committee  (ESC),  °  its 
remit,  level  of  success  and,  a  matter  of  increasing  importance,  its  relations  with  other 
committees  within  the  House  of  Commons.  In  the  final  section,  scrutiny  of  European 
legislation  within  the  House  of  Lords  will  be  considered  with  particular  emphasis  on 
how  it  differs  from  the  Scrutiny  Committee  in  the  House  of  Commons  and  the  Lords 
Committee's  ability  to  influence  the  European  debate  and  legislative  outcomes. 
2  For  a  brief  overview  of  British  EU-membership  in  a  political  context  see,  for  instance,  Armstrong  and 
Buhner  (2003,  p.  389)  who  argue  that  'out  of  a  highly  contested  situation  the  internal  party  factionalism  on 
integration  developed  that  has  persisted  in  various  forms  to  the  present'.  But  see  also  Carter  (Carter,  2001) 
for  a  description  of  how  the  UK  currently  appears  to  be  undergoing  a  'changed  political  climate'  with 
regards  to  EU  membership. 
3  One  example  is  Robert  Kilroy  Silk  from  the  UKIP,  elected  to  the  EP  in  the  2004  election,  who  expressed  a 
wish  to  'wreck  the  European  parliament  (Tempest,  2004). 
a  Membership  was  considered  a  'bad  thing'  by  19  per  cent  of  those  asked,  with  40  per  cent  being  of  the 
opinion  that  membership  has  not  benefited  the  UK.  The  EU  averages  for  these  figures  were  10  and  28  per 
cent  respectively. 
3  The  ESC  in  the  House  of  Commons  should  not  be  confused  with  the  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee  (EESC)  that  operates  at  the  European  level  and  has  no  specific  parliamentary  attachment. 
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too,  with  EU  membership  affecting  the  activities  of  British  MPs.  However,  in  some 
aspects  the  development  of  scrutiny  procedures  for  European  affairs  differ  from  the 
developments  in  the  Danish  and  Italian  parliaments.  The  ESC  was  in  some  ways  a 
forerunner  for  other  select  committees  within  Parliament  and  although  it  adheres  to 
the  structures  and  conventions  of  other  committees,  it  is  also  the  only  committee  that, 
as  a  matter  of  course,  deals  with  its  subject  matter  ex  ante  rather  than  ex  post.  To  fully 
understand  the  importance  of  these  differences,  the  development  of  committees  will  be 
the  initial  focus  of  this  chapter,  together  with  the  related  development  of  the  ESC  in  the 
House  of  Commons. 
1.  How  Parliament  has  developed  over  time 
Despite  a  significant  increase  in  public  business`  passing  through  Parliament,  it  was 
only  in  1902  that  changes  were  approved  which  prioritised  government  business, 
while  the  use  of  standing  committees,  on  an  ad  hoc  basis,  was  also  introduced  at  this 
time  (Norton,  1998b,  p.  20).  Despite  the  possibility  of  using  committees  in  their  scrutiny 
of  government  legislation,  both  the  House  of  Commons  and  House  of  Lords  have  held 
on  to  their  traditions  of  being  debating  chambers.  Although  debates  in  the  House  of 
Commons  may  have  a  long  tradition,  they  are  often  seen  as  little  more  than  formalised 
mud  slinging  matches  with  a  certain  amount  of  entertainment  value.  In  contrast, 
debates  in  the  House  of  Lords  are  generally  considered  more  dignified  affairs-and 
therefore  potentially  more  constructive.  Constructive  debate  on  European  legislation 
can  be  difficult  to  develop  due  to  the  often  very  technical  nature  of  European 
legislation.  Specialised,  technical  matters  are  likely  to  lead  to  dull  debates  in  the  house, 
and  are  therefore  often  better  dealt  with  in  committees.  ' 
Because  the  executive  has  been  given  the  legislative  initiative,  as  well  as  considerable 
control  over  the  parliamentary  agenda,  it  can  be  argued  that  Parliament's  ability  to 
scrutinise  and  hold  the  government  to  account  has  been  reduced.  Indeed,  Stuart  Weir 
writes  that  '[t]he  doctrine  of  "parliamentary  sovereignty"  cloaks  the  reality  of  executive 
supremacy'  (1994,  p.  18).  Despite  the  development  of  executive  power  at  the  expense  of 
parliamentary  influence,  institutional  stability  has  remained  important  to  MPs-even  if 
changes  may  lead  to  improved  scrutiny  of  the  government.  The  development  of 
committees  has  thus  been  slow,  while  modification  of,  for  instance,  the  sitting  hours  in 
`  Legislation  initiated  by  the  government  as  opposed  to  private  members  of  Parliament. 
'  However,  even  technical  matters  can  become  politicised,  although  the  debate  then  tends  to  deviate  from 
the  original  question.  Examples  of  this  can  be  seen  in  various  referenda  held  on  European  issues 
throughout  Europe,  where  specific  debates,  like  the  ratification  of  a  treaty  or  participation  in  the  Economic 
and  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  easily  degenerate  into  arguments  for  and  against  the  EU  itself. 
124 the  House  of  Commons  have  also  proved  difficult  (see  for  instance  David  Cameron 
MP,  2003;  but  also  the  appendices  to  House  of  Commons,  2002a). 
Historically,  the  scrutiny  role  has  mainly  been  exercised  in  debates  on  the  floors  of 
both  Houses,  although  in  recent  years  there  has  been  a  move  towards  more  work  being 
undertaken  in  select  committees.  The  system  of  departmental  select  committees 
developed  between  1966  and  1979,  despite  reformers  having  called  for  select 
committees  to  shadow  the  work  of  government  departments  from  the  middle  of  the 
nineteenth  century  (House  of  Commons,  2003a,  para.  41).  Their  introduction  has  been 
termed  'the  most  important  parliamentary  reform  of  the  [20th]  century'  (Norton,  1998b, 
p.  34).  Norton  explains  the  development  of  select  committees  as  a  product  of  the  wish, 
by  some  MPs,  to  influence  public  policy  without  necessarily  bringing  about  the 
Government's  downfall  (p.  30),  and  lists  parliamentary  specialisation  as  the  main 
consequence  of  the  introduction  of  select  committees  (p.  31).  This  view  appears  to  be 
supported  by  MPs  themselves.  For  instance,  in  a  debate  on  select  committees  in  1995, 
the  following  views  were  expressed: 
I  am  second  to  none  in  believing  that  the  changes  that  we  undertook  nearly 
15  years  ago  in  the  Select  Committee  system  have  been  the  biggest 
improvement  in  increasing  ministerial  accountability  to  the  House, 
probably  even  this  century'  (Higgins,  1995), 
and 
15  or  16  years  ago  we  voted  on  setting  up  the  departmental  Select 
Committees.  I  do  not  know  how  many  hon.  Members  voted  against  setting 
up  those  Committees,  but  I  was  one  of  them.  As  I  have  said  before,  I  did 
that  because  I  did  not  believe  that  they  would  produce  reports  that  were 
good  enough  and  I  did  not  believe  that  they  would  have  sufficient  teeth. 
On  balance,  experience  has  proved  me  wrong.  They  have  provided  hon. 
Members  with  a  good  oversight  of  the  work  of  Departments  which  was  not 
available  to  them  before  (Rooker,  1995). 
Although  committees  have  now  become  an  important  component  of  parliamentary 
activities,  they  still  have  not  taken  on  the  same  importance  (measured  as  either  ability 
to  influence  legislation  or  the  prestige  membership  carries)  as  committees  within  either 
the  Danish  or  Italian  parliaments. 
The  European  Scrutiny  Committee 
In  many  ways  the  European  Scrutiny  Committee  set  a  precedent  for  the  establishment 
of  other  select  committees  within  the  House  of  Commons.  An  important  element  in  the 
debate  preceding  British  membership  of  the  European  Communities  was  the 
parliamentary  interest  in  maintaining  its  influence  over  the  Government's  Community 
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contributed  to  this  concern:  the  contentious  nature  of  membership  and  the  very  old 
parliamentary  tradition  in  the  UK.  Membership  itself  caused  both  inter-  and  intra- 
party  conflicts,  while  parliamentary  traditions  were  threatened  by  the  loss  of 
sovereignty.  These  points  were  also  raised  in  Denmark  and,  to  some  extent,  Ireland.  In 
the  words  of  Fitzmaurice  'the  new  member  states  [as  of  1973],  with  long  parliamentary 
traditions,  with  sensitivity  to  the  democracy  and  sovereignty  issues,  with  strong 
opposition  to  entry  (within  parties  as  well  as  between  them),  took  more  interest  in  safe- 
guarding  the  prerogatives  of  their  national  parliaments  than  had  the  founder  members' 
(Fitzmaurice,  1979,  p.  203). 
During  a  debate  on  EU  secondary  legislation  in  the  House  of  Commons  (21  December 
1972),  the  issue  of  remit  for  the  future  select  committee  on  European  affairs  was 
debated,  as  was  that  of  parliamentary  sovereignty.  MP  Peter  Shore  thus  argued  that 
the  'task  of  the  Select  Committee  is  to  find  ways,  if  possible,  of  making  the  Ministers 
taking  part  in  the  institutions  of  the  European  Community  responsible  to  this  House'. 
For  his  part,  J.  Enoch  Powell  wished  to  'ask  this  Select  Committee  to  survey  the  whole 
field  of  the  knowledge  and  control  by  the  House  of  all  proceedings  of  the  European 
Community  which  may  result  in  commitments  of  law  or  policy  binding  upon  this 
House'  (House  of  Commons,  1972-73,  Parliamentary  debates,  Vol.  848,  columns  1743 
and  1748).  In  response  to  these  concerns  James  Prior,  then  Lord  President  of  the 
Council  and  Leader  of  the  House  of  Commons,  stated  that: 
I  think  there  would  be  general  agreement  that  our  procedures  for 
scrutinising  proposals  for  European  Community  secondary  legislation 
most  urgently  need  to  be  studied;  that  is,  while  this  proposed  secondary 
legislation  is  still  in  the  draft  stage  ... 
it  is  in  relation  to  the  draft  stage  that 
we  think  most  of  the  work  by  this  Committee  will  take  place.  I  think  that 
should  be  the  Committee's  first  priority  (House  of  Commons,  1972-73, 
Parliamentary  debates,  Vol.  848,  column  1749). 
Prior  furthermore  argued  that 
for  the  first  time  there  will  be  an  opportunity  for  draft  regulations  made  by 
the  Commission  for  recommendation  to  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  be 
discussed  by  a  Committee  of  this  House.  So  the  House  will  be  able  to  make 
its  views  known  before  any  decision  is  reached.  That,  I  believe,  in  no  way 
detracts  from  the  sovereignty  of  Parliament.  In  fact,  I  believe  that  it  adds 
considerably  to  its  sovereignty,  and  certainly  to  the  scrutiny  powers  of  hon. 
Members  (House  of  Commons,  1972-73,  Parliamentary  debates,  Volume 
848,  columns  1750-1). 
In  the  end  both  Houses  of  Parliament  established  separate  committees  on  European 
affairs,  each  provided  with  a  remit  to  'scrutinize  ways  and  means  for  Parliament  to 
influence  the  legislation  of  the  European  Community'.  The  committees  began  work 
126 between  December  1973  and  May  1974,  well  after  Britain  had  joined  the  EU.  The  delay 
between  membership  commencing  and  the  committees  beginning  work  caused, 
especially  in  the  House  of  Commons,  a  backlog  of  material  to  dealt  with. 
The  committee  in  the  Commons  was  entrusted  with  the  significant  task  of  sifting 
through  all  legislative  proposals  from  the  European  Commission,.  When  proposals 
were  considered  to  be  of  political  or  legal  importance  the  House  was  alerted-but  the 
merits  of  legislative  proposals  were  not  to  be  commented  upon.  Despite  this  relatively 
limited  remit,  the  committee  was  given  the  opportunity  to  involve  Parliament  in  the 
pre-decision  stage  of  the  European  legislative  process,  a  situation  referred  to  by  Prior 
as  contributing  to  Parliament's  sovereignty,  and  one  David  Brew  claims  the  House  of 
Commons  'rarely  enjoys  in  respect  of  domestic  legislation'  (Brew,  1979,  p.  24). 
Over  time,  attempts  have  been  made  at  extending  the  involvement  of  the  House  of 
Commons  in  European  affairs,  especially  so  with  the  appointment  (in  1997)  of  a  Select 
Committee  on  Modernisation  that  (also)  considered  the  work  of  the  ESC  (House  of 
Commons,  1998b).  Amongst  other  recommendations  it  was  suggested  that  the  name  of 
the  then  European  Legislation  Committee  be  changed  to  'European  Scrutiny 
Committee',  that  the  number  of  Standing  Committees  be  increased  to  four  or  five,  and 
that  a  Parliamentary  office  be  established  in  Brussels.  With  the  implementation  of 
many  of  these  recommendations,  Caitriona  Carter  claims  that  the  new  Labour 
government  'appears  to  have  heralded  a  new  approach  to  scrutiny'  (Carter,  2001,  p. 
438).  The  ESC  is  thus  the  first  committee  in  the  House  of  Commons  to  include  the  word 
'scrutiny'  in  its  title,  although  scrutiny  is  essentially  the  task  of  all  select  committees 
within  the  House  of  Commons. 
Even  after  implementing  these  changes,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  UK  parliamentary 
scrutiny  system  is  consistent  with  the  treatment  of  domestic  legislation.  Indeed,  Carter 
writes  that,  due  to  the  strong  notion  of  parliamentary  sovereignty  that  exists  in  Britain, 
maintaining  parliamentary  control  over  Community  affairs  was  'in  keeping  with  UK 
Constitutional  tradition'  (Carter,  2001,  p.  440).  However,  it  is  also  pointed  out  that  the 
scrutiny  powers  accorded  the  ESC  are  significantly  different  to  those  held  by  other 
committees  in  the  House  of  Commons,  being  ex  ante,  rather  than  ex  post  (Carter,  2001, 
p.  440),  and  thus-potentially-more  influential.  This  potential  is  somewhat  limited 
though,  as  the  committee  'lacks  the  formal  power  to  serve  as  anything  more  than  a 
filter'  (Millar,  1979,  p.  195).  Indeed,  according  to  Anand  Menon  and  Vincent  Wright 
(1998,  p.  54)  'the  core  executive  has  been  granted  a  degree  of  freedom  from 
Parliamentary  scrutiny  previously  unknown  within  the  British  Parliamentary  system'. 
127 The  inability  to  comment  on  the  merit  of  European  documents  has  reduced  the  impact 
of  the  ex  ante  scrutiny,  thereby  limiting  the  potential  influence  of  the  committee.  Menon 
and  Wright  (1998,  p.  64)  argue  that: 
the  UK  denounces  the  'democratic  deficit'  at  the  heart  of  the  EU,  yet  it  is 
reluctant  to  enhance  the  power  of  either  the  European  Parliament  or  the 
House  of  Commons.  Its  decision-making  processes  are  clearly  relatively 
more  'coherent'  because  it  is  unencumbered  by  troublesome  parliamentary 
committees  or  sub-national  governments. 
Being  able  to  operate  relatively  unhindered  by  parliamentary  activities  has  contributed 
to  keeping  disagreements  (on  European  issues)  within  the  main  political  parties 
manageable.  If  the  ESC  was  able  to  expound  on  the  merit  of  documents  submitted  to  it, 
this  would  likely  result  in  the  ESC  becoming  highly  politicised,  as  it  would  possibly 
attract  MPs  with  strong  (and  opposite)  opinions  on  the  EU.  Party  whips  would  need  to 
'keep  an  eye  on'  these  members,  and  party  leaderships  would  wish  to  'plant'  trusted 
people  on  the  committee!  Party  leaderships,  as  well  as  the  government,  are  therefore 
likely  to  prefer  to  avoid  granting  the  ESC  the  ability  to  pronounce  on  the  merit  of  EU 
documents.  Consequently,  progress  through  disagreement  is  not  an  option,  as  inter- 
party  disagreements  would  likely  be  too  damaging. 
2.  Working  methods  of  committees 
Governments  are  also  able  to  work  relatively  unencumbered  by  the  work  carried  out  in 
select  committees.  Work  in  select  committees  is  still  mainly  carried  out  on  a  selective 
basis:  committees  act  autonomously,  carefully  guard  their  autonomy  and  are  very 
independent  of  each  other  as  well  as  of  the  government.  Committee  members  thus 
choose  topics  on  which  they  wish  to  write  reports,  and  can  hold  hearings,  call 
witnesses  and  take  other  evidence  in  the  process.  In  many  instances  an  inquiry  is  held 
ex  post,  that  is,  after  a  piece  of  legislation  has  been  passed,  and  may  well  focus  on  the 
implications,  or  unintended  consequences,  of  that  legislation.  Scrutiny  within  the 
House  of  Commons  thus  cannot  be  seen  to  follow-on  a  day-to-day  basis-the  pre- 
legislative  work  of  government  departments  in  an  effort  to  influence  or  improve  this 
legislation.  In  contrast,  the  ESC  is  able  to  follow  European  legislation  in  its  pre-decision 
stages,  placing  it  at  a  distinct  advantage  in  terms  of  potential  influence. 
However,  since  the  1990s  it  appears  that  a  new  focus  on  pre-legislative  scrutiny  has 
emerged  in  Britain  (for  an  overview  see  Kelly  et.  al.  (2003)).  The  House  of  Commons 
Select  Committee  on  Modernisation  (first  appointed  in  June  1997)  has  published 
'  Indeed,  Jimmy  Hood  is  suspicious  that  this  takes  place  in  other  countries,  citing  the  importance  of 
European  Committees  as  a  reason  why  executives  would  want  to  place  members  on  these  committees 
(interview  UK-10). 
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from  February  2002,  the  need  for  improved  scrutiny  procedures  is  recognised  in  the 
following  statement:  '  the  principal  objective  of  modernisation  must  be  to  improve  the 
scrutiny  of  public  policy.  The  programme  of  work  of  the  Modernisation  Committee  is 
intended  to  enable  Members  of  the  House  to  be  more  effective  in  discharging  their  role 
of  scrutiny'  (House  of  Commons,  2002b,  para.  1),  thus  recognising  a  need  for 
improvement  in  this  area.  Of  the  many  recommendations  contained  within  the  report 
there  are  several  directly  related  to  the  House  of  Commons'  ability  to  scrutinise  the 
executive.  On  the  principal  objectives  of  departmental  committees,  the  Modernisation 
Committee  thus  recommends  that  each  select  committee  should  consider  major  policy 
initiatives,  propose  policy  changes  where  the  Committee  considers  them  to  be  required 
and  conduct  pre-legislative  scrutiny  of  draft  bills  (House  of  Commons,  2002b,  para.  34). 
These  changes  would  require  significant  increases  in  resources  available  to  select 
committees,  an  issue  several  of  the  report's  other  recommendations  address.  "  With  the 
aim  of  creating  a  stronger  parliamentary  focus  on  scrutiny,  the  report  thus  also 
recommends  that  'all  investigative  select  committees  should  be  named  "scrutiny 
committees"'  (para.  37),  and  that  a  parliamentary  career  devoted  to  scrutiny  be  made 
more  attractive  by  providing  chairs  of  'principal  investigative  committees'  with  an 
additional  salary  (para.  41).  In  the  conclusion  it  was  argued  that 
select  committees  have  served  Parliament  and  the  public  well.  They  have 
enabled  Members  of  Parliament  to  hold  the  Executive  to  account  through 
more  rigorous  scrutiny  than  is  possible  on  the  floor  of  the  House  and  they 
have  brought  before  the  public  matters  which  otherwise  might  have 
remained  concealed  (House  of  Commons,  2002b,  para.  59). 
Taken  together,  the  recommendations,  if  enacted,  could  alter  the  entire  focus  of  the 
House  of  Commons,  significantly  reducing  some  of  the  criticisms  voiced  about  its 
current  abilities  (or  lack  thereof)  to  scrutinise  the  executive.  The  recommendations  can 
be  seen  as  a  step  towards  more  scrutiny  being  carried  out  ex  ante,  although  they  still 
leave  select  committees  in  a  largely  reactive  role,  with  the  main  emphasis  being  on 
inducing  government  departments  to  produce  bills  in  draft.  As  long  as  this  is  not  a 
requirement  and  common  practice,  select  committees  will  likely  still  find  it  difficult  to 
achieve  any  significant  influence  over  the  development  of  public  policy.  Furthermore, 
MPs  only  have  a  certain  amount  of  time  available  to  them,  and  may  thus  find  it  too 
'  For  a  full  list  of  reports  see  the  committees  website: 
h":  //www.  parliamenLuk/parhamentary-pommittees/sek--ct  committee_on  modenvsation  of  the  hou 
se  of  commons/seiect  committee  on_modernisation  of  the  house  of  commons  reports  and_publicati 
ons.  cfm 
"  The  allocation  of  parliamentary  resources  is  not  simply  a  matter  of  a  committee's  ability  to  purchase 
expert  knowledge  or  undertake  visits  to  other  countries  or  locations.  MPs  also  strive  to  become  reelected, 
and  therefore  necessarily  devote  attention  to  their  constituency  and  constituents.  A  senior  member  of  the 
House  of  Commons  thus  laments  that  'MPs  spend  more  time  in  their  constituencies  trying  to  get  elected 
than  here,  trying  to  ensure  that  the  legislation  they  have  been  elected  to  try  and  deal  with  is  properly 
examined'.  This  MP  further  argued  that  recent  increases  in  parliamentary  funding  were  mainly  allocated 
to  constituency  work,  therefore  not  helping  counteract  this  development  (interview  UK-9). 
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time  in  committee  is  likely  to  be  resisted,  especially  as  debating  time  has  also  been 
increased,  with  Westminster  Hall  opened  for  debates  not  requiring  voting.  " 
Although  the  Modernisation  report  focuses  mainly  on  improving  scrutiny  through 
select  committees,  its  final  recommendation  is  that  'all  reports  of  select  committees 
should  be  eligible  for  debate  in  Westminster  Hall  after  the  closure  of  the  two  month 
period  within  which  Government  is  expected  to  publish  its  response,  whether  or  not 
such  a  response  has  been  tabled'  (para.  57).  This  is  a  clear  recognition  that  debates 
remain  an  important  element  of  how  the  House  of  Commons  functions.  However,  the 
only  way  in  which  debates  in  Westminster  Hall  can  contribute  to  scrutiny  is  through 
bringing  issues  to  public  attention,  thus  indirectly  putting  political  pressure  on  the 
government.  While  these  debates  may  contribute  to  the  continuation  of  traditional 
parliamentary  debates,  they  have  not  developed  parliamentary  influence  or  power 
over  the  executive. 
The  limited  influence  of  select  committees  is  further  underlined  by  their  composition. 
With  the  government  founded  on  a  majority  in  the  House,  it  will  also  hold  a  majority 
of  seats  on  the  parliamentary  committees,  as  seats  are  allocated  on  a  proportional  basis. 
The  degree  to  which  committees  are  likely  to  be  critical  of  the  government's  policy  is 
thus  drawn  into  question,  as  is,  consequently,  the  effectiveness  of  parliamentary 
scrutiny.  Considering  that  the  strong  whipping  system  within  British  parliamentary 
parties  tends  to  generate  high  levels  of  unity,  the  implications  for  effective  scrutiny  are 
obvious.  British  parliamentary  political  parties  are  generally  characterised  by  a  high 
level  of  cohesion  that  is  crucial  to  a  party's  ability  to  hold  on  to  power  when  in 
government,  and  of  utmost  importance  to  advancement  within  the  party.  Such  unity, 
however,  has  been  difficult  to  maintain  on  European  issues,  with  the  ratification  of  the 
Maastricht  Treaty  in  the  House  of  Commons  an  obvious  illustrative  example.  " 
Christopher  Lord  (Lord,  1992,  p.  435),  writing  specifically  on  British  membership  of  the 
EU,  mentions  the  'constant  search'  for  'obfuscating  formulae  to  conceal  divisions',  and 
goes  on  to  observe  that  party  divisions  are  the  'main  paranoia  of  British  politics'. 
The  voting  system  in  the  House  of  Commons  usually  requires  members  to  pass 
through  the  voting  lobby  in  person,  making  any  party  division  clear  for  all  to  see. 
"  Westminster  Hall  is  a  parallel  chamber  all  MPs  can  attend.  It  debates  matters  referred  from  the  House  of 
Commons,  and  is  situated  in  the  Grand  Committee  Room,  Westminster  Hall.  For  more  information  see  the 
Modernisation  Committee's  fourth  report  (House  of  Commons,  2000).  Arrangements  for  Westminster 
Hall,  previously  sessional,  were  agreed  by  the  House  of  Commons  on  29  October  2002,  taking  effect  from  1 
January  2003  (Sear,  2002). 
12  The  government  of  John  Major  only  narrowly  survived  the  two  votes  required  to  ratify  the  Treaty  of 
Maastricht  in  November  1992  and  July  1993.  Despite  the  latter  of  these  being  a  vote  of  confidence,  the 
Treaty  was  so  divisive  that  a  number  of  Conservative  MPs  voted  against  their  own  government  on  the 
issue,  nearly  bringing  about  its  downfall. 
130 Divisions  amongst  committee  members  from  the  same  party  would  also  be  very 
obvious,  as  meetings  in  select  committees  are  commonly  open  to  the  public,  with 
reports  and  evidence  taken  for  these  reports  available  to  interested  parties.  In  essence, 
the  strong  emphasis  on  party-unity  is  another  factor  that  limits  Parliament's  ability  to 
scrutinise  the  government  and  its  policies. 
European  affairs  may,  however,  be  an  exception  to  the  pattern  of  strong  party  unity,  as 
the  EU  provokes  divisions  within  both  the  two  main  parties  despite  the  constant  search 
for  'obfuscating  formulae'.  Moreover,  the  ESC  stands  out  by  conducting  ex  ante,  as 
opposed  to  ex  post,  scrutiny.  The  word  'scrutiny'  has  been  included  in  the  committee's 
name  since  1998,  thereby  setting  it  further  apart  from  the  remaining  select  committees. 
Rules  regulating  the  work  of  the  ESC  are  laid  down  in  Standing  Order  number  143 
which  states  that  the  committee  is  to  examine  European  Union  documents"  and  'report 
its  opinion  on  the  legal  and  political  importance  of  each  such  document  and,  where  it 
considers  it  appropriate,  to  report  also  on  the  reasons  for  its  opinion  and  on  any 
matters  of  principle,  policy  or  law  which  may  be  affected'  (House  of  Commons,  2003b). 
To  this  end  the  Government  deposits  the  required  documents  with  Parliament, 
complementing  these  with  explanatory  memoranda  on  each  legislative  proposal. 
The  committee  can  further  demand  that  Ministers  not  give  agreement  to  proposals  still 
being  examined  by  the  House.  The  process  of  scrutiny  can  thus  be  described  as  paper- 
based,  as  opposed  to,  for  instance,  the  Danish  scrutiny  system  where  oral  evidence  is 
taken  from  ministers  immediately  prior  to  Council  meetings.  The  British  system  is 
thought  by  many  of  its  participants  to  be  superior  to  systems  based  on  oral  evidence, 
as  the  ESC  is  considered  able  to  enter  the  debates  at  an  earlier  stage.  "  However,  having 
the  scrutiny  process  based  on  the  delivery  of  official  documents  also  has  its  drawbacks. 
This  is  especially  so  when  a  final  decision  at  the  European  level  draws  close,  and  one 
text  may  be  rapidly  replaced  by  another,  making  it  difficult  for  the  ESC  to  stay  current 
with  the  exact  negotiation  situation.  Although  the  committee  can  invoke  the  scrutiny 
"Standing 
order  number  143  goes  on  to  define'European  Union  Documents'  as: 
(i)  any  proposal  under  the  Community  Treaties  for  legislation  by  the  Council  or  the  Council  acting 
jointly  with  the  European  Parliament; 
(ii)  any  document  which  is  published  for  submission  to  the  European  Council,  the  Council  or  the 
European  Central  Bank; 
(iii)  any  proposal  for  a  common  strategy,  a  joint  action  or  a  common  position  under  Title  V  of  the 
Treaty  on  European  Union  which  is  prepared  for  submission  to  the  council  or  the  European 
council, 
(iv)  any  proposal  for  a  common  position,  framework  decision,  decision  or  a  convention  under  Title  Vf 
of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union  which  is  prepared  for  submission  to  the  Council; 
(v)  any  document  (not  falling  within  (ii),  (iii)  or  (iv)  above  which  is  published  by  one  Union 
institution  for  or  with  a  view  to  submission  to  another  Union  institution  and  which  does  not 
relate  exclusively  to  consideration  of  any  proposal  for  legislation; 
(vi)  any  other  document  relating  to  European  Union  matters  deposited  in  the  House  by  a  Minister  of 
the  Crown. 
14  As  expressed  in,  for  instance,  interview  UK-8. 
131 reserve  power,  '  it  may  still  find  it  very  difficult  to  monitor  the  exact  wording  of 
agreements,  even  where  these  have  previously  found  to  be  of  legal  or  political 
importance.  Moreover,  the  scrutiny  reserve  power  offers  no  provision  for  holding 
Ministers  to  the  recommendations  of  the  Committee.  While  ministers  may  be  called 
upon  to  give  evidence  and  explain  their  actions,  the  merit  of  documents  remains 
beyond  the  committee  with  MPs  unable  to  enforce  opinions  and  recommendations 
diverging  from  those  of  the  government. 
To  fulfill  its  role  of  scrutiny,  the  ESC  has  formulated  three  requirements  that  must  be 
fulfilled  before  a  document  can  be  cleared:  (i)  the  committee  must  be  satisfied  that  it 
has  enough  information  to  process  the  document,  (ii)  it  must  decide  whether  it  is 
politically  or  legally  important,  and  (iii)  it  must  decide  whether  it  should  be  debated. 
These  requirements  pointedly  avoid  the  questioning  of  a  particular  policy  or  a 
document's  merit,  which  according  to  Jimmy  Hood  (chair  of  the  European  Legislation 
committee  1992  -  1998,  and  Chair  of  the  ESC  1998  -),  is  a  strength  of  the  committee. 
Hood  argues  that: 
the  power  of  our  committee  lies  in  that  we  do  not  make  such  a  merit 
decision,  we  don  I  say  it  is  a  good  or  a  bad  directive,  we  make  a  judgement 
about  whether  it  is  legally  and  politically  important,  and  therefore  doesn't 
need  further  scrutiny  by  parliamentarians,  and  when  we  come  to  that 
position,  we  then  refer  it  to  people  who  will  look  at  the  merits  for  and 
against.  " 
Put  slightly  differently,  the  committee  is  not  in  a  position  to  withhold  clearance  of  a 
document  on  the  basis  that  it  does  not  support  its  contents.  "  The  biggest  criticism  of 
the  ESC  may  thus  be  that  it  has  little,  if  any,  real  impact  on  European  legislation.  While 
it  can  be  argued  that  the  committee  brings  important  issues  to  the  attention  of  the 
House  and  lets  the  House  debate  these  issues  prior  to  decisions  being  taken,  both  the 
quality  and  quantity  of  such  debates  must  be  questioned.  This  is  especially  so 
considering  how  documents  are  dealt  with  by  the  ESC.  The  scrutiny  committee 
receives  approximately  1100  documents  in  a  year  of  which  approximately  600  are 
"  In  a  resolution  adopted  by  the  House  of  Commons  on  17  November  1998  the  scrutiny  reserve  power 
states  that,  except  in  special  circumstances, 
No  Minister  of  the  Crown  should  give  agreement  in  the  Council  or  in  the  European  Council 
to  any  proposal  for  European  Community  legislation  or  for  a  common  strategy,  joint  action 
or  common  position  under  Title  V  or  a  common  position,  framework  decision,  decision  or 
convention  under  Title  VI  of  the  Treaty  on  European  Union 
(a)  which  is  still  subject  of  scrutiny  (that  is,  on  which  the  European  Scrutiny  committee  has 
not  completed  its  scrutiny  or 
(b)  which  is  awaiting  consideration  by  the  House  (that  is,  which  has  been  recommended  by 
the  European  Scrutiny  Committee  for  consideration  pursuant  to  Standing  Order  No.  119 
(European  Standing  Committees)  but  in  respect  of  which  the  House  has  not  come  to  a 
Resolution  (House  of  Commons  European  Scrutiny  Committee,  2002b,  reproduced  on  p.  49). 
is  Interview  UK-S. 
"  Interview  UK-10. 
is  Interview  UK-8. 
132 considered  of  legal  or  political  importance.  In  recent  sessions  this  number  of  important 
documents  has  given  rise  to  35  recommendation  for  debate  with  the  vast  majority, 
around  30,  being  referred  to  debate  in  a  standing  committee,  leaving  only  five  for 
debate  in  the  House.  "  Although  all  MPs  can  participate  in  all  standing  committee 
debates,  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  this  form  of  scrutiny  within  the  House  of 
Commons  is  often  not  utilised,  with  many  debates  poorly  attended.  "  Of  the  very 
limited  number  of  documents  recommended  for  debate  on  the  floor  of  the  House, 
many  will  be  relegated  to  late  evening  debates  and  thus,  frequently,  receive  a  limited 
amount  of  attention  by  MPs  and  the  media  alike. 
Technically,  then,  the  procedures  adhered  to  by  the  ESC  fulfill  the  requirements  for 
scrutiny,  at  least  under  the  present  system  of  scrutiny  within  the  House  of  Commons. 
The  documents  received  by  the  committee  are  examined,  investigated  and  judged 
according  to  the  criterion  of  whether  enough  information  has  been  received,  whether 
the  document  is  of  political  or  legal  importance,  and  whether  it  should  be  reported  for 
debate.  Even  if  a  debate  is  held,  and  a  minister  has  to  appear  before  a  standing 
committee  to  explain  specific  actions  by  the  government,  the  committee  can  only 
declare  itself  unhappy  with  the  government's  actions  or  decisions.  Furthermore, 
because  the  ESC  is  not  involved  in  overseeing  the  implementation  of  European 
legislation,  scrutiny  of  this  aspect  of  European  legislation  falls  to  other  select 
committees  within  the  House  of  Commons-should  they  choose  to  investigate  a  topic 
relating  to  the  EU.  ' 
3.  European  affairs  in  other  select  committees 
Most  select  committees  within  the  House  of  Commons  do  not  write  reports  specifically 
on  European  matters.  The  only  committee  that  routinely  conducts  inquiries  into  topics 
of  a  European  character  is  the  Foreign  Affairs  Committee  whose  remit  extends  to  cover 
the  European  Union.  The  committee  considers  its  'role  of  supplying  the  House  with  the 
information  it  needs  to  act  on  European  Union  matters  to  be  one  of  our  most  important 
tasks'  (House  of  Commons  Foreign  Affairs  Committee,  2003,  para.  6).  This 
informational  task  does  indeed  appear  to  be  the  most  important  element  in  the 
committee's  work  on  the  EU,  as  reports  on  European  matters  consist  mainly  of 
evidence  taken  by  the  committee,  with  very  few  accompanying  comments. 
'  Interview  UK-8. 
29  Views  supporting  this  argument  were  expressed  in  interviews  UK-6  and  8  as  well  as  in  the  ESC's  own 
report  (2002b).  However,  while  it  may  be  difficult  to  attract  ]VIPs  to  serve  on  committees,  this  has  become 
less  of  a  problem  for  the  ESC.  Committee  members  are  also  increasingly  engaged  in  the  work  undertaken 
by  the  committee,  reading  their  papers  and  asking  questions  of  advisors  (interview  UK-6). 
n  Despite  not  looking  at  the  merit  of  proposed  legislation,  the  committee  is  increasingly  looking  at 
potential  implications  (indicated  by,  for  instance,  interviewee  UK-6).  This  is  one  way  to  further  the 
influence  of  the  ESC  while  staying  within  its  formal  remit,  although  one  that  is  still  under  development. 
133 Reports  from  other  select  committees  will  often  include  a  European  angle  if  relevant  to 
the  inquiry.  One  example  from  the  more  recent  reports  published  by  select  committees 
is  the  Eighth  Report  of  Session  2002-03  from  the  International  Development 
Committee,  which  comments  on  the  EU  development  fund  (House  of  Commons 
International  Development  Committee,  2003,  pp.  13-15).  However,  the  treatment  of  the 
development  fund  constitutes  only  a  small  part  of  the  overall  report,  with 
approximately  one  page  from  a  total  of  46  devoted  to  this  topic.  The  report  is  thus  a 
good  example  of  how  select  committees  will  consider  the  European  angle  where 
relevant,  but  not  often  use  a  piece  of  legislation  originating  from  the  European  level  as 
its  starting  point  for  an  investigation.  The  only  committee  to  have  done  this  is  the 
Environment,  Food  and  Rural  Affairs  Committee,  which  has  published  several  reports 
based  on  European  directives  or  policies.  During  the  2002-03  session,  the  committee's 
first,  third  and  fourth  reports  thus  dealt  with  the  Common  Fisheries  Policy,  the 
Common  Agricultural  Policy  and  the  Water  Framework  Directive  respectively,  "  while 
most  other  reports  incorporated  a  European  angle  where  relevant.  Unusually, 
however,  David  Curry,  chair  of  this  committee  from  2001  -  2003,  has  had  direct 
experience  of  'Europe'  and  its  institutions  as  a  Brussels-based  journalist  and  member  of 
the  European  Parliament  prior  to  becoming  a  member  of  the  House  of  Commons. 
Curry,  therefore,  has  been  well  placed  to  recognise  the  importance  of  European  matters 
to  the  committee  he  chaired,  while  also  being  able  to  draw  on  resources  at  the 
European  level  in  the  investigative  tasks  of  the  committee. 
Curry  does  not,  however,  wish  to  take  instructions  from  the  ESC  regarding  what  topics 
his  committee  ought  to  investigate.  He  claims  never  to  have  received  a  request  from 
the  ESC  to  investigate  a  specific  topic,  and  sees  limited  opportunities  for  collaboration 
with  the  ESC.  When  asked  about  further  engagement  with  European  affairs,  he  stated 
that 
I  don't  think  we  would  become  more  involved  because  the  European 
Scrutiny  committee  would  delegate  to  us,  we  would  do  it  because  we 
wanted  to  deal  with  those  issues,  and  we  would  do  it  entirely  from  our 
own  initiative.  We  already  meet  twice  a  week,  and  we  can't  take  any  more 
work,  people  wouldn't  turn  up,  there  isn't  enough  room  in  the  week  to  do 
that.  We  must  cancel  other  things  to  take  things  over  from  the  European 
Scrutiny  Committee,  and  we  will  not  do  it.  We  cant  meet  three  times  a 
week,  we  just  couldn't  do  it,  it's  a  question  of  time.  There  might  be  little 
odds  and  ends  like  some  science  programme,  which  doesn't  feature  very 
often,  so  they  can  send  things  of  to  the  Science  [and  Technology] 
Committee,  but  the  CAP,  or  fisheries?  It's  an  enormous  chunk  of  European 
business  there!  We  want  to  pick  and  choose  what  we  think  is  important, 
22 
For  texts  of  these  reports  see  the  committees  website: 
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134 and  I  suspect  we  would  always  make  sure  we  included  the  European 
perspective.  ' 
Despite  this  unwillingness  to  take  instructions  from  the  ESC,  Curry  and  other  MPs  still 
insist  that  adequate  scrutiny  cannot  be  undertaken  by  a  single  committee  within  each 
chamber  in  a  national  parliament.  "  The  diversity  of  legislation  emanating  from  the 
European  level  means  that  generalists  are  never  going  to  be  able  to  deal  with 
everything  in  a  qualified  manner.  Indeed,  Curry  argues  that  one  committee  will  never 
be  able  to  cope  with  the  'gargantuan'  amounts  of  European  legislation  on  its  own. 
Taking  this  argument  to  its  logical  conclusion,  and  permitting  specialists  to  partake  in 
the  scrutiny  of  European  affairs,  the  involvement  of  committees  like  the  Environment, 
Food  and  Rural  Affairs  Committee  would  become  an  important  element  in  the  overall 
scrutiny  process.  However,  without  further  cooperation  between  the  European 
Scrutiny  Committee  and  other  select  committees  the  danger  exists  that  topics  may  be 
overlooked  (thereby  missing  an  opportunity  to  exercise  parliamentary  influence)  or 
even  investigated  in  both  the  ESC  and  another  select  committee  (which  would  be  a 
waste  of  resources).  Whether  any  further  cooperation  can  be  established  depends  on 
how  select  committees  within  the  House  of  Commons  develop  in  general,  but  also  on 
the  personalities  on  each  committee.  It  is  thus  conceivable  that  if  committee  chairs  were 
in  agreement,  cooperation  could  develop  without  the  need  for  any  formal  alteration  of 
rules. 
Curry  is  not  alone  in  raising  issues  about  the  current  scrutiny  system.  Michael  Ancram 
(shadow  Foreign  Secretary  2001  -  2005)  also  insists  that  the  scrutiny  process  within  the 
House  is  a  process  'which  cannot  cope  with  even  five  per  cent  of  the  flow  of 
information'.  Although  advocating  a  general  reform  of  the  committee  structure  within 
the  House  of  Commons,  and  wishing  to  make  it  better  able  to  deal  with  the  large 
volume  of  legislation  originating  at  the  European  level,  Ancram  still  claims  that  'within 
the  small  area  [the  ESCI  manages  to  deal  with,  it  does  the  job  parliament  is  supposed  to 
do.  My  criticism  is  not  of  it,  it  is  that  it  is  too  small  and  there  is  too  much  work  for  it  to 
do  to  be  effective  across  the  board'.  '  However,  members  of  the  ESC  themselves 
disagree  on  how  the  committee  should  be  developed.  MP  and  member  of  the  ESC 
Michael  Connarty,  in  contrast  to  his  chairman,  would  like  to  see  a  stronger  emphasis 
on  the  substance  of  the  documents  dealt  with  by  the  committee,  a  'qualitative 
assessment  that  is  politically  important'.  "  In  contrast,  Jimmy  Hood,  chair  of  the  ESC, 
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135 argues  that  'to  be  effective,  we  have  to  be  selective',  and  that  the  British  system  of 
scrutiny  is  the  best  within  the  EU.  " 
Two  significant  problems  for  the  development  of  scrutiny  thus  exist  within  the  House 
of  Commons.  Firstly,  the  autonomy  of  select  committees  inhibits  cooperation  on 
scrutiny.  This  prevents  MPs  with  a  more  specialist  knowledge  in  a  particular  area  from 
assisting  those  knowledgeable  on  European  affairs  in  the  task  of  scrutinising  European 
legislation,  but  also  precludes  a  sharing  of  the  workload  imposed  by  the  significant 
number  of  documents  originating  from  the  EU.  To  a  large  extent,  this  process  is 
hampered  by  the  limited  knowledge  of  the  impact  European  legislation  has  at  the 
national  level,  and  exemplified  by  the  lack  of  willingness  shown  by  chairs  of  select 
committees  to  discuss  their  committees'  role  in  the  scrutiny  process.  '  Moreover,  it  is 
only  very  recently  that  the  ESC  has  begun  to  fully  understand  its  potential  importance, 
usefulness  and  powers.  Off-the-record  comments  by  several  MPs  suggest  that  the 
committee  is  keen  to  maintain  its  powers  for  itself,  thereby  further  hampering 
cooperation  with  other  select  committees. 
Secondly,  if  the  House  of  Commons  wishes  to  develop  the  scrutiny  process  further,  to 
a  point  where  the  House  can  be  said  to  have  a  tangible  influence  on  the  Government's 
activities  at  the  European  level,  significant  changes  in  the  interpretation  of  'scrutiny' 
within  the  House,  as  well  as  a  change  in  how  select  committees  operate  and  cooperate, 
would  be  required.  Not  only  would  departmental  select  committees  have  to  undertake 
European  inquiries  on  a  regular  basis,  they  would  have  to  alter  operational  procedures 
substantially  in  order  to  follow  legislation  through  the  department  within  their  remit 
better.  Such  changes  would  radically  alter  the  House  of  Commons  and  the  working  life 
of  MPs  (making  them  more  specialised)  while  also  altering  the  balance  between 
constituency  and  scrutiny  work.  This  would  very  likely  meet  with  substantial 
resistance,  as  it  would  fundamentally  alter  the  way  an  MP's  role  is  perceived. 
Moreover,  if  the  House  of  Commons  were  to  embrace  a  more  qualitative  scrutiny  of 
European  legislation,  it  could  also  be  argued  that  they  would  encroach  on  an  area 
hitherto  exclusive  to  the  House  of  Lords. 
Z'  Interview  UK-10. 
.  Several  MPs  approached  for  interviews  declined  for  a  variety  of  reasons.  Several  claimed  to  simply  be 
too  busy,  while  others  did  not  feel  they  could  contribute  anything  to  an  EU-related  topic,  referring  instead 
to  the  scrutiny  committee.  One  MP  (the  current  speaker)  did  not  wish  to  give  an  interview  for  the  reason 
that  the  author  is  not  a  constituent  of  his.  The  highest  number  of  refusals  was  received  from  MPs  in  the 
House  of  Commons,  with  Lords  being  more  forthcoming  with  their  time-while  also  exhibiting  a  better 
understanding  that  the  fact  their  committee  did  not  participate  actively  in  the  scrutiny  of  European  affairs 
was  of  interest. 
136 4.  The  European  Scrutiny  Committee  in  the  House  of  Lords 
Whereas  the  ESC  in  the  House  of  Commons  scrutinises  every  document  submitted  to 
it,  the  European  Union  Committee  in  the  House  of  Lords  is  more  selective.  The  ability 
to  be  more  selective  is  based  on  the  committee's  terms  of  reference,  which  stipulate  that 
it  is  to  'consider  European  Union  documents  and  other  matters  relating  to  the  EU'. 
How  documents  are  considered  is  thus  up  to  the  committee  itself,  with  no  requirement 
to  assess  documents  according  to  their  political  or  legal  importance.  The  freedom  this 
has  allowed  the  committee  has  meant  that  submitted  documents  are  initially  sifted  by 
the  chair  of  the  committee  who,  in  cooperation  with  the  clerk  of  the  select  committee 
and  the  clerks  of  the  sub-committees  (who  carry  out  the  majority  of  the  committee's 
work),  "  decide  what  documents  will  be  passed  on  to  the  sub-committees  for  either 
information  or  further  scrutiny.  ' 
The  sub-committees  can  elect  to  treat  the  information  received  by  taking  note  of  the 
documents,  ask  for  more  information,  or,  if  they  consider  the  matter  important  enough, 
conduct  an  inquiry  on  the  issue.  Although  investigations  are  undertaken  and  reported 
on  by  the  subcommittees,  they  are  published  in  the  name  of  the  main  committee  and 
widely  distributed.  While  reports  are,  officially,  intended  either  purely  for  the 
information  of  the  House  of  Lords  or  recommended  for  debate,  they  are  also 
forwarded  to  relevant  institutions  within  both  Britain  and  the  EU.  Both  the  European 
Commission  and  the  EP  thus  receive  such  reports  as  a  matter  of  course.  " 
The  emphasis  on  detailed-and  opinionated-reports,  rather  than  broad  coverage  of 
all  documents,  is  the  main  difference  between  the  work  of  the  European  committees  in 
the  Lords  and  Commons.  A  second  difference  concerns  the  respective  committees' 
memberships.  According  to  Lord  Brabazon  (chair  of  the  European  Committee  in  the 
House  of  Lords  2001-2002)  the  committee  involves  approximately  70  members  in  its 
work,  approximately  ten  percent  of  Lords  members  (or  roughly  20  per  cent  of  the 
active  members  depending  on  how  'active'  is  defined)  This  contrasts  with  the  House 
of  Commons  where  the  ESC  only  draws  on  a  small  fraction  of  the  Ml's  in  the  House. 
The  structure  of  membership,  which  permits  members  of  the  Lords  to  join  one  of  the 
EU  sub-committees  without  being  a  member  of  the  EU  select  committee  itself,  means 
2'  The  number  of  sub-committees  has  varied  over  time.  Currently  seven  exist,  covering  (A)  Economic  and 
Financial  Affairs,  Trade  and  International  Relations;  (B)  the  Internal  Market;  (C)  Foreign  Affairs,  Defence 
and  Development  Policy;  (D)  Environment  and  Agriculture;  (E)  Law  and  Institutions;  (F)  Home  Affairs 
and  (G)  Social  Policy  and  Consumer  Affairs. 
$  Interview  UK-4. 
31  Members  of  the  European  Union  Committee  often  proudly  relate  favourable  comments  made  by,  for 
instance,  members  of  the  European  Commission  as  an  indication  of  both  the  quality  of  the  work  carried 
out  by  the  committee  and  the  wide  readership  its  reports  have  (e.  g.  interview  UK-4). 
32  Interview  UK-4. 
137 that  a  considerable  proportion  of  the  House's  total  resources'  are  taken  up  by 
European  matters.  "  As  the  committee  has  commanded  its  share  of  resources  for  a 
significant  number  of  years,  it  can  only  be  concluded  that  most  Lords  are  in  favour  of 
the  allocation-despite  the  difficulties  associated  with  measuring  influence  as 
stemming  from  the  reports. 
It  is  thus  clear  that,  although  the  European  committees  in  the  two  Houses  operate  in 
different  ways,  many  of  the  problems  facing  the  ESC  in  the  Commons  also  challenge 
the  Lords.  The  'ghettoisation'  of  European  issues  takes  place  in  both  chambers  and,  as 
in  the  Commons,  there  is  very  little  contact  between  the  European  and  other 
committees  in  the  Lords.  Committees  in  the  Lords  feel  fully  justified  in  dealing  with 
European  matters  if  the  topic  falls  within  their  remit,  in  much  the  same  way  as  their 
counterparts  in  the  Commons,  although  here  too  the  approach  is  to  include  a  European 
angle,  rather  than  take  specific  European  legislation  as  the  starting  point  for  a  report. 
While  acknowledging  the  importance  of  the  interrelationship  with  the  European 
committee,  Lord  Peston,  chair  of  the  Economic  Affairs  Committee,  asserted  that  'if  we 
joined  the  EMtJ  my  successor  would  clearly  look  at  the  ECB  on  a  regular  basis,  and  I 
would  regard  that  as  being  within  my  committee,  rather  than  with  the  European 
committee'.  '  Equally,  Lord  Oxburgh,  chair  of  the  Science  and  Technology  Select 
Committee,  has  no  hesitation  in  addressing  EU  matters  if  relevant.  He  also  believes 
that'we  will  necessarily  have  more  and  more  to  do  with  people  in  Brussels  and  people 
in  European  countries',  although  currently  'such  contacts  are  not  shaping  up  in  any 
institutionalised  way'.  '  Both  chambers  can  therefore  be  said  to  treat  European  affairs  in 
isolation  from  domestic  legislation,  arguably  depriving  themselves  of  both  specialised 
policy  and  more  generalised  EU-knowledge  that  might  contribute  to  better  scrutiny  of 
the  government. 
However,  such  scrutiny  is  of  little  use  if  the  government  does  not  feel  obliged  to  follow 
any  recommendation  the  EU  committee  may  make.  As  in  the  Commons,  the  issue  of 
impact  on  government  policy  is  perhaps  of  most  concern.  The  Lords  too  is  a  debating 
chamber,  with  less  emphasis  on  committee  work  than  in  most  other  legislatures.  In  its 
own  review  of  how  European  legislation  is  scrutinised  in  the  Lords  (2002),  evidence 
suggesting  both  'unquestionable'  and  'ephemeral'  influence  is  cited.  Acknowledging 
"  Resources  are  here  taken  to  mean  not  only  human  resources,  as  in  active  members  of  the  House 
participating  in  the  committees'  work,  but  also  resources  allocated  to  travel,  expert  assistance  etc-  Reports 
from  the  EU  committee  constitute  a  significant  proportion  of  the  total  number  of  reports  published  by  the 
House  of  Lords.  In  session  2001-02  the  EU  committee  thus  published  38  of  the  80  reports  published  by  the 
House  of  Lords,  while  the  figure  for  session  2002-03  was  20  from  a  total  of  42  (House  of  Lords,  2004). 
34  Leicester  (1997,  p.  3)  suggests  that'some  two  thirds  of  the  resources  available  for  committee  work  in  the 
House  of  Lords  are  engaged  in  the  European  select  committee  and  its  sub-committees!. 
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138 that  influence  is  difficult  to  measure,  the  review  then  states  that  '[clontributing  to  a 
climate  of  opinion  forming  is  a  key  way  in  which  we  can  have  an  impact,  by  analysing 
issues  and  presenting  a  range  of  evidence  combined  with  our  own  conclusions  on  it' 
(House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European  Union,  2002,  paras  136-140).  More 
candidly,  a  parliamentary  member  of  staff  working  for  the  Scrutiny  committee  opined 
that  'even  if  the  government  changed  from  A  to  B-and  we've  recommended  changing 
from  A  to  B-we  can't  prove  it  is  because  of  the  committee,  it  could  be  coincidence,  it 
could  be  because  it's  Friday'.  "  For  the  Lords  committee,  developing  its  powers  of 
scrutiny  any  further  may,  however,  be  problematic  due  to  its  unique  constitutional 
position.  Its  current  lack  of  democratic  legitimacy`  and  the  resultant  political 
constraints  makes  it  unlikely  that,  in  its  present  form,  it  will  be  anything  more  than  an 
advisory  body.  " 
Condusion 
Understanding  the  workings  of  the  British  Parliament  is  obviously  important  when 
attempting  to  understand  how  it  scrutinises  European  affairs-but  committees, 
especially  in  the  House  of  Commons,  have  also  looked  to  the  ESC  for  inspiration, 
meaning  that  influence  has  flowed  both  ways.  With  a  few  important  deviations,  the 
British  parliament  handles  European  affairs  according  to  long-standing  parliamentary 
traditions.  As  in  other  member  states,  parliament  has  treated  European  affairs  much 
like  foreign  affairs,  delegating  them  to  a  single  committee,  rather  than  integrating  them 
into  the  every-day  work  of  all  select  committees.  The  ESC  conforms  to  British 
parliamentary  traditions  in  the  sense  that  it  cannot  act  on  behalf  of  the  House.  The 
notion  of  the  sovereign  parliament  is  strictly  upheld,  hence  the  importance  of  referring 
issues  to  the  House  for  debate.  However,  given  the  general  lack  of  interest  in  these 
very  infrequent  debates,  the  impact  of  the  committee  must  be  questioned. 
In  contrast  to  many  other  parliaments,  where  committees  dealing  with  European 
affairs  have  tended  to  adhere  to  already  established  practices,  the  ESC  has  in  many 
ways  been  a  forerunner  of  committee  development  in  the  House  of  Commons.  Not 
only  was  it  established  prior  to  the  permanent  establishment  of  select  committees 
within  the  House  of  Commons,  it  is  also  the  first-and  so  far  the  only-committee  to 
include  the  word  'scrutiny'  in  its  name.  Moreover,  it  is  the  only  committee  to  undertake 
"  Interview  UK-4. 
38  The  Labour  Party  has  initiated  significant  reforms  of  the  House  of  Lords,  beginning  with  the  banishment 
of  600  hereditary  peers.  Proposed  reforms  have  been  controversial-in  both  the  House  of  Lords  and 
House  of  Commons.  The  initial  document  detailing  suggestions  is  the  Wakeham  Report  (2000),  but  see 
also  the  government's  White  Paper,  reports  from  the  Joint  Committee  on  House  of  Lords  Reform  as  well 
as  consultation  papers  from  the  Department  on  Constitutional  Reform,  all  available  from  the  Department's 
website  on:  http:  /  /www.  dca.  gov.  uk/constitution/holref/holrefindex.  htm 
"  Interviews  UK-12  and  14. 
139 ex  ante,  as  opposed  to  ex  post,  scrutiny  of  government  activities.  Despite  this  pioneering 
role,  the  impact  of  the  ESC  remains  limited,  as  its  remit  does  not  permit  it  to  pronounce 
on  the  merit  of  documents  submitted  to  it.  Instead  it  is  only  able  to  decide  whether 
documents  have  legal  or  political  importance.  Despite  being  involved  in  the  legislative 
process  prior  to  a  final  decision  being  taken,  influence  over  European  legislation,  as 
well  as  over  British  participants  in  European-level  decision-making  processes,  is 
minimal.  This  minimal  impact  is  also  due  to  the  sheer  number  of  documents  submitted 
to  the  committee.  One  potential  weapon  in  the  ESC's  armoury  is  the  scrutiny  reserve 
power.  However,  despite  being  able  to  impose  the  scrutiny  reserve  power,  the 
committee  still  cannot  hold  the  Government  to  account  for  executive  actions  at  the 
European  level.  The  ESC  can  ask  ministers  to  appear  before  it  and  question  them  on 
their  conduct,  but  ultimately  has  no  way  to  sanction  either  disregard  of  the  scrutiny 
reserve  power  or  decisions  the  committee  does  not  agree  with. 
An  important  question  is  thus  whether  European  matters  would  be  better  scrutinised 
as  part  of  other  select  committees'  workloads.  During  interviews  with  British 
politicians  this  idea  was  rejected.  MPs  from  non-EU  committees  argued  that  their 
existing  workload  was  already  too  heavy,  and  that  they  always  had  the  option  of 
looking  at  issues  from  a  European  angle  when  conducting  investigations.  Members  of 
the  ESC  thought  EU  issues  were  best  considered  by  MPs  who  had  built  up  a 
considerable  knowledge  of  EU  affairs  and  procedures,  seeing  no  need  for  the 
involvement  of  non-EU  specialists.  The  issue  of  committees  cooperating  on  European 
matters  is  especially  pertinent  considering  the  ESC's  severe  workload.  The  problematic 
situation  regarding  cooperation  is  well  illustrated  by  the  fact  that  one  of  the  few 
reports  on  a  European  issue  to  capture  the  public's  imagination  (on  the  'fridge 
mountains')"  was  not  published  by  the  ESC  but  by  the  Environment,  Food  and  Rural 
Affairs  Committee  (House  of  Commons  Environment,  2002). 
However,  under  current  rules  the  ex  ante  involvement  would  disappear  if  European 
legislation  was  considered  solely  in  departmental  select  committees.  From  the 
perspective  of  improved  scrutiny,  the  ideal  position  may  be  some  form  of  cooperation 
between  the  ESC  and  departmental  select  committees.  Such  a  move  would  depart 
significantly  from  traditional  procedures  that  maintain  strict  independence  of  select 
committees.  Furthermore,  any  cooperation  between  the  ESC  and  other  select 
committees  would  take  time  to  develop,  as  trust  between  committees,  fundamental  to 
such  relationships,  currently  appears  to  be  absent. 
40  On  January  12002,  new  rules  for  the  disposal  of  CFC-containing  foam  from  refrigerators  came  into  force 
although,  in  Britain,  equipment  to  deal  with  the  new  requirements  was  insufficient.  This  caused  significant 
'mountains'  of  fridges  to  build  up  throughout  Britain,  at  an  estimated  cost  to  taxpayers  of  £40  million.  For 
further  details  see  the  report  from  the  House  of  Commons  Environment,  Food  and  Rural  Affairs 
Committee  (House  of  Commons  Environment,  2002). 
140 Nonetheless,  the  greatest  hindrance  to  influence  on  European  legislation  may, 
however,  lie  in  the  relatively  late  involvement  of  the  two  Houses  through  the  ESC  and 
the  European  Union  Committee.  It  is  often  the  case  that  by  the  time  the  Commission 
puts  forward  a  legislative  proposal,  very  little  remains  for  negotiation  (Peterson  and 
Bomberg,  1999,  see  especially  Chapter  two;  2000).  To  maximise  influence,  early 
involvement  is  considered  desirable  by  the  chairs  of  both  committees,  but  difficult  to 
obtain  under  current  rules  and  practices.  Although  the  Government  may  fulfill  treaty 
requirements  in  terms  of  providing  parliament  with  documents,  it  means  that  the  ESC 
relies  heavily  on  explanatory  notes  from  the  Government,  with  few  independent 
sources  of  information  and  analysis.  This  too  hinders  efficient  scrutiny.  If  either 
chamber,  but  especially  the  House  of  Commons,  were  to  influence  European 
legislation  in  a  more  substantial  manner,  several  changes  would  be  required.  Not  only 
would  the  ESC  have  to  follow  proposed  legislation  over  a  much  longer  time-scale, 
beginning  with  the  consultation  processes  undertaken  by  the  Commission.  It  would 
also  require  the  involvement  of  other  select  committees  from  the  House  as  well  as  the 
development  of  procedures  binding  the  Government  to  certain  decisions.  All  these 
suggestions,  however,  run  contrary  to  British  parliamentary  traditions  and  political 
culture. 
The  ESC  is  an  unusual  committee  within  the  House  of  Commons  due  to  its  ex  ante 
involvement  in  the  European  legislative  process.  Extending  this  prerogative  to  the 
remaining  select  committees  would  be  a  significant  departure  from  existing  practices. 
Moreover,  under  its  current  remit,  the  ESC  fulfils  its  role  of  scrutiny  fairly  adequately. 
By  bringing  issues  'to  the  attention  of  the  House'  its  role  is  completed,  and  it  then 
remains  for  the  House  to  decide  how  to  proceed. 
With  the  often  very  technical  issues  covered  by  the  ESC,  it  is  not  difficult  to  see  why 
European  legislation  has  not  captured  the  attention  of  the  public.  The  very  adversarial 
style  of  debates  in  the  House  of  Commons  does  not  lend  itself  to  technical  debates,  a 
contributing  factor  in  keeping  European  matters  within  a  single  select  committee.  The 
'ghettoisation'  of  European  issues  has  contributed  significantly  to  the  limited 
knowledge  amongst  other  MPs  and  the  public  in  this  area.  A  limited  understanding  of 
how  membership  of  the  Community  has  impacted  on  domestic  legislation,  and 
therefore  on  practices  and  procedures  within  Westminster  itself,  can  also  be  attributed 
to  the  lack  of  cooperation  between  select  committees  as  well  as  to  the  small  number  of 
debates  on  European  issues  within  the  House.  However,  even  very  technical  issues  can 
become  politicised,  as  the  issue  of  the  fridge  mountains  proves.  Such  politicisation  has 
not  been  in  the  interest  of  political  party  leaderships,  and  it  would  therefore  be 
141 interesting  to  investigate  the  extent  to  which  European  issues  have  been  kept  technical, 
thereby  avoiding  politicisation  of  unwelcome  issues. 
It  is  evident  that  if  MPs  (and  Parliament  as  an  institution)  are  to  gain  further  influence 
over  the  government  on  European  issues,  a  substantial  departure  from  existing 
traditions  and  practices  is  required.  The  greatest  obstacle  is  likely  to  be  the  principle  of 
parliamentary  sovereignty,  a  core  component  of  the  British  constitution.  At  present,  no 
single  individual  or  committee  can  represent  the  British  parliament:  for  a  matter  to  be 
vested  with  parliamentary  legitimacy,  it  has  to  be  put  before  both  Houses.  Whether 
this  concept  of  parliamentary  sovereignty  remains  a  realistic  prospect  merits  further 
consideration.  In  this  context  William  Wallace's  (1986,  p.  369)  continuum  of 
independence,  dependence  and  interdependence  may  be  useful.  Maintaining  strong 
parliamentary  sovereignty  (independence)  would  appear  impractical  if  the  British 
Parliament  wishes  to  engage  further  with  the  substance  of  European  legislation  in  a 
manner  that  has  the  potential  to  influence  government  policy  and  behaviour  on 
European  issues. 
Despite  these  reservations,  it  is  obvious  that  membership  of  the  EU  has  influenced 
activities  in  the  British  Parliament.  Both  scrutiny  committees  are  well  established  and 
considered  important  components  of  the  tool-set  allowing  parliamentarians  to  carry 
out  their  duties.  Moreover,  membership  has  forced  a  debate,  even  if  within  a  limited 
circle,  of  what  'scrutiny'  constitutes  and  whether  the  same  rules  apply  for  scrutinising 
European  and  domestic  legislation.  Although  EU  membership  is  beginning  to  impact 
on  parliamentary  work  beyond  EU  committees  in  all  of  the  case  study  parliaments,  in 
Britain  this  influence  goes  beyond  the  topics  dealt  with  in  committees,  potentially 
impacting  on  the  basic  workings  of  committees  too. 
142 Chapter  7:  Political  culture  and  scrutiny 
European  integration  leaves  national  identity  and  political  culture  by  and 
large  untouched,  while  Europeanisation  involves  mutation  of  national 
identity  and  political  culture.  ' 
(de  Beus  and  Mak,  2003,  p.  2) 
Scrutiny  procedures  have  little  meaning  when  examined  in  isolation,  making  it 
important  to  place  them  in  context.  Variance  in  social  and  cultural  factors  which  help 
determine  political  behaviour  and  attitudes,  or  political  culture,  in  turn  determine  the 
framework  within  which  political  institutions-including  national 
parliaments-operate.  National  political  cultures  influence  how  scrutiny  is  carried  out 
within  national  parliaments.  Political  cultures  obviously  differ  from  country  to 
country,  and  can  therefore  be  a  useful  concept  to  employ  when  attempting  to  explain 
the  different  approaches  to  parliamentary  involvement  in  European  matters.  If  scrutiny 
procedures  are  seen  as  a  compromise  between  national  political  cultures  and  the 
pressures  of  Europeanisation  they  acquire  more  meaning. 
This  chapter  will  therefore  look  at,  firstly,  the  concept  of  political  culture,  establishing 
its  explanatory  value  as  well  as  its  shortcomings-specifically  how  the  concept  is  not 
particularly  helpful  when  it  comes  to  explaining  change.  The  three  case  studies  will 
then  be  examined  in  this  context,  assessing  how  scrutiny  procedures  have  been 
adapted  to  accommodate  change  at  the  European  level  while  still  respecting  the 
specifics  of  national  political  cultures. 
The  'political'  in  political  culture  is  relatively  easy  to  define,  whereas  the  'culture' 
aspect  is  more  slippery  and  perhaps  best  expressed  as  'a  social  process  through  which 
people  reproduce  together  the  conditions  of  intelligibility  that  enable  them  to  make 
sense  of  their  worlds'  (Wedeen,  2002,  p.  717).  In  the  political  context,  that  which 
enables  people  to  make  sense  of  their  worlds  often  involves  the  specific  political 
institutions  and  practices,  including  national  parliaments,  which  have  developed 
within  their  nation  states.  Scrutiny  of  European  politics  is  thus  reflective  of  norms 
embedded  in  specific  political  cultures-although  because  of  its  historic  isolation 
within  domestic  political  structures  the  culture  surrounding  European  affairs  might  be 
more  accurately  described  as  a  subculture. 
As  European  cooperation  has  developed,  so  too  has  its  impact  on  the  national  level. 
Changes  have  thus  been  undertaken  in  national  parliaments  to  improve  scrutiny  of 
143 European  legislation  in  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  distinction  between  European 
and  domestic  legislation  is  becoming  difficult  to  maintain.  National  political  cultures 
thus  do  not  prevent  change  (in  general  or  specifically  in  parliamentary  scrutiny 
procedures).  Instead,  by  providing  an  overarching  framework  within  which  changes 
can  take  place,  they  direct  these  change  in  certain,  country-specific  directions,  making 
it  possible  for  national  parliamentarians  to  'make  sense'  of  EU  membership. 
In  the  three  case  studies,  the  process  of  change  has  been  undertaken  in  very  different 
ways.  While  all  three  parliaments  have  introduced  changes  to  their  scrutiny 
procedures,  the  speed  and  manner  in  which  these  changes  were  undertaken  have 
varied  significantly.  Parliamentary  scrutiny  in  Denmark,  through  the  increased 
involvement  of  specialised  committees,  has  evolved  organically  from  the  existing 
scrutiny  system.  While  the  essence  of  the  original  scrutiny  system  remains  in  place,  it 
has  developed  into  a  closer  system  of  cooperation  with  specialised  committees, 
bringing  the  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  significantly  closer  to  procedures 
employed  for  national  legislation.  In  Britain,  parliament  has  also  been  involved  in 
European  affairs  since  the  UK  joined  the  Community,  and  Europeanisation  has 
changed  the  character  of  scrutiny  here  too.  The  ESC  is  thus  the  only  committee  in  the 
House  of  Commons  to  include  the  word  'scrutiny'  in  its  name,  and  ministers  have 
found  that  they  may  be  called  to  account  for  their  actions  at  the  European  level.  These 
features  of  the  ESC  set  it  apart  from  other  select  committees  within  the  House  of 
Commons,  with  European  legislation  in  some  ways  treated  very  differently  to 
legislation  originating  at  the  domestic  level.  Both  the  ESC  and  the  European 
Committee  in  the  House  of  Lords  operate  differently  to  other  committees  due  to  their 
ability  to  carry  out  ex  ante  scrutiny-but  are  also  similar  to  other  committees  insofar  as 
they  have  maintained  their  strong  autonomy  and  do  not  cooperate  on  scrutiny  with 
other  committees.  In  contrast,  the  Italian  Parliament  is  developing  (and 
institutionalising)  cooperation  between  European  and  other  select  committees, 
although  it  may  also  be  some  way  off  from  having  an  answerable  executive  and  an 
administration  that  delivers  the  documents  required  of  it. 
MPs  in  the  three  countries  have  essentially  responded  in  very  different  ways  to  both 
the  initial  challenge  of  being  involved  in  European  affairs  and  the  subsequent,  and 
perhaps  even  greater  challenge,  of  Europeanisation.  In  the  Danish  Folketing  the 
challenge  of  Europeanisation  has  perhaps  caused  the  fewest  problems,  as  adaptations 
to  scrutiny  procedures  have  involved  more  openness  and  involvement  of 
parliamentarians,  already  prominent  features  of  the  Danish  political  culture.  In  both 
Italy  and  the  UK,  however,  the  process  has  been  more  challenging,  with  more 
fundamental  underpinnings  of  national  political  cultures  being  tested. 
144 1.  The  concept  of  political  culture 
Political  culture  as  a  'mediating'  (not  'determining')  variable  in  comparative  politics 
began  to  develop  with  Gabriel  A.  Almond  and  Sidney  Verba's  book  on  civic  culture 
(1989  (1963)).  In  this  work  Almond  and  Verba  describe  political  culture  as  'political 
orientations-attitudes  toward  the  political  system  and  its  various  parts,  and  attitudes 
toward  the  role  of  the  self  in  the  system'  (1989  (1963),  p.  12).  When  discussing  the 
political  culture  of  a  society,  Almond  and  Verba  refer  specifically  to  'the  political 
system  as  internalized  in  the  cognitions,  feelings,  and  evaluations  of  its  population' 
(1989  (1963),  p.  13).  Dennis  Kavanagh  also  employs  these  concepts,  describing  political 
culture  as  'a  short-hand  expression  to  denote  the  emotional  and  attitudinal 
environment  within  which  the  political  system  operates',  later  narrowing  it  down  to 
'orientations  towards  political  objects'  (1972,  pp.  10-11,  emphasis  in  original).  As  further 
explanation,  utilising  the  three  concepts  from  Almond  and  Verba,  Kavanagh 
(Kavanagh,  1972,  p.  11)  writes  that 
Orientations  are  predispositions  to  political  action  and  are  determined  by 
such  factors  as  traditions,  historical  memories,  motives,  norms,  emotions 
and  symbols.  We  can  break  down  these  orientations  into  their  component 
parts  as  follows:  cognitions  (knowledge  and  awareness  of  the  political 
system);  affect  (emotional  disposition  to  the  system);  and  evaluation 
(judgement  about  the  system).  Political  objects  include  such  parts  of  the 
political  system  as  the  executive,  legislature  and  judiciary,  the  political 
parties  and  pressure-groups,  the  individual's  view  of  himself  as  a  political 
actor,  and  his  views  of  other  citizens. 
David  J.  Elkins  and  Richard  E.  B.  Simeon  put  it  slightly  differently,  arguing  that 
political  culture  is  'a  short-hand  expression  for  a  "mind  set"  which  has  the  effect  of 
limiting  attention  to  less  than  the  full  range  of  alternative  behaviours,  problems,  and 
solutions  which  are  logically  possible'  (1979,  p.  128).  Because  individuals  make 
presumptions  they  are  limited  in  the  choices  they  will  entertain  and  the  political 
culture  will  therefore  'predispose  individuals  in  certain  directions'  (1979,  p.  133). 
However,  these  definitions  expose  the  conceptual  difficulty  of  political  culture  in 
explaining  or  predicting  change.  Because  political  culture  predisposes  or  steers 
decisions  in  a  certain  direction,  outcomes  can  be  expected  to  always  remain  fairly 
similar.  Political  culture  therefore  does  not  explain  how  the  desirability  of  particular 
outcomes  may  alter-with  new  ones  replacing  previous  ones.  As  has  been  mentioned 
above,  most  national  parliaments  within  the  EU  have  historically  treated  European 
matters  as  foreign  affairs,  permitting  a  small  group  of  MPs  to  become  specialists  in  this 
area,  in  effect  creating  a  European  'sub-culture'  within  national  parliaments. 
Increasingly,  however,  European  affairs  are  seen  as  a  matter  for  all  MPs  to  incorporate 
into  their  daily  activities. 
145 The  process  of  integrating  European  affairs  into  the  general  activities  of  national 
parliaments  also  highlights  the  problem  associated  with  causality  when  using  political 
culture  as  an  explanatory  variable.  As  political  culture  is  concerned  with  attitudes  and 
orientations,  it  becomes  a  tool  that  contributes  to  our  understanding  of  a  particular 
decision  at  a  particular  time.  It  can  help  explain  specific  political  episodes,  but  does  not 
contribute  significantly  to  an  understanding  of  evolutionary  developments  that  take 
place  over  time.  Elkins  and  Simeon  (1979,  p.  141)  describe  this  characteristic  of  political 
culture  by  including  'stability'  in  their  list  of  system  characteristics  that  may  be  better 
understood  by  employing  the  concept  of  political  culture.  The  cause  of  changes  in 
national  political  institutions  or  procedures  resulting  from  membership  of  the  EU  can 
thus  not  be  explained  with  reference  to  national  political  cultures.  However,  the 
specific  nature  of  changes  may  be  (partially  at  least)  explained  by  the  concept  of 
political  culture  as  attitudes  and  orientations  towards  political  systems  establish 
parameters  within  which  these  can  develop.  As  a  'mediator'  (see  Kavanagh,  1983,  p. 
59)  between  Europeanisation  and  specific  demands  placed  on  scrutiny  procedures, 
political  culture  contributes  to  our  understanding  of  the  specific  institutional  constructs 
that  have  developed  for  the  purposes  of  scrutiny  within  the  EU  member  states. 
A  further  problem  with  political  culture  is  that  it  has  been  used  to  explain  'anything 
and  everything'.  Indeed,  Stephen  Welch  (1993,  p.  159)  writes  that  the  concept  'is  more 
widely  used  than  ever,  and  has  perhaps  reached  the  stage  of  conceptual  maturity, 
where  debates  over  definition  are  no  longer  prominent,  and  it  is  routinely  invoked  as  if 
there  were  no  question  as  to  its  meaning  or  usefulness'.  Kavanagh  (1972,  p.  55)  was 
perhaps  one  of  the  first  to  voice  his  concern,  stating  that  the  political  culture  approach 
has  been  used  to  cover  so  many  disparate  phenomena  that  it  is  easily  used  as  a 
residual  factor'.  ' 
One  of  the  most  recent  criticisms  of  the  historical  use  of  political  culture  comes  in  an 
article  by  Lisa  Wedeen  (2002).  Describing  how  earlier  criticisms  accused  the  approach 
of  having  'tendencies  toward  cultural  essentialism'  and  being  'either  fundamentally 
tautological  or  empirically  invalid',  she  also  blames  these  theorists  of  'having 
responded  to  genuine  explanatory  needs  by  reviving  an  outmoded  and  unhelpful 
understanding  of  the  concept'  (2002,  p.  714).  Partial  explanations  have  been  achieved 
through  the  acknowledgement  and  use  of  ethnographic  research  and  the  use  of 
symbols  although,  mainly  because  of  the  work  of  Clifford  Geertz,  culture  'became  not 
only  what  a  group  has-beliefs,  values,  or  a  symbolic  system-but  what  a  group  is'. 
'  Chapter  six  of  Kavanagh's  book  'Political  Culture  is  thus  entitled  'Problems  and  Shortcomings,  and 
covers  issues  such  as  cause  and  effect,  subcultures,  management  of  micro-,  meso-,  and  macro-levels 
(including  observational  standpoint)  and  links  between  values  and  behaviour  (Kavanagh,  1972,  pp.  55-69). 
146 Moreover,  '[m]ost  political  scientists  continue  to  think  of  culture  as  connoting  fixed 
group  traits'  (Wedeen,  2002,  p.  716).  In  contrast  to  this  approach,  Wedeen  would  like  to 
adopt  a  system  of  analysis  in  which  culture  is  viewed  as  a  set  of  practices  of  'meaning- 
making'  or  'meaning-creation',  by  which  is  meant  'a  social  process  through  which 
people  reproduce  together  the  conditions  of  intelligibility  that  enable  them  to  make 
sense  of  their  worlds'  (Wedeen,  2002,  p.  717). 
For  national  parliamentarians  to  make  sense  of  their  worlds  it  is  increasingly  necessary 
that  they  include  the  European  dimension  in  their  work.  Although  all  EU  national 
parliaments  have  a  committee  with  the  specific  remit  of  following  European  matters, 
such  'ghettoisation  of  European  affairs  is  becoming  recognised  as  unsatisfactory  due 
(partially)  to  the  very  technical  nature  of  European  legislation  (which  makes  it 
necessary  to  draw  on  the  expertise  found  in  other  select  committees).  As  a 
consequence,  national  parliaments  have  been  forced  to  adopt  new  practices  of 
meaning-making  and  -creation.  Scrutiny  of  European  legislation  is  becoming  integral 
to  national  parliamentarians  if  they  wish  to  make  full  sense  of  their  work.  However, 
national  political  cultures  are  still  distinct,  as  evident  in  the  different  ways  national 
parliaments  have  chosen  to  scrutinise  European  legislation.  For  instance,  what  has 
made  Italian  MPs  believe  they  influence  European  legislation  when  passing  the  legge 
comunilaria,  and  what  has  made  them  focus  more  on  the  pre-decision  stage?  What  has 
caused-and  maintains-the  strict  separation  of  work  carried  out  by  the  European 
scrutiny  committee  in  the  House  of  Commons  from  work  by  this  chamber's  other 
committees?  And  why  do  Danish  Ml's  seem  to  readily  accept,  embrace  even,  wider 
parliamentary  involvement  in  European  affairs? 
Perhaps  the  most  important  question  is  whether  convergence  can  be  detected  in  how 
national  parliaments  scrutinise  European  affairs  and  whether  this  can  be  ascribed  to 
the  effects  of  Europeanisation.  The  opposite  question,  whether  differences  are  due  to 
different  political  cultures,  therefore  also  needs  to  be  asked.  With  Europeanisation 
impacting  on  governance,  institutionalisation  and  discourse  (Radaelli,  2004,  pp.  10-4), 
critical  elements  of  national  political  culture  are  affected.  Specific  systems  of 
governance  and  political  institutions  contribute  significantly  to  how  a  nation  (or  at 
least  its  political  elite)  defines  itself,  while  national  discourse  helps  to  explain  and  make 
sense  of  activities  within  these  political  systems  and  institutions.  However,  generally 
held  beliefs  about  national  political  institutions  and  systems  also  help  determine  the 
extent  to  which  changes  in  institutions  and  procedures  can  take  place.  For  example,  the 
sovereignty  of  the  British  Parliament  is  such  an  important  element  of  British  political 
culture  that  it,  presently,  seems  very  unlikely  that  a  single  committee  will  ever  be 
permitted  to  commit  the  entire  House  from  which  it  is  drawn  in  a  manner  similar  to 
147 that  of  the  Danish  EUC.  National  political  cultures  can  thus  be  said  to  limit  the  extent 
to  which  Europeanisation  impacts  on  the  national  level. 
Although  the  impact  has  been  described  as  `fuzzy',  Europeanisation  has  altered  both 
state  policy  and  machinery  (Bulmer  and  Burch,  1998,  pp.  602-3).  Consequently, 
national  parliamentarians  have  been  challenged  by  membership  of  the  Community,  as 
have  their  political  orientations  and  attitudes  towards  the  political  systems  they 
operate  within.  In  order  to  carry  out  their  jobs  adequately,  it  is  no  longer  sufficient 
merely  to  concentrate  on  activities  at  the  national  level.  MPs  from  national  parliaments 
have  therefore,  at  times  reluctantly,  re-evaluated  their  role  within  a  wider  European 
context.  Having  done  so  differently  in  different  countries,  it  may  be  argued  that 
national  political  cultures  can  affect  how  Europeanisation  affects  national  institutions 
and  procedures.  Consequently,  convergence  in  scrutiny  procedures  caused  by 
Europeanisation  should  not  be  considered  a  certainty. 
Wedeen  does  not  see  culture  as  a  set  of  fixed  practices.  Indeed,  she  writes  that  'a 
dialectical  understanding  of  culture  allows  us  to  view  meaning-making  activities  as 
being  both  stable  and  changeable,  not  a  single  system  and  internally  various  and 
conflicted'.  Although  a  requirement  of  intelligibility  is  established,  this  'does  not  imply 
that  linguistic  or  semiotic  meanings  are  stable,  but  it  does  require  at  least  enough 
stability  so  that  what  one  actor  learned  still  applies  when  another  speaks'  (Wedeen, 
2002,  pp.  720  and  722).  Brian  Girvin  has  expressed  a  similar  position  when  stating  that 
a  political  culture  is  'a  shared  pattern  of  beliefs  within  which  there  may  be  many 
subcultures  but  a  common  source  of  values  which  inform  those  beliefs'.  Although  the 
common  values  may  alter,  change  'need  not  endanger  the  long-term  stability  of  a 
political  system  if  a  mechanism  is  available  for  internalizing  change  without 
endangering  the  maintenance  of  core  values'  (Girvin,  1990,  p.  34).  The  implication  of 
both  the  intelligibility  requirement  and  long-term  stability  is  that  parliamentary 
scrutiny  systems  can  be  altered  if  changes  are  undertaken  in  a  manner  consistent  with 
the  overall  national  political  culture.  As  will  become  evident  in  the  case  studies  below, 
this  is  indeed  what  has  tended  to  occur. 
2.  The  case  studies 
Denmark 
It  has  been  said  that  no  (violent)  revolution  would  ever  take  place  in  Denmark  as  the 
Danes  would  want  to  go  home  and  'sleep  on  it'  before  deciding  what  to  do.  Then,  after 
a  sound  night's  sleep,  they  would  discuss  the  issues  in  an  attempt  to  find  a  peaceful 
solution,  rather  than  resort  to  the  extremes  of  (for  example)  the  French  Revolution. 
148 Indicative  of  this  approach  is  Denmark's  transition  to  constitutional  democracy  in  1849 
when  the  then  King,  Frederik  VII,  voluntarily  signed  Denmark's  first  constitution  that 
limited  his  own  influence  and  handed  political  power  to  the  electorate.  This  event  is 
one  example  of  how  political  change  in  Denmark  tends  to  take  place  by  peaceful 
means  through  deliberation  and  discussion.  Openness,  the  involvement  of  as  many 
interested  parties  as  possible  and  broad  debates  have  become  essential  to  the  conduct 
of  every-day  politics  as  well.  Larsen-Jensen  describes  the  Danish  political  system  as  a 
very  'democratic  democracy'  where  the  distance  from  the  top  to  the  bottom  of  society 
is  not  that  great?  A  highly-placed  source  within  the  Danish  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
also  considers  it  'natural'  that  the  Folketing  mandates  Danish  ministers  (and  civil 
servants)  negotiating  at  the  European  level  as  'we  are  a  democracy  that  stretches  quite 
far  in  the  direction  of  folkestyre  and  need  good  control,  also  over  foreign  policy-and  if 
not  with  all  aspects  of  foreign  policy,  then  at  least  European  policy'.  ` 
Direct  participation  by  Danish  citizens  takes  place  at  elections  and  referenda  that  see 
high  levels  of  participation.  Public  participation  in  elections  conducted  using  a 
proportional  electoral  system  ensures  that  the  Folketing  closely  reflects  public  opinion, 
although  the  system  also  tends  to  deliver  somewhat  fragmented  parliaments. 
Fragmentation  has  been  especially  evident  since  the  election  in  December  1973s  when 
several  new  parties  gained  representation  in  the  Folketing  and  has  necessitated  frequent 
(minority)  coalition  governments.  `  It  can  thus  be  argued  that  virtue  and  necessity 
coincide.  While  it  is  necessary  for  Danish  governments  to  cooperate  widely  in  order  to 
pass  policy,  this  also  fits  well  with  the  consultative  political  culture  in  Denmark.  Work 
within  the  Folketing  also  reflects  the  need  for  anchoring  policy  in  public  opinion.  By 
concentrating  their  work  in  committees  that  follow  the  work  of  individual  ministries, 
Danish  parliamentarians  ensure  that  a  broad  range  of  opinions  are  heard  and  are  able 
to  influence  policy-including  foreign  policy,  traditionally  considered  the  domain  of 
the  executive. 
2  Interview  DK-16. 
The  word  'folkestyre'  is  best  translated  by  'democracy'-but  as  in  the  ancient  Greek  interpretation  of 
'government  by  the  people'  or  'people's  democracy'.  Direct  democracy  is,  obviously,  not  practical,  with 
public  participation  in  politics  mainly  taking  place  through  organised  interests'  involvement  in  the 
legislative  process  as  relevant. 
`Interview  DK-17. 
In  the  December  1973  election  Danish  voters  expressed  their  frustration  with  the  established  political 
parties  who  never  seemed  to  fulfil  the  promises  made  during  election  campaigns.  Five  new  parties  were 
elected  to  the  Folketing,  taking  away  60  mandates  (from  a  total  of  179)  from  the  established  five  parties,  but 
not  ousting  any  of  these. 
The  government  is  not  required  to  obtain  a  vote  of  confidence  in  the  Folketing;  it  merely  has  to  ensure 
there  is  no  majority  against  it.  This  negative  investiture  is  found  in  Article  15,  para  2  of  the  Danish 
constitution,  which  states  that  'If  the  Parliament  passes  a  vote  of  no  confidence  in  the  Prime  Minister,  the 
Prime  Minister  shall  ask  [the  King]  to  dismiss  the  Ministry  [of  the  Prime  Minister],  unless  a  general 
election  is  called'  (Folketinget,  2001b). 
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'making  sense'  of  Denmark's  involvement  at  the  European  level.  The  EUC's  ability  to 
mandate  Danish  ministers  can  thus  be  seen  as  an  expression  of  the  belief  that  strong 
control  with  European  legislation  is  necessary  and  best  undertaken  by 
parliamentarians-except  when  fundamental  changes  at  the  European  level  take  place 
in  which  case  referenda  are  called  for.  Larsen-Jensen  argues  that  the  strong 
involvement  of  the  EUC  has  meant  a  co-responsibility  for  European  policy,  while  also 
ensuring  that  'fundamental  changes  to  Danish  EU  policy  do  not  take  place!  However, 
the  historic  isolation  of  EU  matters  within  the  EUC  has  created  a  European  sub-group 
within  the  Folketing  while  day-to-day  politics  contain  little  reference  to  EU  affairs.  This 
aspect  of  the  relationship  between  the  Danish  public  and  their  politicians  is  well 
illustrated  by  the  various  referenda  held  on  EU  issues  in  Denmark  where  support  for 
European  measures  has  been  significantly  higher  amongst  members  of  the  Danish 
elite.  '  A  divide  has  developed  between  an  elite  culture,  and  a  culture  for  the  "common 
voter"'  (Larsen  and  Ugelvik,  1997,  p.  226). 
The  Folketing  is  attempting  to  eradicate  the  internal  divide  by  involving  select 
committees  more  in  the  scrutiny  of  European  affairs,  a  situation  which  has  been 
strongly  supported  in  theory,  '  although  there  have  also  been  problems  in  developing  a 
horizontal  layer  of  scrutiny  within  the  Folketing.  '  However,  Europeanisation  has 
impacted  on  parliamentary  procedures  to  the  extent  that  Danish  parliamentarians  not 
directly  involved  in  the  EUC  are  beginning  to  realise  that  they  too  need  to  be  involved 
in  European  legislative  activities,  and  that  legislation  originating  at  the  European  level 
significantly  determines  the  room  available  for  (legislative)  manoeuvring  at  the 
national  level.  Closer  involvement  of  select  committees  is  thus  developing  and  has 
required  the  allocation  of  further  resources  in  the  form  of  support  staff  dedicated  to 
assisting  select  committees  in  their  work  on  European  affairs.  Moreover,  support  from 
the  administration  has  been  crucial-but  also  possible  due  to  what  Pedersen  describes 
as  an'exceptionally'  strong  democratic  culture  within  the  Danish  administration.  " 
The  overriding  notion  that  (the  people's)  democracy  should  involve  a  strong  element 
of  scrutiny  by  parliamentary  representatives  has  been  a  powerful  factor  in  inducing 
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`  The  first  referenda  on  Community  matters,  whether  to  join  or  not,  was  held  in  1972,  with  63.2  per  cent  of 
those  voting  doing  so  in  favour  of  membership.  In  subsequent  referenda,  support  for  the  Single  European 
Act  (SEA),  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  the  Maastricht  Treaty  with  Edinburgh  exemptions,  the  Amsterdam 
Treaty  and  membership  of  the  euro  has  been  56.2,49.3,56.7,55.1  and  46.9  per  cent  respectively  (Laursen, 
2001,  p.  107).  However,  the  various  treaties  and  measures  have  consistently  been  supported  by 
approximately  80  per  cent  of  parliamentarians. 
9  Expressed  by,  for  instance,  interviewees  DK-3  and  26. 
Reluctance  is  mainly  based  on  the  fact  that  the  significant  amount  of  work  required  does  not  result  in  the 
ability  to  mandate  Danish  ministers  which  remains  the  prerogative  of  the  EUC  in  order  to  ensure  overall 
coordination  of  the  Folkefing's  EU  policy. 
11  Interview  DK-23. 
150 structural  changes  within  the  Folketing  in  response  to  Europeanisation.  By  further 
developing  the  parliamentary  involvement  in  European  affairs,  engagement  in  the 
European  integrative  process  (in  a  manner  conforming  with  the  values  endemic  to 
Danish  political  culture)  has  been  achieved.  Support  for  the  strong  parliamentary 
scrutiny  is  thus  found  amongst  parliamentarians,  in  the  administration  and  by  those 
who  have  had  to  obtain  mandates  from  the  EUC.  Although  varying  degrees  of 
criticisms  were  expressed  with  regard  to  the  Danish  scrutiny  system,  there  have  been 
no  suggestion  from  civil  servants,  ex-ministers  (including  ex-Prime  Minister  Poul 
Nyrup  Rasmussen)  or  speakers  of  the  Folketing  that  the  Folketing's  involvement  in  EU 
affairs  should  be  diminished.  Danish  political  culture,  as  expressed  through  political 
institutions  and  procedures,  has  helped  ensure  that  stability  has  been  maintained. 
Altered  institutional  arrangements  for  scrutiny  of  the  Danish  government's  activities  at 
the  European  level  have  not  threatened,  and  may  indeed  conform  more  closely  with, 
Danish  political  culture. 
Italy 
Unified  only  in  1861,  Italy  has  had  a  much  shorter  period  than  both  Denmark  and  the 
UK  in  which  to  develop  a  national  political  culture.  Since  unification  Mussolini's  fascist 
rule,  Italy's  experience  of  the  Second  World  War  and  the  subsequent  writing  of  a  new 
constitution,  have  all  contributed  to  a  political  environment  where  strong  regional 
affiliations,  an  emphasis  on  single  issues  rather  than  broad  political  doctrine  and  a 
widespread  lack  of  trust  have  developed.  One  of  the  few  occurrences  of  Italians  joining 
forces  in  order  to  achieve  one  particular  outcome  took  place  during  Mussolini's  reign. 
His  attempt  to  politicise  Italians  failed,  as  the  majority  of  Italians  remained 
unsympathetic  to  fascism.  However,  Richard  Griffin  (1997,  pp.  144)  points  out  that 
'[t]he  supreme  paradox  of  Mussolini's  attempt  to  make  Italians  was  that  it  did  finally 
have  the  effect  of  launching  a  powerful  movement  of  national  solidarity  -  one  aimed  at 
destroying  fascism  for  ever'. 
Subsequent  to  the  overthrow  of  fascism,  a  new  constitution  was  drawn  up.  The  new 
constitution  explicitly  mentioned  a  democratic  foundation  for  the  new  republic  in 
Article  I,  vesting  sovereignty  with  the  people  (Republic  of  Italy,  2002).  According  to 
Senator  Manzella,  the  Italian  constitution  was  the  first  in  the  world  to  permit  the 
relinquishing  of  sovereignty.  "  Article  11  thus  renounces  war  as  a  way  to  settle 
`2  Interview  1-9. 
151 international  conflicts  while  also  permitting  the  ceding  of  sovereignty,  "  and  can  be 
seen  as  yet  another  expression  of  political  experiences  gained  during  Italy's  earlier 
history.  However,  the  willingness  to  cede  sovereignty  may  also  have  other  origins.  It 
may  well  be  argued  that  limited  identification  with  the  Italian  state  and  nation,  and  the 
seemingly  stronger  connection  with  the  regional  level,  has  meant  that  no  real  affinity  is 
felt  for  the  Italian  nation  or  state.  Umberto  Melotti  thus  writes  about  Italian  political 
culture  that  'the  first  trait  to  single  out  is  its  concept  of  the  nation,  which  is  weak  and 
even  ambiguous'.  Moreover,  'the  national  sentiment,  according  to  the  latest  research,  is 
far  weaker  than  in  any  other  European  countries'  (2000,  pp.  7  and  8). 
The  continued  importance  of  regional  affiliations  is  well  demonstrated  in  the  support 
for  regionally  based  political  parties  such  as  Lega  Nord  (Northern  League).  Politicians 
with  an  interest  in  European  affairs  therefore  have  a  significant  task  in  bridging  the 
gap  between  the  local  and  European  stages,  a  task  that  is  made  more  difficult  due  to 
the  Italian  Parliament's  focus  on  legislation  rather  than  scrutiny  and  oversight.  " 
According  to  a  member  of  staff  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  'there  is  a  difficulty  with 
imagining  the  effect  of  future  legislation.  "  Although  the  domestic  impact  of  European 
legislation  being  investigated  by  European  committee  staff  (with  dossiers  distributed 
to  all  select  committees),  Italian  parliamentarians  generally  appear  remarkably 
unconcerned  with  European  legislation.  It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  Italian  political 
culture  is  focused  mainly  on  the  national  level,  and  that  the  importance  of  considering 
European  legislation  (prior  to  decisions  being  made  at  the  European  level)  is  not 
commonly  recognised. 
Despite  the  Italian  Parliament's  relative  institutional  strength,  several  factors  have 
contributed  to  a  situation  where  Community  matters  are  often  not  scrutinised  in  any 
significant  way.  Firstly,  Italy's  motivation  for  joining  the  European  Community  was 
political  in  nature  rather  than  economic.  Membership  was  seen  as  recognition  of  Italy's 
new  and  developing  democracy  (Pasquino,  1996,  p.  160),  and  although  the 
Communists  were  initially  opposed  to  membership  it  gradually  became  a  'non-issue' 
(Bindi  Callusi  and  Grasse,  2001,  p.  297).  Italian  politicians  and  citizens  were  thus,  in 
contrast  to  both  the  UK  and  Denmark,  in  agreement  over  membership  of  the  EU,  with 
neither  inter-  nor  intra-party  disagreements  on  the  issue.  Although  the  number  of 
"  Article  11  states  that  'Italy  rejects  war  as  an  instrument  of  aggression  against  the  freedom  of  other 
peoples  and  as  a  means  for  the  settlement  of  international  disputes.  Italy  agrees,  on  conditions  of  equality 
with  other  States,  to  the  limitations  of  sovereignty  that  may  be  necessary  to  a  world  order  ensuring  peace 
and  justice  among  the  Nations.  Italy  promotes  and  encourages  international  organisations  having  such 
ends'  (Republic  of  Italy,  2002). 
It  The  importance  placed  on  legislation  within  the  Italian  parliament  is  well  illustrated  by  the  chair  of  the 
EU  committee  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  who  declared  that  `I  think  the  European  Parliament  must  make 
law.  Today  the  European  Parliament  cannot  make  law,  so  it  is  a  strange  parliament.  A  parliament  makes 
law!  '  (Interview  I-13). 
15  Interview  I-11. 
152 Italians  who  see  EU  membership  as  a  good  thing  has  declined  over  the  years,  as  has 
the  number  of  Italians  who  believe  Italy  has  benefited  from  membership,  Italians  have 
still  recorded  some  of  the  most  positive  feelings  towards  the  EU,  traditionally  well 
above  the  EU  average  (European  Commission,  2003,  p.  42).  '° 
Secondly,  a  parliamentary  tradition  focusing  on  legislation,  rather  than  oversight  and 
scrutiny,  has  developed.  Although  both  parliamentarians  and  parliamentary  staff 
involved  in  European  affairs  are  aware  that  the  Parliament's  influence  post-decision  is 
limited,  the  traditions  embedded  in  Italian  political  culture  are  powerful,  making  it 
difficult  to  change  attitudes  developed  over  a  long  period.  This  ties  in  with  the  third 
explanation,  which  is  the  lack  of  direct  (political)  benefits  to  be  obtained  from  the 
European  level.  As  local  links  and  contacts  are  vitally  important  for  Italian  politicians, 
this  is  naturally  where  their  efforts  are  concentrated,  with  the  consequence  that  EU 
seems  'a  long  way  away'  without  much  relevance  to  everyday  political  life. 
Italian  Parliamentary  involvement  in  Community  affairs  is,  accordingly,  mainly 
limited  to  the  annual  legge  comunitaria  (see  Chapter  five).  Although  this  annual  bill 
permits  Parliament  to  legislate  on  European  matters,  it  does  not  provide  the 
Parliament  with  any  influence  over  European  legislation.  The  general  treatment  of 
Community  matters  within  Italy  can  thus  be  described  as  very  relaxed,  even 
characterised  by  a  certain  laissez  faire  attitude  in  Parliament,  the  executive  and  the 
administration.  The  Italian  parliament,  despite  having  been  a  member  of  the 
Community  right  from  the  outset,  is  the  weakest  in  terms  of  influence  on  Community 
legislation,  of  the  three  parliaments  examined.  This  is  despite  signs  (including  the 
establishment  of  a  department  of  European  affairs,  an  upgrading  of  the  Giunta  to  a 
select  committee  and  increased  numbers  of  hearings  in  both  Chambers)  that  things  are 
slowly  changing. 
Owing,  perhaps,  to  Italy's  complex  political  history  and  many  unpleasant  memories 
and  consequences  of  both  the  Fascist  period  and  the  First  Republic,  it  has  been  argued 
that  Italian  political  culture  'has  been  the  subject  of  very  few  studies.  The  theme  itself 
seems  to  have  become  a  sort  of  taboo,  perhaps  because  of  the  Fascist  ideological 
exploitation  of  the  Italian  national  idiosyncrasies'  (Melotti,  2000,  pp.  6-7).  The 
predisposition  to  international  cooperation  (expressed  through  Article  11  of  the 
constitution),  a  strong  focus  on  the  local  level  and  a  parliamentary  unwillingness  to 
engage  in  scrutiny  are  all  factors  that  have  influenced  how  Italian  MPs  have 
incorporated  European  matters  into  their  daily  work.  However,  it  appears  that 
15  Eurobarometer  figures  cover  the  years  1981  -  present  for  the  question  of  support  for  European  Union 
membership  and  the  years  1984  -  present  for  the  question  of  whether  Italy  has  benefited  from 
membership. 
153 institutional  practices  (altered  in  response  to  Europeanisation)  have  been  less  of  a 
hindrance  to  greater  parliamentary  involvement  in  European  affairs  than  have  general 
and  cultural  attitudes  towards  Europe.  Both  parliamentary  chambers  have  exhibited 
(institutional)  flexibility  in  the  way  they  involve  themselves  in  European  affairs,  an 
indication  that,  due  to  the  relative  youth  of  the  Italian  state  and  political  system,  there 
may  be  more  of  a  willingness  to  change  practices  and  institutional  habits.  "  Indeed, 
with  the  Senate's  new  14`h  Committee  on  European  affairs  (see  Chapter  five)  tying  all 
of  the  select  committees  together  by  making  dual  membership  a  requirement,  the 
Italian  Senate  is,  in  a  clear  departure  from  traditional  procedures,  the  chamber  with  the 
strongest  institutionalised  cooperation  on  scrutiny  of  European  affairs.  However,  it 
remains  difficult  to  interest  MPs  in  European  work,  a  sign  that  Community  issues  still 
do  not  contribute  significantly  to  the  meaning-creation  of  politics  at  the  national  level. 
United  Kingdom 
Europeanisation  has  also  been  a  significant  challenge  in  the  UK  where  no  written, 
codified  constitution  exists  that  may  provide  guidance  in  its  relationship  with  the  EU. 
Various  texts,  conventions  and  institutions  together  provide  the  UK  with  a 
'constitution',  creating  a  very  unique  political  environment  for  politicians  to  operate 
within.  Although  the  UK  has  always  been  a  country  with  extensive  international  links, 
the  fact  that  it  is  an  island  has  also  contributed  to  British  national  culture  and  self- 
image. 
British  identity,  the  factors  that  put  flesh  on  the  bones  of  'Britishness',  have  historically 
(see  Eatwell,  1997,  pp.  52-3)  been  considered  to  consist  of  Protestantism,  a  belief  in  the 
superiority  of  the  British  Parliament  (a  symbol  of  liberty),  demonisation  of  the  'other' 
(especially  France),  identification  with  moderate  and  pragmatic  thinking  and 
association  with  trade  and  prosperity.  Almond  and  Verba  (1989  (1963))  identified 
similar  traits  in  the  British  society  emphasising  homogeneity,  consensus  and  deference. 
However,  Roger  Eatwell  (1997)  argues  that  these  identifiers  have  lost  most  of  their 
relevance.  British  homogeneity  has  thus  obviously  decreased  with  the  process  of 
devolution,  while  the  UK  has  also  become  more  multi-ethnic.  "  Socialisation  (of  a  less 
authoritarian  and  more  inclusive  variety)  saw  deference  becoming  a  'more  marginal 
feature'  (Eatwell,  1997,  p.  64)  of  British  culture.  Meanwhile,  inter-party  divisions  on 
issues  such  as  fox  hunting  and  the  war  on  Iraq  have  shown  that  consensus  is  not 
"  Discussing  the  regional  level,  Robert  D.  Putnam  describes  how  politics  have  been  transformed  by  the 
establishment  of  regional  governments,  teaching  councillors  the  virtues  of  patience  and  practicality  and 
reasonableness  (Putnam,  1993,  p.  38). 
is  Although  the  proportion  of  ethnic  minorities  in  terms  of  population  may  still  be  relatively  small  (7.9  per 
cent  in  the  2001  census),  the  existence  (and  electoral  success)  of  the  British  National  Party  together  with  a 
focus  on  terrorism  which  is  strongly  related  to  Islam,  helps  give  the  impression  that  the  proportion  of 
ethnic  minorities  is  greater  and  that  it  is  causing  problems  for  Britain  and  British  identity. 
154 necessarily  a  defining  characteristic  of  British  politics  any  longer-although 
membership  of  he  EU  is  perhaps  the  best  illustration  of  this  point. 
What  has  remained  as  one  of  the  most  fundamental  components  of  Britain's  political 
culture  is  the  sovereign  Parliament.  However,  the  notion  that  Parliament  is  'the 
supreme,  and  indeed  only,  law-making  body  in  the  UK'  (Pilkinton,  2001,  p.  78)  has 
been  challenged  by  Britain's  membership  of  the  EU.  The  initial  Treaty  of  Accession 
signed  in  1972  was  a  'massive'  breach  of  constitutional  convention,  as  the  then 
government  'tacitly  accepted  as  part  of  British  law  some  forty-three  volumes  of 
European  legislation 
...  that  became  binding  upon  the  peoples  of  the  United  Kingdom, 
despite  that  law  never  having  been  scrutinised  or  debated  by  the  British  parliament' 
(Pilkinton,  2001,  p.  78).  It  can  be  argued  that  because  Parliament  had  to  ratify  the 
Accession  Treaty,  it  has  not  ceded  sovereignty  unknowingly.  Indeed,  Andrew  Geddes 
writes  that  'by  ratifying  the  accession  Treaty  that  took  Britain  into  the  EC  then  it  is 
possible  to  say  that  the  British  Parliament  self-limited  its  sovereign  authority  because  in 
some  areas  supranational  institutions  such  as  the  council  of  Ministers  and  the 
Commission  make  laws'  (Geddes,  2004,  p.  39,  emphasis  added).  Despite  the  self- 
limitation  on  its  powers,  the  British  parliament  has  remained  a  starting  point  for  other 
characteristics  of  British  politics  such  as  respect  for  the  rule  of  law  and  pragmatism. 
Respect  for  the  rule  of  law  is  evident  in  the  importance  placed  on  debate  within  both 
the  House  of  Commons  and  the  House  of  Lords  and-to  a  lesser  extent-on  scrutiny  of 
legislation.  The  sovereignty  of  Parliament  is  reflected  in  the  fact  that  no  individual  or 
committee  can  act  on  behalf  of  or  commit  a  Chamber.  As  a  consequence,  debates  have 
traditionally  been  considered  the  most  important  feature  of  parliamentary  work,  with 
committees  only  developing  relatively  late  in  the  Parliament's  history.  "  In  this  respect 
the  UK  Parliament  therefore  differs  significantly  from  both  the  Danish  and  Italian 
parliaments  where  committees  are  relatively  more  influential. 
Since  the  1990s,  however,  a  new  focus  on  pre-legislative  scrutiny  has  emerged  (for  an 
overview  see  Kelly  et.  al  (2003)).  In  this  context  the  House  of  Commons'  Select 
Committee  on  Modernisation  (first  appointed  in  June  1997)  has  thus  published  several 
reports  for  consultation  as  well  as  a  reform  programme.  "  In  its  'First  Report'  from 
February  2002,  the  Modernisation  committee  published  a  list  of  11  recommendations  to 
select  committees,  one  of  which  is  'to  conduct  pre-legislative  scrutiny  of  draft  bills' 
79  Select  Committees  are,  however,  considered  increasingly  important,  with  debates  in  the  Chamber 
described  as  'I  wont  say  useless,  but  on  many  cases  it  is  little  more  than  a  cabaret  or  low  drama. 
... 
Most 
of  the  time  what  happens  in  the  chamber  is  extremely  perfunctory,  and  does  not  amount  to  anything  like 
groper  scrutiny'  (Interview  UK  7). 
For  a  full  list  of  reports  see  the  cDmmittee  s  website: 
http:  //www.  parliamenLuk/parliamentarycommittees/select  committee  on  modernisation  of  the  hau 
se  of  commons/selectcommittee_on  modernisation  of  Nhe  house  of_commons  reports  and_publicati 
ons.  cfm 
155 (House  of  Commons,  2002b,  para.  34).  Pre-decision  scrutiny  of  European  legislation 
has  taken  place  since  the  UK  became  a  member  of  the  EU.  The  powers  of  the  ESC  are 
thus,  according  to  Carter,  'in  keeping  with  UK  Constitutional  tradition',  but,  being  ex 
ante,  rather  than  ex  post  potentially  more  influential  (2001,  p.  440).  This  point  has  also 
been  raised  by  Parliament  itself.  In  a  report  on  the  legislative  process  in  the  House  of 
Commons  from  the  Chairmen's  Panel,  a  hope  is  expressed  that  'the  present  system  - 
which  contrasts  so  unfavourably  with  the  arrangements  for  debating  European 
legislation  -  will  be  replaced  at  the  earliest  opportunity'  (House  of  Commons,  1998a, 
para  29).  However,  it  has  also  been  indicated  that  the  European  Scrutiny  Committee 
'lacks  the  formal  power  to  serve  as  anything  more  than  a  filter'  (Millar,  1979,  p.  195), 
thereby  questioning  the  extent  to  which  it  can  be  considered  more  effective  than  other 
select  committees  within  the  House  of  Commons. 
While  select  committees  are  considering  alterations  to  their  procedures,  they  have  done 
so  for  domestic  reasons  and  are  yet  to  establish  methods  for  cooperation  amongst 
themselves  and  with  the  ESC.  To  date,  committees  (including  the  ESC)  have  worked 
autonomously,  with  joint  reports  or  committees  being  the  exception  rather  than  the 
rule.  This  approach  to  scrutiny  appears  particularly,  and  increasingly,  anachronistic 
when  it  comes  to  dealing  with  European  affairs.  As  the  integration  process  has 
developed  to  cover  more  and  more  areas  of  policy  traditionally  considered  domestic 
policy,  select  committees  find  themselves  including  a  European  angle  when  preparing 
reports.  Furthermore,  the  ESC  has  found  that  it  is  increasingly  important  to  establish 
the  domestic  impact  of  European  legislation,  something  that  is  often  difficult  to  do 
without  the  expertise  found  in  select  committees.  As  a  result  of  the  separation,  the 
British  Parliament  too  has  developed  a  sub-culture  of  parliamentarians  who  are 
particularly  knowledgeable  on  the  EU  developing. 
It  is  yet  to  be  established  whether  European  scrutiny  is  developing  together  with  or 
separately  from  Parliament's  scrutiny  of  domestic  legislation.  It  seems  certain, 
however,  that  changes  to  select  committee  procedures  have  been  initiated  from  the 
domestic  level,  although  the  extent  to  which  Europeanisation  has  had  an  impact  on  the 
particulars  of  suggested  changes  is  difficult  to  assess.  Scrutiny  conducted  ex  ante  in 
select  committees  certainly  appears  to  have  become  more  acceptable  despite  it  being  a 
significant  departure  from  traditional  culture  within  the  British  Parliament,  making  it 
difficult  to  ascertain  how  far  select  committees  may  be'permitted'  to  develop. 
As  one  of  the  enduring  expressions  of  British  political  culture,  the  British  Parliament  is 
facing  a  significant  challenge  in  European  legislation.  While  the  British  administration 
has  proven  adept  at  gradually  adapting  to  membership  of  the  EU,  the  UK  Parliament 
has  had  more  difficulties.  In  order  to  adequately  conduct  scrutiny  it  may  therefore 
156 have  to  re-examine  fundamental  aspects  of  its  operational  environment.  The  interplay 
between  Europeanisation  and  British  political  culture  is  difficult  to  assess  with 
certainty  as  cause  and  effect  are  hard  to  establish  with  precision.  What  can  be 
ascertained  with  confidence  is  that  membership  of  the  EU  has  forced  the  two  European 
committees-in  a  novel  development-to  undertake  pre-decision  scrutiny.  It  has  taken 
close  to  30  years  for  select  committees  to  consider  and  accept  the  benefits  of  this 
method  of  scrutiny.  It  thus  appears  that  British  political  culture  is  more  resistant  to 
change  than  those  of  either  Denmark  or  Italy,  making  Europeanisation  a  generally 
more  daunting  challenge  for  the  British  parliament  and  the  UK  in  general. 
Conclusion 
National  parliaments  could  (initially)  allow  themselves  to  think  of  Community  affairs 
as  foreign  policy  because  of  the  Luxembourg  Compromise:  if  a  proposed  policy  was 
considered  unsatisfactory-and  important  enough-it  could  be  vetoed  in  the  Council. 
As  such,  European  legislation  was  considered  distinct  from  domestic  legislation. 
Despite  this  difference,  scrutiny  procedures  developed  from  existing  procedures  for 
dealing  with  domestic  legislation  (the  UK  parliament  being  an  exception). 
Parliamentary  institutional  structures  for  Community  affairs  were  thus  very  similar  to 
those  for  foreign  affairs:  specialised  committees  were  established  whose  members 
became  experts  on  the  topic  but  did  not  involve  parliament  in  any  significant  way 
beyond  that.  The  consequence  of  this  was  the  development  of  subcultures  with 
specialists  on  EU  affairs,  leaving  little  need  for  the  wider  political  culture  to  adapt  to 
membership  of  the  EU.  As  membership  is  increasingly  felt  across  all  policy  areas,  it  has 
become  recognised  that  members  of  EU  committees  need  the  expertise  of  other 
specialist  MPs  to  assess  the  impact  of  European  legislation. 
With  the  initial  involvement  by  national  parliaments  in  European  legislation,  the 
building  blocks  for  greater  involvement  were  laid.  As  a  consequence,  it  became  easier 
to  expand  the  parliamentary  role  at  a  stage  when  politicians  began  to  acknowledge  the 
significant  impact  Community  matters  has  on  the  framework  within  which  domestic 
policy  is  carried  out.  The  emerging  broader  parliamentary  involvement  has  therefore 
challenged  national  political  cultures  and  forced  the  development  of  scrutiny 
procedures.  Plenary  debates,  a  potential  method  for  greater  involvement  of  national 
parliamentarians  and  especially  important  in  the  UK,  have  occurred  only  rarely  in  all 
three  case  studies,  with  debates  generally  limited  to  significant  issues  such  as 
ratification  of  new  treaties. 
The  inherent  contradiction  in  Community  legislation  (is  it  domestic  policy  or  is  it 
foreign  policy?  )  is  important  to  bear  in  mind.  At  present  it  is  neither-or  rather  both.  It 
157 is  domestic  policy  because  it  is  being  implemented  at  and  affects  the  national  level. 
European  legislation  is  being  transposed  into  national  legislation,  has  direct  effect  in 
the  EU  member  states,  and  can  therefore  be  considered  national  legislation. 
Community  legislation  is  not,  however,  negotiated  or  finally  decided  at  the  national 
level  by  nationally  elected  parliamentarians  in  national  parliaments.  It  is  still 
negotiated  between  government  representatives  at  the  European  level,  increasingly  in 
cooperation  with  the  European  Parliament,  and  can  therefore-also-be  considered 
foreign  policy.  While  all  member  state  parliaments  have  realised  this,  it  is  also  evident 
that  their  responses  have  varied. 
To  date,  developments  in  scrutiny  procedures  have  been  relatively  country  and  time 
specific,  although  nowhere  has  the  entire  parliament  been  involved  in  scrutiny. 
European  issues  have  generally  been  left  to  the  care  of  a  small  sub-group  of 
parliamentarians.  As  a  consequence,  sub-cultures  have  developed  with  specialised 
expertise  on  the  EU  and  which  parliamentarians,  government  representatives,  civil 
servants  and  certain  members  of  the  national  elite  inhabit.  European  affairs  have 
therefore  not  become  an  integral  element  of  overarching  political  cultures. 
Wedeen's  emphasis  on  meaning-creation  thus  becomes  relevant,  as  EU  membership  is 
made  meaningful  by  adapting  to  demands  made  on  the  country's  domestic  structures 
and  procedures  (including  scrutiny  procedures)  in  a  manner  that  `makes  sense'  to 
national  political  actors-a  process  that,  in  effect,  amounts  to  Europeanisation.  A 
country's  specific  reasons  and  prerequisites  for  membership,  as  well  as  the 
consequences  of  membership  (including  parliamentary  involvement  in  the  procedures 
for  European  legislation),  only  make  sense  when  incorporated  into  already  existing 
practices  and  political  cultures.  Europeanisation  affects  political  cultures,  practices  and 
institutions,  but  the  limits  imposed  by  national  political  cultures  ensure  that  overall 
stability  is  maintained.  Changes  prompted  by  Europeanisation  have  at  times  been  slow 
and  reluctant,  which  may  be  because  the  wider  political  culture,  not  just  the 
parliamentary  environment,  has  been  affected.  It  may  well  be  that  it  has  been  more 
acceptable  for  parliaments  to  respond  to  changes  in  the  national  political  environment 
rather  than  feel  they  are  responding  directly  to  events  at  the  European  level  (events  in 
the  UK  seem  to  illustrate  this  point). 
Although  national  parliaments  have  acted  independently  of  one  another  when 
responding  to  Europeanisation  (resulting  in  a  wide  range  of  scrutiny  systems,  see 
Chapter  three),  convergence  can  still  be  detected  in  the  common  trend  towards  the 
broad  involvement  of  increasing  numbers  of  parliamentarians  in  European  affairs. 
Within  the  three  parliaments  studied,  convergent  developments  have  come  from 
different  directions.  In  Denmark  and  Italy  greater  involvement  by  select  committees 
158 has  been  driven  by  the  European  committees,  while  in  the  UK  it  has  more  been  a  case 
of  committees  other  than  the  EU  committees  increasingly  including  a  European  angle 
in  their  work.  This  development  has  been  most  evident  in  the  House  of  Lords,  but  is 
also  taking  place  within  the  House  of  Commons.  The  overall  trend  therefore,  in  all 
three  case  studies,  is  for  wider  inclusion  of  parliamentarians  in  the  consideration  of 
European  legislation-or  at  the  very  least  an  increasing  awareness  of  how  legislation 
from  the  European  level  impacts  on  domestic  legislation. 
However,  significant  challenges  for  national  political  cultures  in  relation  to  the 
European  level  remain.  As  European  integration  is  increasingly  driven  by  decisions 
taken  by  QMV,  it  is  no  longer  possible  for  individual  national  parliaments  to  veto 
decisions  taken  at  the  European  level  (assuming  that  parliaments  have  been  invested 
with  this  power).  As  a  result  of  the  inability  to  ultimately  control  their  national 
executives'  actions  at  the  European  level,  national  parliaments  have  also  had  to 
develop  a  certain  degree  of  inter-parliamentary  cooperation.  National  parliaments 
have  traditionally  been  very  autonomous  actors.  Having  to  cooperate  with  other 
parliaments  in  order  to  carry  out  their  work  effectively  has  consequently  presented 
(further)  great  challenges.  As  will  become  evident  in  the  next  chapter,  the  development 
of  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  has  been  hampered  by  significant  difficulties, 
producing  little  besides  non-binding  declarations,  and  with  (usually  small)  steps 
towards  further  cooperation  all  driven  by  national  parliaments  themselves. 
The  extent  to  which  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  will  succeed  may  well  depend  on 
how  far  national  political  cultures  evolve  in  the  direction  of  a  'permissive  consensus' 
that  allows  longstanding  parliamentary  traditions  to  adjust  to  Europeanisation.  In 
Italy,  the  willingness  to  cooperate  at  the  international  level  is  substantial,  owing  mainly 
to  past  political  experiences  and  ideological  motives  behind  Community  membership. 
In  the  Danish  Folkeling  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  is  similarly  considered  in  a 
positive  light  if  it  can  further  aid  the  process  of  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  European 
legislation.  In  Britain,  however,  European-level  cooperation  is  considered  more 
problematic,  mainly  due  to  the  sharp  divisions  between  committees  within  the  House 
of  Commons,  and  the  inability  of  any  one  parliamentary  committee  to  commit  the 
entire  House  from  which  it  is  drawn.  However,  it  can  still  be  argued  that  the  EU  is 
increasingly  given  meaning  and  made  understandable  in  similar  ways  throughout 
national  parliaments  even  if  differences  in  national  political  cultures  clearly  still  exist 
and  continue  to  impact  on  scrutiny  procedures  as  well  as  parliaments'  willingness  to 
undertake  collective  activities. 
One  reason  why  parliamentarians  may  have  different  views  on  their  parliament's  role 
in  European  affairs  is  the  shift  from  European  integration  to  Europeanisation.  As  was 
159 indicated  in  Chapter  one  the  two  concepts  are  related  but  separate,  as  'European 
integration  leaves  national  identity  and  political  culture  by  and  large  untouched,  while 
Europeanisation  involves  mutation  of  national  identity  and  political  culture.  '  (de  Beus 
and  Mak,  2003,  p.  2).  Citizens  in  EU  member  states  may  also  begin  to  feel  the  effects  of 
Europeanisation  if  parliamentarians,  as  a  part  of  their  daily  work,  increasingly  engage 
in  dialogue  about  Europe  as  part  of  everyday  political  discourse.  Because  the  European 
dimension  is  becoming  more  important  as  a  determinant  of  domestic  policy, 
Europeanisation  can  only  be  expected  to  increasingly  impact  on  citizens  as  well. 
Membership  of  the  EU  has  placed  national  political  cultures  under  pressure.  As 
European  legislation  and  activities  influence  parliamentary  activities  at  the  domestic 
level,  national  parliaments  may  appear  to  have  fewer  ways  in  which  to  justify  their 
existence.  However,  the  new  European  level  of  political  activity  can  still  not  be 
considered  a  polity  in  its  own  right,  and  is  therefore  reliant  on  indirect  legitimacy, 
essentially  provided  by  national  parliaments  through  their  support  for  their 
executives'  activities  at  the  European  level.  To  provide  such  legitimacy,  national 
parliaments  must  involve  themselves  in  European  legislation  as  effectively  as  they  can. 
Due  to  the  vibrancy  of  decision-making  structures  at  the  European  level,  national 
parliaments  have  increasingly  become  aware  that  they  must  cooperate,  amongst 
themselves  and  with  the  EP,  in  order  to  influence  European  decisions  better.  Such 
inter-parliamentary  cooperation  has  posed  yet  further  challenges  to  parliaments,  and 
will  be  discussed  in  the  next  chapter. 
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We  must  now  come  to  the  balance  sheet  of  the  'European  experiment.  '  The 
most  visible  aspect  is  the  survival  of  the  nations. 
(Hoffmann,  1966,  p.  889) 
In  recent  years  national  parliaments  have  gained  an  ever-greater  prominence  in  the 
discussion  of  Europe's  future.  National-level  support  for  decisions  made  in  the  Council 
are  necessary  for  these  decisions  to  be  legitimate  (for  a  discussion  on  international 
parliamentary  cooperation  in  general  see  Slaughter,  2004,  Chapter  three).  The  lack  of 
national-level  support  contributes  to  the  'double  democratic  deficit'  (Lodge,  1996a,  p. 
190)  and  has  supported  the  notion  that  the  democratic  deficit  cannot  be  eradicated  by 
parliamentarisation  at  the  European  level  alone.  It  has  become  recognised  that  national 
level  actors,  especially  national  parliaments,  must  become  involved  in  European 
matters-at  both  the  national  and  European  levels. 
The  Maastricht  Treaty  thus  (in  attached  Declarations  13  and  14)  'encourages  greater 
involvement  of  national  parliament  in  the  activities  of  the  European  Union'  and 
provides  for  the  possibility  of  holding  Assizes.  '  Furthermore,  the  Nice  treaty,  in  its 
outline  of  what  the  2003  IGC  would  consider,  specifically  mentions  the  role  of  national 
parliaments,  as  did  the  2001  Laeken  Declaration.  While  only  one  Assize  has  ever  been 
held,  it  can  be  argued  that  the  role  it  was  intended  to  fulfill  has  instead  been  borne  out 
through  the  participation  of  national  parliamentarians  in  the  Convention  on  the  Future 
of  Europe. 
The  third  stage  of  Norton's  outline  of  national  parliamentary  involvement  at  the 
European  level  is  currently  taking  place  (see  Norton,  1996b).  This  stage  sees  national 
parliaments  as  integral  to  addressing  the  democratic  deficit'  However,  simply  because 
there  is  agreement  on  the  fact  that  national  parliaments  are  important  to  European 
democracy  does  not  equate  to  agreement  on  the  most  appropriate  way(s)  for  national 
parliaments  to  contribute  to  the  development  of  Europe.  Table  8.1  is  adapted  from  a 
submission  Norton  made  to  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European  Union 
The  Assize  was  a  conference  where  the  participants  were  members  from  the  EP  and  EU  member  state 
parliaments. 
The  first  stage  is  (by  Norton)  characterised  as  having  no  parliamentary  involvement-and  no  desire  on 
behalf  of  national  parliaments  to  be  involved  in  European  affairs,  while  the  second  stage  sees  adaptation 
and  strengthening  of  parliamentary  procedures  to  accommodate  European  affairs.  Paradoxically  the  first 
stage  coincides  with  the  time  where  MEPs  were  seconded  from  national  parliaments,  whereas  the  second 
stage,  in  many  cases  prompted  by  the  SEA,  only  begins  to  develop  after  this  direct  link  has  been  broken. 
161 (House  of  Lords  Select  Committee  on  the  European  Union,  2001,  p.  15),  outlining  the 
main  options  that  have  been  or  are  being  discussed  by  national  parliaments. 
Table  8.1:  Involvement  by  national  parliaments  in  European  affairs 
Advisory  Formal  Powers 
Individually  Better  supply  of  information  Mandating  Ministers 
Scrutiny  committees 
Offices  in  Brussels 
Scrutiny  reserve 
Nominating  members  of  Commission 
Collectively  Greater  role  of  Assizes 
Greater  role  of  COSAC 
Conference  of  speakers 
Consultation  process 
Powers  for  Assizes 
Powers  for  COSAC 
Second  chamber 
Joint  committees  with  EP 
In  theory,  the  main  options  for  national  parliaments  are  thus  to  act  individually  or 
collectively,  in  either  an  advisory  or  formal  capacity.  However,  in  reality,  not  all  of 
these  options  are  open  to  all  parliaments  and  indeed  may  not  be  suitable.  Using  the 
above  table  as  a  starting-point,  this  chapter  investigates  the  collective  options  for 
national  parliaments  that  have  been  explored  by  national  parliamentarians  in  the  past 
or  are  currently  under  consideration.  This  includes  the  Assize  (which  was  held  in  1990 
and  has  never  been  repeated)  and  the  Conference  of  Speakers  of  European 
Parliaments,  although  the  main  focus  of  the  chapter  will  be  on  the  Conventions  and 
(especially)  the  Conference  of  Community  and  European  Affairs  Committees  of 
Parliaments  of  the  European  Union  (COSAC). 
COSAC  has  traditionally  been  considered  a  `talking  shop',  with  no  ability  to  take 
decisions  or  contribute  significantly  to  debates  on  European  integration.  While 
decisions  are  still  not  binding  on  anybody,  the  very  focused  debate  on  the  role  of 
national  parliaments  in  the  European  integration  process  that  has  taken  place  since 
2000  has  forced  national  parliamentarians  to  consider  their  own  role  with  regard  to 
scrutiny  of  European  legislation.  Moreover,  debates  on  specialised  COSAC  meetings 
could  mean  a  significant  leap  for  inter-parliamentary  cooperation.  Not  only  do 
specialised  COSAC  meetings  provide  MPs  with  an  opportunity  to  discuss  policy  in  a 
European  context,  they  also  demonstrate  to  European  governments  that  national 
parliaments  have  become  an  integral  part  of  the  European  legislative  process.  This 
involvement  was  further  underlined  by  national  parliamentary  involvement  in  the 
Conventions  (and  thereby  in  preparatory  work  for  the  2003  IGC),  making  it 
inconceivable  that  national  parliamentarians  would  be  excluded  from  similar  treaty- 
162 writing  or  -amending  work  in  the  future.  However,  as  the  Assize  was  one  of  the  first 
forums  in  which  national  parliamentarians  met,  this  is  where  the  chapter  will  start. 
I.  The  Assize 
The  Assize  was  originally  proposed  by  the  then  French  President  Francois  Mitterrand, 
who  argued  that  national  parliaments  should  become  more  involved  in  the 
development  of  Europe  and  its  governing  institutions.  Held  over  the  last  four  days  of 
November  1990  and  hosted  by  the  Italian  Camera  dei  Deputati,  the  Assize  had  as  its 
theme  the  future  of  the  Community;  the  implications,  for  the  Community  and  the 
Member  States,  of  the  proposals  concerning  Economic  and  Monetary  Union  and 
Political  Union  and,  more  particularly,  the  role  of  the  national  parliaments  and  of  the 
European  Parliament'  (European  Parliament,  2000c). 
The  context  for  the  Assize  is  important  to  fully  understand  the  results-as  well  as  why 
it  was  held  and  how  it  was  conducted.  In  the  late  1980s,  significant  parts  of  Europe 
(especially  to  the  Community's  south  and  east)  were  in  turmoil,  the  European 
Economic  Area  had  been  conceptualised  and  Austria  had  applied  for  membership  of 
the  Community  (Westlake,  1996,  p.  171).  'Eurosclerosis,  as  experienced  in  the  1970s 
and  early  1980s  was  a  thing  of  the  past,  and  the  Community  was  developing  at  a 
significant  pace,  with  the  IGCs  preceding  the  Maastricht  Treaty  due  to  commence  in 
December  1990.  Europe  seemed  on  the  move,  and  the  potential  impact  on  national 
parliaments  was  significant.  National  parliamentarians  realised  that  the  involvement  of 
parliaments,  national  as  well  as  the  European  Parliament,  was  necessary  to  legitimise 
deepened  integration,  but  were  also  uncertain  about  how  to  respond  to  these 
developments.  Their  uncertainties  were  evident  in  the  convening  of  the  conference  as 
well  as  the  concluding  documents. 
Formally  the  title  of  the  Assize  was  'Conference  of  the  Parliaments  of  the  European 
Community',  with  the  actual  convening  of  the  conference  left  ambiguous.  The 
ambiguity  was  wholly  intentional,  with  most  parliaments  believing  the  conference  to 
be  "'self-convened"  by  all  the  parliaments  collectively'  (Corbett,  1998,  p.  297).  Details 
for  the  event  were  discussed  at  COSAC,  although  the  majority  of  preparations  were 
carried  out  by  Presidents  of  the  participating  parliaments  (Corbett,  2002).  Mitterrand's 
proposal  to  discuss  the  Community's  future,  based  on  his  interest  in  involving  national 
parliaments  in  the  development  of  the  Community  and  its  institutions,  initially  met 
with  scepticism  on  the  part  of  the  EP.  However,  the  EP  soon  realised  that  'if  it  wished 
to  lessen  any  "threat"  from  national  parliaments,  it  would  be  best  advised  to  take  in  its 
charge  the  organisation  of  the  Assises'(Corbett,  2002).  It  thus  proceeded  to  shape  the 
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preparation  for  the  IGCs  [resulting  in  the  TEU]'  (Corbett,  1998,  p.  296). 
Delegates  to  the  conference  were  members  of  European  parliaments  (173  in  total)  and 
the  EP  (85).  At  the  outset  of  the  conference,  delegations  from  each  parliament  were 
seated  together,  the  EP's  delegation  sitting  in  the  centre  of  the  chamber  with  its 
delegates  grouped  according  to  political  affiliation.  However,  in  the  first  session  of  the 
Assize,  a  vote  was  passed  for  all  delegates  to  sit  according  to  political  affiliation,  a 
move  some  delegates  found  contrary  to  their  interests  as  national  representatives  and 
an  attempt  by  the  EP  to  'hijack'  the  event.  While  the  EP  successfully  produced  a  forum 
where  its  ways  of  conducting  business  were  dominant,  national  delegations  (especially 
the  British  and  French)  were  'less  enamoured  with  the  experience  and  the  outcome  of 
the  Assises'  (Westlake,  1996,  p.  171).  This  feeling  may  have  been  furthered  by  the  fact 
that  the  political  groupings  held  meetings  around  the  sittings  of  the  Assize  where 
facilities  were  provided  by  the  secretariats  of  the  political  groups  in  the  EP. 
Furthermore,  'the  core  of  MEPs  within  each  grouping,  having  the  best  international 
contacts  and,  frequently,  the  best  linguistic  skills,  were  often  among  the  key  actors  in 
such  meetings'  (Corbett,  2002).  Each  of  the  participating  parliaments  (but  not  all 
chambers)  delivered  written  submissions,  with  the  EP's  submission  being  its  proposed 
amendments  to  the  TEU.  The  final  declaration,  although  adopted  by  a  majority  of  the 
delegates  (150  to  13),  was  remarkably  similar  to  the  EP's  submission,  'echoing  all  of  the 
European  parliament's  main  proposals  for  treaty  revision'  (Corbett  et  al.,  2000,  p.  300): 
The  declaration  endorsed  the  objective  of  remodeling  the  community  into  a 
European  Union  on  a  federal  basis  and  backed  a  single  currency  governed 
by  an  autonomous  central  banking  system,  taking  the  view  that  this 
required  stronger  instruments  of  economic  and  social  cohesion.  It 
supported  the  incorporation  of  the  [European  Political  Cooperation]  in  to 
the  Community  structures  and  the  inclusion  of  European  citizenship  and 
fundamental  rights  in  the  Treaties.  It  backed  extension  in  Community 
competences  in  the  social  and  cultural  fields,  and  also  endorsed  the  EP  's 
institutional  requests  concerning  co-decision  on  legislation,  appointment 
and  term  of  office  of  the  Commission,  right  of  initiative,  scrutiny  powers 
and  assent  procedure  for  Treaty  modification.  It  called  for  the  EP  and  the 
national  parliaments  to  prepare  a  constitution,  with  the  Commission 
becoming  the  executive  and  Parliament  and  Council  exercising  legislative 
and  budgetary  functions. 
Provisions  for  further  Assizes  were  written  into  the  TEU,  but  the  experiment  has  never 
been  repeated.  Although  not  all  participants  were  satisfied  with  the  Assize,  it  at  least 
brought  an  understanding  that  interparliamentary  relations  could  be  useful  and  would 
have  to  be  developed  further  if  parliaments  were  to  participate  actively  in  the  shaping 
of  European  integration.  It  was  also  realised,  however,  that  the  Assize  might  not  be  the 
best  forum  for  such  co-operation.  One  chamber,  the  British  House  of  Commons, 
declared  its  preference  for  `a  series  of  bilateral  contacts  between  the  European 
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parliaments'  pre-legislative  role'  (cited  in  Westlake,  1996,  p.  172).  This  well  illustrates 
how  national  parliaments  still  considered  European  affairs  as  foreign  policy  and 
therefore  not  a  matter  for  parliaments  as  institutions.  National  parliamentarians  did 
not  appear,  at  this  stage,  to  be  prepared  to  engage  in  European  matters  on  a  party- 
political  basis,  instead  preferring  an  institutions-based  approach.  The  preference  for 
national  and  institutional  representation  was  satisfied  with  COSAC,  another  forum  for 
inter-parliamentary  cooperation,  which  had  already  begun  to  operate  and  permitted 
national  parliaments  to  regain  the  initiative  in  inter-parliamentary  cooperation. 
2.  COSAC 
The  Conference  of  Community  and  European  Affairs  Committees  of  Parliaments  of  the 
European  Union  (usually  known  by  its  French  acronym  COSAC),  is  a  bi-annual  event 
that,  since  1989,  has  been  hosted  by  the  parliament  whose  country  holds  the  EU 
Presidency.  Delegations  from  national  parliaments  consist  of  members  of 
parliamentary  committees  dealing  with  Community  issues  together  with  civil  servants 
responsible  for  Community  affairs.  The  EP  delegation  usually  includes  at  least  one  of 
the  two  Vice-Presidents  responsible  for  relations  with  national  parliaments. 
Although  a  wide  range  of  issues  is  discussed,  COSAC's  main  aim  remains  as  stated  in 
the  1996  Dublin  conclusion  (2000d):  'National  Parliaments  have  their  own  role  to  play 
[within  the  European  Union]  to  strengthen  democracy  and  improve  the  efficiency  of 
the  Union.  COSAC,  through  its  work,  will  give  a  high  priority  to  the  pursuit  of  these 
aims'.  The  move  to  write  COSAC  into  the  Amsterdam  Treaty  in  1999  was  seen  as 
strengthening  national  parliaments  whose  role  in  and  contribution  to  the  Union 
thereby  would  become  better  recognised. 
The  task  of  COSAC  is  two-fold,  with  representatives  from  participating  parliaments 
having  agreed  to  a)  intensify  the  exchange  of  information;  and  b)  meet  twice  a  year  to 
discuss  issues  of  common  concern  (European  Parliament,  2000a).  Over  time,  the 
agenda  of  COSAC  meetings  has  developed  to  focus  mainly  on  institutional  questions 
and  matters  relating  to  particular  policy  areas.  However,  as  COSAC  has  traditionally 
been  perceived  as  a  forum  for  the  exchange  of  information,  no  binding  decisions  are 
taken.  Concluding  'contributions'  are  addressed  to  EU  institutions,  but  'shall  in  no  way 
bind  national  parliaments  or  prejudge  their  positions'  (COSAC,  2003c). 
In  a  process  that  began  at  the  Lisbon  COSAC  meeting  in  May  2000,  the  conference  has 
refocused  its  attention  on  the  role  of  national  parliaments  in  the  European  context.  The 
Lisbon  debate  on  interparliamentary  co-operation  was  relatively  short,  consisting 
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to  national  parliaments  and  the  EP  prior  to  the  Conference.  In  the  results  MEPs 
predictably  confirmed  that  their  links  with  national  level  politics  were  stronger 
through  their  political  parties  than  through  institutional  contacts  such  as  committees  of 
scrutiny.  The  fact  that  national  political  parties  elect  candidates  for  the  EP  was  revealed 
as  an  important  factor  in  interparliamentary  relations,  with  party  links  one  of  the  most 
important  means  of  contact  between  the  two  levels  of  parliament'  In  the  report,  the 
rapport  cur  also  reiterated  that  national  parliaments  are  vital  to  the  European  integration 
process,  and  the  possibility  of  COSAC  emerging  as  the  embryo  of  a  new  European 
parliamentary  chamber  was  (again)  aired.  The  important  issue  of  relations  between 
national  parliaments  and  the  EP  was  thus  raised.  COSAC  meetings  have  aided  this 
relationship  by  serving  as  a  formal  forum  where  MPs  and  MEPs-who  have  a  complex 
relationship  which  at  times  has  been  more  acrimonious  than  co-operative-can  meet  to 
discuss  their  different  contributions  to  the  European  integration  process. 
Both  MPs  and  MEPs  consider  the  meeting  of  the  two  levels  important.  While  MPs 
mainly  emphasise  what  they  can  learn  from  other  national  parliaments,  MEPs  tend  to 
place  more  importance  on  the  mutual  benefits  of  networking,  learning  about  respective 
as  well  as  mutual  concerns,  and  working  collectively  as  parliaments,  not  as  opponents 
from  different  levels  of  governance.  `  COSAC  has  been  described  as  a  good  opportunity 
for  sharing  of  information,  although  the  inability  to  take  binding  decisions,  and  the 
only  recently  revoked  requirement  for  unanimity  has  also  attracted  a  certain  amount  of 
ridicule  with  some  MEPs  and  MPs  describing  it  as  a  'talking  shop'  of  little  consequence. 
Parliamentarians  differ  somewhat  with  regard  to  how  they  envisage  COSAC's  future 
development.  MEPs  see  the  exchange  of  information  as  an  appropriate  function  for 
COSAC,  with  no  need  for  further  decision-making  bodies  at  the  European  level,  ' 
whereas  many  national-level  parliamentarians  would  like  to  see  COSAC  develop  and 
strengthen  further.  Italian  politicians  and  civil  servants  have  thus  floated  the  idea  of 
developing  COSAC  into  an  institution  in  which  national  parliamentarians  met  to 
ensure  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  was  upheld  in  European  legislation.  '  Danish  MPs 
have  also  discussed  this  idea,  but  have  been  more  supportive  of  the  development  of 
new,  specialised,  COSAC's,  each  with  a  remit  roughly  corresponding  to  that  of  select 
committees  within  national  parliaments.  '  Specialised  COSAC  meetings  were  seen  as 
3  The  last  paragraph  of  the  conclusion  from  the  Lisbon  COSAC  stated  that  '(i]n  the  absence  of  a  public 
European  domain,  MEPs  are  elected  from  national  parties,  although  they  represent  all  the  interests  of 
European  citizens.  MEPs  and  national  deputies  are  therefore  not  competitors,  but  rather  partners,  acting 
only  at  different  levels  of  representation'  (COSAC,  2000b). 
`  Interview  B-2. 
For  instance  interviews  B-2,5  and  6. 
`  For  instance  interviews  1-4,13  and  14. 
7  For  instance  interviews  DK-1,13,16  and  30. 
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committees  about  European-level  activities  within  their  policy  area,  while  also 
permitting  debates  on  how  other  parliaments  are  handling  scrutiny  of  these  issues.  The 
overall  effect  might  be  a  reduction  of  the  perceived  difference  between  European  and 
domestic  legislation  and,  consequently,  an  improvement  in  national-level  scrutiny. 
The  concept  of  COSAC  as  a  second-or  as  some  see  it,  a  third-European  chamber  has 
also  been  discussed  at  COSAC  meetings.  '  Debate  on  transforming  COSAC  into  a 
legislative  chamber  was  a  significant  feature  of  discussion  on  the  role  of  national 
parliaments  in  European  affairs  that  continued  at  the  October  2000  Versailles  COSAC. 
Again  the  debate  was  based  on  a  questionnaire  circulated  prior  to  the  conference.  In 
the  main,  delegates  were  opposed  to  the  idea  of  developing  COSAC  into  a  second 
chamber,  citing  issues  such  as  increased  complexity  in  decision-making  procedures 
and  operational  issues  (one  argument  was  that  delegates  to  such  a  chamber  would 
primarily  be  concerned  with  domestic  issues,  especially  at  times  of  national  elections 
which  do  not  all  occur  at  the  same  time).  It  was  also  pointed  out  that  a  second  chamber 
was  not  necessarily  the  best  method  for  achieving  increased  contact  between  national 
parliaments.  Instead,  the  challenge  was  to  'reach  a  better  interconnection  between  the 
European  Parliament  and  the  national  parliaments  in  order  to  make  European 
construction  more  democratic'.  Furthermore,  it  was  argued  that  national  parliaments 
'must  express  the  aspirations  and  concerns  of  peoples.  For  that  purpose,  and  to  help 
European  citizens  to  better  understand  what  is  at  stake,  it  is  essential  that  [national 
parliaments]  have  easier  access  to  the  decisions  that  are  taken'  (Mr  Antonio  Nazare- 
Pereira  (Portugal)  COSAC,  2000a,  p.  49).  The  final  text  adopted  by  the  Versailles 
COSAC  contained  two  elements  specifically  relating  to  national  parliaments  in  the 
European  arena:  firstly,  it  mentioned  the  'useful'  procedure  used  in  negotiating  the 
Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and,  secondly,  outlined  three  issues  for  inclusion  in  the 
IGC  then  underway.  '  However,  the  final  contribution  also  recalled  that  'no  provision  of 
this  protocol  can  jeopardise  the  competences  and  prerogatives  of  each  national 
Parliament  as  provided  by  its  national  constitutional  arrangements'  (COSAC,  2000c), 
thereby  limiting  its  potential  impact. 
By  the  time  of  the  Versailles  COSAC  meeting,  the  role  of  national  parliaments  was  not 
just  a  matter  for  inter-parliamentary  discussion,  but  had  become  an  important 
component  of  the  European  agenda.  The  COSAC  meeting  held  in  Copenhagen  in 
*  Opponents  of  a  second  chamber  often  talk  of  it  as  a  third  chamber,  arguing  that  the  Council  and  the  EP, 
in  effect,  make  up  two  legislative  chambers  at  the  European  level.  The  term  'second  chamber'  will, 
however,  refer  to  a  second  chamber  consisting  of  parliamentarians. 
'  The  three  issues  covered  early  transmission  of  documents  and  proposals  from  the  Commission  to 
national  parliaments;  an  increased  period  for  consideration  of  issues  to  be  applied  under  title  V  of  the 
TEU;  and  a  minimum  period  of  time  between  final  reading  of  a  text  by  COREPER  and  the  Council 
decision. 
167 October  2002  reflected  this  development,  being  devoted  solely  to  discussion  on  the  role 
of  national  parliaments.  At  this  meeting  a  multi-pronged  reform  programme  for 
COSAC  was  begun  (COSAC,  2002c).  The  reform  programme  included  a  move  away 
from  unanimity  when  adopting  the  final  contribution  of  COSAC  meetings  and  the 
establishment  of  a  common  secretariat  for  COSAC,  while  also  mooting  closer  co- 
operation  with  EU  institutions.  A  working  group  was  established  to  further  consider 
eight  issues  of  significance  to  COSAC: 
0a  code  of  conduct; 
"  new  voting  rules; 
"  establishment  of  a  secretariat; 
"  further  interparliamentary  cooperation  and  networking; 
"  COSAC's  work  on  subsidiarity  and  proportionality; 
"a  new  name; 
"  cooperation  between  various  bodies  at  the  European  and  national  levels  and 
"  cooperation  between  EUs  institutions  (COSAC,  2002a). 
Although  COSAC  for  a  long  time  had  the  option  of  setting  up  working  groups,  they 
have  only  been  used  infrequently.  It  was  thus  significant  in  itself  that  a  working  group 
was  trusted  with  the  examination  of  the  issues  detailed  above.  At  previous  COSAC 
meetings  concerns  had  been  voiced  about  the  establishment  of  working  groups,  mainly 
expressing  fears  that  such  a  move  would  institutionalise  COSAC  in  an  undesirable 
manner.  At  the  Copenhagen  meeting,  such  fears  had  largely  been  replaced  by  a  feeling 
that  to  take  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  further,  the  establishment  of  a  secretariat 
and  sectoral  COSACs  might  be  necessary.  Furthermore,  it  was  thought  that  initial 
discussions  on  how  to  develop  COSAC  were  best  undertaken  in  a  smaller  working 
group,  rather  than  in  the  full  plenary  of  a  COSAC  meeting. 
COSAC  is  one  of  the  few  collective  forums  where  national  parliamentarians  can 
discuss  their  own  role  in  the  European  integration  process.  However,  as  it  cannot  make 
any  firm  and  binding  recommendations  to  anybody,  COSAC  is  still  hampered  in  its 
7D  Author's  own  notes  from  COSAC  meetings.  The  results  of  the  working  group's  deliberations  were 
discussed  at  the  COSAC  meeting  held  in  Athens,  May  2003.  New  rules  of  procedure  were  adopted 
allowing  for  contributions  to  be  passed  with  a  75  per  cent  majority  of  votes  cast  (which  must  also 
constitute  at  least  half  of  all  votes,  with  each  voting  delegation  having  two  votes)  (COSAC,  2003c,  Art.  10.5 
and  10.6).  Furthermore,  it  was  decided  to  establish  a  common  Brussels-based  secretariat  before  the  end  of 
2003  (COSAC,  2003d).  A  further  element  in  the  reform  of  COSAC  was  the  publication  of  the  'Copenhagen 
Parliamentary  Guidelines'  in  the  Official  Journal  of  the  Union,  C  Series,  on  2  July  2003.  These  guidelines 
were  presented  as  entirely  voluntary,  but  set  out  'instructive  minimum  standards'  for  relations  between 
governments  and  parliaments  on  Community  issues  (COSAC,  2003b).  Included  in  the  guidelines  were 
desirable  standards  on  the  quantity  and  quality  of  information,  the  timing  of  information  exchange  and 
the  opportunities  for  national  parliaments  to  influence  Community  policy.  Gisela  Stuart  (chair  of  Working 
Group  4  at  the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe),  tabled  an  amendment  to  the  Convention's  draft 
treaty,  wanting  to  include  the  Copenhagen  guidelines  in  the  text.  The  issue  had  not  been  debated  in  the 
working  group,  and  did  not  gain  the  necessary  support. 
168 effectiveness.  The  most  significant  outcome  of  COSAC  conferences  may  therefore  be  an 
increased  understanding  of  the  work  members  of  different  national  parliament 
perform  on  European  matters,  as  well  as  of  problems  common  to  them  all.  Such 
understanding  is,  however,  as  much  a  result  of  informal  discussions  and  contacts  as 
formal  discussions  during  conference  debates.  While  the  above  developments  may 
seem  small  and  relatively  insignificant,  the  establishment  of  a  secretariat  still 
represents  a  substantial  deepening  of  co-operation  between  national  parliaments. 
Moreover,  the  development  of  desirable  minimum  standards  for  relations  between 
parliaments  and  government  has  shown  that  collective  activities  can  affect  events  at 
the  national  level.  Over  a  prolonged  period,  COSAC  has  thus  prompted 
parliamentarians  from  national  parliaments  to  consider  procedures  regulating  their 
own  involvement  in  European  affairs. 
The  involvement  in  COSAC  has,  however,  been  limited  to  politicians  directly  involved 
with  European  committees,  and  has  thus  reinforced  the  false,  and  increasingly 
impossible,  separation  of  European  and  domestic  affairs.  While  members  of  standing 
committees  other  than  European  committees  do  conduct  meetings  at  the  European 
level,  such  contacts  have  not  been  institutionalised  to  the  same  extent  as  has  that  of 
European  committees  through  COSAC.  COSAC  delegates,  however,  have  recognised 
the  problem,  and  'task  d'  of  the  Copenhagen  working  group  therefore  included  an 
examination  of  how  sectoral  select  committees  might  develop  meetings  similar  to 
COSAC  meetings.  The  report  from  the  working  group  highlights  that  meetings 
between  select  committees  already  take  place,  but  that  it  would  be  'possible  to  achieve 
even  better  results  and  form  a  more  general  view  of  the  efforts  of  the  parliaments  if  this 
cooperation  were  coordinated  with  the  work  in  COSAC.  COSAC  could  support  such  a 
development  by  making  itself  available  as  a  supporting  structure  for  the  sectoral 
standing  committees  of  the  parliaments'  (COSAC,  2002b). 
While  members  of  select  committees  have  been  reluctant  to  include  the  European 
dimension  in  their  work  (and  the  increased  workload  this  would  bring),  European 
committees  in  national  parliaments  are  slowly  accepting  that,  to  scrutinise  European 
legislation  properly,  they  need  the  cooperation  of  other  select  committees  in  their 
parliaments.  However,  there  are  also  country-  and  sector-specific  differences.  The  areas 
most  influenced  by  European  cooperation,  such  as  agriculture  or  environmental 
affairs,  are  thus  the  areas  that  show  the  most  activity  with  regard  to  co-operation  and 
meetings  at  the  European  level.  David  Curry,  chair  of  the  Environment,  Food  and 
Rural  Affairs  Committee  in  the  House  of  Commons  2001-3,  thus  indicated  that  it 
would  be  useful  to  him  if  the  chair  and  deputy  chair  of  committees  with  a  similar  remit 
met  to  discuss  topics  of  mutual  concern.  He  also,  however,  emphasised  that  the 
169 number  of  participants  would  have  to  be  limited  and  discussion  kept  to  general  issues, 
with  no  binding  decisions  to  be  taken.  " 
Politicians  involved  in  areas  less  directly  influenced  by  decisions  taken  at  the  European 
level,  such  as  social  matters,  see  less  of  a  need  for  contact  with  other  committees 
working  with  a  similar  remit.  Members  of  these  committees  also  express  more 
concerns  about  the  time  such  activities  will  require  and  the  need  to  avoid  further 
institutions  at  the  European  level.  This  opinion  was,  for  instance,  expressed  by  Tove 
Videbwk  (chair  of  the  Social  Affairs  Committee  in  the  Danish  Folketing  2001  -  2005), 
who  believed  one  annual  meeting  at  the  European  level  to  be  more  than  sufficient  for 
discussing  affairs  covered  by  her  committee's  remit.  Videba'k  was  also  concerned  that 
European-level  activities  would  take  up  too  much  time  compared  to  domestic  work.  " 
Although  national  parliamentarians  accept  that  inter-parliamentarian  cooperation  may 
be  of  benefit  to  their  work  at  the  national  level,  their  comments  also  reveal  that  the 
distinction  between  national  and  European  affairs  remains  strong.  Participants  at 
current  COSAC  meetings  may  have  benefited  in  their  own  work  from  the  COSAC 
meetings  and  therefore  be  able  to  see  the  potential  benefits  in  sectoral  COSAC-like 
meetings.  However,  they  may  also  find  it  difficult  to  persuade  their  colleagues  in 
national  parliaments  to  undertake  the  work  required  in  making  such  meetings  work. 
A  further  area  in  which  COSAC  has  been  active  in  recent  years  are  the  Conventions 
convened  to  draw  up  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  and  the  Convention  on  the 
Future  of  Europe.  COSAC  has  consistently  supported  the  work  of  both  the 
Conventions,  as  well  as  the  way  in  which  national  parliamentarians  have  been 
involved.  Conclusions  from  various  COSAC  meetings  are  evidence  of  this,  with  the 
Rome  meeting  in  2003  being  no  exception.  In  this  conclusion  the  first  point  states  that 
COSAC  '[w]elcomes  the  results  of  the  Convention  and  recognises  the  historical 
importance  of  the  Convention  as  a  method  enabling  parliaments  to  contribute  to  the 
definition  of  the  draft  treaty  establishing  a  Constitution  for  Europe  before  approval  by 
the  IGC  and  ratification  by  National  Parliaments.  '  It  goes  on  to  state  that  the  text 
produced  by  the  Convention  'represents  a  fundamental  step  forward  for  the  European 
construction  and  should  be  the  basis  for  the  IGC  conclusions',  but  also  calls  for  'a  loser 
coordination  between  parliaments  in  the  European  debate'  (COSAC,  2003a).  While 
COSAC  thus  sees  a  role  for  itself  within  the  European  architecture,  it  also  recognises 
that  national  parliaments  must  continue  to  work  individually  at  the  national  level,  as 
well  as  in  other  forums  such  as  the  Conventions,  which  will  be  examined  in  the  next 
section. 
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170 3.  The  Conventions 
Apart  from  the  Assize,  the  first  opportunity  for  members  of  national  parliaments  to 
participate  directly  in  decision-making  procedures  at  the  European  level  was  at  the 
Convention  convened  to  draw  up  the  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights  of  the  European 
Union.  "  Although  this  Charter  was  not  initially  granted  legal  status,  it  quickly  became 
an  important  document  in  European  legal  practice,  with  the  ECJ  referring  to  it 
repeatedly  in  its  first  years  of  existence  (Menendez,  2002). 
At  the  time  of  the  first  Convention,  the  involvement  of  MPs  at  the  European  level  was 
very  much  an  experiment.  The  Charter  was  not  expected  to  be  granted  legal  status  and 
the  participation  of  national  parliamentarians  thus  did  not  intervene  in 
intergovernmental  work.  It  was  still,  however,  the  first  time  parliaments,  including  the 
European  Parliament,  were  directly  involved  in  a  process  to  draw  up  text  which  could, 
conceivably,  end  up  as  part  of  the  Community  treaties.  While  it  was  becoming 
increasingly  difficult  for  European  governments  to  exclude  the  EP  from  matters  of 
significant  importance,  a  Danish  official  claimed  that  many  questioned  the  fact  that 
national  parliaments  were  included.  "  According  to  this  source,  some  argued  that 
national  parliaments  were  represented  by  national  governments  and  thus  did  not  need 
to  be  directly  represented.  However,  the  same  source  also  pointed  out  that  national 
parliaments  are  often  more  used  to  criticising  than  to  proactive  and  positive 
engagement.  The  Convention  was  thus  a  chance  for  national  parliaments  to  become 
directly  involved  and  therefore  also,  ultimately,  co-responsible  for  the  outcome. 
The  second  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  also  involved  national 
parliamentarians,  giving  them  co-ownership  of  the  final  result.  However,  at  the  IGC 
following  the  second  Convention  (described  as  a  'second  round',  see  below)  no 
parliamentarians,  from  either  the  national  or  European  level,  were  present.  Instead, 
government  representatives,  behind  closed  doors,  renegotiated  the  openly  agreed 
document,  which  the  Convention  delivered,  causing  scepticism  to  develop  about  the 
sincerity  with  which  they  supported  the  openness  of  the  Convention  method.  Such 
impressions  were  not  helped  when  Giuliano  Amato,  vice-chairman  of  the  second 
Convention,  stated  that  'I  told  myself  that  they  [national  governments]  are  only  this 
positive  because  they  know  there  is  a  second  round  [an  IGC],  they're  not  convinced 
supporters',  while  Ifligo  Mendez  de  Vigo,  the  EP's  observer  at  the  2003  IGC  fumed  that 
they  [national  governments]  are  going  to  destroy  our  work'  (Nielsen,  2003,  author's 
translation).  Government  representatives  may  not  have  re-opened  a  majority  of  the 
"  This  Convention  held  its  constituent  meeting  in  December  1999  and  adopted  its  draft  text  in  October 
2000. 
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171 articles  in  the  Convention  text,  but  the  relative  importance  of  the  topics  renegotiated 
during  the  IGC  left  little  doubt  as  to  who  the  final  decision-takers  were.  " 
The  situation  at  the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe  was  significantly  different  to 
the  first  Convention.  Because  the  second  Convention  'only'  delivered 
recommendations  to  the  IGC  following  the  Convention,  MPs  were  still  not  active  in  an 
area  previously  the  domain  of  national  governments-but  they  were  actively  involved 
in  deliberating  on  and  making  proposals  for  the  future  direction  of  the  European 
integration  process.  Because  of  the  potential  impact  of  the  second  Convention,  it  was 
perhaps  even  more  important  for  national  parliaments  to  be  represented  here  than  at 
the  first.  Not  only  had  they  become  an  important  part  of  the  European  agenda,  they 
were  also  beginning  to  realise  that,  as  pointed  out  by  the  Danish  government 
representative,  the  relationships  and  divisions  of  power  between  institutions  can  rarely 
be  read  directly  from  the  text  of  a  treaty.  Instead,  they  develop  over  time  (a  good 
example  of  this  is  the  development  of  the  EP's  powers),  making  it  important  for 
national  parliaments  to  be  part  of  this  process.  "  By  participating  in  both  Conventions, 
but  perhaps  especially  the  second,  national  parliamentarians  achieved  a  significant 
step  in  this  direction.  Being  able  to  influence  the  draft  treaty  directly,  and  having  to 
ratify  the  final  outcome  of  the  2003  IGC,  gave  MPs  the  opportunity  to  assemble  an 
overview  (institutionally  at  least)  of  the  process,  something  they  have  often  found 
difficult  to  achieve  with  previous  treaty  negotiations-or  indeed  European  legislation. 
At  the  second  Convention,  national  parliamentarians  again  made  up  a  plurality  of  the 
participants,  "  although  this  time  they  were  also  part  of  the  agenda,  with  Working 
Group  IV  (chaired  by  British  MP  Gisela  Stuart)  dealing  specifically  with  the  role  of 
national  parliaments.  Other  working  groups  dealing  with  the  topic  of  national 
parliaments  were  Working  Group  I  (examining  the  application  of  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity)  and  Working  Group  X  (on  freedom,  security  and  justice).  "  Especially 
Working  Group  I  had  overlapping  issues  with  Working  Group  IV,  to  the  extent  that 
they  held  a  joint  meeting  discussing  these.  Moreover,  their  contributions  to  the  final 
draft  treaty  (protocols  on  the  application  of  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and 
proportionality,  and  on  the  role  of  national  parliaments  in  the  European  Union 
respectively)  were  also  examined  together  in  the  plenary  session  taking  place  on  17 
On  institutional  matters  participants  in  the  IGC  especially  debated  the  structure  of  the  Council,  with  its 
formation,  the  rotation  of  the  presidency,  its  size  and  how  votes  were  weighted  were  the  thorniest  issues. 
A  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  also  caused  much  discussion,  while  contentious  areas  of  policy  were  mainly 
those  of  defence  and  the  finances  and  budget  of  the  EU. 
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"  The  102  members  consisted  of  15  representatives  of  heads  of  state  or  government  from  member  states,  13 
heads  of  state  or  government  from  applicant  states,  30  representatives  from  parliaments  in  member  states, 
26  representatives  from  parliaments  in  applicant  states,  16  representatives  from  the  European  Parliament 
and  two  representatives  from  the  European  Commission. 
is  See  Francesco  Rizzuto  (2003)  for  a  more  detailed  description  of  how  these  two  working  groups  dealt 
with  the  issue  of  national  parliaments. 
172 and  18  March  2003  in  order  to  give  delegates  a  better  overview  of  the  issues,  as  they  are 
so  closely  related  (The  European  Convention  Secretariat,  2003b). 
In  the  mandate  set  out  for  Working  Group  IV  by  its  Chair,  three  areas  were  identified 
for  the  group's  attention  (The  European  Convention  Working  Group  IV,  2002b,  p.  6): 
i)  the  consideration  of  existing  scrutiny  and  consultation  mechanisms  of  national 
parliaments  at  national  level,  with  a  view  to  drawing  attention  to  those  systems 
which  work  best 
ü}  examination  of  those  aspects  of  legislative  procedures  and  working  practices  at 
European  level  which  may  create  difficulties  for  national  parliaments  attempting 
to  carry  out  effective  scrutiny  of  their  governments'  activities 
iii)  reflection  on  the  role  we  believe  national  parliaments  could/should  play  [and] 
identification  and  evaluation  of  the  different  means  by  which  we  enable 
parliaments  to  fulfill  this  role  in  the  future  by  examining  the  proposals  made  by 
Convention  members  and  others  for  formal  and/or  informal  involvement  of 
national  parliament  at  European  level. 
Although  the  group  took  evidence  on  the  performance  of  scrutiny  systems  within 
several  of  the  member  states,  the  topic  of  which  systems  work  better  did  not  contribute 
significantly  to  the  final  report  (see  The  European  Convention  Working  Group  IV, 
2002a,  section  III).  However,  information  gained  through  submissions  on  national-level 
scrutiny  systems  gave  rise  to  the  highest  number  of  recommendations  (10  from  a  total 
of  19,  spread  over  4  sections).  Despite  the  list  of  recommendations,  it  is  still  stated  in 
the  final  report  that  'it  would  not  be  appropriate  to  prescribe  at  European  level  how  the 
scrutiny  should  be  organised'  (The  European  Convention  Working  Group  IV,  2002a,  p. 
3).  This  statement  reflects  a  general  unwillingness  on  behalf  of  national 
parliamentarians  to  be  tied  by  decisions  (when  these  relate  to  their  own  activities) 
taken  at  the  European  level.  The  importance  attached  to  being  independent  actors  at 
the  national  level  was  similar  to  that  expressed  at  COSAC  meetings,  reaffirming 
national  parliaments  as  both  national  and  independent  actors. 
During  the  Convention  on  fundamental  rights  it  was  claimed  that  the  behaviour  of 
MPs  fell  into  three  categories:  they  either  showed  no  interest  in  the  work  of  the 
Convention,  shielded  behind  their  government  representatives  whom  they  believed  to 
represent  their  views  anyway,  or  spent  so  much  time  talking  at  meetings  that 
everybody  became  fed  up  with  them.  "  While  it  has  been  suggested  that  parliamentary 
and  government  representatives  from  the  same  countries  often  followed  the  same  line 
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173 of  argument  in  the  second  Convention  too,  20  MPs  still  distinguished  themselves  from 
other  representatives  by  having  regular  meetings  on  their  own,  while  also  meeting 
with  the  Presidium  as  a  separate  group.  Indeed,  Norman  claims  that  the  political 
'families'  were  used  'as  a  conduit  for  transferring  know-how  and  back-up  resources 
from  the  well  organised  and  well  endowed  European  parliamentarians  to  their  like- 
minded  but  less  well  resourced  colleagues  from  the  national  capitals'  and  that 
'Giscard's  consensus  was  based  on  a  coalition  of  parliamentarians'  (2003,  pp.  325  and 
338). 
However,  interparliamentary  cooperation  at  the  European  level  is  still  considered  to  be 
useful  and  COSAC  was  mentioned  in  Working  Group  IV's  final  report  as  a  vehicle  for 
further  exchange  of  information  and  experience.  The  possibility  of  expanding  COSAC's 
role  to  sectoral  select  committees  from  national  parliaments  was  also  mentioned,  but 
the  Working  Group  stopped  short  of  recommending  that  COSAC  be  developed  into  a 
forum  where  national  parliamentarians  could  scrutinise  European  legislation  or  apply 
the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  Indeed,  Working  Group  IV  'found  it  difficult  to  see  how 
the  creation  of  any  new  institution  could  assist  the  process  of  simplification  [of 
decision-making  and  institutional  structures  at  the  European  level]  (The  European 
Convention  Working  Group  IV,  2002a,  p.  7). 
National  parliaments  are  mentioned  several  times  in  the  draft  treaty,  but  are  discussed 
most  directly  in  the  protocols  on  the  principles  of  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  and 
the  role  of  national  parliaments.  In  the  protocol  on  subsidiarity  and  proportionality, 
national  parliaments  are  given  the  right  to  submit  reasoned  opinions  on  whether  a 
piece  of  legislation  complies  with  these  principles.  In  cases  where  the  Commission  has 
to  review  its  position,  it  must  provide  the  reasoning  behind  maintaining,  amending  or 
withdrawing  its  proposal.  However,  even  if  the  Constitutional  Treaty  becomes  ratified, 
national  parliaments  will  still  not  be  permitted  direct  access  to  the  ECJ  to  test  whether  a 
piece  of  legislation  conforms  with  the  principle  of  subsidiarity.  Article  7  of  the  protocol 
on  subsidiarity  and  proportionality  gives  member  states  the  right  to  do  this,  in 
accordance  with  rules  in  Article  111-270,  or  as  'notified  by  them  in  accordance  with  their 
legal  order  on  behalf  of  their  national  Parliament  or  a  chamber  of  it'  (The  European 
Convention  Secretariat,  2003a,  p.  231).  National  rules  thus  determine  whether  a 
member  state,  in  effect  the  executive,  is  to  take  a  case  to  the  ECJ  and  parliaments  still 
operate  individually  at  the  national  level.  While  national  parliaments  can  coordinate 
activities  in  an  effort  to  obtain  enough  votes  to  force  the  Commission  to  review  its 
position  (see  Article  6  of  the  protocol  for  the  exact  rules),  there  is  still  no  direct  or 
collective  way  for  MPs  to  express  their  concerns  at  the  European  level. 
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174 The  emphasis  on  national  parliaments  as  individual  actors  is  also  evident  in  the 
protocol  on  the  role  of  national  parliaments  in  the  European  Union  where  it  is  stated 
that  'the  way  in  which  individual  national  Parliaments  scrutinise  their  own 
governments  in  relation  to  the  activities  of  the  Union  is  a  matter  for  the  particular 
constitutional  organisation  and  practice  of  each  Member  State'  (The  European 
Convention  Secretariat,  2003a,  p.  226).  The  protocol  outlines  how  national  parliaments 
are  to  receive  legislative  proposals  and  other  information  directly  from  European 
institutions,  while  also  setting  down  a  period  of  six  weeks  between  a  legislative 
proposal  being  made  available  and  the  date  when  it  is  placed  on  the  Council  agenda. 
However,  national  parliaments  are  already  able  to  find  this  information  on  the  internet 
and  are  increasingly  aware  that  it  is  often  too  late  for  them  to  alter  anything 
meaningful  in  the  text  at  the  post-initiative  stage.  Furthermore,  many  MPs  point  out 
that  the  most  useful  information  is  not  necessarily  the  legislative  text  itself,  but  the 
accompanying  explanatory  notes  from  the  national  executives. 
For  parliamentarians  to  have  a  meaningful  influence  on  European  legislation  they 
must  involve  themselves  in  the  pre-initiative  stage.  To  date,  most  parliaments  have 
been  reluctant  to  involve  themselves  at  this  early  stage  as  their  primary  role  has  been 
to  scrutinise  their  governments'  behaviour  at  the  European  level,  not  involvement  in 
the  drafting  of  European  legislation.  Ideas  on  what  constitutes  appropriate 
involvement  at  the  European  level  for  national  parliaments  may  thus  have  to  develop 
beyond  mere  scrutiny  of  executive  activities  if  national  parliaments  are  to  legitimise 
European  legislation  in  a  meaningful  way. 
While  the  draft  treaty  has  significantly  improved  the  visibility  of  national  parliaments 
in  the  European  context,  it  can  also  be  argued  that  by  denying  them  a  direct  voice  at 
the  European  level,  and  by  refusing  to  lay  down  rules  or  minimum  requirements  for 
procedures  at  the  national  level,  the  draft  treaty  has  done  little  to  clarify  the  position 
and  role  of  national  parliaments  within  Europe.  There  is  nothing  new  in  the  fact  that 
national  parliaments  should  operate,  and  do  operate  most  efficiently,  at  the  national 
level.  Indeed,  this  is  what  the  majority  of  national  parliamentarians  themselves  have 
been  saying  for  several  years. 
Because  of  the  emphasis  on  activity  at  the  national  level  it  would  be  improper  for  the 
European  level  to  impose  rules  or  standards  on  parliamentary  behaviour  at  the 
national  level.  Although  this  too  is  a  well-recognised  fact,  it  does  leave  national 
parliaments  with  the  problem  of  how,  individually,  to  place  their  mark  on  European 
legislation  through  their  governments.  Because  national  parliamentarians  see 
themselves  as  national  operators,  many  have  been  opposed  to  the  idea  of  a  second 
parliamentary  chamber  at  the  European  level,  although  such  an  institution  has  been 
175 proposed  as  a  possible  solution  to  the  dilemma  of  national  parliaments  not  being 
effective  at  the  European  level. 
4.  A  second  chamber? 
Perhaps  the  first  to  mention  a  second  parliamentary  chamber  was  Michael  Heseltine 
(1989).  Heseltine's  justification  for  a  second  parliament  at  the  European  level  was  two- 
fold.  Firstly,  he  perceived  a  need  for  reconciling  national  and  European  interests  and, 
secondly,  saw  it  as  a  democratic  way  of  doing  so.  He  took  the  American  Senate  and 
German  Bundesrat  as  models  on  which  the  second  parliament  could  be  based,  asserting 
that  '[t]he  direct  involvement  of  national  parliaments  in  the  democratizing  of  the 
community  can  be  effected  by  creating  an  upper  House  of  the  European  Parliament 
from  within  the  membership  of  our  national  parliaments'  (Heseltine,  1989,  p.  35,  emphasis  in 
original). 
More  recently  the  idea  of  a  second  parliament  has  been  floated  repeatedly  by  heads  of 
state  or  government.  The  aim  of  a  second  chamber  would  be  to  bring  Europe  closer  to 
European  citizens,  and  improve  the  legitimacy  of  decisions  taken  at  the  European 
level.  A  second  chamber  was  thus  mentioned  both  by  Joschka  Fischer'  in  a  speech  at 
the  Humboldt  University,  May  2000,  while  British  Prime  Minister  Tony  Blair  also 
spoke  of  a  second  chamber  in  a  speech  to  the  Polish  Stock  Exchange  in  October  2000.  In 
his  speech  Fischer  (2000)  stated  that  'nation-states  are  realities  that  cannot  simply  be 
erased,  and  the  more  globalization  and  Europeanization  create  superstructures  and 
anonymous  actors  remote  from  the  citizens,  the  more  people  will  cling  on  to  the 
nation-states  that  give  them  comfort  and  security'.  Blair,  too,  acknowledges  that  'the 
primary  sources  of  democratic  accountability  in  Europe  are  the  directly  elected  and 
representative  institutions  of  the  nations  of  Europe  -  national  parliaments  and 
governments',  and  that  '[w]e  need  to  get  the  political  foundations  of  the  European 
Union  right.  The  foundations  are  rooted  in  the  democratic  nation  state'  (2000). 
While  executives  have  tended  to  favour  the  notion  of  a  second  chamber, 
parliamentarians  have  been  much  more  opposed  to  the  idea.  A  second  chamber  has 
been  discussed  at  COSAC  meetings,  the  Speakers'  Conference  (see  below)  and  the 
second  Convention.  The  Spanish  Chair  of  the  2002  Speaker's  Conference  thus,  in  the 
summary  issued  after  the  conference,  stated  that  '[i]n  spite  of  the  fact  that  some  of  the 
Presidents  do  not  totally  reject  the  possibility  of  a  second  Chamber  in  the  European 
Parliament,  most  of  the  participants  prefer  to  avoid  complicating  the  European  Union 
institutional  structure'  (Conference  of  Speakers  of  the  European  Parliaments,  2002). 
21  German  Foreign  Minister,  although  on  this  occasion  speaking  in  a  personal  capacity,  and  not  as  a 
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176 One  significant  objection  is  thus  that  a  further  institution  at  the  European  level  will 
cause  more  confusion  and  complicate  decision-taking  procedures  more  than  it  will 
contribute  legitimacy. 
David  Martin  (vice-president  of  the  European  Parliament  with  responsibility  for 
relations  with  national  parliaments  1989-2004)  has  outlined  three  main  issues  with  the 
idea  of  a  second  chamber.  '  Martin  argues,  firstly,  that  the  idea  of  a  second  chamber  is 
based  on  a  misconception.  Even  if  comprised  of  national  parliamentarians,  the  fact  that 
it  operates  at  the  European  level  will  mean  that  it  ceases  to  be  national  and  instead 
becomes  European  in  nature.  One  way  to  overcome  this  problem,  according  to  Martin, 
is  to  bring  the  EU  to  the  national  parliaments  rather  than  the  other  way  round.  He 
argues  that  national  parliaments  are  more  focused  on  at  the  national  level,  with  better 
press  coverage  for  instance.  Especially  the  improved  press  coverage  at  the  national 
level  could  help  develop  knowledge  of  European  affairs  amongst  European  citizens. 
Martin's  second  and  third  points  concern  practical  issues  a  second  chamber  would 
face.  An  indirect  problem  is  that  there  would  be  no  stable  majority  as  national 
elections,  all  held  at  different  times,  would  interfere  with  the  flow  of  work.  Martin  sees 
this  as  a  serious  problem  if  a  second  chamber  was  to  be  given  any  real  power.  The 
third  point  is  to  do  with  competence:  what,  exactly,  would  a  second  chamber  do?  If  it 
was  to  be  a  direct  participant  in  the  legislative  process  it  would  further  complicate  an 
already  complex  process.  Moreover,  ensuring  that  the  principle  of  subsidiarity  is 
properly  applied  does  not  seem  to  require  a  separate  institution  unless  dealing  with 
details  of  legislation  rather  then  general  principles.  A  further  possibility  is  for  a  second 
chamber  to  operate  post-legislation,  but  Martin  argues  that  this  is  the  role  of  the  ECJ. 
Martin's  analysis  thus  raises  the  issue  of  whether  decisions  by  a  second  chamber  are  to 
be  binding.  If  national  parliamentarians  working  in  a  second  chamber  find  that 
Community  legislation  does  not,  for  instance,  comply  with  the  principle  of 
subsidiarity,  what  would  they  be  able  to  do  about  it?  If  the  second  chamber  is  given 
recourse  to  the  ECJ,  then  legally  binding  documents  would  have  to  be  the  basis  for  the 
work  of  the  chamber,  something  to  which  most  proponents  of  the  idea  seem  opposed. 
Moreover,  appeals  to  the  ECJ  would  impact  significantly  on  the  legislative  process, 
making  it  both  more  cumbersome  as  well  as  significantly  less  transparent.  Citizen 
reaction  would  have  to  be  gauged,  especially  in  relation  to  whether  it  would  improve 
their  understanding  of  the  Community,  its  legislative  processes  and  actual  legislation. 
On  the  whole  the  issue  of  a  second  parliamentary  chamber  at  the  European  level  raises 
more  questions  than  it  answers,  the  idea  was  rejected  by  the  House  of  Lords  in  its 
report  on  the  issue  (2001),  and  it  is  no  great  surprise  that  such  an  institution  has  not 
been  introduced  into  the  European  decision-making  process  by  the  Convention. 
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177 5.  Other  initiatives 
Conference  of  Speakers  of  the  European  Parliaments 
The  conference  of  speakers  is  perhaps  the  oldest  form  of  formalised  contact  between 
national  parliaments,  as  they  have  held  regular,  annual  meetings  since  1975.  According 
to  Article  1  of  the  guidelines  for  the  Conference,  members  are  speakers  of  the  national 
parliaments  in  the  EU  member  countries  and  the  President  of  the  European 
Parliament,  who  all  participate  in  meetings  on  an  equal  basis  (Conference  of  Speakers 
of  the  European  Parliaments,  2001b).  As  with  COSAC,  the  Conference  of  Speakers  is  a 
forum  for  'exchange  of  opinions,  information  and  experiences,  as  well  as  for  the 
promotion  of  research  activities  and  common  action,  among  the  Speakers,  on  topics 
related  to  the  role  of  Parliaments  and  the  organisation  of  parliamentary  functions,  also 
with  respect  to  the  forms  and  tools  of  interparliamentary  co-operation'  (Conference  of 
Speakers  of  the  European  Parliaments,  2001b,  Article  2). 
However,  as  the  mandates  of  the  speakers  of  the  European  parliaments  vary,  Article  1 
also  protects  the  'autonomy  and  constitutional  position  of  each  participating  Speaker'. 
To  ensure  that  this  principle  is  not  violated,  no  formal  conclusions  are  issued  from  the 
meetings.  Instead,  the  chair  issues  a  'Chairman's  Summary'  based  on  the  discussions 
held  during  the  meeting.  Although  it  is  generally  respected  that  no  declarations  or 
statements  can  be  issued,  certain  speakers  find  it  necessary  to  reiterate  the  fact  that 
they  are  unable  to  do  so.  Accordingly,  at  the  2001  meeting  held  in  Sweden,  the  deputy 
speaker  from  the  British  House  of  Commons,  Sir  Alan  Haselhurst,  made  the  'traditional 
disclaimer  that  as  an  individual  parliamentarian  he  could  not  speak  for  Parliament' 
(Conference  of  Speakers  of  the  European  Parliaments,  2001c,  p.  15,  author's  emphasis). 
With  the  increased  interest  in  the  role  of  national  parliaments  in  European  decision- 
making,  this  topic  has  naturally  also  been  discussed  at  the  Speakers'  conferences, 
especially  since  2000.  From  this  point  in  time  it  has  been  repeatedly  underlined  that 
national  parliaments  are  important  in  the  European  architecture,  and  that  cooperation 
between  them  must  be  strengthened  (Conference  of  Speakers  of  the  European 
Parliaments,  2000,2001a,  2002).  Although  the  speakers  see  a  purpose  for  their  own 
meetings,  a  report  prepared  by  Ivar  Hansen  (former  speaker  of  the  Danish  Folketing) 
states  that  '[o]n  the  European  scene,  COSAC  is  the  most  important  forum  for  co- 
operation  between  the  national  parliaments'  (Hansen,  2002a,  p.  13).  The  relationship 
between  the  Conference  of  Speakers  and  COSAC  is,  indeed,  very  close,  with  the 
Conference  of  Speakers  having  founded  COSAC  in  1989. 
178 The  benefits  obtained  from  having  the  Speakers'  Conference  are  similar  to  those  of 
COSAC,  although  not  all  participants  willingly  set  aside  the  time  required  for 
participation.  A  British  MP,  speaking  off  the  record  but  with  extensive  experience  of 
the  Conference,  thus  stated  that  'if  it  was  up  to  us  there  wouldn't  be  any  meetings  at 
all',  but  also  continued  to  say  that  'we  just  find  it  valuable  from  the  point  of  view  of 
personal  contact'.  '  The  latter  viewpoint  is  echoed  by  Ivar  Hansen  (2002b)  who 
experienced  a  'constant  exchange  of  new  ideas  and  a  coordination  between  parliaments 
about  certain  aspects  of  parliamentary  work'.  He  further  felt  that  good  contacts 
between  parliamentary  administrations  contributed  significantly  to  the  exchange  of 
experience  and  knowledge.  Although  no  formal  decisions  are  taken,  the  debates  and 
personal  relations  no  doubt  contribute  to  discussions  at  the  national  level  where 
speakers  may  be  able  to  influence  how  their  parliament  addresses  European  issues. 
This  is  obviously  more  difficult  in  parliaments  where  the  speaker's  role  is  separated 
from  that  of  leader  of  the  legislature,  as  is  the  case  in  the  UK,  and  in  such  cases  the 
influence  may  be  more  limited,  unless  committees  dealing  with  European  affairs  take  a 
more  direct  interest  in  the  work  of  the  Speaker's  Conference. 
Other  meetings  and  contacts 
According  to  Hansen's  report  to  the  Speakers'  Conference,  several  standing  committees 
from  national  parliaments  already  hold  regular  meetings.  This  includes  committees  on 
development  and  aid,  defence  and  the  environment  (2002a,  pp.  15-6).  An  official  from 
the  European  Parliamen'  also  mentioned  round-table  meetings,  as  well  as  meetings 
between  select  committees-in  effect  specialised  COSACs.  National  parliamentarians 
admit  to  being  invited  to  these  meetings,  but  frequently,  and  usually  off  the  record, 
state  that  the  time  required  could  be  better  spent  at  the  national  level.  Although  many 
parliamentarians  believe  that  committee  work  benefits  from  contact  with  other 
parliaments,  the  reluctance  to  become  involved  in  European  affairs  remains  strong. 
Erling  Olsen,  former  speaker  of  the  Folketing,  believes  that  the  limited  participation  by 
Danish  parliamentarians  in  the  first  Convention  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  such 
work,  in  the  main  conducted  abroad,  goes  unnoticed  in  the  MP's  constituency.  Thus,  'if 
a  person  [MP]  is  to  use  a  lot  of  energy  on  foreign  affairs,  it  demands  a  very  solid 
foundation  in  their  constituency'.  r'  This  implies  that  even  if  MPs  understand  the 
importance  of  the  European  dimension,  their  voters  often  do  not.  MPs  are  therefore 
forced  to  consider  the  electoral  impact  when  choosing  where  to  utilise  their  resources, 
rather  than  merely  what  they  consider  to  be  important.  The  problem  of 
parliamentarians'  reluctant  participation  in  joint  meetings  is  further  compounded  by 
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179 practical  issues  as  outlined  by  the  EP  official:  because  the  European  Parliament  has 
constant  access  to  simultaneous  translation  this  is  most  frequently  where  joint 
meetings  are  held,  giving  the  impression  that  the  EP  is  'pushy'.  '  Memories  of  the 
Assize  easily  come  to  mind,  and  national  parliamentarians'  feelings  of  limited 
influence  on  procedures  and  the  organisation  of  meetings  may  thus  actually  prevent 
them  from  taking  place. 
6.  Conclusion 
When  considering  the  development  of  national  parliaments'  collective  activities,  a  clear 
progressive  development  over  time  is  evident.  Inter-parliamentary  cooperation  has 
evolved  gradually,  with  national  parliaments  increasingly  taking  charge  of  and 
pushing  co-operation  in  directions  they  consider  most  useful.  The  Assize,  whose 
organisation  as  well  as  final  output  was  strongly  guided  by  the  EP,  is  a  good  example 
of  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  that  has  little  to  offer  national  parliaments. 
Although  relations  between  the  EP  and  national  parliaments  are  improving,  national 
parliaments  are  still  only  discovering  their  potential  when  it  comes  to  engagement  in 
European  policy.  On  the  other  hand,  European  legislation  is  the  sole  focus  for  the  EP, 
leaving  national  parliaments  with  agendas  (including  institutional)  that  differ 
significantly  to  that  of  the  EP. 
To  develop  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  (which  the  Assize  at  least  established 
could  be  useful)  COSAC  was  established.  In  this  forum  national  parliamentarians  are 
more  fully  in  control  of  the  agenda  and  the  institutional  arrangements  and  although 
development  of  COSAC  has  been  slow,  it  has  now  reached  a  point  where  a  common 
secretariat  has  been  established  with  further,  specialised,  COSACs  under  discussion. 
For  national  parliaments  to  arrange  and  host  several  COSAC  meetings  would  be  a 
difficult  undertaking,  especially  so  with  the  requirement  of  simultaneous  translation 
into  all  EU  languages.  Such  practical  issues  may  help  overcome  the  aversion  of 
national  parliamentarians  to  conduct  meetings  in  the  EP.  However,  the  first  step  is  to 
persuade  members  of  select  committees  that  it  is  important  they  too  examine  European 
legislation.  In  order  to  achieve  this,  European  scrutiny  committees  would  have  to 
surrender  their  monopoly  on  scrutiny  of  European  legislation.  Furthermore,  it  must 
become  commonly  accepted  that  European  affairs  are  no  longer  foreign  affairs,  but  that 
many  areas  of  'domestic'  affairs  are  heavily  influenced  by  what  takes  place  at  the 
European  level.  The  work  of  COSAC,  the  Speakers'  Conference  and  the  Conventions 
has  contributed  to  the  linking  of  the  two  levels  within  national  parliaments,  while  also 
making  it  generally  accepted  that  national  parliaments  have  a  role  in  the  European 
decision-making  process-even  if  this  is  indirectly  through  their  executives. 
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these  events,  while  in  the  Second  Convention  (on  the  Future  of  the  Union)  they  were 
also  part  of  the  agenda.  Working  Group  IV  considered  both  scrutiny  at  the  national 
level  and  European  procedures  that  may  impede  scrutiny  by  national  parliaments, 
while  also  reflecting  on  the  role  national  parliaments  could  or  should  play  within 
Europe. 
How,  precisely,  the  involvement  of  national  parliaments  develops  remains  uncertain 
and,  although  considered  an  important  issue  at  the  Convention,  relatively  little  was 
done  to  clarify  the  situation.  All  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  emphasises  the  fact 
that  conclusions  from  meetings  are  non-binding  on  participants  and  that  national 
parliaments  remain  independent  and  autonomous  actors.  The  lack  of  binding  collective 
decisions  at  the  European  level  makes  it  unlikely  that  national  parliaments  will  work  in 
anything  but  an  advisory  capacity  at  this  level.  However,  following  the  relative  success 
of  the  second  Convention  and  its  preparatory  work  of  the  IGC  completed  June  2004,  it 
seems  inconceivable  that  national  parliaments  would  be  excluded  from  any  future 
treaty  (re)negotiations.  National  parliaments  have  thereby  succeeded  in  carving  out  a 
distinct  role  for  themselves  at  the  European  level,  although  treaties  will  likely  he 
finalised  at  IGCs  where  parliamentary  representatives  have  no  direct  role. 
Because  national  parliaments  are  independent  actors  unwilling  to  become  bound  by 
common  decisions  from  a  forum  such  as  COSAC,  it  has  been  difficult  to  discuss 
specific  policies  at  these  gatherings.  Not  only  do  national  parliaments  hold  different 
attitudes  towards  policy  issues,  they  also,  institutionally,  address  them  in  different 
manners.  National  differences  and  emphasis  on  independence  led  to,  especially, 
COSAC  being  labelled  a  'talking  shop',  with  participants  debating  topics  such  as 
'Enlargement  and  Employment'  or  'the  EU's  priorities  in  the  area  of  freedom,  security 
and  justice,  including  the  preparation  of  the  EU  Charter  of  Fundamental  Rights'.  While 
these  issues  are  of  obvious  importance  to  national-level  politicians,  they  are  also  too 
unwieldy  for  anything  more  than  general  debate.  However,  as  both  the  Speaker's 
Conference  and  COSAC  have  undertaken  work  with  a  more  institutional  direction  and 
discussed  the  role  for  national  parliaments  at  the  European  level,  the  road  for  more 
specialised  debates  (if  not  necessarily  legislative  work)  has  been  paved. 
While  nobody  disagrees  that  national  parliaments  must  be  involved  with  European 
affairs,  the  nature  of  this  involvement  remains  an  issue-especially  activities  at  the 
European  level.  Scrutiny  undertaken  within  national  parliaments  at  the  national  level 
are  purely  a  matter  for  parliaments  themselves  to  determine,  a  situation  that  reflects 
their  status  as  independent  and  autonomous  institutions,  while  also  allowing 
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scrutiny  activities  can  present  problems  for  the  individual  parliaments,  these  are  of  a 
somewhat  technical  nature  that  can  be  overcome  by  the  alteration  of  rules  and 
structures  within  national  parliaments. 
However,  collective  activities  present  problems  of  a  different  nature,  mainly  to  do  with 
the  nature  of  national  parliaments  rather  than  that  of  the  EU.  Institutionally,  national 
parliaments  have  a  particular-national-focus,  with  national  parliamentarians 
expected  to  defend  and  protect  the  interests  of  their-nationally  based-constituents. 
Operating  at  the  European  level  in  anything  but  a  non-binding  manner  would 
therefore  be  impossible,  as  the  activities  of  national-level  actors  would  be 
compromised  by  binding  decisions  at  the  European  level,  even  if  these  were  taken  by 
unanimity.  Moreover,  in  parliaments  such  as  the  British,  no  individual  (or  committee) 
can  commit  either  of  the  Houses,  let  alone  the  entire  Parliament,  to  a  decision  taken 
outside  the  British  Parliament. 
While  national  parliaments  of  the  EU  may  benefit  from  common  discussions  of  topics 
of  concern  to  all  of  them,  the  benefits  achieved  are  therefore  likely  to  be  most  acutely 
felt  at  the  national  level.  National  governments  may  negotiate  on  behalf  of  the  member 
state  at  the  European  level,  but  parliamentarians  legitimise  these  decisions  by 
supporting  them  in  the  national  parliaments.  Nevertheless,  procedures  for  scrutiny 
may  develop  as  a  result  of  discussions  with  other  parliamentarians,  and  awareness  that 
scrutiny  of  European  legislation  is  an  important  task  to  be  undertaken  may  also 
develop  as  a  result  of  collective  actions.  The  inter-relationship  between  the  collective 
and  individual  levels  is  thus  important,  and  better  knowledge  of  this  may  contribute  to 
an  improved  understanding  of  scrutiny  at  the  national  level. 
Currently,  much  more  information  is  available  about  what  is  formally  possible  (such  as 
the  Rules  of  Procedure  for  COSAC  or  formal  instructions  on  how  European 
committees  in  national  parliaments  work),  than  about  what  actually  takes  place.  This  is 
the  case  for  both  collective  and  individual  parliamentary  activities,  which  itself  begs  a 
number  of  questions.  For  instance,  why  has  COSAC  developed  the  way  it  has?  Why 
has  a  further  Assize  never  been  held?  And  how,  exactly,  has  interparliamentary 
cooperation  fed  into  activities  at  the  national  level?  More  research  is  needed  to  fully 
understand  inter-parliamentary  cooperation-but  especially  the  interplay  between 
collective  and  individual  actions. 
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As  the  European  Union  has  developed,  so  has  the  role  of  national  parliaments  within 
it.  Initially  expected  t 
o  do  little  more  than  ratify  treaties  that  national  governments  had  negotiated, 
parliaments  have  become  increasingly  involved  in  EU  decision-making  through 
scrutiny  procedures  of  varying  complexity.  Most  academic  work  on  European 
integration  has  largely  ignored  national  parliaments,  and  although  they  are  included  in 
the  Constitutional  Treaty,  no  previous  EU  treaty  mentions  national  parliaments.  This 
contrasts  with  the  European  Parliament,  which  has  been  given  specific  (and 
expanding)  roles  in  each  treaty  ratified  since  the  EU  was  founded.  Integration  theorists, 
even  writers  on  multi-level  governance,  view  national  parliaments  mainly  as 
supporters  of  national  governments  and  their  policies  on  the  EU.  When  national 
governments  could  veto  decisions  in  the  Council,  national  parliaments  could  still, 
formally,  be  considered  sovereign.  However,  as  the  integration  process  has  deepened 
and  the  impact  of  European  legislation  has  become  more  widely  felt  at  the  domestic 
level,  national  parliaments  have  found  that  their  room  to  manoeuvre  has  shrunk. 
National  parliaments  have  become  part  of  a  multi-level  system  of  governance  and  can 
no  longer,  singularly,  determine  the  parameters  within  which  they  operate. 
The  aim  of  this  thesis  has  been  to  develop  a  better  understanding  of  how  national 
parliaments  are  involved  with  European  legislation.  Central  to  the  problem  of  how 
national  parliaments  engage  with  European  affairs  is  the  contradiction  of  national 
parliaments  dealing  with  European  legislation.  However,  the  increased  involvement  in 
EU  decision-making  by  national  parliaments,  at  both  the  national  and  the  European 
levels,  reflects  the  fact  that,  while  legislation  may  originate  at  different  levels,  both  are 
being  implemented  at  the  national  level,  making  it  important  that  the  views  of  national 
parliamentarians  are  taken  into  account  during  the  decision-making  process. 
The  three  main  findings  of  the  thesis  all  link  to  how  membership  of  the  EU  is  causing 
changes  at  the  national  level.  Firstly,  it  has  been  established  that  Europeanisation  has 
caused  changes  within  national  parliaments.  These  changes  are  detectable  in  both 
governance,  institutionalisation  and  discourse.  Secondly,  parliamentary  developments 
have  occurred  within  the  framework  of  each  parliament's  own  national  political 
culture.  Existing  rules  for  dealing  with  national  legislation  have  most  frequently  been 
adopted  for  EU  legislation  and  national  differences  in  how  scrutiny  procedures  have 
developed  can  therefore  be  traced  to  different  parliamentary  approaches  to  domestic 
legislation.  A  certain  level  of  convergence  can,  however,  be  detected.  This  has,  to  some 
183 extent,  been  due  to  the  third  finding,  that  inter-parliamentary  cooperation  has  been  of 
some  importance  to  national  procedures,  although  the  exact  extent  to  which  national 
parliamentarians  let  other  parliamentary  procedures  guide  them  is  difficult  to  gauge. 
It  can,  however,  be  firmly  concluded  that  adjusting  to  the  new  international  system  of 
governance  has  not  been  easy  for  national  parliaments.  Many  parliamentarians  are  still 
finding  it  difficult  to  grasp  the  importance  and  impact  (domestically)  of  European 
cooperation.  Typically,  small  groups  of  parliamentarians  within  national  parliaments 
(usually  the  members  of  committees  charged  with  examining  European  matters)  have 
developed  a  significant  knowledge  of  European  affairs  and  the  implications  of 
European  legislation  at  the  domestic  level.  In  contrast,  parliamentarians  who  are  not 
members  of  European  committees  (a  significant  majority)  often  have  no  involvement 
with  European  affairs  on  a  regular  basis  and  do  not  automatically  consider  the 
European  dimension  in  their  daily  work.  Increasingly,  this  situation  has  become 
untenable.  EU  specialists  are  unable  to  provide  the  expertise  on  all  areas  covered  by 
European  integration  and  increasingly  need  expertise  from  other  committees  within 
national  parliaments  to  perform  their  scrutiny  adequately.  For  a  coherent 
parliamentary  stance  to  develop  on  EU  matters,  it  therefore  seems  to  make  institutional 
sense  to  maintain  EU  committees  as  coordinating  bodies-even  in  parliaments  that  do 
not  mandate  their  ministers. 
Despite  the  variety  of  political  cultures  and  systems  within  which  the  national 
parliaments  of  the  EU  operate,  it  can  be  argued  that  they  have  followed  a  similar 
developmental  path  in  terms  of  their  involvement  with  European  affairs.  The  first 
section  of  this  concluding  chapter  will  therefore  examine  the  connection  between 
national-level  scrutiny  and  Europeanisation.  In  an  attempt  to  bridge  a  seeming 
contradiction,  it  argues  that  although  there  is  an  international  element  to  national 
scrutiny  of  European  cooperation,  support  for  stricter  scrutiny  has  mainly  developed 
from  the  national  level.  The  second  section  will  look  specifically  at  developments  at  the 
national  level,  followed,  in  the  third  section,  by  a  closer  look  at  the  convergent 
movements  that  can  be  detected  in  the  evolving  scrutiny  procedures. 
1.  Europeanisation 
Academic  debate  on  Europeanisation'  has  developed  to  the  extent  that 
Europeanisation  has  become  a  phenomenon  to  be  explained  (explanandum)  rather 
Defined  in  the  introduction  as: 
184 than  the  explanation  itself  (explanans)  (Radaelli,  2004,  p.  8).  Employing 
Europeanisation  as  an  explanandum,  this  research  becomes  a  'bottom-up'  study.  Again 
drawing  on  work  by  Radaelli  (2004,  p.  8),  a  bottom-up  study  can  be  defined  as  research 
where 
the  starting  point  is  a  system  of  interaction  at  the  domestic  level.  By  using 
time  and  temporal  causal  sequences,  a  bottom-up  approach  checks  if, 
when,  and  how  the  EU  provides  change  in  any  of  the  main  components  of 
the  system  of  interaction.  Finally,  "bottom-uppers"  try  to  measure  the 
consequences  of  all  this  in  terms  of  change  at  the  domestic  level. 
Scrutiny  systems  within  national  parliaments  have  been  altered  as  a  direct 
consequence  of  EU  membership.  These  changes  have  significantly  affected  interactions 
between  national  parliaments,  executives  and  administrations,  all  of  which  can  be 
considered  'main  components'  of  national  systems  of  governance.  Although  there  is  a 
developing  element  of  international  cooperation  in  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  European 
affairs,  the  main  thrust  has  occurred  at  the  national  level,  with  national  parliaments 
developing  their  internal  procedures  and  structures  to  integrate  and  scrutinise 
European  legislation  more  effectively.  It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  the  'story'  of 
parliamentary  scrutiny  begins  and  finishes  at  the  national  level,  although 
Europeanisation  has  influenced  these  changes  which  can  be  measured  in  a  'before  and 
after'  fashion,  as  well  as  in  a  comparative  manner.  Both  types  of  comparisons  are 
important,  as  'snapshots'  of  individual  parliamentary  scrutiny  capabilities  do  not 
promote  our  overall  understanding  of  the  role  of  national  parliaments  within  the 
European  governance  structure. 
When  used  as  an  explanatory  tool  in  the  analysis  of  national  parliamentary  adaptation 
of  scrutiny  procedures,  Europeanisation  covers  all  three  of  Radaelli's  types  of  'deep 
interrogations':  Europeanisation  as  governance,  institutionalisation  and  discourse 
(2004,  pp.  10-14).  As  has  become  evident  in  the  three  case  studies,  membership  of  the 
EU  has  caused  changes  (albeit  to  varying  degrees)  to  governance  in  all  three  member 
states;  institutions  have  altered  and  discourse  has  both  expanded  and  (partially) 
reconstructed. 
It  can  be  argued  that  membership  of  the  EU  has  altered  governance  within  the  member 
states,  but  also  that  increased  national  parliamentary  involvement  in  European  affairs 
in  turn  has  impacted  upon  governance  at  both  the  national  and  European  levels. 
Membership  initially  reduced  the  role  of  national  parliaments,  thereby  shifting  the 
Processes  of  a)  construction,  b)  diffusion  and  c)  institutionalisation  of  formal  and  informal 
rules,  procedures,  policy  paradigms,  styles,  'ways  of  doing  things'  and  shared  beliefs  and 
norms  which  are  first  defined  and  consolidated  in  the  EU  policy  process  and  then 
incorporated  in  the  logic  of  domestic  (national  and  sub-national)  discourse,  political 
structures  and  public  policies. 
185 inter-institutional  balance,  redistributing  power  and  influence  between  national 
parliaments  and  their  executives  and  administrations.  As  the  involvement  of  national 
parliaments  in  European  affairs  develops,  this  balance  is  continuously  being  addressed 
as  well.  National  parliaments  have  ceded  power  to  the  European  level  on  a  permanent 
basis,  and,  using  the  definitions  of  power  and  influence  from  the  introductory  chapter,  ' 
will  only  be  able  to  regain  a  certain  level  of  influence  over  European  decisions!  As  the 
three  case  studies  have  clearly  shown,  the  extent  to  which  national  parliaments  pursue 
this  influence  varies  considerably,  with  the  Danish  Folketing  at  one  end  of  the 
continuum  and  the  Italian  Parliament  at  the  other. 
A  question  raised  by  Radaelli  (2004,  p.  11)  is  whether  Europeanisation  produces  `good 
and  legitimate'  governance  in  Europe.  Almost  by  definition,  greater  scrutiny  of 
European  affairs  by  national  parliaments  can  only  lead  to  more  legitimate  governance 
within  Europe.  It  should  be  recognised,  however,  that  legitimacy  and  efficiency  might 
work  in  opposite  directions.  While  national  parliamentarians  may  improve  the 
legitimacy  of  European  legislation  by  engaging  in  EU  decision-making,  the  efficiency 
with  which  legislation  is  being  produced  may  suffer  to  the  extent  that  decision-making 
becomes  slow  and  difficult,  potentially  reducing  the  benefits  of  legitimacy  originally 
conferred  by  parliamentary  involvement. 
National  parliamentarians  are  generally  considered  to  be  closer  to  European  citizens 
and  therefore  also  more  aware  of  and  sensitive  to  the  wishes  and  interests  of  the 
citizens.  While  it  is  important  that  decisions  taken  by  executives  at  the  European  level 
are  supported  by  national  parliaments,  in  the  eyes  of  member  state  citizens  such 
decisions  may  appear  more  legitimate  if  they  have  been  scrutinised  by 
parliamentarians  at  the  national  level.  Any  increase  in  legitimacy  may  be  due  to  the 
perception  that  national-level  political  institutions  are  more  legitimate  than  those  at  the 
European  level,  but  may  also  result  from  expectations  that  national  parliamentarians 
examine  European  legislation  from  a  national  perspective-and  therefore  protect 
national  interests. 
As  scrutiny  procedures  have  evolved  to  include  more  national  parliamentarians  from 
outside  European  committees,  they  have  developed  to  include  a  specialised  aspect 
(through  MPs  from  other  select  committees)  that  complements  the  European  expertise. 
Europeanisation  has  thus  caused  institutional  adaptation  throughout  EU  member  state 
2  Influence  was  defined  as  policy-shaping,  whereas  power  was  described  as  policy-setting.  Using  these 
definitions  it  is  possible  to  have  influence  without  power,  while  power  may  bring  influence  as  well. 
3  It  may  be  argued  that  the  Danish  scrutiny  committee  exercises  power  over  the  domestic  aspect  of 
European  decision.  However,  as  the  committee  operates  on  the  basis  of  a  political  agreement  and  does  not 
formally  have  the  legal  right  to  mandate  the  executive,  it  is,  technically,  more  correct  to  describe  its 
activities  as  influencing  decisions,  rather  than  exercising  power  over  these.  Moreover,  as  the  mandates  it 
provides  can  be  voted  down  at  the  European  level,  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the  committees  preferred 
options  are  achieved,  thereby  limiting  it  to  attempts  at  influencing  the  final  outcome. 
186 parliaments  as,  at  the  domestic  level,  scrutiny  procedures  have  been  reassessed  and 
European  committees  established  or  strengthened,  while  parliamentary  cooperation  at 
the  international  level-especially  through  COSAC-has  also  been  developed. 
Arguably,  parliaments  can  therefore  be  described  as  fulfilling  the  second  condition  in 
Börzel  and  Risse's  argument  that 
Europeanization  must  be  "inconvenient",  i.  e.,  there  must  be  some  degree  of 
"misfit"  or  incompatibility  between  European-level  processes,  policies  and 
institutions,  on  the  one  hand,  and  domestic-level  processes,  policies  and 
institutions,  on  the  other.  This  degree  of  fit  or  misfit  constitutes 
adaptational  pressures,  which  is  a  necessary  but  not  sufficient  condition  for 
expecting  change.  The  second  condition  is  that  there  are  some  facilitating 
factors  -  be  it  actors,  be  it  institutions  -  responding  to  the  adaptational 
pressures  (Börzel  and  Risse,  2000,  p.  1). 
While  national  parliaments  have  altered  procedures  and  re-assessed  their  activities  in 
relation  to  the  European  level,  this  has  not  necessarily  been  a  response  to  adaptational 
pressure  from  the  European  level.  Indeed,  pressure  from  domestic  audiences  and 
actors,  based  on  requirements  other  than  perceived  misfits  between  the  national  and 
European  levels,  may  in  many  cases  have  been  more  significant  than  pressure  from  the 
European  level. 
However,  the  notion  of  pressure  from  the  European  level  warrants  further  reflection. 
Although  European-level  actors  have  long  argued  that  national  parliamentary 
involvement  would  benefit  the  legitimacy  of  European  legislation,  agreement  on  the 
nature  of  such  involvement  has  been  illusive.  New  institutions  at  the  European  level 
have  been  deemed  undesirable,  while  European-level  actors  have  also  been  hesitant  to 
dictate  solutions  for  the  national  level  (as  evident  in  the  proceedings  of  Working  Group 
IV  at  the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  the  Union).  Beyond  guarantees  regarding 
delivery  of  documents  and  time  for  national  parliaments  to  examine  them,  few 
initiatives  have  been  discussed,  and  fewer  still  come  to  fruition. 
The  EP  has  realised  that  national  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  is  a 
necessary  step  if  the  EU  (and  therefore  also  the  EP  as  an  institution)  is  to  gain  greater 
legitimacy.  Its  response  has  been  to  invite  national  parliaments  to  multi-lateral 
meetings  of  specialised  committees,  while  also  taking  a  strong  interest  in  COSAC. 
However,  it  has  never  made  suggestions  for  scrutiny  procedures  at  the  national  level. 
National  parliaments  have  determined  their  own  systems  for  scrutiny  of  European 
affairs.  While  national  parliaments  still  differ  significantly  with  respect  to  their  levels  of 
ambition  and  individual  procedures,  increased  attention  to  the  EU  and  European 
legislation  has,  at  the  very  least,  had  the  consequence  of  inducing  most  national 
parliamentarians  to  consider  the  appropriate  level  of  their  involvement. 
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can  be  identified.  The  most  obvious  line  of  division  is  perhaps  that  between  supporters 
and  opponents  of  further  European  integration.  Less  visible,  but  likely  to  prove  more 
important,  is  the  distinction  between  MPs  frequently  involved  with  European  affairs 
and  those  who  only  rarely  engage  with  the  European  dimension.  Comprehension  of 
the  multi-level  system  of  governance  that  national  parliaments  increasingly  operate  in 
is  becoming  ever  more  important  for  parliamentarians  to  carry  out  their  work 
effectively.  More  of  a  continuum  than  a  dichotomy,  the  latter  distinction  has 
parliamentarians  active  in  European  scrutiny  committees  at  one  end  and  MPs  serving 
on  committees  with  a  remit  not  much  affected  by  EU  legislation  (such  as  social  affairs) 
at  the  other.  '  In  between  these  two  are  MPs  serving  on  committees  whose  remits,  to 
varying  degrees,  are  affected  by  European  legislation. 
All  these  participants  bring  their  own  sets  of  ideas  and  language  to  debates  and 
interactions  on  parliamentary  involvement  in  European  affairs  and  the  appropriate 
methods  of  scrutiny,  thus  becoming  purveyors  of  Radaelli's  third  understanding  of 
Europeanisation:  that  of  discourse.  According  to  Radaelli,  discourse  is  both  'a  set  of 
ideas  and  an  interactive  process'  (2004,  p.  14,  emphasis  in  original),  with  the  former 
being  the  process  of  making  sense  of  and  judging  reality,  while  the  latter  covers  policy 
formulation  and  communication  with  the  public.  In  the  three  case  studies, 
Europeanisation  as  discourse  can  therefore  be  interpreted  as  debate  on  how  national 
parliaments  are  to  be  involved  with  European  affairs  and  how  they  can  incorporate  the 
need  for  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  into  already  existing  national  political 
cultures.  All  participants  in  this  debate  can  utilise  (selective)  elements  in  their 
communications  with  the  public,  claiming,  for  instance,  that  European  legislation  is 
being  subjected  to  greater  scrutiny,  and  therefore  kept  under  better  (domestic) 
democratic  control,  or  improved  for  the  benefit  of  all  Europeans. 
National  parliaments,  through  their  internal  discourse,  may  also  communicate  more 
about  the  EU  to  their  voters.  Where  this  takes  place,  it  can  be  argued  that 
'Europeanisation  is  a  process  through  which  the  EU  gains  its  own  autonomous 
meaning  and  self-validation  within  the  logics,  cognitive  frames,  and  norms  of 
behaviour  of  domestic  actors'  (Radaelli,  2004,  p.  13).  In  other  words,  the  fact  that 
national  parliaments  engage  in  debates  on  the  most  appropriate  level  of  involvement 
in  European  affairs  to  some  extent  legitimises  the  EU  and  the  legislation  it  produces. 
However,  the  projected  legitimacy  is  not  dependent  on  a  specific  output  (such  as  the 
achievement  of  a  particular  result  at  a  Council  meeting).  The  mere  fact  that  parliaments 
In  the  UK  House  of  Commons,  the  point  furthest  away  from  the  ESC  would  be  not  serving  on  a  select 
committee  at  all,  and  in  no  other  way  being  involved  with  work  at  the  European  level  as,  for  instance,  a 
Speaker  of  the  House  involved  in  the  Speakers'  Conference. 
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collectively,  confers  a  degree  of  legitimacy  to  the  European  level  of  cooperation. 
In  national  parliaments'  debates  on  scrutiny  procedures,  it  is  therefore  possible  to  find 
all  three  of  Radaelli's  aspects  of  Europeanisation.  National-level  discourse  assesses  the 
situation,  and  establishes  parameters  for  responses  that  are  acceptable  to  both 
politicians  and  the  public.  These  responses  often  require  alterations  of  existing 
procedures,  if  not  the  institutional  setting,  and  will  in  turn  affect  governance.  Over 
time,  the  adaptations  required  in  both  institutions  and  governance  take  place  at  the 
national  as  well  as  European  levels.  Scrutiny  procedures  impact  directly  on  inter- 
institutional  relations  at  the  national  level-and  indirectly  on  governance  at  the 
European  level  through  the  European  Council.  Moreover,  events  like  the  Convention 
on  the  Future  of  Europe,  where  national  parliamentarians  were  involved  to  such  a 
degree  that  their  exclusion  from  any  future  Conventions  would  be  inconceivable,  are 
evidence  that  national  parliamentarians  are  involved  in  the  negotiation  of  the 
fundamental  agreements  on  which  future  European  integration  is  to  be  built.  The  circle 
has  thus  been  dosed:  national  actors  are  involved  in  negotiating  the  conditions  under 
which  European  cooperation  will  take  place,  cooperation  which  in  turn  influences 
discourses,  institutions  and  governance  at  the  domestic  level,  again  feeding  back  into 
structures  and  debates  at  the  European  level. 
2.  National  parliaments  in  the  EU 
The  second  major  finding  of  this  thesis  is  that  national  parliaments  have  largely 
adopted  (and  adapted)  procedures  for  scrutiny  of  domestic  legislation  for  scrutiny  of 
European  legislation.  This  process  has  taken  into  account  specific  domestic  political 
cultures  and  requirements.  Despite  this  finding,  it  is  also  largely  true  that  national 
parliamentary  participation  in  the  European  legislative  process  has  passed  through 
three  stages  (as  described  by  Norton).  During  the  first  stage  'parliaments  were 
accorded  no  formal  role  in  the  process  of  supranational  law  making,  and  they  had  little 
inclination  to  seek  such  a  role.  ... 
A  policy  inimical  to  the  national  interest  could  be 
killed  off  in  the  Council  of  ministers.  There  appeared  little  reason  for  national 
parliaments  to  get  involved'  (1996a,  p.  177)'  During  this  initial  stage,  European  affairs 
were  considered  foreign  policy  and  therefore  a  matter  for  the  executive,  with  national 
interests  amply  protected  through  the  right  of  veto.  Furthermore,  even  in  the  countries 
most  skeptical  of  European  cooperation  (notably  Denmark  and  the  United  Kingdom) 
the  emphasis  was  on  economics,  with  the  promise  of  an  'ever  closer  Union'  yet  to 
s  Of  the  three  case  studies  both  the  Danish  Folketing  and  the  British  Parliament  can  be  considered  as 
exceptions  to  this  statement,  due  to  their  emphasis  on  parliamentary  scrutiny  from  the  outset  of 
Community  membership. 
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approval  but  it  avoided  closer  national  parliamentary  scrutiny  by  being  dressed  up  as 
foreign  policy. 
Despite  the  right  of  national  veto  on  most  important  issues,  the  Community  was  not  a 
static  entity  during  the  early  years  of  cooperation.  '  Changes  in  European  structures  and 
activities  meant  that  national  parliaments  became  aware  of  the  importance  of  involving 
themselves  in  Community  issues  and  attempted  to  adapt.  While  the  European-level 
changes  encompassed  growth  in  size  as  well  as  scope  for  the  Community  (thereby 
extending  its  operations  into  many  new  fields  of  cooperation),  for  national  parliaments 
the  main  impetus  for  change  was  the  SEA  and  the  White  Paper  preceding  it.  These 
documents  made  it  clear  that  European  Cooperation  was  no  longer  simply  about  a 
free(er)  internal  market  and  that  even  the  undertaking  of  an  internal  market  would 
impinge  seriously  on  what  had  previously  been  exclusively  domestic  policy-and 
therefore  the  domain  of  national  parliaments. 
The  move  towards  a  single  market  brought  with  it  a  considerable  increase  in  the 
number  of  legislative  acts  originating  from  Brussels,  a  significant  factor  contributing  to 
a  raised  awareness  amongst  national  parliamentarians  of  European  issues.  Moreover, 
altered  decision-making  procedures  at  the  European  level  (mainly  involving  a 
significant  increase  in  the  use  of  qualified  majority  voting)  meant  that  national  interests 
could  no  longer  be  protected  as  previously.  These  developments  further  marginalised 
national  parliaments  in  the  European  legislative  process,  a  connection  that  was 
weakened  even  more  as  the  direct  link  between  national  parliaments  and  the  European 
level  was  severed  when  direct  elections  to  the  EP  began  in  1979.  MEPs  were  now 
directly  elected  and  no  longer  seconded  from  national  parliaments,  with  an  ever- 
diminishing  number  of  MEPs  holding  a  'double  mandate'.  During  this  same  period  the 
EP's  influence  grew  significantly-granted,  ironically,  by  national  parliaments 
ratifying  consecutive  treaties. 
However,  the  power  accorded  the  EP  did  not  match  that  ceded  by  national 
parliaments,  a  process  that  contributed  to  the  democratic  deficit.  In  the  words  of  Juliet 
Lodge 
neither  [national  parliaments  nor  the  EP]  can  exercise  effective  control  over 
either  what  national  governments  do  in  the  EU  or  what  the  EU  executive 
6  J.  H.  H.  Weiler  (1999,  p.  16)  has  argued  that  'from  a  legal-normative  point  of  view,  the  community 
developed  in  that  first  phase  with  an  inexorable  dynamism  of  enhanced  supranationalism.  European  legal 
integration  moved  powerfully  ahead.  From  a  political-decisional-procedural  point  of  view,  the  very  same 
period  was  characterized  by  a  counter-development  towards  intergovernmentalism  and  away  from 
European  integration'.  Weiler  (Weiler,  1999,  p.  96)  further  states  that  both  processes  were  necessary,  with 
each  'conditioning'  and'explaining'  the  other. 
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deliberately  engineered  a  situation  whereby  national  parliaments  were 
denied  effective  controls  over  national  executives.  This  made  it  easier  for 
national  governments,  working  within  the  council,  to  escape  national  as 
well  as  European  parliamentary  scrutiny  and  control.  Thus,  allegations  that 
the  European  Parliament  was  engaged  in  an  exercise  to  increase  its  powers 
at  national  parliaments'  expense  were  based  on  a  false  premise:  national 
governments,  not  the  European  Parliament,  were  the  beneficiaries  of 
parliamentary  weakness  at  both  national  and  EU  level  (1996a,  p.  188). 
The  Council's  ability  to  evade  the  control  of  both  national  parliaments  and  the  EP  is 
described  by  Lodge  (1996a,  p.  190)  as  a  'double  democratic  deficit',  which  became 
recognised  at  both  the  national  and  European  levels,  and  seen  as  requiring  addressing 
at  both  levels.  Although,  technically,  it  is  possible  to  democratise  the  European  level  by 
granting  the  EP  additional  legislative  power  (which  has  happened  with  every  new 
treaty  since  the  establishment  of  European  cooperation),  this  solution  on  its  own  is 
politically  untenable.  In  attempting  to  overcome  the  democratic  deficit  it  has  been 
necessary  simultaneously  to  Europeanise  the  national  level,  a  process  that  has  taken 
place  through  national  parliaments  becoming  increasingly  engaged  in  scrutiny  of 
European  legislation. 
National  parliaments  adapting  to  the  changes  occurring  at  the  European  level  are 
described  by  Norton  as  the  second  stage  in  the  developing  relationship  between 
national  parliaments  and  Europe: 
The  national  parliaments  could  not  rely  solely  on  the  European  Parliament 
to  scrutinise  EC  documents  and  hold  the  Commission  and  Council  of 
Ministers  to  account....  The  result  has  been  that,  in  the  field  of  EC  affairs, 
national  parliaments  have  exhibited,  from  the  mid-1980s  onwards,  three 
distinct  characteristics:  (i)  greater  specialisation,  (ii)  greater  activity,  and 
(iii)  some  attempts  to  integrate  MEPs  into  their  activities  (Norton,  1996a,  p. 
179). 
Moreover,  according  to  Neunreither  (1994,  p.  303)  'national  parliaments 
underestimated  very  much,  for  a  long  time,  the  impact  of  the  EC's  evolution  on  their 
own  political  functions. 
... 
Only  with  considerable  delay  did  parliaments  start  to  think 
about  specific  internal  structures  which  could  help  them  to  fulfill  their  role'.  The 
continued  lack  of  influence  led  Norton  (1996a,  p.  182)  to  declare  that  'national 
parliaments  not  only  remain  marginalised  within  EC/EU  law-making  but  are 
increasingly  marginalised'.  Much  earlier,  Michael  Niblock  (1971,  p.  34)  had  similarly 
concluded  that  'the  initiative  lies  elsewhere  than  with  the  national  Parliaments  which 
have  no  obvious  part  to  play  except  to  be  compliant  in  the  face  of  diminishing 
authority'. 
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authority,  but  have  created  or  strengthened  committees  specifically  dealing  with 
European  issues.  Despite  this  'awakening',  it  is  obvious  that  not  all  parliaments  in  the 
EU  member  states  have  developed  similar  levels  of  power  and  influence.  As  was 
shown  in  Chapter  three,  the  ability  to  influence  domestic  legislation  does  not  always 
equate  to  influence  over  European  legislation  (see  summary  in  Table  9.1). 
Table  9.1:  Types  of  actors  in  a  two-level  game 
Strong  national  player  Weak  national  player 
Strong  European  player  DK,  SF  EP 
Modestly  strong  European 
player 
D,  S  F,  UK 
Weak  European  player  A,  1,  NL  B,  E,  GR,  IR,  LUX,  P 
Table  adapted  from:  (Maurer  and  Wessels,  ZUUla,  p.  51U). 
The  three  case  studies  have  provided  an  understanding  of  how  European  scrutiny  has 
developed.  Moreover,  the  analysis  clearly  shows  that  attempts  to  hold  national 
executives  accountable  have  varied  substantially  in  both  effort  and  effectiveness. 
Individual  national  contexts  and  political  cultures  have  determined  the  seriousness 
with  which  scrutiny  of  executive  activities  at  the  European  level  have  been 
approached-and  often  also  the  methods  utilised. 
While  it  may  have  been  natural  for  national  parliaments  and  the  EP  to  become  allies  in 
the  process  of  scrutinising  Community  legislation  and  keeping  the  European-level 
executive  accountable,  instead  animosity  developed  between  the  two  levels.  This 
animosity  was  in  part  due  to  the  increased  independence  the  EP  gained  in  1979  when 
direct  elections  were  introduced,  but  was  also  caused  by  subsequent  increases  in  the 
EP's  powers  and  influence  that  were  felt  to  be  at  the  cost  of  national  parliaments.  The 
treaties  granting  increased  powers  to  the  EP  were  all  negotiated  without  the  direct 
participation  of  national  parliaments  (or  indeed  the  EP).  Treaties  have  historically  been 
a  result  of  compromises  agreed  by  national  executives,  with  government 
representatives  doing  the  negotiating.  Presented  with  the  final  result  ex  post  facto, 
national  parliaments  have  found  themselves  in  a  'take  it  or  leave  it'  position  where 
they  stood  the  risk  of  jeopardising  the  European  integration  process  if  they  rejected  the 
treaty,  an  option  few  parliaments  have  even  contemplated.  This  has  especially  been  the 
case  if  a  government  negotiating  on  behalf  of  a  nation  holds  a  majority  in  parliament! 
7  There  have  been  a  few  exceptions  to  this  scenario.  The  Danish  government  could  not  build  a 
parliamentary  majority  supporting  the  ratification  of  the  Single  European  Act  (SEA)  when  this  treaty  went 
through  the  ratification  process  in  1986.  This  was  somewhat  inconsequential,  as  a  referendum  had  already 
been  planned,  in  the  event  carrying  the  ratification.  Problems  were  also  experienced  in  the  German  and 
British  Parliaments  in  the  early  1990s  when  the  TEU  went  through  the  process  of  ratification. 
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phenomenon.  It  was  only  seriously  undertaken  with  the  two  Conventions  on  Human 
Rights  and  the  Future  of  Europe.  The  second  Convention  did  not  result  in  a  new  treaty, 
but  in  a  draft  treaty  that  was  recommended  to  the  IGC  that  followed  the  Convention. 
However,  the  involvement  of  national  parliaments  has  set  a  precedent,  making  it 
unlikely  that  future  treaties  will  be  negotiated  without  initial,  preparatory  involvement 
of  national  parliaments.  As  discussed  below,  the  participation  of  national  parliaments 
in  the  two  Conventions  (together  with  the  developments  of  COSAC  described  in 
Chapter  eight)  can  be  seen  as  part  of  a  trend  towards  more  parliamentary  cross-border 
cooperation.  In  the  words  of  Anne-Marie  Slaughter  (2004,  p.  3) 
[i]nternational  parliamentary  organizations  have  been  traditionally  well 
meaning  though  ineffective,  but  today  national  parliamentarians  are 
meeting  to  adopt  and  publicize  common  positions  on  the  death  penalty, 
human  rights,  and  environmental  issues.  They  support  one  another  in 
legislative  initiatives  and  offer  training  programs  and  technical  assistance. 
Within  the  EU,  the  involvement  of  national  parliaments  in  the  final  stage  of  treaty 
negotiating  remains  unlikely,  as  does  any  other  direct  representation  of  national 
parliaments  at  the  European  level.  National  parliaments  thus  remain  marginal  players 
in  decision-making  at  the  European  level,  at  the  most  participating  indirectly  through 
attempting  to  influence  their  executives.  Holding  the  executive  to  account  is  a  task 
frequently  listed  in  an  overview  of  parliamentary  duties.  However,  as  outlined  in 
Chapter  three,  it  is  an  activity  several  parliaments  within  the  EU  still  do  not  perform 
effectively  with  regard  to  European  legislation.  National  parliaments  thus  still  display 
significant  differences  in  their  treatment  of  domestic  and  European  legislation.  This  is 
despite  the  fact  that  the  current,  and  third,  stage  described  by  Norton  (1996a,  p.  182)  is 
one  where  national  parliaments  are  considered  as  integral  to  addressing  the 
democratic  deficit  within  the  EU.  Member  state  parliaments  are  all  at,  or  well  on  their 
way  towards,  this  third  stage-even  if  they  are  all  doing  it  in  their  own  way.  Their 
movement  in  this  direction  reflects  the  recognition  that  granting  the  EP  powers  akin  to 
those  held  by  national  parliaments  will  not  sufficiently  alleviate  the  democratic  deficit 
within  the  EU,  since  the  nature  of  European  co-operation  is  such  that  parliamentary 
legitimacy  must  be  obtained  at  both  the  European  and  national  levels. 
As  has  been  demonstrated  in  the  case  studies,  national  parliaments  have  been  forced  to 
develop  new  areas  of  activity  as  a  direct  consequence  of  EU  membership.  Whereas 
foreign  affairs  have  traditionally  been  handled  by  a  small  number  of  MPs  in  a 
committee  dedicated  specifically  to  that  topic,  an  increasing  number  of 
parliamentarians,  especially  through  work  in  select  committees,  now  dedicate  time  to 
EU  legislation  as  a  matter  of  course.  EU  membership  has  consequently  contributed  to  a 
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transnational  issues.  In  two  of  the  case  studies,  Denmark  and  Italy,  this  recognition  has 
resulted  in  stronger  cooperation  between  EU  committees  and  other  select  committees 
within  parliament,  whereas  in  the  British  Parliament  no  such  cooperation  exists.  In  the 
latter  case  individual  committees  may  choose  to  include  a  European  angle  in  their 
reports,  but  have  not  done  so  at  the  instigation  of  the  ESC  (House  of  Commons)  or  the 
EU  Select  Committee  (House  of  Lords). 
Overall,  however,  parliamentarians  are  engaging  more  with  European  issues,  with  the 
consequence  that  parliaments  and  their  work  have  come  to  reflect  increasing 
globalisation.  For  national  parliamentarians  the  full  effect  of  this  development  is  yet  to 
be  realised.  Many  parliamentarians  still  remain  unaware  of  it  (especially  in  the  UK  and 
Italian  parliaments),  while  others  have  been  unable  to  fulfill  their  ambitions  for 
scrutiny  (again  mainly  the  case  in  the  UK  and  Italy).  "  To  some  extent,  the  continued 
existence  of  political  subcultures  heavily  involved  with  European  affairs  has  prevented 
a  broader  awareness  of  how  important  it  is  for  all  parliamentarians  to  engage  in 
scrutiny  of  European  legislation.  These  subcultures,  however,  have  become  more 
aware  of-and  increasingly  vocal  about-the  need  to  involve  parliament  on  a  wider 
scale 
3.  Convergence 
It  is  obvious  that  responses  to  Europeanisation  have  varied  significantly  and  that 
variations  above  all  reflect  differences  in  national  political  cultures.  Even  where  it  is 
recognised  that  influence  can  only  be  achieved  through  government  representatives  in 
the  Council,  some  parliaments  (such  as  the  Danish,  Finnish  and  Swedish)  wish  to 
influence  EU  legislation,  while  other  parliaments  (for  example  those  of  Greece,  Italy, 
Portugal  and  Spain)  have  more  modest  ambitions,  simply  wishing  to  remain  informed 
about  European  activities  and,  if  necessary,  express  an  opinion  thereon. 
However,  discernable  patterns  of  convergent  movements  have  still  occurred,  with  the 
first  being  recognition  of  the  impact  European  legislation  has  on  domestic  legislation. 
Scrutiny  procedures  thus,  at  a  minimum,  involve  more  awareness  of  and  information 
'  It  should  also  be  noted  that  for  some,  even  the  most  comprehensive  system  of  scrutiny  is  not  good 
enough.  A  Danish  parliamentarian  thus  conceded  that,  under  the  current  system  with  the  Council  as  the 
main  decision-taker,  it  would  be  difficult  to  improve  much  on  the  existing  procedures  and  involvement  of 
national  parliamentarians.  However,  this  politician  also  stated:  'I  cannot  image  what  reforms  would  be 
required  before  I  would  feel  like  a  real  participant  in  a  democratic  process'  (interview  DK-11). 
The  best  example  of  parliamentarians  recognising  the  need  for  greater  parliamentary  involvement  is 
perhaps  the  institutional  structure  of  the  new  14h,  Committee  in  the  Italian  Senate,  where  committee 
members  are  also  members  of  another  select  committee  within  the  Senate.  This  particular  institutional 
structure  ensures  a  combination  of  specialised  and  EU  knowledge-büt  still  runs  the  risk  of  ghettoising 
European  affairs. 
194 about  government  activities  at  the  European  level.  Of  the  three  case  studies  the  least 
involved  is  the  Italian  parliament.  Focusing  mainly  on  passing  the  legge  comunitaria 
that  ensures  the  implementation  of  European  legislation,  both  chambers  have  found 
pre-decision  involvement  difficult.  Scrutiny  of  executive  activities  is  not  an  activity  the 
Italian  parliament  performs  well-a  fact  that  has  made  it  difficult  to  engage  Italian 
MPs  in  scrutiny  of  European  issues.  The  British  parliament  has  developed  a  deeper 
involvement  than  has  the  Italian.  This  is  especially  so  in  the  House  of  Lords  which  has 
the  ability  to  write  in-depth  reports  on  legislative  proposals  originating  at  the 
European  level,  whereas  the  House  of  Commons  is  limited  to  deciding  whether 
proposals  are  of  political  or  legal  importance.  Both  chambers  are  consequently  kept 
informed  about  European  matters  and  may  also  impose  the  scrutiny  reserve  power  if 
an  issue  is  considered  important  enough.  However,  direct  influence  by  either  chamber 
over  European  legislation  is  still  not  possible.  As  the  EUC  in  the  Danish  Folketing 
delivers  negotiating  mandates  to  ministers  representing  Denmark  in  the  Council,  it  has 
the  highest  level  of  ambition  to  fulfill.  The  Danish  system  is  often  criticised  for  only 
involving  the  Folketing  at  this  very  late  stage  of  the  decision-making  process.  However, 
supporters  of  the  system  claim  that  the  EUC's  influence  is  evident  at  much  earlier 
stages  of  the  decision-making  process  because  of  the  awareness  amongst  Danish  civil 
servants  of  the  final  requirement  that  decisions  must  be  agreed  to  by  the  EUC. 
Knowledge  about  scrutiny  procedures  in  other  EU  parliaments  has  increased  as 
interparliamentary  contacts  have  developed  through  multilateral  meetings  or 
parliamentary  delegations  visiting  each  other.  Italian  parliamentarians  thus  perceive 
the  British  system  of  scrutiny  as  desirable  and  ambitious  (providing  timely  information 
on  and  analysis  of  all  European  legislation).  Moreover,  although  many  British  MPs 
consider  the  Danish  mandating  system  unworkable  and  too  involved,  a  certain 
admiration  for  its  thoroughness  and  strong  parliamentary  involvement  can  also  be 
detected.  A  limited  degree  of  'trickle  down'  effect  can  thus  be  found  as  national 
parliaments  learn  from  each  other. 
Contributing  to  the  convergence  is  an  underlying  shift  in  the  perception  of  how  the  EU 
is  to  be  understood.  EU  affairs  have  traditionally  been  treated  as  foreign  affairs  by 
national  parliamentarians,  thereby  relinquishing  control  and  permitting  executives  to 
act  largely  unrestricted  in  this  area.  As  European  integration  has  broadened  to  include 
an  expanding  range  of  issues,  and  as  domestic  legislation  is  increasingly  affected  by 
decisions  taken  at  the  European  level,  the  perception  of  EU  affairs  as  foreign  affairs  has 
changed.  In  all  three  case  studies  the  differentiation  between  EU  and  foreign  policy  has 
led  to  greater  scrutiny  of  European  topics.  Over  time,  this  development  may  likely 
cause  greater  divisions  within  national  parliaments  as  European  legislation  is  subjected 
to  inter-  and  intra-party  disagreements  usually  only  applied  to  domestic  legislation. 
195 On  the  other  hand,  because  European  legislation  becomes  subjected  to  greater  scrutiny, 
it  may  also  become  invested  with  greater  legitimacy.  While  it  is  still  not  possible  to 
claim  that  EU  legislation  is  thought  of  as  similar  to  domestic  legislation,  a 
differentiation  has  been  established  between  it  and  foreign  policy,  with  European 
affairs  attracting  increasing  attention  and  resources  within  national  parliaments.  As 
globalisation  develops  and  the  world  becomes  increasingly  'networked'  (Slaughter, 
2004),  the  requirement  that  national  parliamentarians  add  an  international  dimension 
in  their  work  will  only  become  more  pressing. 
Foreign  policy  has  traditionally  been  less  divisive  within  national  parliaments  than 
domestic  policy,  a  situation  reflected  in  national  parliamentary  treatment  of  European 
matters  which  in  many  instances  has  been  based  on  broad  parliamentary  agreements. 
However,  as  the  interest  in  and  scrutiny  of  European  affairs  increases,  the  differences 
between  European  and  foreign  policy  are  likely  to  become  increasingly  well 
understood.  Moreover,  it  is  likely  that  traditional  political  cleavages  will  come  to  apply 
to  European  as  well  as  domestic  issues.  For  the  three  case  studies,  the  implications 
could-potentially-be  significant.  In  Italy,  the  historic  broad  and  often  unquestioning 
support  for  European  matters  may  gradually  disappear  as  Italy,  for  instance,  becomes 
a  net  contributor  to  the  European  budget.  The  EP's  rejection  of  the  candidacy  of  the 
Italian  nominee  Rocco  Butiliogne  for  the  European  commission  in  2004  over  his 
perceived  anti-gay  and  anti-feminist  views  illustrates  both  points:  the  emergence  of  the 
traditional  secular-confessional  cleavage  in  EU  politics  and  fresh  doubts  about  the 
European  project  in  Italy  more  generally.  Traditional  broad  agreements  on  EU  affairs 
in  the  Danish  Folketing  may  also  dissolve  as  EU  affairs  are  subjected  to  domestic 
political  cleavages  with  select  committees  increasingly  involved  in  the  scrutiny 
process.  A  shift  of  this  nature  seems  least  likely  to  take  place  in  the  British  parliament 
where  EU  affairs  remain  very  isolated  within  the  parliamentary  structure  and  daily 
activities.  However,  resisting  such  a  shift  altogether  is  difficult  when  treaties  must  be 
ratified,  especially  when  such  ratification  involves  the  consultation  of  the  public 
through  a  referendum. 
A  further  convergent  movement  is  that  of  closer  involvement  of  select  committees  in 
scrutiny  procedures.  However,  pressure  to  involve  departmental  select  committees 
more  closely  in  the  scrutiny  of  European  legislation  has  come  from  different  directions 
in  the  three  case  studies.  Whereas  the  European  committees  in  the  Danish  and  Italian 
parliaments  are  insistent  that  other  select  committees  need  to  develop  their  activities 
on  European  matters,  the  British  ESC  has  been  more  intent  on  keeping  its  scrutiny 
powers  to  itself.  Nonetheless,  other  committees  within  both  chambers  of  the  UK 
parliament  have  included  a  European  angle  where  it  has  been  considered  relevant. 
While  this  trend  is  strongest  in  the  House  of  Lords,  it  can  also  be  observed  in  the 
196 House  of  Commons  and  is  a  development  both  chambers  will  have  to  consider  in 
future  reviews  of  scrutiny  of  European  legislation. 
Because  of  the  (current)  stark  separation  between  committees  within  both  houses  of  the 
British  Parliament,  scrutiny  of  European  affairs  has  the  potential  to  become  a  matter  of 
contention.  The  potential  for  disagreements  remains  greater  within  the  House  of  Lords 
because  of  its  ability  to  write  reports  questioning  the  merit  of  European  legislation. 
Within  the  House  of  Commons  the  remit  of  the  ESC  is  significantly  different  to  that  of 
other  select  committees  (its  work  being  ex  ante  rather  than  ex  post),  to  the  extent  that 
potential  conflicts  may  be,  if  not  avoided,  then  at  least  possible  to  overcome.  However, 
the  ESC  may  begin  to  assess  European  proposals  in  a  more  qualitative  manner, 
inquiring  as  to  the  potential  impact  of  European  legislation  at  the  domestic  level,  a 
move  that,  in  effect,  would  anticipate  the  work  of  other  select  committees,  thereby 
increasing  the  scope  for  conflict. 
How  British  parliamentarians  perceive  EU  matters  is  likely  to  dictate  how  the  UK 
Parliament  approaches  scrutiny  of  European  affairs.  If  EU  legislation  is  thought  of  as 
being  both  separate  from  and  distinct  to  domestic  legislation,  it  is  likely  to  remain 
isolated  within  parliamentary  activities.  However,  if  a  connection  between  the  two 
levels  of  legislation  is  acknowledged,  a  more  holistic  manner  of  examining  European 
legislation  may  eventually  develop.  More  thorough  scrutiny  would  require 
cooperation  between  select  committees  and  the  ESC  in  the  Commons. 
As  national  parliaments  increasingly  involve  themselves  with  European  affairs,  the 
nature  of  their  information  requirements  alters.  Not  only  do  they  need  the  actual 
legislative  proposals  from  Europe,  they  also  need  to  be  aware  of  their  governments' 
concerns  and  analysis  surrounding  the  legislative  proposal.  However,  while  such 
technical  information  is  necessary,  it  may  in  fact  be  of  limited  relevance  for  the 
purposes  of  influencing  the  legislation,  as  real  influence  is  difficult  to  achieve 
subsequent  to  the  Commission  proposing  European  legislation.  If  national 
parliamentarians  are  to  achieve  a  measure  of  influence  over  European  legislation,  their 
awareness  of  upcoming  legislation  is  crucial.  Such  a  shift  in  focus  would  require  yet 
further  adjustments  both  internally  within  parliaments  and  in  their  relationships  with 
national  executives-an  area  in  need  of  much  further  research.  " 
A  progressive  development  can  thus  be  detected  in  national  parliaments'  involvement 
in  European  affairs,  beginning  with  a  distinction  being  made  between  EU  and  foreign 
"  information-sharing  and  discussions  of  these  topics  take  place  at  events  such  as  COSAC  meetings  and 
the  Speakers'  Conference  but,  as  discussed  in  Chapter  eight,  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  how  useful 
participants  find  these  meetings. 
197 affairs,  with  the  former  increasingly  treated  more  in  line  with  domestic  legislation.  An 
acknowledgement  of  the  difference  has  most  frequently  led  to  a  higher  level  of  scrutiny 
of  EU  affairs,  often  involving  committees  other  than  those  involved  solely  with 
European  scrutiny.  Consequently,  the  possibility  that  European  affairs  become  part  of 
everyday  parliamentary  life,  with  parliamentarians  outside  scrutiny  committees  also 
examining  European  legislation  and  its  national-level  impact,  has  developed.  To  do  so 
adequately,  parliamentarians  require  new  levels  of  information  made  available  to  them 
by  administrations  and  governments,  procedures  that  forge  new  relationships. 
National  parliaments  differ  with  respect  to  how  far  they  have  travelled  down  this 
developmental  path,  but  all  have  moved  in  the  same  direction. 
4.  Conclusions 
The  traditional  role  of  national  parliaments  has  been  challenged.  From  being 
institutions  where  legislation  is  determined,  EU  member  state  parliaments  have  been 
reduced  to  participant-observers  in  a  decision-making  process  over  which  they  are 
unable  to  exercise  full  control  or  power.  The  influence  national  parliaments  potentially 
have  over  European  decision-making  has  become  easier  to  wield  with  the  growing 
recognition  of  their  importance  within  that  process.  However,  as  has  been  shown  in  the 
case  studies,  the  willingness  of  national  parliamentarians  to  exercise  this  influence  has 
varied.  In  part  this  may  be  due  to  the  nature  of  the  new  demands  being  made  of 
national  parliaments.  Increasingly  national  parliamentarians  are  required  to 
incorporate  an  international  dimension  into  their  work  in  national 
parliaments-institutions  whose  natural  operational  environment  remains  the  national 
level  (as  is  evident,  for  instance,  from  their  strong  reluctance  to  permit  binding 
decisions  to  be  taken  in  inter-parliamentary  forums). 
This  thesis  has  provided  insights  into  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  European  affairs  while 
also  making  it  possible  to  present  a  number  of  general  conclusions  as  well  as  the  three 
main  findings  already  outlined. 
Firstly,  if  national  parliaments  are  to  engage  successfully  with  European  decision- 
making  (let  alone  decisions  at  the  global  level),  several  requirements  must  be  fulfilled. 
One  is  the  development  of  an  overview  of  European  legislative  activities.  A 
comprehensive  overview  is  necessary,  not  only  to  influence  events  in  the  most 
constructive  and  effective  way,  but  also  in  order  to  scrutinise  government  conduct 
during  the  decision-making  process  adequately.  "  The  nature  of  national  parliaments, 
with  the  occurrence  of  regular  elections,  makes  such  institutional  memory  significantly 
more  difficult  to  develop  than  in  national  administrations.  Developing  a  more 
11  The  term  'adequately'  being  defined  by  national  practices  and  political  cultures. 
198 substantial  parliamentary  bureaucracy  to  counter  the  government's  administration  is 
clearly  not  the  answer  as  it  is  outside  the  role  of  national  parliaments  to  develop 
alternative  policies  to  those  of  their  governments.  The  importance  of  trust  and  respect 
between  national  parliaments  and  national  administrations  therefore  becomes 
paramount. 
Secondly,  a  further  concern  is  the  skill-set  national  parliamentarians  themselves  will  be 
required  to  develop.  For  many,  a  second  or  third  language  will  be  necessary  in  order  to 
follow  European  legislation  adequately-especially  during  the  later  stages  where 
changes  may  take  place  relatively  quickly  and  translations  of  the  relevant  texts  may 
not  always  be  available.  Moreover,  a  more  comprehensive  understanding  of  European 
decision-making  procedures  is  required  in  order  to  maximise  the  influence  of  national 
parliaments.  National  parliamentarians  must  also  develop  an  understanding  of  when 
their  efforts  are  most  effective-and  therefore  most  efficient  in  terms  of  resources 
applied. 
However,  achieving  parliamentary  engagement  in  scrutiny  of  European  affairs  faces  a 
significant  obstacle  as  the  electoral  rewards  for  conducting  efficient  scrutiny  of 
European  legislation  remain  very  limited.  Although  politicians  are  increasingly  aware 
that,  in  order  to  conduct  their  jobs  properly,  they  must  include  the  European 
dimension  in  their  work,  this  realisation  has  not  yet  'spilled  over'  to  become  general 
knowledge  amongst  voters.  "  It  can  thus  be  argued  that  the  (significant)  energy  and 
resources  required  to  undertake  thorough  scrutiny  have  not  been  well  spent  if  it  does 
not  result  in  re-election.  Politicians,  at  both  the  European  and  national  levels,  thus  face 
the  task  of  educating  European  citizens  about  how  European  legislation  impacts  upon 
the  domestic  level,  and  why  it  is  important  for  national  parliamentarians  to  engage 
with  European  issues.  This,  in  effect,  amounts  to  Europeanisation,  with  domestic 
discourse  increasingly  influenced  by  European-level  activities. 
Thirdly,  the  mere  fact  that  parliaments  discuss  how  to  involve  themselves  more  at  the 
European  level,  individually  as  well  as  collectively,  confers  a  degree  of  legitimacy  to 
the  European  level  of  cooperation.  Moreover,  engaging  with  European  citizens  in 
order  to  convey  this  development  is  becoming  an  important  function  for  national 
parliamentarians.  As  the  EU's  legitimacy  has  become  accepted  by  national 
parliamentarians,  through  them  increasingly  incorporating  European  affairs  into  their 
daily  work,  the  reasons  and  methods  behind  such  incorporation  must  be  explained 
beyond  parliamentary  committees  in  order  for  wider  acceptance  and  understanding  of 
multi-level  governance  to  develop. 
'2  If  all  parliamentarians  included  a  European  dimension  in  their  work  this  concern  would,  obviously,  be 
irrelevant. 
199 Fourthly,  with  globalisation,  parliamentary  scrutiny  of  executives  will  have  to  alter. 
From  mainly  operating  and  focusing  on  the  national  level,  national  parliaments  will 
have  to  become  more  substantially  engaged  in  international  affairs-even  if  their 
activities  in  this  area  may  be  limited  to  assessing  the  domestic  impact  of  international 
activities.  Already  this  is  taking  place  within  the  EU.  What  lessons  can  be  learnt  and 
applied  at  the  global  level  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  thesis  but  certainly  warrants 
further  research. 
One  possible  consequence  of  globalisation  hinted  at  by  Europeanisation  is  that  the 
distinction  between  foreign  and  domestic  affairs  may  become  progressively  blurred. 
While  it  is  already  impossible  for  EU  member  states  to  conduct  trade  policy  without 
consideration  of  EU  activities,  they,  and  the  EU,  are  simultaneously  required  to  comply 
with  WTO  rules,  creating  a  multi-layered  system  of  governance  for  national 
parliaments  to  operate  within.  The  demands  this  places  on  national  parliamentarians 
are  significant.  Not  only  do  they  have  to  recognise  the  limitations  on  their  powers  in 
this  multi-layered  system,  they  must  also  come  to  understand  how  it  functions  in  order 
to  maximise  their  ability  to  influence  decisions  taken  within  it.  Developing  an 
overview  of  activities  and  their  implications  at  that  national  level  then  becomes 
crucial-as  well  as  more  complicated.  The  challenges  for  MPs  should  not  be 
underestimated  and  will  likely  take  time  to  implement,  while  also  requiring 
continuous  adjustments. 
Fifthly,  as  mentioned  above,  it  is  likely  that  with  an  increased  interest  in  and  scrutiny 
of  European  affairs,  traditional  political  cleavages  will  come  to  apply  to  European 
issues  as  well.  This  development  may  not  be  so  important,  perhaps,  in  member  states 
with  a  more  positive  attitude  towards  membership  of  the  EU.  However,  in  EU-skeptic 
countries,  where  the  legitimacy  conveyed  on  EU  affairs  by  regular  involvement  may  be 
resented,  broad  agreements  on  EU  policy  may  disappear  and  scrutiny  may  develop  in 
a  more  critical  direction. 
In  conclusion  it  can  be  argued  that  national  parliaments  have  always  been  involved  in 
European  affairs  and  that  their  level  of  participation  has  increased  in  recent  years. 
Parliamentarians  have  requested  and  invited  these  changes  themselves,  but  have  also 
been  prompted  by  the  European  level,  specifically  via  entries  in  the  treaties 
encouraging  participation,  invitations  to  EP  committee  meetings  and  statements  by 
heads  of  states  about  the  importance  of  national  parliaments  to  the  European  project. 
All  parliaments  within  the  EU  have  thus  established  or  strengthened  EU  committees 
and  scrutiny  procedures.  However,  the  precise  undertaking  of  these  changes  and  their 
effects  have  varied  enormously  from  one  parliament  to  the  next. 
200 Nonetheless,  all  national  parliaments  have  been  important  as  legitimisers  of  European 
cooperation  through  their  ratification  of  the  treaties  on  which  European  cooperation  is 
based  upon.  Moreover,  as  European  activities  have  broadened  in  scope  and  deepened 
in  intensity,  the  role  of  national  parliaments  has  become  increasingly  important.  Not 
only  have  they  become  participants  in  procedures  leading  up  to  treaty  negotiations 
(the  Convention  on  the  Future  of  Europe),  they  have  also  been  recognised  as  important 
actors  in  European  decision-making  processes-even  if  such  participation  takes  place 
indirectly  through  their  national  executive  representatives  in  the  Council.  By 
participating  more  in  European  decision-making,  national  parliaments  lend  credibility 
to  both  European  institutions  and  EU  legislative  output.  Parliamentary  discussions  of 
appropriate  methods  for  involvement  send  the  signal  that  such  activities  are 
worthwhile,  again  contributing  to  the  legitimacy  of  the  EU  and  legislation  originating 
from  it. 
A  specific  challenge  to  national  parliaments-although  it  too  is  indispensable  to 
democracy  within  the  EU-is  the  European  Parliament.  While  democracy  has  been  a 
requirement  placed  on  member  states  from  the  outset  of  European  cooperation,  it  has 
now  become  firmly  established  that  the  EU  itself  must  also  be  democratic.  As  a 
consequence,  the  EP  has  gained  powers  and  influence  with  each  treaty  revision, 
becoming  an  essential  participant  in  the  European  legislative  process. 
The  perceived  need  for  democracy  at  the  European  level  is  symptomatic  of  broader 
concerns  about  subjecting  policy-making  within  international  organisations,  which 
have  been  strengthened  in  response  to  globalisation,  to  some  kind  of  democratic 
control  (Keohane,  2002;  Slaughter,  2004).  As  globalisation  develops,  permitting  an 
increasingly  efficient  transmission  of  raw  materials,  finished  goods  and  (especially) 
know-how  and  economic  resources  across  borders,  regulation  of  these  movements  has 
become  necessary,  with  the  EU  being  one  response.  States  have  become  more  limited 
in  both  their  political  and  economic  options  by  globalisation  and  increasingly  deprived 
of  certain  means  of  self-government.  In  the  European  integration  process,  member 
states  have  willingly  relinquished  part  of  their  ability  to  act  independently  and 
autonomously,  with  national  parliaments  authorising  the  transfer  of  decisions  from 
member  states  (where  they  have  power  over  the  legislative  process)  to  the  European 
level  (where  they  may  only  influence  decision-making). 
States  apply  and  sign  up  to  become  members  of  these  voluntary  agreements  in  the  full 
knowledge  that  membership  imposes  limits  on  their  sovereignty  (autonomy). 
Consequently,  the  concepts  of  sovereignty  and  state  autonomy  are  being  revised  in  the 
face  of  globalisation-and  the  role  of  national  parliaments  reassessed  accordingly. 
201 The  adverse  affect  of  globalisation  on  national  parliaments  is  exacerbated  by  the  fact 
that  the  'lagging  legislators'  have  been  slower  at  developing  international  networks 
than  have  their  governments  (Slaughter,  2004,  Chapter  three).  However,  networks  are 
developing  with  parliamentarians  associating  themselves  directly  with  organisations 
such  as  the  North  Atlantic  Treaty  Organisation  (NATO),  the  Organization  for  Security 
and  Cooperation  in  Europe  (OSCE)  and  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations 
(ASEAN)  as  well  as  within  geographical  regions.  Slaughter  (2004,  p.  121)  claims  that 
`(i]t  is  frankly  hard  to  find  a  region  of  the  globe  without  some  kind  of  parliamentary 
assembly'.  Slaughter  further  argues  (Slaughter,  2004,  p.  127-30)  that  parliamentary 
networks  are  developing  for  three  main  reasons:  firstly,  in  order  to  counter  existing 
networks  of  officials,  secondly,  because  of  a  desire  to  interact  for  political  purposes 
and,  thirdly,  to  strengthen  parliamentarianism  as  a  profession. 
In  this  context  parliamentary  advocacy  groups  and  'educational'  forums  become 
important  (see  Slaughter,  2004,  pp.  115-8,125-7).  By  addressing  problems  of  a  general 
nature  (such  as  how  to  become  better  informed  about  activities  at  the  international 
level),  national  parliamentarians  may  simultaneously  learn  about  global  networks  as 
well.  Within  the  EU  the  fora  fulfilling  this  role  are  COSAC  and  the  Speakers' 
Conference.  The  developments  that  have  taken  place  within  these  organisations  mirror 
developing  parliamentary  cooperation  taking  place  on  a  wider  global  scale. 
However,  accepting  that  national  parliaments  are  important  to  the  legislative  process, 
as  well  as  democracy  at  the  European  level,  has  prompted  new  questions  about 
precisely  how  national  parliaments  are  to  be  engaged  in  activities  at  the  European 
level.  This  is  especially  so  as  the  idea  of  a  second  (third)  chamber  at  the  European  level 
has  been  rejected  by  most  national  parliamentarians. 
Nation  states  remain  the  building  blocks  of  international  organisations,  including  the 
EU,  and  consequently  important  seats  of  political  power.  Indeed,  states  'remain  central 
to  the  EU  policy  process,  but  they  are  no  longer  the  only  significant  actors-and  are  not 
always  the  predominant  actors'  (Wallace,  2000,  p.  532,  emphasis  in  original).  National 
parliaments  therefore  maintain  their  importance  too,  as  they  remain  the  ultimate 
legitimisers  of  national  governments  and  their  actions  at  the  international  level.  The 
EU  is  an  important  actor  in  the  international  arena,  but  its  mere  existence  and 
empowerment  over  time  can  also  be  seen  as  a  response  to  globalisation  and  the 
repercussions  it  has  had  for  nation  states.  Member  state  parliaments  have  seen 
limitations  on  their  powers  as  a  result  of  globalisation,  but  as  members  of  the  EU  they 
are  in  the  relatively  advantageous  position  of  being  able  to  receive  information  about 
and  influence  certain  decisions  taken  in  this  international  forum. 
202 Technically  it  may  be  possible  to  democratise  the  EU  (and  other  international  systems 
of  cooperation)  without  the  involvement  of  national  parliaments.  However,  improving 
the  democratic  underpinnings  of  the  EU  by  exclusively  granting  more  powers  to  the 
EP  is  currently  not  a  politically  viable  option.  National  parliamentarians  have  therefore 
become  a  necessary  component  in  the  European  legislative  process  despite  their  lack  of 
power  over  this  process.  National  parliaments  are  unlikely  to  develop  a  direct  role  in 
European  legislative  procedures.  They  will  only  be  able  to  influence  decisions  at  this 
level-although  as  shown  by  the  case  studies,  the  influence  exercised  at  the  national 
level  over  the  executive,  extending  to  its  behaviour  and  activities  at  the  European  level, 
can  potentially  be  substantial. 
Reaching  into  the  far  corners  of  what  has  traditionally  been  considered  domestic 
activities,  the  nature  of  European  legislation  means  that  traditional  methods  of 
scrutinising  EuroFean-level  activities  are  no  longer  sufficient.  EU  specialists  cannot 
also  be  experts  on  all  the  areas  in  which  the  EU  is  active,  making  cooperation  within 
parliaments  necessary  in  order  to  undertake  adequate  scrutiny.  EU  subcultures  may 
therefore  be  weakening  as  Europeanisation  generates  pressure  for  European  affairs  to 
be  treated,  if  not  similarly  to  domestic  policy,  then  at  least  not  with  as  much 
detachment  as  has  been  traditional  for  foreign  affairs. 
National  parliaments  are  likely,  however,  to  remain  firmly  anchored  in  the  domestic 
level,  maintaining  their  roles  as  legitimisers  of  national  executives  as  well  as 
expressions  of  national  sovereignty.  They  can  therefore  also  be  expected  to  remain 
independent  and  autonomous  institutions,  determining  their  own  activities  and 
procedures.  As  a  consequence,  the  impetus  behind  any  move  by  national  parliaments 
to  further  develop  their  influence  over  European  (or  global)  decision-making  and 
activities  must  come  from  within  national  parliaments  themselves. 
203 Appendix  A:  Research  Notes 
Primary  research  for  this  thesis  has  been  conducted  in  two  ways:  through  documents 
from  the  parliaments  that  were  the  subjects  of  the  case  studies  and  through  interviews 
with  politicians,  civil  servants  and  parliamentary  staff.  Further,  a  number  of  MEPs 
were  also  interviewed  together  with  a  representative  from  the  Commission  and  staff 
from  the  EP. 
Documents  were  obtained  from  various  sources.  Many  were  available  via  the  internet 
while  others  were  collected  during  fieldwork.  The  aim  was  to  obtain  an  overview  of 
how  the  parliament's  treatment  of  European  legislation  had  developed  over  time,  what 
the  considerations  behind  changes  had  been  as  well  as  the  likely  direction  of  future 
changes.  Where  possible,  documented  debates  and  discussions  preceding  these 
documents  were  also  considered  in  order  to  gain  further  understanding  of  the  process 
that  led  to  their  creation. 
Interviews  were  conducted  with  politicians  as  well  as  parliamentary  staff  and  civil 
servants.  Several  visits  were  made  to  London  and  Copenhagen,  while  a  lengthy  stay  in 
Rome  made  research  there  possible. 
As  the  link  between  parliaments  and  the  administrations  was  shown  to  be  of 
significance,  the  view  of  the  administration  was  obviously  important  to  obtain 
although  the  main  focus  was  on  parliamentarians  and  their  staff.  ' 
For  information  about  parliamentary  EU  committees,  members  (especially  chairs)  of 
EU  committees  were  important  interviewees,  as  were  the  staffs  of  these  committees. 
However,  members  of  other  committees  were  also  approached  in  order  to  develop  a 
more  thorough  understanding  of  how  EU  matters  are  beginning  to  permeate  the  daily 
work  of  national  parliaments  (outside  of  EU  committees).  Not  all  were  understanding 
of  this  request,  with  many  referring  to  the  'experts'  in  EU  committees.  This  was 
especially  the  case  in  Italy  and  the  UK. 
In  Denmark  an  additional  group  of  interviewees  was  approached:  former  ministers 
with  experience  of  the  mandating  process  were  asked  for  their  opinion  of  this  process. 
'  Several  appointments  were  made  with  members  of  the  British  civil  service  for  interviews.  However,  all 
were  cancelled,  usually  at  the  very  last  moment,  leaving  little  time  for  rearranging  such  appointments.  A 
high  rate  of  turnover  in  staff  at  the  relevant  offices  (relations  with  parliament  on  EU  matters)  further 
complicated  the  situation.  Unfortunately,  in  the  end,  no  interview  was  obtained  with  members  of  the 
British  civil  service. 
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government  had  governed  1993  -  2001),  ex-ministers  were  deemed  to  have 
significantly  more  experience  of  working  with  the  European  Committee  and  the 
mandating  procedure  than  the  recently  appointed  ministers.  Although  the  list  of 
questions  for  the  ex-ministers  was  the  shortest,  these  gave  rise  to  the  longest  interviews 
conducted  for  this  thesis. 
Contact  with  interviewees  was  initiated  by  a  physical  letter,  which  included  a  brief 
introduction  of  the  research  and  the  basis  for  contacting  the  particular  person.  Where 
necessary,  introductory  letters  were  followed  up  by  further  letters  or  emails  (if  use  of 
electronic  media  was  initiated  by  the  interviewee).  Some  interviewees  were  also 
contacted  via  telephone  or  via  introductions  and  personal  recommendations  from 
previous  interviewees.  Especially  in  Italy  this  approach  seemed  both  successful  and 
appropriate. 
Previous  interviewing  experience  convinced  me  that  a  formal  list  of  questions  to  be 
answered  by  the  interviewees  was  considered  to  be  essential.  Interviews  were  thus 
built  upon  lists  of  topics  tailored  to  the  separate  groups  of  interviewees  (see  Appendix 
B  for  examples).  The  same  topics  would  thus  be  covered  in  interviews  with,  for 
instance,  chairs  of  EU  committees.  However,  the  questions  were  not  necessarily  asked 
in  the  exact  same  order  or  in  exactly  the  same  way.  Furthermore,  as  interviewees  had 
different  amounts  of  time  available,  it  was  at  times  necessary  to  focus  on  the  most 
important  issues.  In  other  situations,  when  time  permitted,  it  was  possible  to  allow  the 
interviewee  to  expand  more  on  the  topics  as  well  as  following  up  on  related  matters. 
An  example  of  a'related  matter  is  the  inter-ministerial'battles'.  While  these  are  of  obvious  importance  to 
how  an  administration  handles  the  coordination  of  EU  affairs  and  its  relations  with  the  national 
parliament,  it  was  an  issue  that  was  only  brought  up  when  time  permitted. 
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Questions  for  chairs  of  EU  Committee 
1.  Are  you  satisfied  with  current  powers? 
2.  Would  you  like  to  have  mandating  powers?  (Question  omitted  in  interview 
with  chair  of  Danish  EUC) 
3.  What  would  mandating  powers  achieve?  (Question  omitted  in  interview  with 
chair  of  Danish  EUC) 
4.  What  level  of  control  over  decision-making  process  should  national 
parliaments  have? 
5.  Has  this  question  been  discussed  within  committee  or  in  international  fora? 
6.  How  has  co-ordination  process  influenced  work? 
7.  How  well  is  Committee  fulfilling  its  task? 
8.  What  could  be  done  to  improve  its  working  conditions? 
9.  What  logistical/  library  support  does  committee  have? 
10.  How  much  contact  with  MEPs?  (what's  desirable/how  to  develop?  ) 
11.  How  do  you  'use'  your  staff  in  Brussels?  (how  much  staff  there?  ) 
12.  How  much  contact  wifit  other  parliaments?  (what's  desirable/how  to  develop?  ) 
13.  What  do  you  think  of  DK  Committee?  Like  to  emulate  it?  (Question  omitted  in 
interview  with  chair  of  Danish  EUC) 
14.  Do  you  delegate  stuff  to  select  committees? 
15.  How  has  increasing  'blending'/merging  of  foreign  policy.  and  domestic  policy 
affected  work  of  committee? 
16.  Would  a  second  chamber  in  Europe  a  good  idea? 
17.  What  are  your  feelings  about  the  Convention? 
18.  Is  the  Convention  a  good  solution  for  specific  situations  like  the  Charter  on 
Human  Rights  or  for  long-term  involvement? 
19.  What  is  the  appropriate  level  of  participation  by  parliaments  in  IGCs? 
20.  What  is  the  long-term  role  of  EP? 
21.  The  EP  is  specifically  mentioned  in  treaties,  national  parliaments  are  not,  do 
you  think  they  should  be?  What  would  their  role  be? 
22.  What  is  the  appropriate'  division  of  labour'  EP  -  national  parliaments? 
206 Questions  for  chairs  of  select  committees 
1.  What  involvement  does  your  committee  have  with  EU-issues? 
2.  Should  national  parliaments  be  more  involved  in  EU-issues?  How/  why  not? 
3.  Are  you  in  contact  with  the  European  Scrutiny  Committee?  Are  issues 
delegated? 
4.  Do  you  leave  it  to  EU-Committee  to  assess  consequences  of  EU-legislation  on 
issues  within  your  remit? 
5.  Is  this  satisfactory  with  blending  /merging  of  domestic/  EU  issues? 
6.  Danish  committee  part  of  'experiment'  (explained  to  interviewees),  would  you 
like  to  emulate  this?  (Question  omitted  in  interview  with  chairs  of  select 
committees  in  the  Danish  Folketing) 
7.  Would  it  be  appropriate  for  your  committee  to  have  more  influence  over  EU- 
issues  within  your  remit? 
S.  What  is  the  appropriate  role  of  national  parliaments  in  the  EU?  in  IGCs? 
9.  What  is  the  appropriate'division  of  labour'  EP  -  national  parliaments? 
10.  How  has  the  blending  of  foreign  policy/EU  and  domestic  policy  affected  the 
work  of  your  committee? 
11.  How  could  the  EP  help  you  conduct  your  work  better? 
12.  Would  a  specialised  COSAC  be  a  good  idea? 
13.  Do  you  meet  with  'twin  Lommittees  in  other  MS  parliaments?  in  EP? 
14.  Do  you  have  any  contact  with  your  parliamentary  representatives  in  Brussels? 
15.  Do  you  have  any  contact  with  MEPs? 
207 Questions  for  Danish  ex-ministers 
1.  How  did  you,  as  a  minister,  experience  the  mandating  and  questioning  process 
in  the  EUC  and  other  committees?  ) 
2.  What  advantages/  disadvantages  did  you  experience  as  the  Folketing,  through 
the  EUC,  followed  the  Council's  work  within  your  remit?  ) 
3.  When  talking  to  politicians  outside  Denmark,  one  is  given  the  clear  impression 
that  Denmark's  system  of  mandating  is  seen  as  both  troublesome  and  slow  and 
that  it  delays  decision-making  at  the  European  level.  Was  this  your 
experience?  ) 
4.  To  what  extent  has  the  fact  that  Danish  governments  often  are  minority 
governments  influenced  the  mandates  provided  to  the  EUC? 
5.  Do  you  believe  it  is  possible  to  improve  a)  the  way  in  which  the  Folketing 
handles  EU  affairs  and  b)  the  cooperation  between  select  committees  and 
departmental  ministries?  If  yes,  how? 
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Where  no  name  appears,  the  interviewee  was  promised  anonymity.  Instead,  a  title 
explaining  the  person's  position  will  be  listed. 
Brussels 
1.  Jens-Peter  Bonde  (MEP) 
2.  Richard  Corbett  (MEP) 
3.  MEP's  assistant 
4.  Andrew  Duff  (MEP) 
5.  Jo  Leinen  (MEP) 
6.  Neil  McCormick  (MEP) 
7.  European  Parliament  employee 
8.  Mike  Shackleton  (EP) 
9.  David  Martin  (MEP) 
10.  Commission  official 
209 Denmark 
1.  Margrethe  Auken  (MP) 
2.  Svend  Auken  ex-minister 
3.  Lars  Barfoed  (MP) 
4.  EU-secretariat  staff 
5.  Pia  Gjellerup  ex-minister 
6.  Ivar  Hansen  ex-speaker  of  the  Folketing  (email) 
7.  EU-secretariat  staff 
8.  Kai  Ikast  ex-minister 
9.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  official 
10.  Marianne  Jelved  ex-minister 
11.  Jern  Jespersen  (MP) 
12.  Henrik  Dam  Kristensen  ex-minister 
13.  EU-secretariat  staff 
14.  EU-secretariat  staff 
15.  Erik  Larsen  (MP) 
16.  Claus  Larsen  Jensen  (MP,  Chair  of  the  EUC) 
17.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  official 
18.  Mogens  Lykketoft  ex-minister  (email) 
19.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  official 
20.  Rasmus  Nielsen  altinget.  dk 
21.  Poul  Nyrup  Rasmussen  ex  Prime  Minister  (letter) 
22.  Erling  Olsen  ex-speaker  of  the  Folketing 
23.  Ove  Kai  Pedersen  Professor,  Kebenhavns  Universitet 
24.  EU-secretariat  staff 
25.  EU-secretariat  staff 
26.  Kristen  Touborg  (MP) 
27.  Jens  Peter  Vernersen  (MP) 
28.  Eyvind  Vesselbo  (MP) 
29.  Margrethe  Vestager  ex-minister  (email) 
30.  Tove  Videb  ek  (MP) 
31.  Jacob  Buksti  ex-minister 
32.  Niels  Helveg  Petersen  ex-minister 
210 Italy 
1.  Senatorial  employee 
2.  Filadelfio  Basile  (Senator) 
3.  Senatorial  employee 
4.  Chamber  of  Deputies  staff 
5.  Senatorial  employee 
6.  Alfiero  Grandi  (MP) 
7.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  staff 
8.  Giorgio  La  Malfa  (Senator) 
9.  Andrea  Manzella  (Senator) 
10.  Department  of  European  Affairs  official 
11.  Chamber  of  Deputies  staff 
12.  Chamber  of  Deputies  staff 
13.  Giacomo  Stucchi  (MP) 
14.  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs  staff 
211 United  Kingdom 
1.  Michael  Ancram  (MP) 
2.  Lord  Astor  of  Hever  (Peer) 
3.  European  official 
4.  Lord  Brabazon  (and  House  of  Lords  staff)  (Peer) 
5.  Cabinet  office  staff 
6.  Michael  Connarty  (MP) 
7.  David  Curry  (MP) 
8.  House  of  Commons  staff 
9.  MP 
10.  Jimmy  Hood  NO 
11.  Michael  Moore  (MP) 
12.  Lord  Norton  (Peer) 
13.  Lord  Oxburgh  (Peer) 
14.  Lord  Peston  (Peer) 
15.  UK  Parliament  staff 
16.  Lord  Watson  (Peer) 
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